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ABSTRACT
The first chapter of this thesis describes the origin 
and gradual growth of the Bengal native infantry forces in th« 
period of almost continual war between 1757 and 1795, and the 
fashioning of a disciplined force, with elaborate codes of 
regulations, from the military adventurers of Mughal Bengal*
The second chapter deals with the army regulations of 
1796, the reasons behind the measure and its effect upon the 
European officers. The other Government orders relating to the 
service condition of the European officer cadre of the Bengal 
sepoy establishment during the period from 1796 to 1852 are 
therefore discussed, and their consequences considered.
The third chapter describes the changes in the service 
conditions of the sepoys in the same period 1796 to 1852 and 
the reactions those changes provoked.
The fourth chapter narrates the gradual extension of 
the Company's territory, the rapid increase in the number of 
the sepoy regiments, and the changes in the nature of their 
duties which followed from the absorption of all North India 
into the Bengal Presidency. The part played by the native 
regiments in the campaigns of conquest are described, and the 
mutinous incidents which occurred in the course of those 
campaigns. The occasion, cause, and outcome of the mutinies 
are discussed in detail, so as - to establish that sepoy 
dissatisfaction was growing steadily in the last 25 years of 
the period under study.
The fifth chapter seeks to answer the question why the 
Bengal native infantry found it necessary to mutiny, and to 
estimate 'the relative imp oi't anew of the grievances to which 
vent was given in mutiny*
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FOOTNOTES.
Adj.- Genl. - Adjutant General.
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INTRODUCTION
The Bengal sepoy army of the East India Company had
a very humhle Beginning. Prom the few native levies which
were raised in 1757 , the army developed into a body of men
trained and disciplined on the European model, over 50,000
strong. They shouldered and executed a task, undreamt of at
the army's foundation, the conquest for the East India
Company of all North India. In effect, "an army was Built up
from the people of India themselves, which in the end Brought
1
its own country under the sway of its foreign masters."
Sepoy units were first raised By the East India Company 
in Bombay and then at Madras, the Bengal Presidency only 
raising its first sepoy units in 1757. The three Presidential 
armies developed independently under the three Councils, 
their size matching the territorial expansion and the require 
ments of the individual Presidencies. Although Bengal's was 
the latest Born, it came to surpass the others in rate of 
growth and in ultimate size, called as it was to Bear the 
main Burden of the Company's military effort in India, from 
Assam to Sind.
In the period to Be reviewed the Bengal sepoy army 
took part in virtually every major campaign of the Company, 
and in the process accumulated unavoidable testimonials to
1. E.W,Sheppard - A short history of the British army, p.264.
its valour and fidelity and a multitude of honours. Yet, from 
1824 onwards that same army showed itself to he an increasing­
ly unreliable instrument in the hands of the Government of 
India, until the evidence of unrest being ignored it rose in 
1857 in a mutiny which first shook British power in India and 
then destroyed the army itself.
Why did the revolt of 1857 take place? Numerous 
articles and books have been written on this question and 
listing a great variety of reasons for the outbreak. But if 
the causes of that outbreak are to be understood it is 
necessary to look back upon the whole process whereby the 
Bengal army was created. This theses therefore, attempts to 
analyse in detail the problems of organisation and structure 
of the Bengal sepoy establishment and the reaction of such 
regulations, service conditions and the like, on the discip- 
line and morale of the officers and men of the Bengal army 
during the whole period 1795 to 1852. It has been sought in 
this way to establish the stages by which both the officers, 
and sepoys of the Bengal native infantry became discontented 
and disillusioned with the service, and to explain the causes 
for the mutinies in which that discontent was displayed. It 
will also be shown that though the more far-seeing occasion­
ally voiced warnings about the growth of discontent, only a 
few, most noticeably Bentinck tried to provide remedies for 
grievances, and only partially succeeded. The financial needs 
of the Company, a growing lack of sympathy with and under-
standing of the Indian sepoy, and a self-confidence fed by 
continuous success and expansion, led in most cases to a 
refusal to heed the warnings, and so to the final disaster 
of 1857.
Though the contrasts between the organisation of the 
Bombay, Madras and Bengal armies,and in their record of 
service are instructive, it soon became apparent that to 
attempt a survey of all three must restrict a general survey 
of the sepoy armies to a period so narrow as to permit no 
understanding of developments in time. For rather different 
reasons no attempt has been made to study the irregular 
infantry units, the cavalry and artillery wings of the Bengal 
native army. The objection to studying the irregulars, is 
found in the very fact that they were irregular, both in the 
sense that they were not governed by those military codes 
which ruled the regular regiments, and that they show no 
continuity of existence. To seek to establish the impact of 
the changes in structure, organisation and regulation on 
these regiments over a period would be a futile task. The 
effort has been made, however, to provide a full picture of 
the regular Bengal native infantry - the actions in which 
it took part, the manner of its growth, the service condition 
of its officers, European and Indian, and of its men, the 
benefits it provided, the failings which caused discontent 
and mutiny.
As for the period covered in this thesis, that was 
dictated by the fact that only in 1796 did the rapid, 
haphazard growth of Clive's original forces give way to some 
regularity of organisation and by the wish not to become 
involved, by proceeding beyond 1852, in the very complex 
issues raised by the mutiny of 1857.
In writing this thesis both official and unofficial 
sources have been used. The military letters sent to and 
from Bengal, the army orders and regulations issued by the 
Government in India, the military consultations, the reports 
of the enquiry committees, as well as the biographies, auto-* 
biographies of the army officers and other narratives have 
all been used. The opinions of the press in India have also 
been considered.
”The Structure and Organisation of the Bengal 
Native Infantry with special reference to 
Problems of Discipline (1796-1852 )i?
CHAPTER I
The Origin and Early Development of the 
East India Company's Bengal Army.
The succession of Siraj-ud-daula to the Subadari of 
Bengal in 1756 led to a political revolution in that province 
and to a radical change in the policies of the East India 
Company in Bengal. Under his predecessors Bengal had been one 
of the most stable of the Mughal provinces, little disturbed 
by the war of succession at the centre, main-
campaigns against possible rivals to the Subadari, to con­
flict with groups of older Muslim nobles of his father's day 
and with leading Hindu officials and merchant-bankers, and to 
a rapid worsening of relations with the English Company.
Under such circumstances the Company's agents at Calcutta, 
who hitherto had not felt it necessary to follow the example 
of Bombay and Madras in enlisting Indian levies for factory 
defence, thought it necessary to prepare to defend the 
factories against any attack. Since the number of European 
soldiers sent by the Company from England was always very 
limited, it was necessary for the Calcutta Council to recruit, 
train and admit to the Company's army natives of the country. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to trace the growth of 
these first Indian forces into the Bengal native infantry
army, and to discuss the problems which arose out of this 
growth.
The first hurried recruitment of local levies by the 
Bengal agents of the Company proved inadequate, for Siraj-ud- 
daula, turning aside from his march against his rival, stormed 
and captured the English settlement at Kasimbazar in 1756.
The garrison at Fort William, then consisted of 264 men 
including the Topasses.^ There were also two companies of 
militia, 250 men each, raised from this Company's servants and
the European, Portuguese and Armenian residents of the town.
2There were also natives, the Peons or Buxaries as they were 
then generally called. As the Nawab was evidently proceeding 
to attack Calcutta, some preventive measures had to be taken 
quickly. Orders were issued that "batterys (sic) should be 
errected in all the roads leading to the Fort at such distances 
as could be anywise defensible with the small number of 
troops we had, that the inhabitants should be immediately 
formed into a body of militia...and likewise what sepoys and 
peons could be got to be formed into a body under the command
1. Hobson-Jobson.ou. 933-4gives the following explanations, from 
various sources, of the word Topasses: "Black foot 
soldiers, descended from Portuguese natives" and "Topasses 
are either the mixed produce of Portuguese and Indian 
parents or converts to the Portuguese from the Indian faith".
2 . Buxaries - "Apparently used in much the same sense as 
Burlcundazze or a matchlock man...from the possible circum­
stances it can be suggested that such men were recruited in 
the country about Baksar (Buxar), the Shahabad district 
which up to 1857 was a great recruiting ground for sepoys". 
Hobson-Jobson. p, 136
of some Europeans. ” The Bengal Council also took measures to
conscript men - measures which ^occasioned a general
grumbling and discontentment”- and the total of the force in
2
Calcutta was hurriedly increased to 1500 men. Unfortunately,
the Council, misjudging Siraj-ud~daulaTs power and resolution,
held that it was ”capable to stand out against any number of
3
a country enemy”, and so neglected the training of the 
native corps that they had raised. The native units, raised 
on such very sketchy foundations and inadequately trained 
in the event proved to be of poor military quality.
The one new feature was that they were placed under
European officers whereas in Madras the sepoys, though well
trained and grouped into companies,^ were left under the
command of their own native officers, rather in the manner of
the Mughal mansabdari system. (In Bombay, though sepoy
companies were formed the.Council never had any real faith in
5
their fighting capacity).
After ransacking Kasimbazar, Siraj-ud-daula advanced 
on Calcutta and the storm of Fort William. The Fort was not 
in a good state of defence and though an opposition was put up
1. Letter from Capt. Grant. Fulta 13 July, 1756. B.M.Addl. ' 
MSS. 29, 209.p.39
2 . Robert Orme - A History of the Military transactions of the 
British Nation in IndostanVot.ii,p«59.
3. Letter from Capt. Grant. Fulta 13 July, 1756* B.M.Addl.
MSS. 29, 209, p.39
A. W.J.Wilson - History of the Madras Army, vol#i, p.8.
5* P. Cadell - History of the Bombay Army, p.49
by the European troops, the mass desertion of the native
Tpeons * on the second night of the battle, left them with
very little alternative but to withdraw or surrender. The
Fort was deserted by the Governor of the Presidency, Drake
and by the Commander (Captain Minchin) who along with the
women and children fled on board ship to Fulta and sought
help from the Dutch. The Fort fell to Siraj-ud-daula on
20 June, 1756 and the Council was left without any defensive
post in Bengal.
After this disaster help was sought by the Bengal
Council from both Madras and Bombay. The Madras Council was
then expecting an attack from the French. But after some
hesitation and at some risk, the Madras Council decided to
come to the rescue of the Bengal Council by sending troops,
even though this meant that ”all garrisons upon the coast
were drained to strengthen the detachment preparing for 
n 1Bengal. The detachment consisted of both Royal and Company*s
troops, its strength being nearly six hundred Europeans
2
(officers included) and 940 sepoys, and was under the
command of Colonel Clive who was assisted by Admiral Watson*
The Madras sepoys were armed with ^matchlocks, bows and
arrows, spears, swords, bucklers, daggers or any other weapon
3
they could get.” And if their equipment was thus of a very 
mixed nature, their military training and discipline also was
1. Bengal in 1756-1757 Ed. S.C.Hill, vol.i, p.11$.
2 . Letter from the Governor and the Select Committee at Fort 
St. George to the Secret Committee of the East India 
Company. 11 October, 1756. Home Misc.vol.94, p.292
3. Wilson * op.cit. vol.i, p*72.
rather haphazard and uncertain. Nevertheless, the Madras
2sepoy force had so proved itself in the field under Clive
that it was sufficiently relied upon to form a major element
in the relief force.
Its staunchness and discipline were fully tested on
the voyage to Fulta. The passage, estimated to be of six
weeks duration, took over two months to complete. ffWhen the
forces came from Madras, by the unexpected length of the
passage, they were greatly reduced for the want of provisions
in so much that there was no rice left for the Gentoo seapoys
(sic) and nothing to serve out to them but beef and pork, but
though some did submit to this defilement, yet many preferred
a languishing death by famine to life polluted beyond 
3
recovery.^ Reinforcements from Bombay did not arrive until 
January, 1757 and so it was with the Madras sepoys alone that 
Clive advanced from Fulta, - which he had reached on 
16 December 1756, - took the Mughal batteries on the river, 
and drove the Nawab from Calcutta in January 1757* Siraj-ud- 
daula was compelled to make peace, restore Calcutta, pay 
compensation and renew the rights and privileges of the 
Company in Bengal.
1. Even in 1755 gardeners and other servants of the merchants 
and officers of Madras were included in the lists of the 
Madras sepoys. Letter from John Smith t'cr Orme, Devaeottah, 
31 December 1755* Orme MSS. 0.7. 289, pp. 53-59
2 . Wilson* oo.cit. yol.l, p. 72.
3. L, Scrafton ~ Reflections on the Government etc. of 
Indostan. p.ll.
The services of the troops were not yet at an end,
however, for Clive had to take into account not only the
hostility of the Nawab but also the fact that war had been
declared with France and that Bussy was in the Northern
Circars, within 200 miles of Calcutta* The Nawab of Bengal
was suspected of having contracted an alliance with the
French* Clive could not, in such a situation, return to Madras
as had been planned. He realised that the situation in Bengal
in 1757 resembled that in the Carnatic a few years before, and
that ”had there been a Dupleix in Bengal, he would have
supported Siraj-ud-daula as a French Nawab”. Clive therefore
made ready to set up an English Nawab in Bengal if opportunity 
1
offered.
Hitherto the Bengal agents had been trying peacefully 
to prosecute the trade and commerce of the Company. They had 
had no ambition to establish an empire or to maintain a 
considerable military force to defend one. They had been most 
reluctant to be involved in wars with the Indian powers, as 
peace to them meant the continuance of what for years had been 
a prosperous trade. But forced into war to secure the very 
existence of the Company's activities in Bengal, they had now 
to prevent the defeated but still hostile native power from 
falling under the influence of the French. For that, the 
Bengal Council required armed forces, and that urgently too.
As recruits from England were impossible to get in time,
1. J.T.Wheeler ~ Early records of British India, p.259
Clive turned his attention to the other military material 
■which was available at hand. He began recruiting a sepoy force 
as had been the practice at Madras, and selected a few hundred 
natives *Vith due regard to their physical and other military
i
qualifications.^ These men were not the native inhabitants
of Calcutta but were military adventurers who had come to
Bengal in the service of the Afghans and the Mughals, ffThe
Muslim conquest of the Province, the actual independence of
the Nawabs of the Court of Delhi, the frequent changes in the
Government and the continued hostility between the various
princes in the country invited many adventurers from the
2north to come down in search of s e r v i c e . T h e y  came from
Bihar, Oudh, the Doab, Rohila Kund and even from beyond the
Indus and so satisfied the demand for troops of the Bengal sub-
adars. But as soon as each immediate occasion for their
service had passed away, they were thrown on their own
resources. It was from such men, or their descendants, that
the first battalion of Bengal sepoys was assembled, Hence,
Pathans, Rohillas, a few Jats, some Rajputs and even Brahmins
were to be found in the early sepoy battalions of the Bengal 
3
Presidency,^
In order to bring the tactics and discipline of these 
sepoys as far as possible into line with those of the European 
soldiers, Clive furnished his new battalion with European arms 
and accoutrements. The men were clothed in European fashion
1, A, Broome - History of the Rise and Progress of the Bengal 
Army, p.92. ' “
2, Ibid.,P* 93.
3, Ibid.,p.93.
and were drilled and disciplined under non-commissioned 
European officers. The command of this new sepoy battalion was 
given to Captain Richard Knox, who had come up from Madras 
with Clive,
The Bengal sepoy battalion was thus organised and 
trained under European officers and in the European way. This 
innovation of Robert Clive was found to answer in a most 
satisfactory manner and before long it was adopted by the 
other two sister Presidencies,
The outbreak of the Seven YearsT War (1756-1763) had 
introduced a new element into the situation. After organising 
the native battalion and thus augmenting his strength Clive 
was eager to attack the French at Chandernagore, The Nawab was 
known to be friendly with the French. The news of Ahmad Shah 
DuraniTs capture of Delhi had however forced the Nawab to seek 
British aid to keep the Afghans out of Bengal. Accordingly 
when Clive sought his leave to attack the French, he gave an
1
indecisive answer which Clive interpreted as his permission* 
Fortified with this permission and by the arrival of a Bombay 
detachment consisting of Topasses and European troops %  Clive 
attacked Chandernagore in March 1757 and after stiff fighting
3
took it.
But even after the defeat of the French at Chanderna­
gore the Company did not feel free from danger. The Nawab was
1. H, Dodwell - Dupleix and Clive, p. 129
2 . Cadell - op.cit. p. 54
3. Dodwell -op.cit. p.129
hostile to the English - he protected the defeated Law and
other Frenchmen - and the question of peace or war with the
English Company now rested with him. Clive was also aware that
though vanquished in Bengal, the French were still in strength
in Hyderabad and his forces and the ships of Watson might at
any time be recalled to meet pressing dangers in the south.^
In his efforts to solve the problem, he resorted to intrigues,
for he had come to know that many of the NawabTs officers were
dissatisfied with Siraj-ud~daula and desired a revolution in
the Government. The Seths, Rai Durlabh, Omichand and Mir Jafar,
known to be already conspiring, were sounded out and a plot
was set on foot to overthrow and replace the Nawab, On
12 June 1757, the English troops together with the Madras and
2Bengal sepoy contingents marched against the Nawab from 
Calcutta. So thoroughly did treachery pervade all ranks of the 
NawabTs army that Clive marched with little opposition. Battle 
was joined on the ground of Plassey on 23 June, 1757 and 
Siraj-ud-daula was defeated. Mir Jafar was proclaimed the 
Subadar of Bengal and Siraj-ud-daula, who was captured after a 
few days, was murdered by the order of Miran, the son of Mir
Jafar.
The skirmish of Plassey marked the beginning of a new 
era in the history of the Company. Hitherto, Englishmen in 
Bengal had been nothing but merchants, humble applicants for
1. Cambridge History of India Vol.V, p#147.
2. Journal of Military proceedings-on the expedition to 
Muxadabad, Orme MSS, O.V. 20, p.35
trading privileges. But after their victory of Plassey, they 
were a force to reckon with and were respected even by the 
Mughal Court at Delhi* Clive by his victory secured for the 
Company a large sum of money as compensation for the losses at 
Calcutta and the zamindari of the Twenty-four Parganas. More­
over Clive soon realised the limitations of Mir Jafar and was 
concerned to ensure punctual payment to the Company by the new 
Nawab and his continued reliance upon the Company. He there­
fore felt compelled to interfere in the management of the 
Subah.
For this reason, Clive had to increase the armed 
forces of the Presidency. As regards the European troops he 
could hardly do anything more than write to the Directors and 
impress upon them the necessity of sending out more recruits. 
Until they should arrive, he turned his attention to utilising 
the resources within his reach and he raised a second sepoy 
battalion in August 1757, By taking this measure Clive also 
sought to solve another problem. There had been severe mortal­
ity in the European ranks at Calcutta and Chandernagore 
because of the bad climate, fatigue and exposure. Besides this, 
the great amount of prize money obtained by the troops at
Plassey^ had encouraged them to plunge into T¥every descrip-
2
tion of debauchery.¥T The consequence was that by October
3
1757 only 150 of the men who had come to Bengal from Madras
1. Orme - op.cit., Vol.ii, p.275
2. Broome - op.cit. p. 274
3. Only five men of the 230 who had come with Major Kilpatrick 
remained alive. Broome - op.cit,, p,l&5
1 . 2 remained alive. Such losses, so difficult and expensive
to make good, made it essential to use Indian troops as far 
as was possible. That Clive did.
The political situation in Bengal remained as serious 
as before. It was rumoured that Raja Ram Narain, the Governor 
of Bihar, had allied himself with the wazir of Oudh, had 
declared his independence and was marching towards Murshidabad 
from Patna. To meet this new' threat, Nawab Mir Jafar proceeded 
late in 1757, towards Patna, Clive accompanying him with a 
detachment of about 55O Europeans and the first and second 
Bengal sepoy battalions.
No war, in fact, was fought at Patna. Miran, Mir 
Jafar!s son, was appointed governor of Bihar and Ram Narain 
accepted the position of deputy. But Clive realised that if 
the uneasy peace was to be maintained more force was needed, 
and he therefore raised a third battalion of sepoys from the 
Bhojpur district .
It was as well that he did so, for by the end of 175^ 
the news had reached Bengal from Madras of the fall of Fort 
St. David to the French, and Clive felt compelled to send part 
of his army under Colonel Forde to the Northern Circars. With 
Forde went 500 Europeans and two of Clive*s three Bengal sepoy
1. J. Long - Selections from the unpublished records of
Government 174S- ? 6f7~T
2. The Bombay diary of 11 April 1737 records, T?Our Honourable 
Masters are at great expense to supply us with European 
soldiers, including the outlay on those who die before 
their arrival here. Every man they send stands them in 
between £16 and £-20.” Bombay Gazetteer.
Vol.XXVI, pt, iii, p. 83.
1 £ « 
battalions, together with three troops of the Madras sepoys
' ,  2who had come with him in 1756. Glive, therefore, had to 
raise yet another sepoy battalion for service in Bengal,
In their internal organisation, CliveTs Bengal sepoy 
battalions differed from those of Madras and Bombay mainly in 
their officering. The command of each battalion was entrusted 
to a European Captain, a Lieutenant and an Ensign acted as 
Field Officers, and two Subalterns, assisted by a Sergeant- 
Major and a few Sergeants, were entrusted with the task of 
disciplining the sepoys. The native Commandant took post in 
front with the Captain, while the native Adjutant remained in 
the rear of the battalion with the Subalterns, The battalions
were made up of ten companies, two of which were Grenadiers,
(a) (b)
each company being composed of a Subadar, three Jamadars,
(c)
five Havildars (one of whom was a colourman) four 
Naiks, two Drummers, one trumpeter and seventy sepoys.
Dressed and drilled in European style, each company had its 
distinctive colour which also carried the emblem of its 
Subadar, The Grenadiers, as a mark of distinction, had a Union 
Jack in the upper corner of their flag. Because of the 
insufficient numbers of European officers, Clive could not at
1, The Bengal sepoys, later to be described as so very 
prejudiced against crossing the sea, embarked on this 
occasion without a murmur,
2, R,0,Cambridge - An Account of the War in India, between the 
English-and French, on the Coast of Coromandel, from the 
year 1750 to the year 1760; p. 40,
(a) A native rank in infantry and in regular cavalry
equivalent to a captain.
(b) A native rank corresponding to a subaltern,
(c) A native sergeant in regular cavalry or infantry,
F. Cardew - A sketch of the Services of the Bengal native
army  Glossary.
3, Capt. J, William - An Historical account of the Bengal army
pp. 4-5. ' ” “  *
first fill all the posts of the sepoy battalions and so for
1some time the complement was not the same in each. After
seeing the success that Clive had achieved with this new
2 3organisation the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay' 
decided to follow suit, and plans were set on foot in 1759 to 
reorganise their sepoy battalions in a similar fashion.
While Clive was thus busy in reorganising his forces, 
the political atmosphere in Bengal remained uneasy. The 
Shahzada, the eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi, in an effort 
to establish his claim to the throne, fled from Delhi, 
collected a band of soldiers, and advanced to attack the 
provinces of Bihar and Bengal. Clive was again called upon by
Mir Jafar for help in removing the danger* To this Clive
acceded, but with two battalions of Bengal sepoys already at 
Madras he decided that it was necessary to raise yet another 
sepoy battalion to supplement the force at Fort William.
The Companyfs army together with that of the Nawab 
met the forces of the Shahzada at Patna and after a brief 
battle the Shahzada was forced to retreat with heavy loss. 
Returning to Calcutta in June 1759, Clive found that he had to 
deal with yet another danger which, for some time past, had 
been threatening the CompanyTs position in Bengal. The 
increase of the political and commercial influence of the
1. Broome - op.cit., p.274
2 . Wilson - op.cit., Vol.I, p.68,
3. Bombay Gazetteer. Vol.XXVI, Pt.iii, p*134
English Company in Bengal had caused jealousy and dissatis­
faction amongst the Dutch, and it was believed that Mir Jafar 
would not be averse to using them as a powerful check against 
the English, Then in August 1759 ? a Dutch vessel arrived in 
the Hugli river and rumours got abroad that the Dutch Govern-
1
ment at Batavia was despatching a powerful armament to Bengal.
The Nawab of Bengal, at the request of Clive, asked the Dutch
to avoid any form of hostilities, the Dutch ship left Bengal,
and everything seemed to be quiet. But in October 1759 a
Dutch fleet again made its appearance in the Hugli, When
questioned by Clive Mir Jafar informed him that ??he had
granted them certain indulgence as regards their trade and
2
they had agreed to send away the ships.v? But the Dutch fleet 
showed no signs of departure and instead it was rumoured that 
the Dutch agents were enlisting sepoys at Chinsurah, Kasim- 
bazar and Patna, To admit the establishment of a rival force
in the province meant the ruin of English influence and power 
in Bengal, Clive, with his usual foresight, realised the 
potential danger of the situation and decided to seek a 
solution in a show of force. However, England was then at 
peace with Holland and Clive found himself to be in an awkward 
position. All he could do was to await an opportunity to 
defend the Company’s interests. Fortunately for him it was the
1, John Malcolm - Life of Lord Clive. Vol.I, p.75.
2. Broome - op.cit., p,263 
3» Ibid., p.26A
Dutch themselves -who started hostilities by seising English 
ships and attacking the English factories at Fulta and Raipore. 
Clive now considered himself free to act and several
skirmishes took place of which the most decisive was that at
1 2 
Biderra, a place between Chandernagore and Chinsurah. The
action was very short and in half an hour the Dutch force was
completely routed and they sued for peace* Thus, an affair
which had seriously threatened the English interest in Bengal
ended for them in the most satisfactory manner* And once again,
Clive had won the day with a mixed body of troops, with
European soldiers of the garrison and the sepoys of the 5th
3Native infantry battalion.
By the end of 1759, after the ransacking of Chander­
nagore, the repulse of the Shahzada and the defeat of the 
Dutch, the influence of the English Company in Bengal was un­
challenged by any other power. *7The Subadar was of their 
making; their troops formed the only effective military force 
in the province; in so far as it might be expedient, their
k
will was the determining voice in his counsels*7* In compari­
son the situation in the Presidency of Madras continued to be
l*T7Biderra does not appear on any map. Probably it is
Bhadreshwar,*T 3.C.Hill - Catalogue ofQrme Collection. ,0.243
2. Letter from Francis Forde'to Clive, 25 November 1759*
Orme MSS * O.V. 292. pp.115-116 
3* Dodwell - op.cit*, p.270
fluid. The war between the French and the English was still in 
full swing there, though it was evident that French influence 
was declining.
Before he left India in January 1760, after establish­
ing the English Company as the sole effective power in Bengal, 
Clive took yet another step to properly organise his newly 
established Bengal sepoy battalions * Hitherto the deficiency 
of European officers had led to their very unequal distribu­
tion amongst the sepoy battalions. By calling several officers 
from Madras, Clive, by the end of 1759, was able to attach to
each battalion its full complement of European Commissioned
1and non-commissioned officers. He also increased the
strength of each company to 100 men and thus each of the five
2
battalions consisted of 1000 sepoys.
While the Bengal sepoy battalions were thus steadily
progressing in organisation, efficiency and strength under the
guidance of Clive, the Directors at London were criticising
the very maintenance of troops by the Bengal Council. They
complained that the Bengal agents seemed !,so thoroughly
possessed with military ideas as to forget [that] their
employers [were ] merchants and trade was their principal 
3
object.1' The Court had apparently failed to grasp the
1. There may have been some reluctance amongst the officers 
to join the sepoy battalions, for an additional two rupees 
a day was now added to the pay of the subalterns in the 
name of drill money. Williams - op.cit., pp.L-5
2. Broome - op.cit., p*274
3. G.L. to Bengal, 23 March 1759. D. to B e n g a l N 0 .B9B.
revolutionary nature of the changes in the political circum­
stances and the urgency of the need to defend the English 
possessions in Bengal, for it observed, ?*were we to adopt your
several plans for fortifying, half of our capital 'would be
1buried in stone walls.TT
Such an attitude in the Directors was perhaps not
entirely unexpected* Not merely were they merchants with only
trade in mind but they were Englishmen, and Englishmen under
2the Parliamentary and Puritanic influences had a suspicion
3
of standing armies and regular troops. Even the English
Government raised troops only when peril was imminent - and
hastily disbanded them the moment peace was in sight. As
A.M.Davies commented, ”when England signed the treaty of
Utrecht, it must have seemed to the world  that she had
deliberately let slip the opportunity to make herself the
greatest military power in the world. All was at that moment
in her grasp - the road to Paris lay open to MarlboroughTs
victorious army - yet her rulers had thought only of peace and
4their own domestic af fairs,l* Had the Court had its way, a 
similar abandonment of opportunity and power might have been 
witnessed in Bengal.
In spite of this censure from the Directors, who 
failed to realise how far the merchant status of the East 
India Company in Bengal had been replaced by that of a 
political power, the Bengal Government did not forsake their
1. G.L. to Bengal, 23 March 1759- D. to Bengal, I, No.£98.
2. Wilson - op.cit., Vol. I, pp*3-4.
3. C.M.Clode - The Military forces of the Crown. Their 
Administration and Government. Vol.II, p.l.
4* A.M.Davies - Clive of Plassey. *p# 30.
policy of maintaining a standing army, for they were already
caught '?in a current that was to bear them at a rapid pace
down an ever stronger, ever-widening stream of empire. Again
and again they- might try to stay their course by clinging to
what seemed like solid land, but each time the current proved
too much for them and every time they made mooring a fresh
1
flood came down and swept them on.5?
It must be admitted, of course, that the Directors 
had good cause for concern. However ill placed to see and 
grasp the change in the character of the CompanyTs operations 
in India, they were well placed indeed to observe the finan­
cial effects of raising troops and waging war. ?TThe war with 
France, the expenses of convoys, increased shipping hire and
the losses of India men to privateers were already placing
2
the Company under strain t?. If the Bengal Council would
but consider, the Directors wrote in 1760, iTthe heavy
demurrage incurred by ships detained by accident or otherwise
in India, the immense expense at Madras, with very scanty
returns, your own charges very great, those of Bombay beyond
all bounds, our settlements in Sumatra, at the same time
requiring large sums to put them in some state of security
3
against enemies and dangerous neighbours, they would surely 
share the Director^ surprise at the difficulties surmounted,
1. Davies, op.cit.« p.251.
2. L, to Bengal.'v'April 1760. Peter Auber - Rise and Progress 
of_ the British Power in India. Vol. 'I, po,71-72.
3. L. to" Bengal. April 1760. Ibid. Vol.I, p‘72
and at the unmurmuring generosity of the Proprietors in con-
1senting to reduce their dividend 25 per cent1'. But such a
strain should not continue for, the Directors went on, ”with
all our economy and care, unless our servants studiously”
attended ”to lessen their charges and increase our advantages,
2
the burden” would be ”too great for us to bear much longer*”
There was moreover, a particular reason why the
Court of Directors should adopt such an attitude. The Court
at that time was dominated by Lawrence Sulivan, a Bombay man
who had made ”a comfortable fortune from private trade,” a
man whose experience had been of trade and not of the politics
and conquests in which Madras and Bengal were now involved.
Bombay in his day had been a home of the commercial spirit,
3
and Sulivan was a product of this atmosphere. Although he 
might have realised that the conquest of Bengal would lead to 
some advantage to the trade of the Company, he was against the 
CompanyTs acquiring any sort of political responsibility or 
maintaining any considerable military force. To him that 
meant only increased expenditure and a consequent decrease in 
the dividends of the Company.
Further the very completeness of the success of the 
Company's army on the Coast of Coromandel, of the political 
arrangement for securing their possessions in Bengal, and of
1. L. to Bengal. April 1760. Auber - op*cit., Vol.I, p*72*
2. L. to Bengal. April 1760. Ibid. Vol.I,'p.72.
3. L.S.Sutherland - The East India Company in Eighteenth 
Century Politics. p#62
the measures taken for the reduction of the Sidi at Surat led 
the Home Authorities to consider that nthe military forces at 
each of the Presidencies were nearly if not altogether equal 
to the defence of their possessions.^ The Directors, in fact, 
had been rather dazzled at the cheapness of their unexpected 
successes. Hence their refusal to count the probable ultimate 
cost of empire or to take adequate measures for the defence of 
their valuable acquisitions.
That being the case, the attitude of the Directors 
towards the armed forces in Bengal was, if parsimonious, 
understandable. They wrote to Calcutta in April 1760, ordering 
that '?the fixed garrison at Calcutta should not be more 
than 1500 Europeans, (^the blacks at your discretion)n.
Nothing could show more clearly how little the military revo­
lution in India had touched the imagination of the Directors 
than this off-hand reference to the sepoy forces which had 
already played and were increasingly to play a major part in
the military exploits of the Company in India.
After the departure of Clive, the new Governor
Vansittart and his Council found the financial situation in
Bengal to be extremely critical. With his treasury nearly 
exhausted, the Nawab Mir Jafar could not be depended upon to
1. i?Review of the Military History of the Hon'ble East India
Company arising out of the political circumstances of 
Hindustan and of the French schemes of acquiring territor­
ies in India from 1744 to 1 7 9 5 (completed only to 1761) 
Home Misc. Vol. 91^, p.1305.
2. L. to Bengal April 1760. Auber- op.cit., Vol.I* p*72
pay the arrears of his promised award to the Company.
Vansittart could hardly expect any monetary help from London
either, since Clive had earlier informed the Home Authorities
(in 1757) that Bengal would need no supplies of money from
1home for over three years. Indeed the Home Authorities were 
under the impression that the vast wealth which had been 
acquired in Bengal would meet the expenses not only of Bengal,
p
but of Bombay and Madras also. This assumption was far from
true, as neither in 1757 nor in 1760 was there enough money in
the treasury of the Nawab to meet the demands of the Company
and from the first governorship of Clive to that of Vansittart
3
the Bengal Presidency was in a critical financial condition.
The feeling gradually grew that under the ineffective rule of
Mir Jafar there was little hope of economic improvement,
while his political duplicity annoyed and alarmed the Company ,
In an effort to solve the problem Vansittart tried to persuade
Mir Jafar to hand over real power to Mir Kasim. This, Mir
Jafar refused to do; preferring instead to abdicate
and so allow Mir Kasim to be placed on the throne of
Murshidabad. The new Nawab agreed to pay the arrears of Mir
Jafar and £200,000 in cash as the token of his gratitude to
the Calcutta Council, and to cede the three districts of
Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong to the Company for the
3
maintenance of its troops.
1. Sutherland - -op. cit. p. 75
2. Ibid*, p*75
3. The Oxford History of India, p,471
On the death of the Emperor of Delhi in 1759, the 
Shahzada declared himself Emperor under the title of Shah 
Alam II, and asked the provincial rulers of his Empire to 
acknowledge his Imperial title. The Nawab and the English 
Company of Bengal refused to do so, and appeared to be in open 
rebellion against the Emperor; Shah Alam, with the help of the 
Nawab Suja-ud~daula of Oudh, set out to invade Bengal. The 
conflict that ensued between the forces of the Company and 
the Nawab of Bengal on the one hand and that of the Emperor 
and the Nawab of Oudh on the other continued till 1761, when 
the forces opposing the Company were forced to withdraw under 
successive defeats. In these actions two native sepoy 
battalions, the third and fourth Bengal -Native Infantry, took 
part with credit and were in the field for a considerable 
period. The Bengal Council once again considered the remaining 
military establishment to be insufficient for the administra 
tion and management of the CompanyTs territory, and two new 
sepoy battalions were accordingly raised in 1761, one at Patna 
and another at Chittagong, Thus, by January 1762 there were 
seven battalions of sepoys under the Government at Fort
I
William.
The news of the war with Shah Alam II and of the 
placing of a new Nawab, Mir Kasim Khan, on the throne of 
Murshidabad reached England in 1762. The increasing political 
activities and the consequent rise in the military charges of
1. Ninth report-of the Committee of Secrecy, 
1773 H.C. p.508.
the Bengal Government greatly displeased the Directors* In a
letter of 19 February 1762 they warned the Government at Fort
William that it should be more careful to avoid constant wars
and only on the ground of absolute necessity should any new
1
measure involving extra military expenditure be undertaken.
Nor did they object to the constant wars in Bengal solely
because of the consequent mild.tary charges; as traders they
had a vested interest in peace for, as they said, it was only
”from a quiet situation of affairs in Bengal” that they could
”hope to have the benefit of the large revenue” which they had
”in possession of. A permanent tranquility in Bengal and
isolation and neutrality therefore must be the constant object 
2in view”. Peace in Bengal was their primary ambition. If 
they could secure their ^possession and privileges in Bengal, 
preserve the peace of the province and the Nawab in the govern­
ment, and prevent the borders from being invaded or disturbed 
by the neighbouring Rajahs or other Powers**, they would think 
that the forces were judiciously employed in answering these 
principal points.” For they were”by no means desirous of 
making further acquisitions, or engaging” their ”forces in 
very distant projects unless the most absolute necessity shoul 
should require it to answer one or other of the principal
3
views before mentioned”.
1* L. to Bengal, 19 February, 1764. para. 24. D* to Bengal .Vol. 2$..
2. S.L. to Bengal, 17 December 1764. para. 33* D. to BengalVol^l
3. S.L. to Bengal, 13 May 1763- para. 29. D. to Bengal. Vol. 21.
In addition to such warnings and advice, the 
Directors in their attempt to reduce the military expenditure 
at Fort William once again fixed the number of soldiers to be 
maintained in the Presidency. While agreeing that the terri­
torial acquisitions in Bengal, 77could not be preserved without 
a respectable military force/7 the Directors laid down that 
as peace was now established the Bengal military forces
should consist of from 2500 to 3000 European infantry, 200
1
cavalry, 300 artillery (all Europeans) and 5000 sepoys. The
Court strictly required the Bengal Council to carry out the
plan granting its Bengal agents the right to deviate from it
only if it were really necessary and provided, a full explana-
2
tion were given,
A review of the attitude of the Home Authorities of
the Company from 1759 towards their army in Bengal would
indicate that the Directors were gradually realising the
implications of the local situation* In 1759? ntheir idea of
a sufficient military force for Bengal was three hundred
3
Europeans and no more77 • In 1760 the garrison at Fort
William was allowed to be increased to 1500 Europeans in
4
addition to native troops, and in 1763 they provided for
3500 Europeans and 5000 sepoys in the Bengal army establish- 
5
ment* Moreover, in spite of all the criticisms and warnings
1. G.L, to Bengal 30 December 1763* Para*19* D. to Bengal.V0U 4,
2. G.L, to Bengal 30 December-1763* para.24. D* to Bengal.Vol
3. G.L. to Bengal 23 March 1759, No,898. B* to Bengal. Vol.I
4* L. to Bengal. April 1760. Auber - op.cit., Vol.I, pc72 
5* G.L. t© Bengal, 30 December 1763* para.26. D, to Bengal.
Vol. E.
that had been voiced the Bengal Council was left, from 1763 
with the power of changing the military plan of the Court if 
it was demonstrably necessary.
The necessity of such a flexible policy was soon to 
be proven, for by 1763 the Council at Fort William again 
became involved in war, this time with Mir Kasim Khan. To meet 
this emergency several new sepoy battalions were raised in 
that year at Burdwan, Midnapore, Chittagong and Calcutta* 
Indeed by February 1763 when the war with Mir Kasim was only 
imminent the Bengal native establishment already consisted of 
ten sepoy battalions and according to the army list there were 
10,000 sepoys in the Bengal army.
Though the figures would suggest that each of the ten
battalions in existence in February 1763 consisted of 1000
sepoys and that each battalion would have the same complement
of European officers, such was very definitely not the case.
The battalion at Patna had 2803 native soldiers on its
strength, while that at Malda had only 57* The proportion of
European officers also varied according to the number of the
sepoys. Thus there were three Captains, three Lieutenants, two
Ensigns and eleven Sergeants with the sepoy battalion at Patna
but each of the battalions at Dacca, Malda and Kasimbasar was
1under the command of a Sergeant. In spite of CliveTs efforts 
the Sepoy battalions very evidently were still ad hoc 
creations, varying widely in numbers and in officer strength 
according to the temporary importance of their duties or
1. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy 1773* 
H,C.p.5I4.
station#
War with Mir Kasim broke out in June 1763 and in July- 
1763 Mir Jafar Khan was restored to the throne of Murshidabad. 
In the midst of this campaign, the Bengal Government, as in 
1756, had again to ask for help from Madras and Bombay# The 
Madras Government, then busy suppressing the rebellion of its 
agent Muhammad Yusuf Khan at Madura, was itself in want of 
troops'^ and could not render any help* The Bombay Government
however, was able to send two European and two sepoy infantry
2
companies and a company of artillery to Bengal. A series of
battles were fought and the CompanyTs force gained impressive
victories over Mir Kasim, who at the end of 1763 fled to Oudh,
The flight of Mir Kasim by no means ended the
struggle, for the Nawab of Oudh and the Emperor Shah Alam,
then in Oudh, agreed to help in his restoration. The Company,
faced with this new coalition of enemies, had hurriedly to
raise new forces* Four new sepoy battalions were raised in
3
1764, at Murshidabad, Midnapore, Burdwan and Monghyr, and 
these were mainly employed to protect Fort William, which had 
sent most of its garrison to fight with Mir Kasim.
By January 1?64, the Company’s field force, consist­
ing of the European troops of the Presidency and six sepoy 
battalions, were encamped under the command of Captain
1. Wilson- op.cit., Vol, I, p.169 ,
2. Three years gleanings. E.I.U.3.J./1B3B. g;15S /
3. Broome- op.cit. pp# 403-410. '
Jennings at Sawant on the border of Bihar and Oudh. Its ally
the Nawab Mir Jafar Khan, was only a short distance away,
waiting to meet the enemy. All of a sudden, on 30 January 1764
the European troops refused to obey the word of command on
parade. They stated that in July 1763 Mir Jafar Khan had
promised a donation to the troops on the successful completion
of the campaign against Mir Kasim Khan. Moreover, they had
been promised that a portion of the donation would be paid to
2
them as soon as the army had reached the river Karamnasa.
That .river they had reached a month ago and since then they 
had undergone much fatigue and privation in driving the 
enemies of Mir Jafar Khan out of the province. The European^ 
troops now claimed that until this donation was paid, and the
3
promise fulfilled, they would perform no duties.
Captain Jennings was taken aback at this sudden and 
general outbreak of the European troops. He was not certain
4
Tfas to how far the sepoys who had equal cause of complaint/* 
were concerned in this demonstration# Hence, without attempt­
ing to punish the mutineers, he tried to persuade them to 
return to their duty. Admitting that the mutineers were 
justified in their complaint he assured them that he would 
write immediately to the Calcutta Council for redress. He also
1. Sawant « 5?Then called Sant on the bank of the river 
Durgawati**. Ibid# , p.403.
2. Karamnasa - The river formed the boundary between Bihar 
and Oudh, Dodwell. op.cit.« p. 150
3# Charles Carracioli - The life of Robert Lord Clive .Vol.I.p. 
4# L, from Capt. Jennings. 1  February 1764* Bengal”Sec.Progs,
13 February 1764.
stated that a supply of money was already on the way to Patna
and that on its arrival the army would get a part of the
promised money. Captain Jennings* tactful handling had the
desired effect and the mutineers, satisfied with all these
1assurances, went back to camp.
Captain Jennings informed Calcutta at once, and asked 
for a speedy remittance of the necessary money. But the 
mutineers did not wait for the reply from Calcutta. On 
11 February 1764 the European battalions with all the non­
commissioned officers assembled on the parade ground. Captain 
Jennings again tried to pacify the mutinous troops by offering 
to collect all the money available from the officers in the 
camp and the Nawab for distribution amongst the men. But the
European troops, paying no heed to the assurance, marched
2instead towards the Nawab ?s camp on its way to Patna.
While the mutineers had been marching to the Nawab*s 
camp, their European officers had been attempting to bring 
them to reason, and by the time the troops had arrived there, 
the officers had succeeded in persuading the greater part of 
the Englishmen in the battalions to return to duty.
The sepoy battalions had hitherto stood firm and 
held aloof, and Captain Jennings marched them against the 
mutineers in an attempt to persuade the latter to return to
1. L. from Capt. Jennings. 1 February 1764. Bengal Sec.Progs, 
13 February 1764.
2. L, from Capt, Jennings 13 February 1764* Bengal Sec.Progp.
23 February 1764.
camp, ^promising full pardon to all and a speedy payment of
the promised donation”« He, too, had some success.
Unhappily, however, the sepoy battalions themselves
soon became infected by the example of the Europeans and
joined the mutineers on the march. It was with much difficulty
that about half the sepoys were eventually persuaded by their
officers to return to their lines.
What made the situation more serious was that the
mutineers were carrying on a correspondence with the European
soldiers under Mir Kasim Khan. It was suspected that Tfthe
French portion of these mutineers intended to join the army
of the Nawab of Oudh and to make themselves the masters of the 
1
country”,
Captain Jennings, realising that it was useless to
follow the mutinous troops any more, came back to the camp
at Sawant* With him returned the officers and the loyal
European and native soldiers. Eventually it was found that
”5 Sergeants and 152 rank and file of the European battalion,
almost all Frenchmen, 16 of the European cavalry and about 
2
100 natives,” had proceeded to Allahabad to join the Nawab 
of Oudh.
The Bengal Council, in its report to the Court about 
the mutinous behaviour of the European troops, observed, that 
they had been ”alarmed with an accident as sudden as unexpect­
ed and which had well nigh exposed these provinces to fresh
1. Broome - op.cit., p, 416
2. L* from Bengal 27 February. 1764. Home Misc.
Vol. 97, p.304,
disturbances and thrown your affairs into greater danger than
1all the strength of your enemies.”
Indeed the time which the mutineers had chosen for
their demand was evidently a critical one for the Bengal
Government* They had deserted right in the middle of a war,
throwing all semblance of attachment or discipline to the
winds. But considering the manner in which the CompanyTs
European troops were recruited this non-military behaviour
should cause little surprise. As early as in 1760 Major Scott
had informed the Court that ”among the 900 raw highlanders”,
who had been sent to India as recruits, there was ”not one
soldier” who could speak English or even use a Firelock -—
The menTs inducement to enlist was a promise that they might
2
carry ten women in each company.” William Kaye commented
thus upon the recruiting of the Company?s soldiers in
England: ”the refuse of the streets was swept up and
shovelled at once into the ships. Embarked as rabble, they
3
were expected to land as soldiers,” Worse still, ”a very 
large proportion” of the European troops, ”were foreigners, 
either Dutch, German or French.”^ From such men so recruited, 
the military virtues or any consideration for the Company 
could scarcely be expected,
1, L, from Bengal 27 February 1761. Home Misc. Vol. 97, P* 304
2, L. from Scott, 26 March, 1760. Home Misc, Vol. 95, P# 373
3, W, Kaye - Lives of the Indian Officers. Vol.I, p*109
4 , Broome - op.cit., ' p.411.
The main reason for the comparative success of the 
Officers in preventing their men from deserting altogether 
was the promise of an early distribution of the Nawab !s 
donation. This actually took place,for on the arrival of the 
soldiers at the camp at Sawant one lac of rupees offered by 
the Nawab was promptly paid to them.
Strangely enough the payment of money gave rise to 
further complications. While the share satisfied the mutinous 
European troops the sepoys were displeased with their relative­
ly low share of the reward# Nor was this surprising, for 
whereas each European Sergeant received SO rupees, each 
Corporal 60 rupees, and each private 40 rupees, the sepoy 
Sergeants (Havildars) were offered only 12 rupees each, the
Corporals (Naiks) nine rupees each, and the sepoys only six 
1
rupees each.
The sepoys registered their protest by refusing to
receive this comparatively small sum. Like their English
comrades, the native soldiers decided to stand against the
authorities and ??on the 13th of February 1764, 9 o f clock in
the forenoon, in the invitation of the Europeans they
2assembled under arms on their several parades.n The white 
troops, apprehensive of the prospect of having to share their 
spoils, fTwere most anxious to show their sense of, and to
1. Orderly Book. B.M.Addl. MSS., 6049- p. 90
2. L. from Capt, Jennings, (no place was mentioned) 13
13 February 1764. Bengal Sec. Progs. 27 February 1764.
atone for their past misconduct and the only difficulty was
to restrain their violence, and prevent their falling upon
the Sipahis for presuming to follow the example they them-
1selves had afforded.” Fortunately for the Company nothing
serious happened. The sepoys, on whom the Government were of
necessity greatly dependent, were in their turn pacified but
only after more concessions had been made.
Realising the gravity of the situation Captain
Jennings raised the sepoys* share and by this new arrangement
Rupees 40, 30 and 20 were awarded respectively to each
2
Havildar, Naik and Sepoy, This new measure seemed to satisfy 
the sepoys and order was restored. Nothing is recorded as to 
who paid for this increased award to the native troops. 
Perhaps, as the Nawab had promised the argued donation, it 
was he who had also to meet this extra expenditure.
Two serious and threatening mutinies in the Bengal 
army were thus averted and the Government was again rendered 
free to pay attention to its enemies, who were busy 
marshalling their forces. The Nawab of Oudh and the Emperor 
were proceeding to invade Bihar in support of Mir Kasim, The 
Bengal Council, in order to face the imminent campaign, sent 
the entire sepoy forces up to Patna in a campaign, of a 
scope hitherto unknown in the Presidency. The united forces
1. L. from Capt, Jennings (no place was mentioned)
13 February 1764* Bengal Sec. Progs. 27 February 1764.
2. L. from Capt. Jennings 13 February 1764* Bengal Sec.Progs.
27 February 1764*
of the Nawab of Oudh, the Emperor, and Mir Kasim, supported 
by the Rohillas, had crossed the river Son and had entered 
Bihar. The CompanyTs troops, a grand total of about 19,000 
men, ”the largest Indian army the English had ever had in
i
the field,” had reached Buxar, In April 1764 the enemy
crossed the river and the two forces stood face to face.
No full scale engagement took place, however, for
after skirmishes, in which the Nawab had the worst of the
struggle Shuja-ud-daula decided to withdraw. The Bengal
Council urged that his retreat be at once followed up. But 
2
Major C a m a c , pointing out the insufficiency of the troops
and the approaching rainy season, desired to wait. The Council
at Fort William thrust aside his objections: ”the rains,”
they wrote, would ”not be any impediment to the operations
but on the contrary, with regard to the receiving provisions
and stores, rather a convenience from the advantage of the
3
rivers,” and ordered that he should pursue the enemy. Again 
and again the Council urged the Major to proceed. On the 14 
June 1764 Vansittart wrote: it was ”absolutely necessary to 
proceed against Suja^ud-daula, without loss of time, nor stop 
until” the CompanyTs Government ”convinced him that it was
4
capable of acting offensively as well as defensively.”
1. Broome - op.cit.. p.440,
2. Major Carnac, a Major in the Royal Army, had been nominated
to the command of the Bengal army in December 1763 on the
death of Major Adams. Broome - op.cit., p.421.
3* Correspondence between Major Carnac an’d Bengal Council
11 June 1764. Home Misc. Vol. 198, p. 50.
4. Correspondence between Major Carnac and Bengal Council 
14 June 1764* Home Misc. Vol. 19&, p# 56.
Regarding the insufficiency of the force the Bengal Council
asked for the opinions of the other field officers and
expressed its readiness to send immediate reinforcements.
They even raised three new sepoy battalions and added these
1
to the establishment of the Bengal army.
On receiving these letters Carnac did prepare to
march but before he could do so, orders came from England
dismissing him from the Company’s service for his opposition
2
to Vansittart in 1761, Carnac gave up his charge in the
midst of the campaign and the command of the army devolved
upon Hector Munro, a Major in His Majesty’s regiment at Bombay
Major Munro established the headquarters of the army
at Bankipore and at Patna and distributed the troops at
3
Futwah. Monier, Dinapore, Manjee, Chuprah and Monghyr, which
were in the neighbourhood of Patna,
While thus marshalling his army for the next action,
Major Munro became aware that signs of discontent still
existed amongst the native battalions. Their unrest was
4
scarcely allayed by a reduction to half batta - imposed M  
in the interests of economy - which was carried into effect
1. Williams - op.cit. r pp, 142 - 149? 153«
2,”In 1761 Major Carnac was recalled by Vansittart - an order 
which was not immediately obeyed.” Dodwell - op,cit,,
pp. 209 - 211,"- 
3* Broome - op,cit., p<- 455
4, Batta - An extra allowance made to officers, soldiers or 
other public servants when in the field, or on other 
special grounds. It is difficult to arrive at the origin 
of the word - but most probably originated in the 
Portuguese practice. Hobson-Jobson. p. 72.
though, as was reported, ”the army was in great difficulty
1for want of provisions*”
The first station at which open signs of insubordin­
ation were shown was Patna. Major Pemble, the Commanding 
Officer of that station informed the Gouncil at Fort William 
that Major Adams had promised the sepoys that on their 
achieving victory their cartouche boxes would be filled with 
money reward. But as that promise had not been fulfilled, and 
as ”the batta was now taken off and as they had not received
the proper share of prize money the sepoys had determined
2
to march off with fixed bayonets and loaded arms.”
Once more the answer to ill-discipline was found in
concession. Major Pemble, in command of the Patna sepoys
restored the issue of full batta and persuaded the Government
to sanction the measure. But regarding complaints that the
prize money had not been equitably shared the Council
observed ”Prize money was an indulgence that none had a right
to ask and it had been divided according to the approbatip^
of the Nawab who gave it” and hence it could admit ”of no 
3
alteration.” It was further added that ’’Indulgence such as 
prize money will never be permitted again in any army in India 
and the sepoys and the soldiers will be treated on the same
1. Letter from Champion to Vansittart. Patna. 4 August 1764* 
Bengal Sec, Progs. 20 August 1?64*
2. L. from Pemble to Bengal Council. 3 August 1764. Bengal 
Sec, Progs, 13 August 1764.
3. L. from Vansittart to Munro. Ghyraity. 12 August 1?64* 
Bengal Sec, Progs. 13 August 1764.
footing and that it expected the sepoys to behave soldierlike.”
Meanwhile, however, insubordination had spread* The
sepoys of Captain ScotlandTs battalion (ist sepoy battalion)
at Monier seized their arms and imprisoned their officers.
Major Stibbert marched from Patna with reinforcements and on
his arrival at Monier compelled the mutineers to return to
2
their lines and to release the arrested officers*
The mutineers surrendered without any opposition, and 
were immediately made prisoners and taken to Chuprah. At 
Chuprah, they were marched to the parade ground where all the 
troops stationed in the cantonment were arranged in parade 
formation with their arms and field guns. The mutineers were 
granted permission to have their say and justify their action. 
They blamed the Grenadiers and their native officers as the 
instigators. Twenty five men were identified as ringleaders 
and they were tried by a general court martial, constituted 
by the native officers of the 6th sepoy battalion. The Court 
was warned by Major Munro that fTif proper sentence was not 
passed, no regard would be paid to the same and proper notice 
would be taken of them.”-" with its sense of justice thus
quickened, the Court sentenced the guilty soldiers ”to be
1, L* from Vansittart to Munro, Ghyratty, 12 August 1764*
Bengal Sec. Progs. 13 August 1764*
2, L, from Stibbert to Vansittart. Monier. 7 August 1764*
Bengal Sec. Progs, 20 August 1764.
3, L. from Munro to Vansittart. 16 September 1764.
Bengal Sec. Progs. 24 September 1764-
blown away from the guns .
In the presence of the assembled troops, Major Munro 
had eight of the condemned men blown away at Chuprah, Five 
more were sent for execution in the like manner to Monier, 
six to Bankipore and six to Begumpore. The 1st Battalion was 
thus disbanded with dishonour. The discharged sepoys were 
incorporated in the five junior battalions with the warning 
that they were at liberty to accept the terms of the service
2
or lay down their arms and go to *TSuja-ud-daula or the Devil
This harsh punishment backed by the stern warning
crushed the spirit of discontent amongst the native troops of
Bengal and order was restored. The Bengal Council in a General
Order expressed its regret over the incident and the
consequent disgrace of the mutinous battalion at Manjee. But
it was made clear to the sepoys that the decision of the
Council regarding prize money was final and that any protest
or opposition to the orders of the Commanding Officer would
3
make the sepoys liable to severe punishment.
It had, perhaps, been necessary to proceed to such 
bloody extremes not merely because the Nawab was still in the 
field, but because the sepoys had to be taught European 
standards of discipline. Irvine has written, of the late 
Mughal army: Mbeing a body of mercenaries it inevitably
1. L. from Munro to Vansittart. 16 September 1764. Bengal 
Sec. Progs. 24 September 1764*
2. L, from Munro to Vansittart, 16 September 1764* Bengal 
Sec, Progs. 24 September 1764.
3. Bengal Sec. Cons,24 September 1764. No,112
consisted of men who only served for what they could get, and
ready at any moment, when things went badly to desert or
1transfer themselves to the highest b i d d e r * T h e  Maratha
troops ??had no scruple in changing masters as often as it was
2convenient to them or their recruiting officer.n Even when 
Siraj-ud~daula advanced in 1756 to capture Calcutta he had 
to ??pay the army six months! pay, indeed they refused marching 
without it*t?^  From following such examples the CompanyTs 
sepoys had sternly to be dissuaded.
Yet the sepoys had some legitimate grievances. Their 
batta had been halved, their pay cut, they received a meagre 
share of the prize money of which they had had such high 
hopes and this despite the great difficulty in procuring 
supplies* The Bhojpur district having been a scene of war and 
disturbance for a long period, was completely devastated. The 
hilly districts of South Bihar were unproductive* The 
Ghazipur district was under the Raja of Benares - tefessfefeeasf
- and no supplies could be obtained from 
it* Again, Saran district, though under the Nawab of Murshi­
dabad, was so badly managed that it was hard to get supplies. 
The army was thus entirely dependent upon supplies from Patna.
t?0ur present land carriage from Patna,?? Captain Jennings had
1. W* Irvine - The Army of the Indian Mughals. p,297
2. S.N.Sen - Military System of the Marathas.* p*205
3. Narrative of the capture of Calcutta in 1756 (no signature). 
B.M.Addl* MSS. 29, 209. p. 12
informed the Council in Calcutta had raised ”the price of 
rice etc* in the Bazar a hundred per cent more than the Patna
market, besides the uncertainty occasioned by the merchants
1
selling at different places in the road.” Ghampion had
confirmed this in his journal ”Our provisions” seemed to come
2
in from hand to mouth having no more than two days provisions;7
Major Carnac had also written to the Government asking for
speedy supply from Bengal. With prices nearly doubled, the
sepoys were in great distress and ”could scarcely live upon 
3
their pay.” To ease this situation the Council had ordered
its agents at Burdwan, Purneah, Maldah and Dinajpore to
despatch grain and other necessaries as soon as possible to
Patna^ but this measure did not bring any immediate relief to
the sepoys stationed at the different camps.
A reaction on the part of the sepoys was only to be
expected under such circumstances, especially when they had
(a) 5
Major Adam’s promise stll ringing in their ears and the 
example of the Europeans7 successful mutiny before their eyes* 
After thus enforcing strict military order and 
discipline in the army, Major Munro proceeded to meet the 
enemy, On the 22 October 1764, he fought and won the important
1* L, from Jennings to Bengal Council* 26 February 1764.
Bengal Sel* Cons* 19 March 1764. No. 29
2. Champion’s Journal. 20 March 1764* Home Misc. Vol. 196.p.252
3. Broome - op* cit.426*
4. Bengal Sec,Con* 6 March 1764. No. 54.
(a) See p.
5* This was a*period when the word of a Commanding Officer was 
more important than regulations* Just as the Maratha troops 
felt that they ”had nothing to do with the State but looked 
for pay, promotion and preference to the Jagirdar under whom 
they immediately served” (*) the Company’s sepoys also looked 
to their regimental officer,
* Sen - op. cit. \2. .
and stubbornly contested battle of Buxar. Mir Kasim had 
escaped to Rohilkund before the battle was fought and Shuja- 
ud~daula first fled to Allahabad and then to Rohilkund after 
his defeat. The Emperor Shah Alam, representing himself as 
having been a state prisoner of the Nawab of Oudh at Benares, 
desired to be taken under British protection. To this the 
Council acceded and Major Munro with a detachment marched 
towards Benares to assure the Emperor of British protection. 
Shuja-ud-daula was pursued through Oudh, and on 3 May 1765 
his last stand at Kora, where he was supported by Holkar’s 
Maratha forces, ended in his final defeat. Meanwhile Mir Kasim 
had passed into obscurity, and the Emperor had been installed 
in Allahabad, under British protection. All Oudh was at the 
Company’s disposal, and the Calcutta Council toyed with the 
idea of granting it to Shah Alam and of thus becoming the 
power behind the imperial throne.
In Bengal, too, events had permitted a further con­
solidation of the Company’s power. In February the restored 
Mir Jafar had died, and his successor Nazim-ud-daula had only 
been recognized on condition that he appointed a British 
nominee as his acting deputy.
In England, however, the successful outcome of the 
struggle was still unknown. The news, ’’Bengal has again become 
a scene of bloodshed”, had reached England in 1763 and had at 
once caused the Company’s stock to sag. In 1764, ”when news of 
Mir Kasim’s resort to arms became public, the uneasiness rose 
to alarm and even to panic.” Clive had entered Parliament at 
1, Sutherland - op.cit., pp„ 116-117.
& £
that time, but a vigorous debate was going on there and within
the Company about his acceptance of the Jagir. The news of
this fresh turmoil in Bengal enabled him to win a complete
victory over his opponents. So much so that the Court of
Proprietors insisted on sending Clive to Bengal with supreme
military and civil powers. Consequently, in May 1765, Lord
Clive arrived in Bengal to restore the situation. He found
however that the Company!s army had already been victorious
everywhere and that ”the highest political authority of all
1
India now was a suppliant for British charity,” He also found
the dazzled Council in Bengal in danger of being involved in a
war for Delhi in which the Company, whose primary interest was
trade and commerce, could not really be interested,
Clive restored the necessary measure of realism, Oudh
he restored to Shuja-ud-daula, less the districts of Kora and
Allahabad, upon payment of a war indemnity of fifty lakhs of
2
rupees. To the Emperor he allotted Kora and Allahabad with a
tribute of twenty-six lakhs of rupees a year - and in return
secured the imperial grant of the Diwani of Bengal, Since the
CompanyTs nominee Muhammad Reza Khan was already empowered by
Najm -ud-daula to exercise all the powers of the Nizamat, the
whole administration of Bengal thus came under the Company!s
control. f?The Company became TNabobsT in fact, if not in name,
3
perhaps totally so without disguise”,
1, P,E.Roberts - History of British India p. 155
2* Lbid. 160
3. Ibid. p> i5g
f ' J
Clive thus solved the difficult problem of where to
stop. He was legal master within Bengal of all functions that
could concern the Company, He had secured the borders of the
province from external threat by his treaties of alliance with
the Emperor and the Nawab of Oudh. He had also resisted the
dangerous temptation to involve the Company by an advance to
Delhi in the wider politics of India.
In that the Company was very much behind him, for
their prime concern was to reduce the heavy costs of war. To
the representation by the Government at Fort William made in
1764 about 7Tthe indisputable necessity of keeping up such a
body of English troops at the settlement as might of themselves
1
be a sufficient security for their possessions,n and to their
warning against too much reliance on the sepoys, the Court had
turned a deaf ear. Instead, it was demanded that Clive should
cut down all the military expenditure in Bengal, ffexperience
having shown that an influence maintained by force of arms**
was ^destructive of that commercial spirit™, was ™ruinous to
2
the Company and oppressive to the country.7 The Court 
therefore urged Clive 77to conciliate the affections of the 
country powers, to remove the jealousy they77might ™have con­
ceived17 of the English ^ambition and convince them™ that the 
Company aimed ™not at conquest and dominion, but security in 
carrying on a free trade.77 Indeed the Directors would have gone
1, S.L. from Bengal. 17 September 1764. Ninth report of the 
Committee of Secrecy. 1773- H.C. p. 577
2. Third report of the Sel. Committee 1773. H.C. Ap.67*
3  ^
beyond economy to renunciation: ”The sacrifice of conquests,” 
the Directors stated, which they ”must hold on a precarious 
tenure, and at an expense more than equivalent to their 
revenues”, was ”of little consequence” to them."*'
Since some force had obviously to be maintained, the
more so since the acquisition of the Diwani involved the
Company in revenue collection which often needed the backing
of force Clive set about making that force efficient. In
August 1765, be divided the entire Bengal army into three
Brigades which were placed in the command of Lieutenant-
Golonel Sir Robert Eletcher, Colonel Richard Smith and Colonel
Sir Robert Barker respectively. Each Brigade consisted of six
sepoy battalions, one European infantry regiment, one troop of
cavalry and one company of artillery. Each Brigade was thus
made a complete force by itself. The Commanding officers of
both European and native infantry battalions who had hitherto
been directly under the Commander-in-Chief, were placed under
2
Brigadiers with the intention of closer supervision.
These three Brigades were stationed at three different 
centres in the Presidency. The 1st Brigade was at Monghyr (300 
miles from Calcutta) and met the requirements of the Presidency 
and Murshidabad. The 3rd Brigade remained at Bankipore (near 
Patna) while the 2nd Brigade was stationed at Allahabad (200 
miles beyond Patna) to render assistance to the Nawab of Oudh,
1. Third report of the-Sel«B* Committee, 1773, H.C. Ap,67.
2, Broome - op.cit., p. 533
”Though the greater portion of each Brigade was concentrated 
at these headquarters, they furnished the necessary details 
for the several outposts such as Lucknow, Jaunpore, Chunar, 
Benares, Midnapore and Chittagong.”’1’
By the new arrangement, the sepoy battalions were 
equalised in their complement of privates and European officers,
In addition to the Captain, who remained in command of a ;
battalion, there were two Lieutenants^ two Ensigns, three 
European Sergeants and three Drummers. The posts of a native
Commandant and a native Adjutant were retained in each batta­
lion, which was also made up of ten companies as before. The 
establishment of a sepoy company was fixed as one Subadar,
three ^amadars, four faavildars, four tfaiks, one trumpeter,
(a) 2
three tom-tom players and 69 privates.
Considering the great expense incurred in maintaining so 
large a force, the Bengal Council decided that ”the Company 
should only stand charged for such a part of the forces as were 
necessary for the defence of their own fortifications and terr­
itorial possessions and that the Government [of the Nawab] 
should be charged with the rest.” One Brigade, they decided, 
was sufficient for the protection of the CompanyTs fortifica­
tions and this was to be paid from the revenues of Calcutta, 
Chittagong, Burdwan and Midnapore, while the cost of the rest 
of the army w’ould be charged on the Dewani revenues,^* Clive
1* Broome, op.cit., p.534.
(a) Indian Drum.
2. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773. H.C*pp.559-60
3. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy.1773.H.C, p.578.
4. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy.1773.H.C. p.578.
was thus able to satisfy the Home authorities, as in the books 
at least he reduced the military expenditure of the Company.
The reorganisation of the army into Brigades was admir­
ably calculated. English troops were everywhere incorporated 
with native troops. By distributing the three Brigades at three 
different centres, the defence of the more distant districts 
was secured. Monghyr, situated between Bihar and Bengal, 
covered all the passes into the country. Troops at Allahabad 
were ready to beat back any attack from the Marathas, while the 
garrison at Bankipore could command the rivers Gandak and Son. 
Besides, by distributing the forces thus widely, the Company 
avoided yet another disadvantage. It had appeared from the late 
disturbances in the army that assembling too many battalions 
and regiments in one place frequently led to trouble, as it 
terrified the inhabitants of the region and frequently caused 
the price of provisions to rise. Spreading out the troops
avoided this drawback and as the Directors said the new
1
brigade structure was ”a happy contrivance.”
For reasons of internal security, Clive further proposed
that the sepoy force of each Brigade should be composed of an
equal number of ”Gentoos and Mussalmans” and that a rivalry in
2
the standard of discipline between them should be encouraged.” 
The Committee of Secrecy approved Clivefs suggestion 
and observed that ”if it were only on the principle of
1. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773- H.C.p.578,
2. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773. H.C.p, 549.
”Divide et impera”, the Moormen and Gentoos should be 
separated into distinct companies. Besides, the obvious 
reasons, other advantages might result from it, by detaching 
all Mussalmans or all Gentoos, into any particular country, 
as might be expedient in war or to conciliate their affection 
by rendering it more satisfactory to the inhabitants in times 
of peace,
The question of batta, which in future was to lead to 
so many disputes between the CompanyTs Government and the 
Bengal Officers, now drew the*attention of Clive, In all the 
three Presidencies, the army officers of the Company were 
allowed an extra monthly sum when in the field in addition to 
their basic pay in garrison. This allowance was known as batta. 
While full batta was a field allowance, half batta was also 
allowed at certain up-country stations and was meant to cover 
increased expenditure in the field or at an out-station. In 
Bengal, further allowance was paid, which provided in effect 
a double batta. This double batta had been awarded by Nawab 
Mir Jafar Khan after the battle of Plassey. During his reign, 
the army was constantly in the field, and in consequence the 
double batta was continued, Mir Kasim Khan, after obtaining 
the throne at Murshidabad, also confirmed this grant. But in 
1760, when the Company received the three districts of Burdwan, 
Midnapore and Chittagong for meeting its military expenses, in 
lieu of cash payments from the Nawab?s treasury - from the day
1. Ninth report of the Committee ox Secrecy. 1773. 
p.550.
when the burden was upon the Company - the Directors repeat­
edly issued orders to discontinue the double batta. The 
Bengal Council, being always engaged in war during that period, 
however, never considered it advisable to obey, arguing that it 
would be ”a measure which could not fail to create a feeling
of discontent in the army on whose services at the time they
1were so entirely dependent.”
But by 1765 when Clive arrived, war had been brought 
to a close in Bengal and he decided without further prevarica­
tion to carry out the DirectorsT commands. An order was issued 
that from the 1 January 1766, double batta was to be withdrawn 
from the army except for the 2nd Brigade stationed at 
Allahabad, ”which on account of the high price of provisions 
at that station and the expense of procuring the necessary 
European articles at so great a distance from the Presidency 
[town] were to be allowed the double batta in the field and the
old original single batta in cantonment or in garrison, until
2
they should be recalled within the province.” This advantage 
was extended to all the troops who should be employed beyond 
the river ICaramnasa. Single or full batta was allowed to the 
army when marching or in the field and half batta for service 
in cantonment or in garrison with the exception that at 
Calcutta and its subordinate factories - Barrackpore,
Berhampore and Dinapore - no batta was allowed. Instead
1, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773. H.C, p. 581
2, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773. H.C, Ap.I, 
p.672.
quarters at public expense were provided to the officers at
these stations,
The Bengal Council informed the Directors about this
new arrangement and stressed the economy that would follow.
The Council however confessed that the Government needed ”to
devise a means of their (the officers) living cheaper and of
supplying them with liquors and other stores at a more
moderate price than those articles had usually been furnished”
and admitted that ”until the charges for equipage of the field
in this climate were diminished by some public regulation the 
1
Allowance of a Subaltern would scarcely maintain him in the
2
station of a Gentleman,” The Council had therefore decided, 
they reported, that every Lieutenant attached to a sepoy 
battalion should be granted an extra allowance of 62 rupees 
and every Ensign 50 rupees per month as sepoy allowance.* 
Further, an extra allowance of AO rupees per day was sanctioned 
to each Colonel commanding a Brigade to enable him to support 
the expense of a public table and in general to maintain his 
dignity. The Council had decided that in the ColonelTs
1, Pay and batta allowed per month to the officers of the 
Bengal Sepoy battalions, (rupees)
Pay Field batta Addl.Allowance *
Captain ... 124 'l&6 granted
Lieutenant ... 62 124 62
Ensign 50 93 50
H* Strachey (Secy, to Lord Clive)-Narrative of the'Mutiny 
of the Officers of the Army in Bengal in 1766^ Ap,5.
2, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773*
P* 581
6 0
absence, the next senior Field Officer was to enjoy the
Colonel*s batta as also the table allowance. The Government
was also to supply officers on the march, with tents
according to their rank and with boats when proceeding by 
1
water,
Clive further tried to improve the financial condition of 
the officers by proposing that they be allowed a portion of the 
profits of the Government monopoly of the salt trade. On 
3 September 1765, he sent his plan to the Directors and 
suggested that of the profits of the monopoly some twelve or 
thirteen lacs should go to the Company, and that the rest 
should then be divided into sixty shares, to be distributed 
amongst the senior civil and military officers of the Bengal 
Presidency, For example each of the three Colonels of Brigade 
would be allotted two shares, the three Lieutenant-Colonels 
two-thirds of a share each and the four majors each one third 
of a share.
While submitting this plan, Clive emphasised the necessity 
of rewarding the CompanyTs superior servants, both civil and 
military, nConsidering that the late great advantages of 
unlimited tradeft had been cut off, he expected that the Court 
of Directors would grant ntheir servants their Share of 
Benefits, as a Recompence for their Attention and Assistance 
in the Management of the important concerns of these Provinces,
1, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy.1773-H,C« p, 5SI
2, Fourth report on the nature, state and condition of the 
East India Company, 1773. H.C, Ap,36,
On the other hand", he said that the servants should ”look *
upon these emoluments as a Gift from the Hand of their
Employers offered to them annually in Reward of their fidelity”,
which would ”certainly be withheld from them, if ever their
?!1authority should be resisted, ■ — .
The Directors did not approve CliveTs proposal as
they were too alarmed by the effects of English engagement in
the inland trade in the past. ”The vast Fortunes acquired in
the Inland trade”, they said had ”been obtained by a scene of
the most tyrannic and oppressive conduct, that ever was known
in any Age or Gountry,.. and your Lordship” would TTnot therefore
wonder, that after the fatal experience we had of the violent
Abuses committed in the Trade, that we could not be brought to
approve it, even in the limited and regulated Manner laid down
2
in the Committee Ts proceedings. '7 But they did agree with 
Clive ”on the propriety of holding out such advantages to our 
chief servants, civil and military,” as might ”open to them
3
the means of honourably acquiring a competency in our service, ” 
The Directors therefore in 176? granted to the officers an 
annual commission upon the Diwani revenue, by which the 
Commander-in-chief was granted 7i shares, the Colonels and the 
Lieutenant-Colonels were allotted 2j shares and 1^ shares
1. Fourth report on the nature, state and condition of the 
East India Company. 1773* H,C, Ap.43.
2. L, to Bengal. 17 May 1766. Fourth report of the Committee
of Secrecy, 1773* H. C. Ap.A5.
3. L. to Bengal. 17 May 1766. Fourth report of the Committee
of Secrecy, ---  1773. H.C.Ap,15.
13respectively per person and the Utajors 4 of a share of the
total available. To remove all complaints regarding the
withdrawal of Double batta the subaltern officers were
granted an allowance or gratuity at the rate of three shillings
per day for a Captain, two shillings for a Lieutenant and one
1
shilling for an Ensign.
Before these orders had arrived from England, the new
arrangement regarding the withdrawal of batta had come
into force from 1 January 1766. Memorials, protesting
against the cut, had immediately been sent in from each
Brigade and to these Clive had replied that the CourtT's order
was positive and no modification of the regulation would be
allowed. No further sign of discontent was apparent and the
Bengal Government remained under the impression that the new
arrangement would not lead to any disturbances amongst the
2
army officers.
A generous gesture by Clive himself might also have 
been expected to reconcile the officers to the cut, Mir Jafar, 
who died in 1765, by his will, left some five lacs of rupees 
to Clive. Since at that time the order of the Company against 
the receipt of presents had not yet been published, it would 
have been open to Clive to pocket the money. Rightly thinking, 
however, that the example would have been an unhappy one to 
set, Clive chose to use the money to form a fund for wounded
1, L, to Bengal, 20 November 1767. para. 114. D* to Bengal.-vol.3' :
2. Ninth report from the Committee of Secrecy.1773j H.C.Ap,I,
and disabled European officers and men of the CompanyTs army.
While Clive was thus busy in promoting the interests of 
the Army officers of the Company, secret meetings and consul­
tations were being held in each Brigade upon the issue of 
double batta. All the European officers determined to compel 
the Government to a renewal of the batta by a general resig­
nation of their commissions - and did so "without regarding
the probable consequences to themselves or to the public, and
1
unanimity, they doubted not, would ensure success,” The
plotters decided ”to refuse their usual advance of pay by the
2
month of June”. In each Brigade a Committee of Correspondence 
was appointed with full authority to answer all letters 
regarding the batta question. The day for the general res­
ignation was fixed as 1 June 1766. Everything was kept so
secret that "even the Field Officers upon the spot entertained
3
not the least suspicion of what was going forward.”
On the 19 April 1766, the officers of the 3rd Brigade 
(nine Captains, twelve Lieutenants and twenty Ensigns) sent a 
memorial to the Bengal Council pointing out that the wages of 
their servants, the price of food and the cost of other 
necessaries of life were higher in Bengal than in Madras or 
Bombay and therefore requesting the Government to continue 
with the double batta. Clive decided to ignore this memorial
1, Strachey - op.cit., p. 7.
2* I M d o , p. 7~.
3. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773*H.C.Ap,I.
as it was not sent through the Brigade Commander Sir Robert 
Barker.^
On the 28 April Clive received yet another letter
from Sir Robert Fletcher, this time reporting that the officers
2
of the First Brigade had resolved to resign their commissions. 
General Carnac also received an anonymous letter that the
officers of the 2nd Brigade were preparing to resign their 
. . 3
commissions, Clive then realised that a mutinous spirit
had silently spread throughout the European forces and
prepared himself to face the situation.
Indeed, such a spirit amongst the European officers
had far less justification than had the sepoy unrest so
severely suppressed by Munro, Double batta had been an
exceptional, temporary grant by the Nawab Mir Jafar, which
might well have been ended without compensation, for despite
the statements of the Bengal officers, it was more than
doubtful whether the costs of servants, provisions etc, were
any higher in Bengal than in Madras particularly for the up 
 ^ . 4
country stations. As the Ninth report pointed out provisions 
were "much cheaper in Bengal than on the coast of Coromandel” 
and again regarding European articles "expenses of transporting 
necessaries from Calcutta to any port in Bengal” could not
1. Strachey- op.cit., Ap.6.
2. Ibid. , A p X
3. Ibid. Ap, 10.
4. In 1757, the Directors had urged that batta should be 
greater in Madras than in Bengal "where all the necessaries 
of life are so much cheaper",
L. to Bengal. 11 November 1757. Para.73.
D. to Bengal, Vol.l,
6”be so great as on the coast of Coromandel, because the whole 
country” was iTintersected with navigable rivers”. The real 
trouble was that Calcutta, the capital, encouraged extravagance: 
in the words of the Ninth report "luxury was boundless, and 
hence arose the imaginary wants and the real distress of the 
officers on the Bengal establishment. Even had costs been as 
high as the memorialists stated, the Company’s grant of free 
quarters, tents, boats, etc, together with the commission on 
the land revenue for the senior and the sepoy allowance for 
the junior officers had made very ample amends for the loss 
of batta.
Clive certainly did not believe that the officers had
any legitimate grievances and resolved to suppress their
mutinous behaviour by force. He knew that a few of the officers
had already acquired comfortable fortunes and the resignation
of their commissions was "a matter of indifference; but many
on the contrary, he knew, there were, whose circumstances,
whose youth, whose extravagance could not bear that they should
voluntarily deprive themselves of the only means of present 
2
subsistence.” Clive therefore applied to Madras for every 
officer who could be spared and prepared to call the Bengal 
officers’ bluff. He ordered the Brigadiers to send down to 
Calcutta every 'officer who displayed the smallest intention 
to mutiny. Clive himself boldly proceeded to the three Brigade 
stations, Monghyr, Patna and Allahabad. At Monghyr, he found
1, Ninth report from the Committee of Secrecy, 1773. H.C.Ap.I,
2, Strachey - op.cit., p. 167
6that 42 officers had already resigned their commissions. He 
also learnt that the European soldiers wanted to follow their 
officers and they had submitted their resignations on the 
13 April, It was only the appearance of two battalions of 
sepoys with fixed bayonets, that had thrown the European 
soldiers into confusion and prevented them from causing 
trouble, Clive first ordered the officers who had resigned to 
proceed to Calcutta and then addressing the whole Brigade 
asked the troops "to behave with regularity and sobriety", He 
also addressed the native troops through an interpreter and 
"ordered double pay to be issued to them for the months of 
May and June,
From Monghyr, Clive proceeded to Patna, Four of the 
officers who were active in the plot were sent down to Calcutta 
and the rest were pardoned.
The 3*h Brigade was then stationed partly at
2
Allahabad and partly at Serrajepore awaiting an attack from 
the Marathas, On 6 May, six of the officers resigned at 
Serrajepore and the rest expressed their intention to resign 
on the 1 June. The officers at Allahabad declared their 
determination to resign on May 20 and thus to coerce the 
Government into granting them double batta. Instead, they 
heard of the firm resolution of Clive, of his having summoned 
officers from Madras to replace those who had tendered their
1, Strachey - op.cit., p.34.
2. 104 miles distant from Allahabad - Ibid., p. 46
resignations and of the shipping of officers who had resigned
down to Calcutta, In the face of such vigour and determination
their courage failed and they asked for pardon. Thus the
mutiny collapsed. Subsequent enquiry proved that Sir Robert
Fletcher had instigated the officers to stand against the
Government, He was tried by Court Martial and was cashiered.
Six of the officers were likewise sent to England, The rest
1were reinstated.
With this display of firmness-warmly applauded by the 
Directors - the second governorship of Lord Clive ended in 
1767. He left for England on the 29 January 1767 leaving 
Verelst, his successor, with what seemed excellent prospects
for peace. The sepoy army had become an efficient body of 
2
troops and the Europeans had been brought to order,
In 1763, the Court again advised the Bengal Council 
to decrease the number of sepoys arguing that "an establish­
ment of fifteen thousand sepoys would be far superior to any 
country force" which could "be brought against the provinces., 
and it "would be best answered by your paying them regularly, 
using them with humanity and giving the battalions as many
European commissioned and non-commissioned officers as the
3
service" could "afford."
The first of the DirectorsT wishes - that the Bengal
1. Ibid., p, 129
2. L. from Richard Smith to Orme - 7 January 1767.
"Some of our sepoy battalions would astonish the King of 
Prussia and they astonish me." Orme MSS.O.V,Vol.17.p.13.
3. G.L, to Bengal, 16 March 1763. para,42, D, to Bengal,
VOI -4V, :
force be reduced in size - could not be complied with, for 
while the war with Haider Ali and the Marathas continued in 
the Deccan, Bengal had to lend her troops to the other Presi­
dencies. The despatch of Bengal sepoys to Madras in 1768 
was so ill managed that it could scarcely be said, either,. 
that the request for humane treatment of the sepoys was 
heeded.
Some of the Bengal sepoys sent to Madras in 176$ went
the whole way by sea with a call at Vizagapatnam. They were
so distressed by the want of provisions and of water on board
ship and by the excessive overcrowding that they refused to go
any further by sea and marched instead from Vizagapatnam to
Madras. On arrival there, the Bengal sepoys found conditions
no less difficult. As General Joseph Smith had reported, at
one point movement against Haider Ali became impossible
1
because the troops had for days been without rice. These 
sepoy battalions returned to Bengal in 1770, Bad luck continued 
to follow them for two grenadier companies were lost at sea 
on the way back.
The majority of the Hindus, of whatever caste they 
might be, were averse to travel outside the borders of India 
and still more to a passage by sea. But, as has been noted 
before, both Bengal and Madras sepoys, Hindu and Muslim, had 
on occasion agreed to passage by sea from one Presidency to 
another, in time of war. If in later years, they proved 
increasingly reluctant to travel on ship-board, much of that
1, Wilson - op.cit., 1, pp, 239 - 2k2
reluctance can properly be attributed to their experience of 
inadequate administration. Short supply of essential and 
suitable provisions and water on board ship and gross over­
crowding made the natural dislike of an unknown element turn 
to positive hostility. As the Ninth report of the Committee 
of Secrecy puts it "from the horrid inconsiderate,,,cruel
management of the last embarkation to the Deccan, not a
1
Gentoo" would "ever venture on board a ship again."
This reluctance of the native soldiers to travel by
sea greatly complicated military planning, the more so
because Bombay and Madras had to rely on Bengal’s support in
2
any major conflict. Such was the case in 177# when Bombay 
had to be helped by Bengal and six sepoy Battalions made the 
perilous, and famous overland march under Goddard, Similar 
was the situation in 1781 when five Bengal battalions marched 
in January from Midnapore and reached Madras in August 17&1.
So great was the suffering on these marches that the battal­
ions lost half their number on the way by sickness, death and 
desertion.
Nor did the Directors’ order that the sepoy forces 
should be well paid prove any less difficult to obey, for the 
ten or twelve years from 1770 onwards were years of financial 
crisis for the Company. In India, Bengal had to serve as a
1. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy. 1773. H.C, 549
2, Review of the military history of the Hon’ble East India 
Company arising out of the political circumstances of - 
Hindustan.... 1744-1795/6, Home Misc. Vol. 91A, p.1305
financial as well as a military support to the other Presi­
dencies of the Company, for the Madras territories had been 
fought over ever since Aurangzeb destroyed Golconda and 
Bijapur while Bombay was still a trading post and naval base 
and not a major territory. But in 1769-70, Bengal itself 
suffered from a disastrous famine, which played havoc with the 
finances of the Bengal government, Lucy Sutherland has summed 
up the situation thus: "an increase in the expenses of admin­
istration, particularly on the military side,,, a trade 
depression in Bengal, suddenly intensified by the disastrous 
famine of 1769-70 inevitably cut down the revenues. Between 
1767-S and 1770-1 , there had been a decline in territorial 
collections of some £400,000 per annum and an increase in the
sums spent on fortifications of some £162,000 per annum,
1
while other administrative costs were also rising." As
Holden Purber has observed, the Bengal Government was over-
o
whelmed with debts. Yet it was from Bengal that the wars of
Madras and Bombay had to be financed to the amount of nearly
3a crore of rupees.
The financial embarrassment in India and the military 
dangers to which the Company was exposed were reflected in 
England in a steady slump in East India Company stock. The 
Company had repeatedly to seek treasury permission to postpone 
the payment of customs dues upon their cargoes. Sales were
1. Sutherland, op.cit., p. 225
2. Holden Furber - John-Company at work. p. 225
3. Auber - op.cit., Vol. I, p, 563
difficult. The declaration of a dividend was postponed. The
short-term loans upon which the under-capitalised Company had
been accustomed to operate, could not be renewed, "Nothing
could now keep the Company out of bankruptcy and bankruptcy
meant that the Company would have to throw itself on the
1doubtful mercy of the Parliament." In 1772 the Directors had 
to inform Lord North that "unless they could obtain a loan of 
one million pounds from the State, they could not carry on 
their business." They got the loan but only at the cost of a 
measure of Government control over the Company embodied in the 
Regulating Act of 177#jJ.
The respite gained in India by the conclusion of peace 
with Haider Ali in 1769 and in England by the settlement, 
financial and political, of 1774 was short lived. In 1775 > the 
Bombay Government involved itself in Maratha affairs but in 
spite of the treaty of Purandhar Hastings opened a disastrous 
four years of war in 177$ with the Maratha powers. In that same 
year the revolt of the American colonies merged into the 
European war in which France, Spain and Holland combined 
against England, In 17^0, Haider Ali burst once more upon the 
frontiers of Madras, At that moment there was, as Hastings 
said, "a war either actual or impending in every quarter and
3
with every part in Hindustan." Financial stringency or not, 
the sepoy force had to be augmented and the number of Bengal
1. Davies - op.cit., p. 468
2. Roberts - op.cit. , p, 181
3. Roberts - op.cit., p„ 197
r; C)
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sepoy infantry battalions steadily increased from 21 in 1777
1
to 35 in 1780, There could obviously be no hope of securing 
additional European forces at that time.
In 1781, the Bengal Council brought about a major 
reorganisation in its sepoy units. The old battalions re- 
emerged as regiments of 1000 in strength, each composed of 
two battalions with five companies having a hundred men in 
each. The regiments so formed were commanded by Majors, the 
battalions by Captains and the companies by Lieutenants, Each 
regiment had an Adjutant, each battalion a Sergeant-major and 
a Quartermaster sergeant, This change had gone hand in hand,
2
moreover, with the abolition of the post of native commandant.
That post had never been so important in the Bengal as
in the Madras forces. In Madras, there had been a succession
of able native commandants who earned the praise of Lawrence
and other officers, The two native Commandants Sheikh Ibrahim
and Meer Mansur had distinguished themselves in the battle of 
3
Trichinopoly, Muhammad Yusuf Khan had been appointed as
Commandant-in chief of all the sepoy troops at Madras, However
in 1764, Yusuf Khan had gone into rebellion and finally in 1764
4had been hanged. There was a consequent revulsion of feeling 
against the employment of such native officers: there were
1, From 1778 these extra battalions were raised one by one,
Cardew - op.cit., p.41.
2, G.O.C.C, 10 January 1781. The Code of Bengal Military 
Standing Regulations 1791. Sec, xxiv,
3, Wilson - op.cit., Vol. I, p. 73*
4, S.C.Hill - Yusuf Khan. The Rebel Commandant.
pp. 144, 2267"
”but few instances where they had ”been of much service but
frequent ones where” they had ”done mischief. When they” were
”clever men, their influence over the native officers and
sepoys” became ^dangerous and when they ”were not so they”
1
could ”be of no use”. Hence it was thought necessary in the
reorganisation of 1781, to abolish this post.
Of the reorganised regiments, four were ordered in
1782 to assist the hard pressed Madras Government by a move
into the Northern Circars, These were the 4th, ljth and 17th at
Barrackpore and the 3 5 ^  at Burdwan, But when in February 1782,
the 35^h received orders to join the others at Barrackpore,
disturbances began.
The 35th had only recently returned from service in
Western India, Now it received orders to march for some unknown
destination - one which rumour had it was to be reached by sea.
The regiment refused to move. The sepoys claimed it ”to be
their due to be allowed to stay for a period of twelve months
2
in any cantonment before proceeding on any foreign service,” 
Moreover they complained that their pay was four months in 
arrears so that they were in great distress for want of pro­
visions, Indeed, the CompanyTs credit had fallen so low1 that,
as Hastings stated, ”sufficient money could not be raised for
3
the ordinary wants of the troops,,,” The major part of the 
arrears were paid in March 1782. Even then the 35th regiment 
refused to move and the sepoys asked for their discharge. The
1, Wilson - op.cit,, Vol3 II, p„174.
2, L, from Capt.Sparke to Major Popham, Burdwan 26 February, 
1782. Bengal Sec, Prop's, 11 March 1782, No, 13.
3, Williams - op.cit., p} 202,
disbandment of the regiment was thereupon proposed by Major 
Popham and ordered by General Stibbert. The Council at Calcutta 
agreed that no lesser punishment was merited by the sepoys,
1
who, without any genuine grievance, had refused to obey orders.
The 35th was marched to Midnapore, compelled to lay down its
arms and was ignominiously disbanded. The colours of the
regiment were burnt in the presence of all the troops in the
station. The native officers were marched out with halters
round their necks and the sepoys were discharged. Two Subadars
and two sepoys, being sentenced by the Court Martial were
2
blown away from the guns.
But this stern example did not prevent the other three 
regiments at Barrackpore from refusing to embark for foreign 
service. Since there was only one other regiment at Barrackpore, 
the Government had not sufficient strength at the station to 
enforce obedience to its orders. On this occasion, therefore, 
General Stibbert suggested a court-martial but not disbandment
3
and the withdrawal of the orders for foreign service. The 
Governor General approved of this suggestion and the order for 
foreign service was withdrawn. The regiments were let off with 
a severe warning. But in 17$4, the 4th, 5th and 17th were 
broken up for their ?Tunsoldier likeff conduct and the men were 
drafted into the six Bengal battalions which had returned from
4
the West Coast of India and were now formed into six regiments,
1, L. from Warren Hastings to Stibbert. Ft,William, 11 March 
17$2, Bengal Sec, Progs. 11 March 1782,
2, L, from Ironside to Stibbert. Berhampore, 25' March 1782,
Bengal Sec, Progs. 22 April 1782, No,15*
3, Bengal Sec. Progs,- 22 April 1782, No,15,
4* Cardew - op.cit., p. 50
In all four regiments the men had been guilty only of 
a refusal to march - there had been no violence, no other dis­
orderly action. The sentence passed was thus tolerably severe. 
But no solution was attempted of the basic difficulty, either 
by the imposition upon recruits of a specific pledge to accept 
voyages by sea as part of their duty, or by the recruitment of 
more Muslims who did not hesitate to sail for foreign service. 
The Muslims were in fact generally distrusted, ™The Moors™ 
were ™bound by no ties of gratitude™ the Bengal Government 
observed ™and every dayTs experience™ convinced ™us that 
Mussalmans™ would ™remain firm to the engagements no longer 
than while they™ were ™actuated by principles of fear, always 
ripe for a change wherever there™ was ™the smallest prospect 
of success,™^
By 1734 peace had been restored both in Europe and in 
India, It was necessary to reduce the swollen Indian armies 
and to consider their organisation afresh. The changes intro­
duced in the army organisation by the Bengal Government in 
1731, with but scant reference to the Home Authorities, had 
sought to promote the internal strength of the sepoy units, by 
increasing the British and reducing the Indian element in the 
officering of that army. The Directors in 1732 had expressed 
their disapproval of this reorganisation and censured the 
frequent structural changes made in the past™ according to the 
whim and caprice of different Governors and Commanders™ and on
1, Long - op. cit. , M p l ,  p,151.
s' t*
a pi ea of economy which was scarcely achieved. They had also
expressed their sentiments in favour of the battalion as the 
basic unit of their Indian armies, since upon that system
Captains and Lieutenants were all the Officers that were 
1
needed. The Court in 1784 again reminded their agents in
Bengal of the imperative need to reduce the military expenditure
of the Presidency, To this request the Bengal Government had
replied by carrying out yet another reorganisation in 1784 by
which the whole sepoy establishment under its charge was
subdivided into three brigades consisting in total of thirty 
2
regiments. Upon this reorganisation, the Directors now
effectively pronounced by forwarding in 1785 a plan of their
own. Besides claiming to ensure economy and efficiency, by this
new plan the Directors sought to make the system uniform in all
the three Presidential armies, so that they would be able ™to
take the Field in the shortest notice and to act with effect
whenever they™ happened ™to be united upon service,™ They
ordered the Indian authorities therefore to reduce ™the corps
of every denomination at each of the Presidencies to the same
strength in point of officers, non-commissioned officers and 
3
privates™. The Directors also set limits upon the total size 
of the armies - that of Bengal being fixed at 36 sepoy 
battalions as compared to 30 regiments of two battalions each
1, L, to Bengal 28 April 1782, D, to Bengal, Yol, M l-
2, Bengal Military Peace Establishment. 20 December 1784. 
Home Misc. Vol. 361, pf97.
3, Early P.P. relating to’India. 1788, Collection No.22,
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then existing. Each of these battalions was to consist of
eight companies of 68 men with the complement of European
officers for each battalion fixed at one Captain, one Adjutant,
eight Subalterns and eight Sergeants. The number of native
officers - commissioned and non-commissioned - was kept at
eight Subadars, eight Jamadars, 32 Havildars and 32 Naiks.
Orders were also sent to distribute these sepoy battalions
equally among six Brigades, to each of which one Lieutenant and
one Major were to be attached as Field Officers for super-
1
vising the military duties.
The plan had the effect of undoing the Bengal Govern­
ments re-organisation of 1784 and of drastically reducing the 
total officer strength in India, This latter result raised the 
problem of redeployment of the European officers in the army 
establishment. Some were absorbed by increasing the number of 
officers per battalion, the rest who became supernumerary were 
granted half pay and ordered home, where the Directors 
promised, they should ”enjoy that allowance till the
opportunities offer of restoring them to full pay on the
2
establishment”,
The sepoys rendered surplus were to be disbanded but 
the native officers because of their acquired skill and the 
possibility of their joining the native powers of India were 
ordered T¥to be retained upon full pay and to take the earliest
1. L. to Bengal. 21 September 17&5- Paras. 82-83. to Bengal
Vol. \4.
2. L, to Bengal 21 September 17&5. Para 87, D. to Bengal 
Vol. ffiST. \a .
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opportunity of restoring them to former situations.
The provision that surplus officers should be sent 
home and that they should be retained on half pay until their 
services could be used again had its origin in a similar 
problem. The native rulers of India were showing alarming 
readiness to place their forces under European officers, There 
was an obvious threat here to the Company!s military superior­
ity, Indeed as early as 1775? the Company had forced the Nawab 
Vizier of Oudh to dismiss all the Europeans whom he had 
employed in his service and asked the Bengal Council to make it 
”an express article in the treaty to be concluded with the
Nawab that no Europeans would be employed in his service with-
2
out the permission of the Company”, As the Nawab was a sub­
ordinate ally of the Company such preventive measures had been 
easily taken. But in 17$4 Mahadji Sindhia appointed Be Boigne 
”an expert of ability and experience, trained in the best 
military schools of Europe who had served under the French and
the Russian flags before his arrival in India” to the command
3
of his forces. Before long Holkar appointed a French Officer 
Dudrenec to his army. Following these examples, the Poona Gov­
ernment also enlisted some European officers to command the
A
battalions of its army. The Company had no power to stop 
these native princes from engaging European officers and hence 
all these preventive measures had to be taken.
1, L, to Bengal 21 September 1785. Para-SB. D, to Bengal,Vol. 3^1
2, L, to Bengal 15 December 1775. Para 59. D. to Bengal,"Vq1*Y©
3, Sen - op.cit. , 133
4o Ibid. I3A
Finally the Directors emphasised, as they had done in
1768, the vital importance to the Company of its reputation as
a good paymaster. They anticipated that the savings effected
by the reduction in the total strength of their sepoy forces
would make it possible to clear off the arrears of pay which
had accumulated during the war years. They laid it down that
”the leading principle of the CompanyTs Government should be
that the pay of the soldier ought never to be in arrear; while
there was a rupee in the treasury, he was to be paid, every
other article of expenditure being postponed to that considera- 
1
tion,”
These attempts of the Company to make the Bengal sepoy
army more efficient did bring about the desired effect* In
September I7S6 , when Lord Cornwallis came out as Governor
General and Commander-in--Chief in India, he found the high
military efficiency of the native corps of the Bengal Presid-
£
ency quite admirable, ffA brigade of our sepoy” he said ”would
2easily make anybody Emperor of Hindustan.« in another letter 
to the Duke of York, he praised the courage and patience of the 
sepoys in bearing hunger and fatigue and remarked that ”the
native black troops” were ”fine men and would not --  disgrace
even the Prussian ranks,”-' Again, in a letter to Dundas he 
expressed his surprise at the good condition of the native 
troops. He also observed that they would soon arrive at a very
4
high pitch of discipline.
1, L, to Bengal, 11 April I7S5. Paras,647-649,D.to Bengal Vol*
2, Correspondence of Cornwallis, ed, C.Ross, Vol.I, p, 304
3. Ibid. , Vol9 I, p,225«
4. Ibid. , Vol, I, p„299
In sharp contrast, his opinion of the European troops of the
Company was not so happy. In fact in the same letter to Dundas
he thus expressed his dismay, ”1 did not think Britain could
have furnished such a set of wretched objects.” "^ To Sir
William Fawcett he wrote nothing could be more prejudicial” to
our interests and safety, than to degrade the character of
Europeans, in a country where a handful of them” were ”to hold
millions in subjection. The contemptible trash of which the
2
Companyfs European force” was composed made ”me shudder.”
Though Cornwallis had expressed a general satisfaction 
with the soldierly qualities of the sepoys, he was not content 
merely to accept unchallenged their aversion to movement by 
sea. British possessions in India and the East were so widely 
scattered, and so often separated by independent territories 
that the delay which overland marches imposed upon troop con­
centration was not lightly to be borne. He therefore sought to 
undo the mischief caused by the inefficient handling of 
earlier expeditions by sea, and to win the sepoys to an accept­
ance of movement by sea as a normal incident of their service. 
An opportunity presented itself early in 17&9. A reinforcement 
of croops was necessary at Fort Marlborough, Bencoolen, on the 
north-west coast of Sumatra. Sepoy volunteers were called for 
from the 1st, 30th and 32nd sepoy battalions and a bounty of 
ten rupees for each volunteer was promised. Two Subadars of the 
32nd battalion who tried to prevent their men from volunteering
1. Correspondence of Cornwallis - op. cit. , Vol- I, p.299 
2* Ibid. , Vol, I, ppc 26B-269.
U  J.
were publicly discharged with ignominy from the service. Not­
withstanding their efforts, sufficient volunteers were raised 
from the three battalions to form the required four companies. 
Cornwallis issued a circular in which he assured the sepoys 
that ?*he would never exact compliances from them which might be
inconsistent with the tenets of their different religions, or
1
with the rules of their respective castes.ff The detachment
with six European officers sailed at the end of February 17&9,
The officers were instructed to make the situation of the
sepoys as comfortable as possible on board. Before sailing,
the sepoys themselves supervised the filling of their water
casks, and nwere required to state every sort of article they
wished for, for their diet during the voyage, of which an
2
ample supply was provided at the expense of Government,”
These troops reached Sumatra at the beginning of March 
17^9 and remained there till the end of October* After a five 
weeks * voyage the contingent reached India again in December 
17&9. As had been promised the sepoys were paid full batta
while on duty outside India, and they were given a month?s
3
full pay as a gratuity on their return. Moreover the volun­
teers were also exempted from the tax which was levied on the 
performance of the rites and ceremonies for deceased parents 
at Gaya which all Hindus were expected to perform.
With these efforts to persuade the sepoys to proceed 
by sea on foreign service, the Court of Directors expressed
1. Williams - op.cit.,p.90.
2. Ibid. , p. 90.
3. G,0„C.C, 2 December 1789. Supplement to the Bengal Military 
Regs. 1799.
its agreement and pleasure. The effect upon the sepoys was 
marred to some extent, however, by the sickness experienced by 
the contingent in Sumatra and the mortality suffered on the 
voyage home. Men who embarked sick only too often succumbed to 
the discomforts of the sea voyage when their diet was 
restricted for religious reasons, to parched rice and peas.
Twelve months later, the attitude of the sepoys towards 
sea voyages was again to be tested, Britain in 1789 was on 
friendly terms with Holland, France had withdrawn her military 
forces from Pondicherry, and the Court of Directors even 
looked for a reduction on their military expenditure, thus 
achieving a judicious economy in India, Cornwallis however had 
warned them that though the neighbouring powers *?professed the 
most pacific disposition towards the Companyfs Government, the 
ambition and real inclination of Tippoo” were ??so well known, 
that should, unluckily, any difference arise with the French 
nation we must lay our account that the Carnatic” would
1
immediately after became the scene of a dangerous war.” In
1790, his foreboding proved justified, for war did break out
with Tipu Sultan. The Bengal battalions were enlarged from
2eight to ten companies each, and troops were sent by land
from Bengal to Madras under the Quarter-Master-General Lt. Col,
3
Cockrell. An appeal was then issued for volunteers and in 
1791 Gornwallis himself sailed for Madras accompanied by more
1, Auber - op.cit., Vol.II, p.$6.
2. L, to Bengal. 11 March 1791* Para 13, D, to Bengal, Vol.,.Sri.
3. G, 0. C. C, 8 November 1790. Supplement to the Bengal Military
Regs. 1799* -
than 1400 sepoy volunteers. Another body of 850 volunteers also 
sailed in the same year for the Carnatic, where in 1792 
Cornwallis brought the campaign against Tipu to a successful 
close.
In 1793 when the sepoy volunteers returned to Bengal 
Cornwallis once again wrote to the Directors to express his 
great satisfaction with their spirit. It was ”a pleasing 
reflection to the Commander-in-Chief”, he wrote to the Court, 
”that during his command of the army,” a spirit had been 
”shown by the native soldiery of sacrificing their prejudices 
to their duty and of overcoming their natural reluctance when 
the state” had ”occasion for their services.” "^
let another occasion arose in 1795? when Bengal was
called upon to despatch troops by sea. While the outbreak of
the French Revolution in 17^9 had not led to any serious
repercussions within India itself - the English Company had
prevented trouble by seizing Pondicherry - in 1795 it became
necessary to send troops to Malacca, for ”its redemption and
2
defence” from the French,
The Madras Presidency had already supplied a number of 
troops for service in Malacca and in 1795 professed its 
inability to furnish more. It was decided, therefore, to send 
Bengal sepoys. That did not seem to pose any problem, for the 
Bencoolen expedition of 17&9? and the ease with which volun­
teers had been found for the voyage to the Carnatic in 1791?
i* Cornwallis Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 455
2. Bengal Mily. Progs, 9 October 1795* No.2,
had made it seem that the sepoys had been weaned by judicious
management from their old fears of crossing the black water.
Accordingly the 15th battalion, at Midnapore was asked to
volunteer as a body for the expedition to Malacca, The
battalion stationed at Barrackpore was not asked since it had
already furnished volunteers for the Bencoolen contingent.
To ask a whole battalion to volunteer was a new
departure, for in the past volunteers had been assembled from
several battalions. Considerations, either of speed or economy
led to the new experiment, which, if successful, would have
marked a new stage in the adaptation of the sepoy forces to
the Company's new needs.
Every effort was made to ensure the success of the
experiment. Captain Grant, who commanded the 15th battalion
was asked to broach the proposal to his troops, assuring them
that full attention would be paid to the comforts and customs
on board ship and that their families would be well looked
after during their absence. It was also laid down that only if
all unanimously accepted would the whole battalion be sent by 
1
sea.
The sepoys were informed of the plan on 22
August 1795 and on a first reading of the arrangement there
2was no opposition. But when the proposals were again read at 
the evening parade, the Grenadiers refused to embark. Ultimate­
ly, only 140 men out of the entire battalion expressed their
1, Bengal Mily, Cons. 9 October 1795. No. 3.
2. L. from Nataman to Scott.Midnapore 22 August,1795. Bengal 
Mily. Ccns„ 9 October 1795, No.3.
Q i’.’
1
willingness to proceed by sea.
The refusal would perhaps have led to the cancellation
of the whole experiment, had not the Grenadiers themselves
approached Captain Grant a few days later and expressed their
readiness to proceed. They appeared to be ashamed of their
earlier conduct. The entire battalion was then paraded and the
consent of all the men was obtained, A few sepoys were selected
from the battalion to supervise the arrangements for procuring
and storing the provisions and water on board ship. Transport
was arranged. Boats were sent to Midnapore to bring the
battalion to the mouth of the river Rupnarain where the ship
was ready for them.
Then, on the 30 August suddenly and without any warning
the two Grenadier companies attached to the 15th battalion'
again stated their strong objections to board the ship. They
further accused the native officers of having deceived them.
The sepoys too came forward and declared their utter aversion
to embark. Throughout the night the Grenadiers, "never took of
their commurbands and compelled the other sepoys to swear by
the Koran, Ganga, and Toolsey in their hands, to refuse to 
2
embark," The Government, being informed of this mutinous 
behaviour of the 15th battalion, decided to convince the 
mutineers and other sepoys that it would "neither submit to the 
capricious behaviours of its soldiers nor suffer its orders to
1, Narrative of the C,in C, before the Council, Bengal Mily. 
Progs, 9 October 1795. No,3A.
2, L, from Bateman to Scott. Midnapore, 30 August 1795.
Bengal Mily. Progs, 9 October 1795. No.3C,
be trifled with with impunity.!?
Lieutenant-Colonel Erskine was sent up to Midnapore
with the instruction that ?Tin his treatment of that battalion
he was not only to consider what was due to itself for its
misconduct but the impression which that treatment would make
2on the minds of the other native troops of the army,tT At a 
Court of Enquiry which he held, it appeared from the evidence 
that Captain Grant had been over hasty in reporting to the
3
Government that his battalion was ready for overseas service.
It was also proved that the native officers, without any 
authority, had promised extra money to the sepoys and had
4
tried in that way to extract their consent to the sea voyage.
It became equally clear to Erskine that when the sepoys 
eventually reacted against the pressure, it was only because 
of certain religious and social prejudices.
However, Erskine was under instruction to make an example 
of the battalion for its conduct. It had indeed shown an even 
more mutinous disposition after its refusal to embark by refus­
ing also to perform weekly duty when ordered, on the grounds 
that it was the turn of the 29bh battalion. He therefore 
ordered a parade of the troops at Midnapore. The 15 th were then 
ordered to lay down their arms and strip off their uniforms. 
They were warned that if they refused to carry out these 
orders the guns were ready to blow them off the parade ground,
1. L. from Scott to Bateman Ft.William 1 September 1795.
Bengal Mily, ProgsVJ 9 October 1795. No02
2. L, from Scott to Bateman Ft.William 4 September 1795.
Bengal Mily.Progs, 9 October 1795* No,2
3. L, from Erskine to Murray Midnapore 26 September 1795.
Bengal Mily.Progs, 9 October 1795. No, 2.
4. Evidence of sepoys before Court of enquiry. Midnapore,
2$ September 1795. Bengal Mily. Progs. 9 October 1795* No,34,
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They did refuse, ignoring the warning, and the order
was given to open fire upon the mutinous sepoys; for some
fifteen minutes they returned the fire, and then, many having
been killed or wounded, dispersed and fled. The colours of the
battalion were publicly burnt and the battalion was declared
disbanded. Instructions were issued by Erskine that any person
found sheltering any of the mutineers would be tried by Court 
1martial. Magistrates of all the district courts were also
asked to detain for enquiry all sepoys and native officers
passing through their districts or towns without a valid dis-
2
charge certificate or other written authority.
Thus the attempt to embark an entire battalion for 
foreign service failed. From the proceedings of the Court of 
Enquiry it was evident that the officers, both European and 
native, perhaps with an eye to personal advancement or from a 
wish to win credit for the battalion, had tried to force the 
sepoys to agree to the proposal of the Government. One of the 
sepoys deposed before the Court of Enquiry that Lieutenant 
Rutledge had come to the lines and urged them to go on the 
expedition. Later, when the sepoys refused to embark, the same 
officer showed his anger in violence and threats. Thus when 
parading the battalion he had kicked a sepoy for not standing 
properly to attention, and had declared, so the accusation 
went, that f?he would make the sepoys eat beef and pork when he
1, L, frorruErskine to Abercromby. Midnapore, 8 October 1795.
Bengal Mily. Progs. 9 October 1795. No0 3P.
2. Bengal Mily, Progs, 9 October 1795. No,3C,
1got them on board ship,” Captain Grant, when informed of the
incident, had not believed it. Without any proper enquiry he
2
had asked the sepoy to forget and forgive, Subadar Kistna 
Ram was stated to have said that all the sepoys would be sent
3
to Calcutta and hanged for having refused to go on board, 
and Subadar Ram Sing to have said, ?fin ten days we” would 
”put string in all these scoundrelsf noses and carry them on
4board ship,” Some other native officers had sought to tempt
the sepoys to embark by setting out what grants would be made
for each rank if they did agree to go to Malacca, It had been
this double appeal to their cupidity and their fear which for
a moment had persuaded the sepoys to reverse their first
refusal to consider overseas service, But threats and appeals
had both given way before religious feelings when the moment
for actual embarkation arrived.
The patient efforts of Cornwallis thus ended in
apparent failure, and the Home Government expressed its deep
IZl
disappointment that its ”most sanguine expect^ons that the
prejudices of the-Hindu troops to a voyage by sea were grad-
5
ually lessening” , had been so dramatically exposed as 
unfounded. The only comfort they were able to draw from the 
unhappy incident was that Erskine had acted most judiciously
1, Evidence of sepoys before the Court of Enquiry. Midnapore. 
28 September 1795. Bengal Mily,Progs. 9 October 1795. No.3^ .
2, Capt.Grant before the Court of Enquiry, Midnapore,
28 September 1795. Bengal Mily. Progs, 9 October 1795. No,39
3, Capt, Grant before the Court of Enquiry, Midnapore, •
29 September 1795. Bengal Mily. Progs, 9 October 1795. No*39
4, Bengal Mily, Progs, 9 October 1795. No,3C.
5, L, to Bengal, 5 July 1791. Para 53. B, to Bengal.
Vol, ISSE.2L,
and that the 29th battalion, which acted against the mutineers, 
had furnished ”an exemplary proof of their steadiness and 
attachment to the service.”'1' What was also notable about the 
incident was that no punishment other than disbandment was 
inflicted upon the 15th battalion. There was no court martial, 
and the sepoys who had for fifteen minutes violently resisted 
authority were neither tried nor punished. The Government, it 
would seem, had realised that where religious feelings were 
concerned patience and persuasion were more effective than 
coercion.
The maintenance of discipline and loyalty in a 
mercenary army had never been an easy task, As the Committee 
of Secrecy observed in 1773, ?!of all artificial fabricks, an 
Army” was ^perhaps the most complicated and like other
2
Machines”, required ^constant attention to keep in order,”
But the task in the Bengal Sepoy army was made more difficult 
than in the Madras or Bombay armies by the policy of recruit­
ment, It has already been noted that the first sepoy 
battalions raised in Bengal by Clive were not composed of 
native Bengalis, The recruiting grounds were rather Bihar, 
Orissa and Oudh, The inclusion of men from Oudh was early seen 
to have its disadvantages, for the great number of desertions 
from the first Brigade, marching in 1768 from Monghyr to 
Calcutta to embark for Madras, led the Directors to order that
1, L, To Bengal 5 July 1791. Para 53. D0 to Bengal Vol, XXXI,
2, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773. H,C. p, 290
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recruitment be restricted to the Company?s territories of 
Bihar and Orissa, They asked to recruit "as much as possible 
in Behar or Orissa so that we” might "not be exposed to 
desertion or treachery by having them levied in the countries 
of any of the neighbouring provinces.In 1790, when the 
Bengal Government had to despatch troops to Madras for the 
campaign against Tipu Sultan, desertions were again numerous,
Once again, likewise, it was observed that the largest number 
of deserters were Oudh men. The Commander-in-chief drew the 
obvious conclusion, "An experience so unquestionable must 
satisfy every person that whatever advantages such men" might 
"possess in point of height and appearance", they were "by no 
means so fit for soldiers in the Companyfs service as the 
natives of our own provinces," It was therefore directed that 
Commanding officers of battalions of sepoys should receive as 
few men as possible from the countries to the west of Benares,
but fill up all vacancies in these battalions, as few as may
2
be practicable, with natives of the CompanyTs provinces," 
let despite this second example and warning recruiting contin­
ued to be made from Oudh for reasons discussed later,*
That the known disadvantages of such recruitment, most 
notably the reluctance of Brahmin and Rajput troops to move by 
sea, were ignored, may partly be attributed to the desire of 
Commanding Officers to have their troops look well, a Prussian
1, L. to Bengal. 11 November 1768, Para 107.D. to Bengal. Vol, M4,
2. G.O.C.C, 28 June 1790. Supplement to the Bengal Mily.Regs. 
1799.
* See Chapter III,
passion for tall, well-built men, and partly to the way in
which recruits were collected. The army officers, in fact,
took the easy way of accepting those who presented themselves
for service rather than of particularly recruiting in such
areas as Bihar and Orissa. ”Xoung men, many of whom** were
”Rajputs, from nearby villages always presented themselves
1
daily on the parade ground for employment,” When an urgent 
need arose, trustworthy Jamadars or Havildars were sent out to 
bring in new' recruits, and, being sent out ”with a smart new' 
turban, glaring sword, laced coat and some money, they gener­
ally succeeded; for as in England their fair speeches and
2tinsel coats” attracted ”many followers.” It may also be said, 
that these men took the opportunity to enlist their own 
relatives, and this led to the Bengal army being doubly unusual 
in that it was predominantly high caste Hindu in composition 
and was restricted as to the area of recruitment.
In other matters however, the Company sought to ensure 
uniformity between its forces. Thus though the first code of 
military regulations was produced for the Madras army in 1765, 
the Directors in 176B ordered the Bengal Government to follow 
these as far as possible. ”Iu order to assist” it ”(to frame 
regulations)” they sent ”the private Military code or plan 
given out at Madras in 1765, for the troops on the coast of 
Coromandel, which allowing for the difference of the service 
at the two Presidencies ”might be adapted to the situation and
1. Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy, ,1773. H.C. p.' 550
2, Ninth report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773. H.C.p* 550
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particular circumstances of the troops employed in Bengal
varying the rules, orders and regulations accordingly.” The
Bengal Council was "not only to transmit” the Home Government
"a copy of such a code annually but” was "likewise to transmit
copies to the other Presidencies”, who were "to do the same
with respect to Bengal. "This mutual communication” would as
the Directors mentioned "if duly attended to, be productive of
1
similarity of system throughout our whole possessions.”
The Home Government in its letter of 1773 further asked
the Bengal agents to translate the Articles of war into the
country languages and laid down that these "must be publicly,
2at stated times, read at the head of the several companies,”
The latter also said that ”a Mode of trial must also be estab­
lished and adequate punishments inflicted for offences, partic-
3
ularly for Disobedience and Desertion.”
While Codes and Courts martial were one side of the 
effort to secure uniformity, regularity and discipline in the 
Company?s sepoy forces, good pay and pensions were another.
The pay scale was framed in 1779. Sepoys received six 
rupees a month, naiks eight, havildars ten. The rate of pay of 
the commissioned officers was fixed at sixteen rupees for a 
Jamadar and sixty for a Subadar. In addition to their basic pay 
full batta (dearness allowance) was granted at the rate of 
three rupees for a sepoy, ten for a "Naik or Ifevildar, fifteen
1. G, L, to Bengal, 16 March, 1768. Ninth Report of the 
Committee of Secrecy, 1773? H. C. p. 5^6.
2. L. to Bengal. 7 April 1773. Para 29. D, to Bengal, Vol.M.fc,
3. L. to Bengal 7 April 1773. Para. 29. D, to Bengal.Vol.IS. <2,
0 eJ>
for a Jamadar and thirty for a Subadar, This batta until 1781
was given automatically in all circumstances. In 1781, however,
the Government at Fort William revoked the regulation, it
!,being found from experience that giving them (the sepoys) the
same batta in the field as in Cantonment has proved a discour-
1agement to their going upon s e r v i c e, I ns t ea d  it was laid
down, the Court of Directors approving, that *?no more than
half batta was allowed to the native troops in any cantonments
whether within or without the province except upon foreign
2
service beyond the Jumna or Subarnarekha.
The sepoys were always paid at the expiration of every 
month. Neither the pay nor the batta was ever advanced to them 
and hence in the case of desertion the Company did not exper­
ience any loss of money.
Good pay, regularly issued was supplemented on campaign 
by prize money and by the grant of medals to sepoys and of 
standards to battalions. The Company also introduced a system 
of pensions for native soldiers at the rate of half the pay 
of the M  rank. In 1782, when the Bengal treasury was exhausted, 
the Governor General with the approval of the Court, 
established the jagir system of land grants. T*In order to 
relieve the Company from a part of the expenses of the native 
invalid establishment --  and to afford a satisfactory pro­
vision for the objects of it,,T^  the Bengal Government
1, Home Misc. Vol. 243. p." 56,
2, Homo Misc Vol. 243. P*5&.
3, M.C, 14 June 1782. The Code of Bengal Military Regs,
1791. Sec.IV.
decided to grant waste lands to those native soldiers who
desired to receive them instead of invalid pay or pension. The
area of land allotted varied according to the rank. The full
pension of soldiers who accepted land continued for three
years, when it was reduced by one third. After two years the
pension was again reduced. The remaining third was paid for
life. Upon the death of the grantee his heirs were allowed to
2
enjoy the land at an annual fixed rent.
For those invalided out of the Service there was
similar provision of land or grants to pay and an annual
Committee of Surgeons was appointed after 1791 to examine the
sick and to recommend their transfer if necessary to the
invalid establishment.
The Company also sought to introduce order into the
system of promotion by laying down that seniority as well as
3
merit should be rewarded.
1, A Subadar - 400 Bighas*, a Jamadar - 200 Bighas,
a Havildar -120 Bighas, a Naik -100 Bighas and
a Sepoy - 80 Bighas.
H.C. 14 June, 1782. The Code of Bengal Military Regulations 
1791, Sec.IV.
* ”A Bigha is the most common Hindu measure of land area, 
varying much in different parts of India”. Hobson-Jobson,
p. 29.
2, H.C, 9 May 1788. The Code of Bengal Military Reg,s.
1791. Section XV,
3, The odd system applied to commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers of having to pay a fee when they were promoted.
It was laid down in 1?86 that ”The Major of Brigade in 
conferring the commissions shall be allowed to receive from 
every Havildar promoted to the rank of a Subadar half a 
month*s pay for the considerable trouble and labour for the 
Major.” M. C. 9 March, 1786, What that extra trouble was, 
for which this fee was paid, is not easy to see.
The pride of the men, and a sense of corporate
identity and discipline was also fostered by putting them into
distinctive uniforms. 77 A short regimental Jacket, white
Neemah, white country breeches, halfway down the thigh, rather
tight and bordered with a figured binding, of the colour of the
Facing of the Battalion, a Turban, either blue, red or mottled,
smartly cocked in the Maratha fashion and decorated with a
Plume of feathers or cloth77 expanded 77like a small fan,®
their sashes77 were 77the colour of their turbans with their
bayonets fixed in them like a dagger* Black officers77 wore the
same upper dress only laced, and their plumes or combs
ohnamented with Gold, their lower garments are Nankeen
Breeches and stockings all in one.'*'
By such measures an effort was made to transform the
individualist, laxly disciplined Indian mercenary troops of
Mughal and Maratha days into a disciplined sepoy army. In the
main, the effort had proved successful, the rules and regula*-
tions had taken effect by 1795# On many occasions the sepoys
had afforded gallant proofs of their fidelity and devotion to
the Company, At Buxar the sepoys, it was reported, behaved
admirably 77although some of them were new corps, not having
2
been raised more than eight months,77 Warren Hastings 
observed 77on my arrival at Chunar I found myself in great and 
immediate distress for want of money. The troops were some
1. M. C„ 7 May 1781. The Code of Bengal Military Regs, 
1791. Section XXVI.
2, Williams - op.cit., p# 52
four and other five months in arrears;” but he had ”however
great pleasure in testifying that distressed as the sepoys
were for the want of money, they never manifested the least
symptoms of discontent.” Thus he said ”1 frequently visited
the camp and passed the line each time in review; once and
only once I heard one or two voices of complaint but neither
clamourous nor disrespectful.”1 Cornwallis, as Commander-in-
chief congratulated the Bengal sepoys who had served in Madras
remarking that "the adherence and fidelity of the native
officers and soldiers on a service so extensive in its
duration and so distant from the Presidency to which they”
belonged would ”be a memorable proof of the attachment of the
2
Bengal native soldiery to the British Government in India.”
1. Williams - op.cit.. Ap„ E,
20 G,0,C0C. 22 January 1793. Supplement to the Bengal Military 
Regs. 1799o
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CHAPTER II
THE EUROPEAN OFFICERS OF THE BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY
(1796 - 1852)
In the preceding chapter, the formation and growth of the 
Bengal native infantry, the regulations enacted to govern it 
and certain highlights in its career over the years 1757 to 
1795 have been discussed. During this period the East India 
Company’s Bengal native army functioned as a loosely-joined 
collection of regiments, each of which was supervised by an 
European officer with extensive control over the sepoys in his 
care. He was, in effect, the virtual owner of his regiment and 
more often than not, such absolute authority led to mismanage­
ment or at least to some corruption. Significantly, neither the 
Board of Control nor the Company’s Executive at Fort William 
thought it necessary to spend much time in formulating policies 
to check such regimental autonomy and correct such evils as 
sprang from it, for their attention was not so much centred 
upon how the Bengal native infantry was administered as upon 
its profitability as an item of cost in the overall budget of 
the East India Company, They generally agreed that a force 
which produced economically valuable results, even though 
corrupt, should not be tampered with and it was not until dis­
content amongst the army officers reached a dangerous pitch, by 
the late 1790Ts, that the Home Authorities considered it nec­
essary to devise a new military policy. For this purpose,
they welcomed the memorandum of the recently returned Governor- 
General of Bengal, Lord Cornwallis, and on the basis of his 
recommendations the Board set forth a number of reforms which 
it deemed ‘valid to institute. The basic policies embodied in 
the reforms were those of centralisation, Europeanisation of 
the army and strict economy, But the over emphasis upon economy 
in these, as well as in subsequent reforms, defeated the object 
ive of the Board which was to achieve a sound military policy 
for the Bengal native infantry. Instead, its reforms had part­
icular and significant effects on the attitude and status of 
the European officer cadre, on the relationship between the 
officers and their sepoys and ultimately upon the efficiency of 
the native army. These developments, in turn, made their con­
tribution to the history of the Bengal native infantry, and 
hence form a necessary part of our study.
It is perhaps better to pause momentarily and consider the 
service conditions of the European officers of the native army 
prior to 1794 in order to appreciate the causes of their dis­
satisfaction, Since 1757, the army of the East India Company 
in Bengal, Bombay and Madras had consisted of both Company and 
royal troops. By an act of Parliament of 1754, officers of 
the Crown serving in India always took precedence over Company’ 
officers of the same rank. A captain of the King’s army, even 
if he was a captain of one day’s standing only was considered 
in India to have seniority over the most senior captain of the 
Company’s army. So long as the inflow of the royal officers 
was negligible, this inequality was little felt by the. Company’
officers. But, as has been seen, from 1782 the Company became
embroiled in Mysore with Hyder Ali and then in several quarters
with the Marathas, and so required assistance from the Crown.
A considerable number of royal officers consequently arrived in
India, all of whom superceded the Company officers of the same
rank. Further in those years many junior officers of the royal
regiments received promotion during their service in India, ^
promotion which was certainly more rapid and extensive than
that received by the Company’s officers. This preferential
treatment raised vehement protest from the Company’s officers
who only obtained redress in 1788, when, with the sanction of
the Parliament, royal commissions were locally granted to the
Company’s officers which entitled them to equal privileges
2
with their colleagues in the royal regiments.
This measure removed the most immediate and glaring in­
equalities between the two services but the greater considera­
tion - that of unequal prospects of promotion within the Com­
pany’s and the Crown’s army - was left untouched. This was the 
more bitterly felt since, as the following illustration indi­
cates, even the prospects of promotion within the Company’s 
forces had receded with the passage of years so that an officer 
appointed to the sepoy army in 1784 found himself promoted at 
a much slower rate than an officer appointed in the same rank
1* Cornwallis Correspondence op. cit. , Vol, 1, Ap. XIX,
2# Wellington’s Despatches. Ed. S.J.Owen p„ 595.
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in 1765. 1
Name Tear of appointment and rank
Cadet Lt. Capt. Com,of Major Lt.Col* 
Battalion
Col.
Col.
Bristo
1763 - 1765
(3)
1769
(6 )
1778
(15)
1781
(18)
1788
(25)
Lt.Col. 
Duncan
1766-67 - 1774
(7)
1778-79
(12)
1781
(15)
1793
(27)
-
Capt.
Gruber
1769 - 1781
(12)
1794
(25)
- - -
Capt*
Davis
1772 1778
(6 )
1793
(21)
- - - -
Lt.
Ramsay
1734 1794
(10)
mm - - - mm
N.B. Figures in Brackets indicate the years of service since 
entry as a cadet.
This was primarily so, because the number of senior
officers in the CompanyTs army remained ludicrously small,
2
there being only 102 field officers amongst an establishment
of 1050 to 1080 officers in the Company’s army for the three
3Presidencies as sanctioned by the regulations of 1786* The 
ratio of one field officer to ten officers did not parade any
1* The questions answered on observations upon the points
submitted by a personage of high rank for the consideration 
of certain of the Hon’ble Company’s service now in India 
1794* Home Misc, Vol.85, p«633«~
2, Field officers - 12 colonels, 45 lieutenant^colonels and 45 
majors.
3* Regulation of 1786 - A native battalion consisting of eight 
companies, each under a Lt* was commanded by a Capt. Six 
such native battalions, formed a Brigade which was officered 
by one Ma. j, one Lt.-Col. and one Brigadier Genl.
L* to Bengal, 21 September 1785. Paras. 82 & 83.
D. to Bengal, vol. t4.
very bright prospects of promotion before the eyes of the 
junior officers, and in fact subalterns were often detained in 
the same rank for more than twenty years. As Sir John Shore 
observed, "the Company’s officers were frequently employed in 
command of detachments in point of force as well as of import­
ance equal to what field officers are entrusted with in Europe. 
But this experience and habits of reflection does not bring 
them quick promotions* No subaltern has the prospect of arriv­
ing at the rank of a Captain under a period of 30 years. Enter­
ing at 17? he will be 57 years old before he obtains a Colonel’s 
c o m m a n d . T h e  Berhampore officers in 1795 furnished details 
which fully supported Shore’s observation. They noted the 
average number of years of service required to reach the 
various ranks in the Company’s native armies, which worked out 
at "Senior Lieutenant twenty one years, Ensigns ten years and 
if the present system is suffered to continue, of a majority 
of subaltern officers in the infantry not one can be made a 
Captain until he shall have been sufficiently fortunate or 
rather unfortunate to survive an exile of from twenty four to
twenty eight years in the uncongenial and debilitating 
2
climate." Criticising the almost total stagnation of promo-
3
tion prospects John Malcolm in 1794 recorded "on an average
1. Shore to Dundas (no date). Home Misc. Vol.451. P.25*
2. Address from the Berhampore officers to the Directors.
Home Misc. vol. 451? p.490.
3. In 1819, Malcolm became Major General. The East India 
OtWHiaaiHr Military Calendar, vol. 1, p. 468.
in the year 1793? the number of years the officers of each
rank had served in India - the Colonels from 30 to 33 years,
Lieutenant-Colonels from 27 to 30 years, Majors from 25 to 27
years, the Captains from 21 to 25 years and the Lieutenants
from 10 to 21,” “^ The Company officers were indeed of the
2opinion that ”this was an army of subalterns,”
Not only was promotion terribly slow, it also ended
abruptly, for the CompanyTs officers could not achieve a rank
higher than that of Colonel, whatever their competence and
seniority in years of service. Though their knowledge of the
country and of the manners and the language of its inhabitants
gave them a great advantage over any officer of the royal army
the general in charge of a Brigade was always appointed from
a royal regiment, ”The men educated on the fields of Germany
and America were regularly sent to India to lead the troops
there,” It was in sheer despair that we find the officers of
the Bombay native army in a petition asking whether they ”can
avoid feeling themselves degraded when in an army of sixty
thousand men constituted in other respects upon the same prin
ciples as the armies of the European states, there is not a
4single officer above the rank of a Colonel,”
Further, there was no regulation to secure the grant of
1. Malcolm to Col,Mark Wood, relative to the proposed army 
arrangement, 14 November 1794. Home Misc, vol.451. p.243.
2. Address from’the Madras officers to the Directors. Home
Misc, vol. 451.? p.500.
3. Malcolm to Mark Wood relative to the proposed army arrange­
ment, 14 November 1794. Home Misc, vol. 45T, p.243.
4. Address from-the Bombay officers to the Directors. Home
Misc. vol0 451? p.517.
pensions for old Company officers, A worn out* wounded or in­
firm officer could not expect an honourable and comfortable 
retirement from service. He had two avenues open to him and 
neither of them very promising - to remain in India and be ban­
ished from his native land or to return to his friends at home
as an object of charity after twenty or thirty years of 
1
absence.
The Company officers were not even granted the privilege 
of returning to Europe for a limited period during their term 
of service. They had to give up the service and their pay for 
the period of absence from India, if they proceeded homef be 
it for personal reasons or on medical grounds, On return, they 
were kept on half pay and could re-enter the service only when 
a vacancy occurred, The royal officers, on the other hand, were 
not only permitted to visit England during their period of 
service, upon either personal or medical grounds, but they were 
permitted to retain their position in the service and to 
receive their regular pay while on such leave.
To add to all these grievances, the officers of the 
Company7s army found good reason to be greatly perturbed over 
the gradual deterioration of their general prospects. In the 
early eighteenth century men from several sections of English 
society had been encouraged to join the service of the Company 
by the great opportunities India then offered. By 1757 nNabobtT 
had become a familiar and in some circles enviable word in
1. Malcolm to Mark Wood, 14 November 1794. Home Misc, vol.451> 
p.244.
England, ’’There were nabobs who bought fine estates and de- 
voted their energies in making them still finer,” and there 
were others who led a more active life and entered Parliament, 
Consequently, a position with the Company whether administra­
tive or military, came for a time to be considered as a sure 
means to fame and fortune.
But with the passage of Pitt’s Act in 17&4 this picture 
changed, though the change did not make itself immediately 
known to aspiring recruits, who continued to come forward for 
military service with the old expectations only to be disillu­
sioned, Of this change in prospects, Malcolm observed in 1794, 
’’they neither did nor could know - the rise had formerly been
rapid and but a short time ago eleven years were reckoned an
2
unusual length of time to remain a Subaltern. By the last 
decade of the eighteenth century, however, the junior officers 
of the Bengal infantry after some years of service in India, 
had begun to realise that far from returning home as ’Nabobs’, 
they would most likely never rise above the rank of subalterns. 
The growing frustration and discontent with their service 
conditions of the Company’s officers (especially the more 
junior) emerged in the open when several memorials listing 
their grievances were sent during 1793- 94 to the Company’s
3
Government at Fort William. Copies of these memorials were
1. J.M.Holtzman - The Nabobs in England - A study of the 
returned Anglo-Indians. 1760-1785. p770“ " „ a,
2. Malcolm to Mark Wood./Home Misc. Vol. 451? p. 255./^ Nc>VJ*
3. The memorials from officers at Fort William, Fattvjghur, 
Chunargarh, Cawnpore, Dinapore, Berhampore, Madras and 
Bombay, 10 February 1793 bo 10 September 1794. Home Misc. 
Vol. 431, PP.471-517,
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forwarded to the Home authorities at London. Besides ventila­
ting their discontent, the Company officers reproached the 
authorities for their indifference, observing that ”in the
very proportion that your fortune have improved, the prospects
1
of your officers have declined.n The officers further argued 
that the Companyls Government, being essentially a body of 
merchants, was so preoccupied and anxious to maintain its trad­
ing concerns that it neither realised the importance of sov­
ereignty, with which the victories achieved by its army had 
endowed it, nor understood that good policy and justice 
demanded prompt improvement in the service condition of its 
army officers. Though these memorials failed to move the Board
i
to specific action they did find their way into the Calcutta 
Press publication, tTThe World™, in which under the pseudonym 
of Anthony1 several letters, presenting in very strong lang­
uage the claims and rights of the Bengal army officers, were 
2
published. When the editors of the publications received
strong hints from the Government that no such letters should
be published in future, the Company officers of the Bengal army,
as a counter step formed a Select Committee with full powers
to act for the whole army and bought a printing press with the
3
resolve to assert their freedom of expression. The situation 
became increasingly serious. When the Home authorities in
1. Address of the Madras officers. Home Misc. Vol.451? p.501.
2. L. from Col,J.Braithwaite to Maj, G. Braithwaite.
13 April 1794. Home Misc. Vol. 451? p.310.
3. L. from Col.J0Braithwaite to Maj. G. Braithwaite about the 
discontent of the Bengal officers. 13 April 1794. Home 
Misc. Vol.451? p.310.
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London learned of this development they admitted the reason­
ableness of the memorialists* demands and, with the consent of 
His MajestyTs Ministers, assured the officers that relief would 
be provided. However, nothing was done,’*' for the Government 
was too busy with the war against France seriously to consider 
Indian affairs. With such inaction the CompanyTs officers lost 
faith in the Home authorities and thereupon formed committees 
of Bengal officers, both in Bengal and in London to develop a
concerted plan and to force the authorities to redress their 
2
grievances. Their final step was the presentation of a
3
memorial to the King.
By 1794a when Cornwallis returned from India, the action 
of the Bengal officers had compelled the Board to give serious 
consideration to their grievances. (They had been moved also 
by the fact that the Company could ill afford to have rising 
discontent in its army at a period when its Charter was being 
renewed). So,when on 1 September 1794, Henry Dundas, the Pres­
ident of the Board of Control, learnt that Cornwallis had 
given considerable thought to the state of troops in India, he
requested him to submit a plan for the reorganisation of the
4
Company!s army. Cornwallis submitted his proposal on 7 Novem­
ber 1794 to Dundas, who forwarded it to the Directors for their
1. Sir Francis Barring, debate at-the East India House 5 May 
1797* Home Misc. Vol.450, p.295.
2. An Indian Governor-Generalship Ed. H. Furber. pp. 11-12.
3. Memorial of‘the officers to the King (no date) Home Misc. 
Vol.452, p„520.
4. L. from Dundas to Cornwallis, 1 September, 1794.
Cornwallis correspondence op.cit., Vol. "2 , p.263.
1
consideration*
A man of the landed aristocracy and a Whig in his politic*-
al attitude, Cornwallis had a deep rooted belief in English
ideas and institutions. He was convinced that English ways were
2
right and best. To him the defects of the Company’s army 
could best be remedied by integrating it with the royal army. 
After making various specific recommendations to meet the 
grievances of the officers, he pointed out that as the oppor­
tunities for making money were to be found not in service 
with a regiment of the European army of the Company but with a 
regiment of sepoys, the Company’s European regiments had been 
sadly neglected and badly officered. He suggested, therefore, 
that the native wing of the Company’s army should be separated 
completely from the European wing. He further sought to re­
duce the military expenditure of the Company, to reorganise 
the sepoy army on an European model, to improve its morale by 
stopping the frequent transfer of officers and by removing the 
temptation to peculation of the sepoy officers. He also ex­
pressed himself strongly in favour of centralisation and recom­
mended that the Government of India should always refer any 
decision on military matters to the London authorities for 
sanction prior to their introduction.
The Directors took strong exception to Cornwallis’ recom­
mendation that the Company’s army should be merged with that of
1, Cornwallis’ plan of military arrangements for the Company’s 
forces. 7 November 1794, Home Misc, V o l . p . 503.
2, Philips - $p.dia» P.&3.
the King, They were afraid of losing their patronage and
control over the Company’s army and warned Dundas that they
would ”on no account consent to the transfer of the Company’s
1army to the King’s service,” Dundas evolved a compromise
plan and submitted this to the Directors for their approval.
Though based essentially on Cornwallis’ plan with only
minor modifications, Dundas’ plan permitted the Company’s
Government to retain its control over the Company’s army. The
Directors returned this draft with their approval to Dundas in
March 1795. But unfortunately, Dundas, who was too preoccupied
with other pressing business, could not deal with the matter
till September 1795 and the plan in its final shape was not
2
sent to India until January 1796,
This considerable time-lag made the Bengal officers more 
anxious than ever and a mere assurance that a new* plan was 
forthcoming scarcely proved satisfactory to them. Their Select 
Committee again became very active in 1795 and plans for 
securing redress were widely discussed. This development was 
so secretly guarded that the election of the members, the pro­
ceedings of the Committee and the transaction of all their
other business only came to the knowledge of the Government
' 3
at Calcutta at the very end of 1795. All this discontent, 
finding vent in conspiracy, seriously weakened the discipline 
of the Bengal officers, and as General Harris noted, ’’the
1, Philips - Thg:_JSast Inffia ,,, p.90,
2, Ibid. , p. 957"“ '
3* An Indian Governor-Generalship op.cit., p.13.
Subalterns are all become Generals since meetings and conven-
1
tions have taken place, and never think of attending a parade*. 
Sir Robert Abercromby, the Commander-in-chief, for his part, 
expressed his great disappointment ”at not receiving the much 
wanted arrangement for the Indian army” and openly criticised
the CompanyTs home government as ”in no way qualified for the
2management of such a machine.” Even Sir John Shore, the
Governor General wrote on 1 February 1796 that if the regula-
3
tions did not arrive soon he must frame some himself.
Indeed, the situation had become so critical by February 
1796 that Sir John Shore, apprehending a mutiny in Bengal, re­
quested General Craig at the Cape of Good Hope to hold troops
k
in readiness for despatch to Bengal,
The momentum of the crisis fortunately abated, and the
new plan, finalised after protracted negotiations, reached
India by the end of 1796. Under this new arrangement, the
5
Bengal military establishment was to consist of twelve double
battalion regiments of native infantry instead of the 36
battalions, as under the existing organisation,^ Each batta-
lion was to have ten companies. Each regiment was allowed
five field officers i.e. one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels
I* Cornwallis correspondence, op, cit*, Vol. pp.298^299*
Ibid., Vol.2 , p.299*
3* Ibid., Vol.2 , p.316.
4. An Indian Govemor->Generalship - op.cit., p. 14,
5* Madras was allowed to have four regiments of native cavalry 
and ten regiments of native infantry with 1800 privates and 
Bombay had four regiments of native infantry with 1&00 
privates*
6. In carrying out this arrangement several battalions were
broken up and ceased to exist as distinct bodies.
1 lu
and two majors, and the subaltern ranks were to consist of 
seven captains, one captain-lieutenant, 22 lieutenants and 
ten ensigns. The number of native commissioned and non-commis­
sioned officers was to be 240, made up of 20 subadars, 20 
jamadars, 100 havildars and 100 naiks. The total strength of 
each double-battalion regiment was to be 1600 privates. Finally 
for the first time native cavalry was attached on a regular
basis to the Bengal army establishment and was fixed at four 
1
regiments.
The staff complement for each regiment was also laid 
down by this regulation of 1796 and one adjutant and one 
quarter-master (plus two further adjutants, one for each batta­
lion) one pay-master, one sergeant-major, one quarter-master- 
sergeant, one drum major, one fife major, two drill havildars, 
two drill naiks, one surgeon, one surgeon!s mate, and two
native doctors were attched to each regiment of Bengal native 
2
infantry.
By the same plan, the Supreme Government at Fort William 
was made responsible for the other two Presidencies, though for 
all important matters, i.e., the augmentation and reduction of 
army establishments, changes in infantry allowance and the 
appointment of general officers etc,, prior sanction of the 
Home authorities was made compulsory.
Instead of appointments being made to a general staff,
1, The new arrangement, with respect to the ranks and promotions 
of the army in the East Indies, 1796. E.Mss. 0,33.
2. The new arrangement, with respect to the ---  E.Mss, C.33.
the 1796 reforms ruled that officers should be taken from 
their regiments to perform staff duties, and that their promo­
tion should continue to be governed by their position within 
the regiment* Six general officers were appointed to/staff, 
four from the Company’s and two from the King’s army establish­
ment in India, under a procedure similar to that followed by 
the King’s army in England,'*" It was also ruled that promotion 
was to be regulated by seniority within the regiment, and that 
the Directors were to be informed and satisfied with valid 
reasons in all cases of supercession* To eliminate the jealous­
ies then existing between the King’s and the Company’s forces, 
the King’s commission was granted to every officer of the 
Company, ”0f the same date with that which he received from the
Company with a retrospect founded on the date of the King’s
2
commission they now hold.” The brevet rank of captain was 
granted to every lieutenant who had served the Company for 
fifteen years but had failed to receive any higher rank for 
lack of a vacancy. This new rank, however, did not carry with 
it the pay and emoluments of a r'egular captain. Further, the 
ten most senior officers of the Company’s army in Bengal, who 
had been hitherto restricted to colonelcies, were promoted to 
the rank of major-general*
Attention was also paid to the removal of other
1. L, Wraxall - Handbook to the Naval and Military resources 
of the principal"European nations, p*12*
2. The new arrangement, with respect to the rank and promotion 
of the army in the East Indies* 1796. E MSSC C. 33*
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existing discrepancies. Furlough privileges were granted to 
the Companyfs officers, who were now allowed to proceed on 
leave on the pay of their rank, though without any allowance 
or passage money. The subalterns were made eligible for fur­
lough only after 10 years of service, an exception being made 
in case of certified sickness when they were allowed passage 
money,Officers were permitted to retire after 25 years of 
service in India (this period to include three years of fur­
lough), and the retirement pay was fixed at the same rate as
2
that received by an infantry officer of the CompanyTs army 
holding the same rank. These regulations relating to furlough 
and retirement privileges were not applicable to colonels and 
generals, whose privileges depended on the pleasure of the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Government, Their approval, when 
granted, automatically brought full pay on retirement or on 
leave of absence,
A fixed and regular rate of emoluments for the officers 
of the Company serving in all three Presidencies was also 
established, and the varying rates of allowances and batta 
which had been in vogue in the Presidencies, and which had 
formerly caused great discontent in Bengal, were replaced by 
a uniform system for the whole of India. It was ordered that
1, By a G,0. of 24 October 1809, passage money for dismissed 
or retired officers was also allowed. They were to sleep in 
the steerage and mess at the third officers table to whom
the sum of £&69-6-9d was to be paid,
2, The infantry officers of the CompanyTs army received lower
pay than their counterparts in the cavalry.
half batta -was to be granted to all officers, except to colon­
els who were always to receive full batta. It was further ruled 
that full batta was to become the highest allowance except for
the dominions of the Wazir of Oudh where the rate was to be
1 (a)decided by the Bengal Government. The bazaar allowance
1. Pay and allowance for the Bengal native infantry officers 
(European) in garrison.(per month)~in Sonaut * rupee).
Ranks Gratuity Addl.Pay Pay Tent Half batta Total
Allowance
Colonel(hot 
a General
officer) - - 300 180 750 1230 
(full batta)
Lt,Col. — - 240 150 300 690
Major — — 180 120 225 525
Captain
Capt,
36 — 120 75 90 321
Lieutenant 36 — 60 75 90 261
Lieutenant 24 30 60 50 60 224 ■
Ensign 12 30 48 50 45 185
As regards the variation in the rates of batta then existing
the situation was that Bombay officers hardly received any 
batta at all, Madras officers stationed outside the Presid­
ency received only half batta, whether in the field or at 
any other station. Bombay and Madras officers never received 
more than full batta. In comparison, Bengal officers never 
drew less than half batta and a great majority were always on 
full batta. Moreover Bengal officers serving in the Vizier*s 
dominion or outside the borders of the CompanyTs provinces 
were allowed double full batta,
(a) Bazaar Allowances consisted of a duty levied on sales with­
in the cantonment of spiritous liquors, tobacco and other in­
toxicating drugs. Bengal Military Statement 1793/94* p.90.
This duty in the general bazaar of a station belonged to the 
officer commanding the whole force and yielded an additional 
income of about £5000 a year. The duty received by the Com­
manding officer of the Corps from a battalion bazaar was 
equivalent to £1000 a year, P.P,1831-*32, XIII, (735-v)*
H.C. p, 161. 7
* ?TThe term Sonaut rupees, which was of frequent occurrence 
down to the reformation and unification of the Indian coinage 
in 1833, I® one very difficult to elucidate:The word is prop­
erly Sanwat,..According to the old practice in Bengal,coins 
deteriorated in value, in comparison with the rupee of account 
when they passed the third year of their currency, and these 
rupees were termed Sanwat or Sonaut,^Hobson-Jobson,p.775(fn)
I 1
Revenue 1 commission and table2 allowance which had hitherto 
been enjoyed by the Commanding Officers of battalions of the 
Bengal native army were abolished. As regards the payment of 
allowances, the subalterns of the Company's army of the three 
Presidencies were placed on equal footing and the additional 
allowance of one rupee per day enjoyed by the subalterns 
attached to the Bengal native army, the sepoy allowance enjoyed 
by the Madras subalterns, and the language allowance of the 
Bombay subalterns were all withdrawn. The general officers on 
the staff were sanctioned an aggregate allowance of 4000 sonaut 
rupees per month during peace and an additional sum of 1000 
sonaut rupees in time of war. Besides this, the general 
officers were allowed to receive the regimental pay and allow­
ance of a colonel as well as their share from the off-reckon- 
3ing fund, which was an aggregate fund subdivided equally 
between the colonels. The general officers were also allowed 
400 Sonaut rupees for camp equipage, carriage and travelling 
expenses.
1. Revenue Commission was granted by a General order of 25th 
August 1789. The Hon'ble Court of Directors allotted a sum 
of six lacs of current rupees to the field officers of the 
King's and Company's forces of Bengal establishment - Bengal 
Military Statement 1793/94. p.90.
2. Table Allowance, 1200 rupees per month was granted to the 
Commanding officer of a native infantry Brigade for main­
taining his position. Ibid., p. 37#
3. Off-reckoning fund - A portion of the monthly pay of the 
non-commissioned officers and privates was stopped to pro­
vide them with clothing. The clothing was supplied by con­
tract and the difference between the contract cost and the 
stoppage total was credited to the off-reckoning fund which 
was divided amongst the Captains commanding the native batt­
alions, Each Adjutant received about Rs,1200 a year from the 
fund whereas a Captain received about Rs,2500.
’Vol. 452,— py489* t
11 j»
New gradations of junior lieutenant-colonel and junior 
major were introduced in each native regiment. These officers 
were to receive the salary of their rank, with the allowances 
of the next inferior rank. This was a measure designed to 
adopt a?oyal army procedure for use in the Company’s army and 
so to create additional opportunities for promotion. Besides 
this, three additional subalterns were attached to each native 
regiment for their better control, over and above the officer 
complement of the corresponding European regiment.
Measures were also adopted to improve the administration 
of the native soldiers and to ensure their regular payment. 
Hitherto, company commanders had been responsible for issuing 
their pay to the native soldiers under their command and they 
had not been required to furnish any records to certify the 
authenticity of such payments as they reported had been made.
A captain or a major in charge of a battalion of sepoys had 
therefore been able to make a fortune for himself over a few 
years by defrauding his men or by keeping his battalion under­
strength. In fact, this fraud had been so widespread that 
Wellington had observed ?TEvery officer who was detached made
1
a sum of money in proportion to the size of his detachment,”
and Sir John Shore had informed Dundas in 1795 of the case of
a certain Captain Green who, having withheld the batta of the
sepoys and having been tried by Court martial, had been com-
2pelled "to make a restitution of 30?000 rupees.” Under the
Wellington Despatches $&c€won, p. 595
2. An Indian Governor-Generalship op.cit., p.13
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1796 plan, it was ordered that "after every issue of pay, 
acquittance rolls signed by every individual of each company 
showing that he had received his full demand,," were to be 
delivered to the Commanding Officer of the regiment. One of the 
officers, holding rank below field officer, was to be appointed 
as paymaster in each regiment and was to be made responsible 
for making payments in accordance with the rules. Moreover, 
the paymaster was also ordered to prepare detailed muster rolls 
for every month and send these to the Government,
Finally, the plan attempted to improve relationship 
between the officers and their sepoys. All officers of the Pre­
sidential armies were ordered to promote the sepoys on the 
basis of seniority and to publish these promotions in regiment­
al orders. The Articles of War were to be published in both the 
Persian and Nagari characters, and every officer commanding a 
corps of sepoys was ordered to read out and explain these to 
the sepoys once a month. Significantly only the Commanding 
Officer of a regiment was authorised to approve a new recruit, 
grant leave of absence to the native soldiers or to dismiss a 
sepoy for unfitness. He was to record in the regimental orders 
the reasons of all dismissals. Furthermore, it was laid down 
that native soldiers might only be punished by Court-martial 
and that only a General Court-martial could dismiss a sepoy.
It was also laid down that the officers of the European 
regiments and those of the native regiments of the CompanyTs 
army were to be treated as separate bodies and no interchange 
between them was to be permitted.
This plan of reorganisation was published as a General
Order in India in 1796, The now regulations fell so far short
of the expectations of the Bengal army officers that their 
promulgation brought forth remonstrations from every station. 
The Home authorities were blamed for indifference and were 
accused of having unworthy motives in framing some parts of the 
regulation. Each and every measure was bitterly criticised.
The order regarding regimental promotion was held by the 
officers to contradict their implied contract with the Company 
as laid down by an Act of Parliament in 17&5. That Act 
had stated that all promotions and advancements of officers and 
servants of the East India Company in India, Civil and Military 
in their respective line shall be made according to seniority
of appointment in a regular progressive succession. In the
opinion of the Bengal officers, the new rules regarding regi­
mental promotion laid down that the seniority was to be consid­
ered within the officers1 respective regiments only, rather 
than in the line, so that the date of their appointment no 
longer had any importance. Consequently, they thought the mea­
sure to be "constituted upon such narrow circumscribed princi­
ple that * *. instead of our hopes and expectations being
realised it is an aggravation of the sufferings of which 
2
we complain." The granting of furlough privileges and retire­
ment pensions were regarded as "consolations that justice and
1. Memorial from the officers at Dinapore. 12 May 1797. Home 
Misc. Vol.454. p,120.
2, Memorial from the officers it Midnapore, 21 May 1796. Home 
Misc. Vol. 454, p,133.
humanity had long called for,” but in the words of the Bengal 
officers, ”public interest and advantage of service” required 
something more substantial and immediate than permission to 
retire after twenty five years of service with ten shillings 
a day,^ The measure adopted to separate the European wing of 
the CompanyTs army from the Native wing was also severely 
criticised. The officers of the European regiments strongly 
resented this order as it meant not only a reduction in the 
possible scope of their earnings - as officers of the sepoy 
regiment, they had enjoyed bazaar money and tent allowance - 
but a loss of other advantages like that of a superior command 
at a great number of separate and independent stations. They 
further argued that he ”who has not occasionally served with 
both the descriptions of men of which the armies in India are 
composed, European and native, cannot be a finished Indian 
officerr— ♦ The French, the first of European powers that 
raised and disciplined corps of sepoys, were never able to 
render them formidable, principally from their having wholly 
separating this line from the European, the consequence was 
that the officers in the native branch, considering themselves 
as inferior, soon lost that self-esteem which is the soul of
o
a military man, and became contemptible.” It was similarly 
argued that, ”the officers henceforth to be attached exclusive­
ly to the CompanyTs native Corps will inevitably be considered
as a less respectable body than the officers of the European
1, Memorial from the officers at Chunar, (no date) Home Misc, 
Vol.454, p.146.
2, Memorial from the officers at London. 9 May 1797. Home Misc. 
Vol.454, p.293.
1establishment*?T
Besides these issues, the Bengal officers were most
disturbed by the abolition of the bazaar money and various
other allowances which they had enjoyed - among their real
motives for originally joining this service had been that of
securing these plums. As they noted, nIn our early youth we
had exiled ourselves from our mother country, bade farewell to
our friends not for the mere receipt of the present pay of our
respective ranks but for obtaining those high emoluments,
bazaar money, revenue commission, double full batta. the strong
and only inducements which decided our selection of the Bast
India CompanyTs service; now it has been taken, can law and
equity defend this invasion of the breach of faith which dooms
us to perpetual slavery or turns us grey headed beggars upon 
2
the world*
Widespread indeed was the discontent among the Bengal
army officers that followed the publication of the regulations.
The resistance to the new regulations was so apparent that the
Governor-General Sir John Shore and the Bengal Council thought
it judicious to apply the new system with care and to modify it
wherever it seemed necessary. The Governor-General, in fact,
was of the opinion that the new regulations were not TTfounded
on solid principles or framed with any knowledge of the 
3
c o u n t r y . B o t h  he and the Bengal Council considered the
1. Memorial from the officers at London. 9 May, 1797*Home Misc. 
Vol.454. p.293.
2. Memorial from the officers at London. 9 May 1797. Home Misc, 
Vol.454. p.293.
3* Cornwallis Correspondence op.cit., Vol. 2, p.316,
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situation to be so aggravated that, having sent the Governor-
General *s minute to England, they decided to act without wait-
1
ing for a reply. They modified the regulations with regard to 
allowances and the question of promotion, and then circulated 
these modified rules to the other Presidencies with a request 
to adopt them. The Directors were subsequently informed that 
the pressure upon the Government of Bengal had been so great 
as to necessitate this action,
These modifications were purposely designed to meet the 
most acute of the demands of the officers. Promotion was still 
to be based on regimental seniority as in the plan sent by the 
London authorities, but only up to the ranks of major and after 
that on one general line. The rates of batta, table allowance 
for a dolonel, and tent allowance such as had been enjoyed by 
the officers of the native troops were reinstituted, and all 
the Company officers promoted to brevet rank were granted batta 
retrospective to the date of their brevet commissions. Junior 
lieutenant-colonels and junior majors were also allowed batta 
and other allowances of their respective ranks. An extra allow­
ance of one rupee per day was also granted to officers holding 
the rank of captain-1ier. tenant to support the character of such 
rank. The officers serving in the W^jirTs dominion were allowed
1, In those days it took a long time for a despatch to travel 
between India and England, The army arrangements as advised 
by the Home authorities were sent out to India in January 
179^ > but reached India only by the end of that year, Simi­
larly the minute of the Governor-General did not reach 
England till December 1797. Cornwallis Correspondence 
op.cit. , \M/1, r>\c> .
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full or double full batta depending upon their rank, because
nothing short of that sum would be sufficient compensation for
the increased expenses of the officers stationed there. Full
batta was also allowed to the general officers* who were not
on the staff together with a share from the off-reckoning
fund. These modifications were duly forwarded to the Directors
1
by the Governor General in Council.
The despatches sent by Sir John Shore to England on
the subject of the new regulations reached the Home authorities
by 5 December 1797# Five days later, the Directors received
another letter from Sir John Shore, in which he indicated that
modifications had been made and expressed the hope that the
General Orders as modified by his Council would be acceptable
2
to the officers. But the London authorities were greatly 
alarmed at what the Bengal officers had demanded and at what 
the Bengal Government had done. They severely censured the 
officers: ”Instead of receiving the material benefits and ad­
vantages held out to them by the new regulations with gratitude 
and respect,[ they] had presumed to arraign those Regulations 
in a style of disrespect and intemperance highly unbecoming
the situation in which they stand to those who had prescribed 
3
them.M The action of the Governor-General was no less
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1- CornwallisT correspondence, op.cit., Vol. 2 , p.316.
2. TbidT7-*^ Voirr-^ —] p. 316,
3# M.D. to Bengal 6 June 1798. para 118, E. MSS. C-33.
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severely condemned: though ”some few individuals might not
feel their present situations to be exactly what they wished,”
any modification of the plan should have been referred to the
authorities at London, previous to its being carried into exe- 
1
cution, The Directors felt that Sir John Shore had not shown
the firmness and decision befitting a Governor-General and they
decided to recall him and to replace him by Lord Cornwallis,
2
who was sworn in as Governor-General on 1 February 1797.
Yet even though the Board of Control initially con­
demned Shore and the Bengal officers, they in time had to deal 
with the situation as it existed, and even to initiate a series 
of discussions in London with the Committee of Bengal officers, 
on the basis of the modifications made by the Bengal Government, 
Though they did not approve of all the changes, they did ac­
quiesce in certain of them and by so doing they went against
the will of Lord Cornwallis, who eventually resigned in
3
protest in August 1797.
On the basis of this compromise between the Court and 
the Committee of Bengal officers, orders were sent to the 
Bengal Government that the increased batta for the brevet 
ranks, which had already cost the Company an additional expen­
diture of six lakhs of rupees, be discontinued. It was also 
laid down that no officer should be allowed higher batta than 
that of his regimental rank. The tent allowance for a colonel
1, M0D, to Bengal, 6 June 179$. para. 119, E.MSS, C-33.
2, Cornwallis correspond ence. op.cit,, Vol.2 • p. 316.
3, Ibid., Vol. 2. p.317.
was also withdrawn, as the new regulations had already augmented 
the emoluments of this rank. The Bengal Government was further 
ordered to publish an order to the effect that, i!if any of our 
officers hereafter presume to address themselves to our Govern­
ment in an offensive, intemperate and disrespectful style upon 
the subject of orders received from us, such officers, whatever
be their rank or services, be immediately dismissed from our
1
employ and sent to England,1
Though the modifications made by the Bengal Government 
had in some measure been undone by the Court, one of the princi­
pal objectives of the original reorganisation, - namely that of 
economy - had been defeated. So alarmed was the Bengal Govern­
ment at the discontent of its army officers that peace had been 
bought at the expensive price of an additional permanent expen­
diture of about six to seven lakhs of rupees per annum. And 
this purchase in turn, proved to be of dubious value, for though 
the officers of the Bengal army returned to their duty, the 
encouragement thus given to their mutinous proceedings affected 
the whole future history of the sepoy army, Sir John Shore 
failed where Clive had succeeded in 1766 and one might reason­
ably conjecture that had there been a Clive, the question of 
the Government granting concessions to the mutinous officers 
might never have arisen.
Although the Bengal officers were satisfied with the 
modified regulations, the reform promulgated in 1796 was not
1, M.D, to Bengal, 6 June 179$. para, 119. E,MSS* C-33*
beyond criticism. The size of the military establishment laid
down for Bengal was not in keeping with the requirement of the
Presidency. As the Duke of Wellington later noted, ftIt seems
difficult to say, upon what principle the establishment of 
. 1
1796 was formed.™ The provinces of Bengal and Bihar, a small 
part of Orissa, and the zamindary of Benares were directly 
under the control of the Bengal Government. The defence and 
the security of the Nawab Wazir*s dominion was also entrusted 
to the Company!s government. The Bengal army was thus required 
to guard the frontiers of the British provinces and the Wazir*s 
country and also to man the principal military stations so as 
to curb internal disturbances and afford protection from for­
eign attack. Thus the native establishment of twelve regiments 
of Infantry and four regiments of Cavalry, which was sanctioned 
in 1796, was spread over an area of 215?000 square miles and 
could hardly be considered adequate for either defence or sec­
urity. ,?It was not sufficient for any purpose not even as a
2
peace establishment.^ As a result this limit could not be
adhered to and within four years, i.e., by 1&00, the Bengal
native army establishment carried a complement of 19 regiments
3
of Infanbry and six regiments of Cavalry.
The complement of officers allocated to a regiment of
1. Wellington Despatches Ed„Cwen., p.Akk.
2. Wellington Despatches Ed.Qwon... p. 144.
3. ^Observations on the military letter to Bengal 11 February 
lBOl and a proposed despatch regarding reduction of Military 
establishments in India.n
Home Misc. Vol.£7. p.115.
native troops was also a subject of criticism* A native regiment 
consisting of 1600 sepoys and an European regiment with only 
950 soldiers were allowed the same number of European officers. 
And this in spite of the fact that the efficiency of a native 
regiment greatly depended upon its officers, and the need for 
officers was thus naturally greater in a sepoy regiment than 
in an European one. Besides, the new regulation allowed officers 
to seek appointments on the staff, in volunteer service, with 
detached corps or irregular local troops or even in the Civil 
Department, In fact, the opportunities that opened before the 
army officers were so varied that many of them could pick their 
positions* Since the reform of 1796 had greatly curtailed an 
officerTs chances of making quick money, and service with the 
CompanyTs army had lost much of its attraction, many officers 
did look for other posts outside their regiments. As the Home 
authorities at the period were concentrating on the problem of 
officers rendered surplus to establishment by the 1796 reorg­
anisation, not a single ensign was appointed to any one of the
i
native infantry regiments for the period from 1796 to 1799. This 
rather too drastic measure when taken in addition to a continued 
drainage of officers into alternative situations, depleted the 
officer complement of the sepoy regiments very appreciably. In
2
some regiments the number of officers missing was as great as ter
1.Bengal Military Statement. 1796/97> 1797/9$, 179$/99. This 
was so because the Home authorities sought to absorb the 
officers rendered surplus by the reorganisation of 1796.
2, Bengal Military Statement 1796/97, 1793/99.
thereby reducing the sanctioned number of 40 officers to 30. 
That number was not enough for carrying out even routine 
regimental dutiesJ-
Though the regulations of 1796 allowed of promotion to 
higher rank for a considerable number of subalterns it had not 
been possible to promote every one of them. Several officers 
with the brevet rank of captain remained subalterns, and in 
the Bengal army there remained 140 to 150 subalterns of 14 or 
15 years standing with hardly any prospect of promotion. These 
officers continued to be very dissatisfied and formed the hard 
core of discontent in the army,
Eten the furlough regulations as laid down in the 
reforms of 1796, though apparently a good measure, proved to 
be impracticable. Not even one officer out of ten as a subal­
tern could avail himself of leave of absence for the very 
reason that he could not raise the passage money, Besides, the 
furlough pay in England of ten shillings a day for a captain 
was totally inadequate to support a man and his family. For 
simple economic reasons therefore, an officer generally wanted 
to complete his turn of service of 22 years and retire with 
full pay and other benefits in preference to proceeding on 
furlough.~
However the measures adopted to reduce the earning 
potentialities of the officers were those which irked the 
Bengal officers most and in time adversely affected their per­
formance within the regiments. Before 1796, the Commanding
1. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-V), H.C. P.9.
2. Ibid,, p.9-
Officer of a corps of sepoys granted furlough to his men on
condition that they gave up their pay to him during their
absence* The Commanding Officer used to use this money as
capital and lend it at a high interest to the Company or to an 
1
individual* The appointment of a paymaster to each sepoy reg­
iment stopped this source of earnings and various other illegal 
means like faked pay rolls3 non-payment of batta etc*
Barred by the new reforms from many old-established 
sources of extra money, the officers looked for weaknesses 
within the new system which might be exploited - and found one 
in the transfer regulations. Before 1796 an officer had been 
permitted to change his regiment according to his own will, 
but after the reforms of 1796 transfer from one regiment to the
other had to be sanctioned by local authority, though the
2sanction of the Directors was not needed. Thus, transfers
soon came to be arranged in order to enable officers to be
posted to higher earning posts. As a result, officers attached
3
to regiments at cantonments where half batta was allowed 
came to be either fTon furlough** or v*with the staffs, whereas 
officers stationed with regiments at Benares or at certain 
stations of Bengal and Bihar where full batta was allowed or 
in Oudh where double full batta was permitted wesre all present 
and accounted for. Most of the regiments at the half batta
1* Wellington Despatches Ed„Qw»en_, p. 596.
2, M.D, to Bengal, 4 June 1?>34. Memoranda of Military reference. 
Vol.IS, No. 712.
3. Dinapore, Berhampore, Barrackpore and Dumdum were half batta 
stations. Bengal Military Statement, 1793/94.
stations had no other officer except the colonel, who always
received full batta T and the adjutant and quarter-master who
1received very large allowances, and it was not altogether
surprising to find as in the case of Barrackpore, that a sepoy
battalion was entirely managed by an adjutant and the sergeant- 
2
dajor. The Bengal officers thus arranged transfers for them*- 
selves to the more lucrative posts and offset the decline in 
their income resulting from the reforms in army administration. 
But their shifts and expedients did more than defeat the 
authorities1 plan to secure economy* it fostered a disregard 
for duty in the officers and a state of indiscipline amongst 
the sepoy ranks.
Besides the reduction in earnings, the drastic cur­
tailment of the authority vested in the European officers of 
the sepoy regiments also became a cause of disgust with the 
service. The enforcement of detailed regulations and the 
allotment of increased responsibility to staff positions prac­
tically deprived the flineT officers of all decision-making 
power. The change of emphasis had so altered the old situation 
of regimental autonomy that the sepoy officers came to consider 
their routine duties as being boring and unattractive. In 
addition, this withdrawal of authority lowered the prestige and 
influence of the !line! officers in the eyes of their sepoys 
and had far reaching consequences for sepoy discipline,
1, Bengal Military Statement, 1798/?99.
2. J.H.Stodtqueler - The Old Field Officer, Vol, 1, p.61,
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The deterioration in morale caused by the various 
factors outlined above might have been arrested had any measures 
been taken in 1796 to improve the selection and training of the 
European officers for the sepoy corps* But none were taken, and 
junior officers arriving in India only to find themselves posted 
to undermanned regiments officered by the disgruntled who had 
failed to secure a transfer to a more lucrative post or station, 
were only too likely themselves to become disgruntled*
That inadequate selection and training was one of the 
shortcomings in the reforms of 1796 was eventually realised by 
the Home authorities and though the next few years, from 1798 
to 1B1 3, saw no further wholesale reorganisation in the 
CompanyTs army in Bengal, both the Court and the Bengal Govern­
ment did busy themselves in framing various rules and regulat­
ions for the training of cadets.
Prior to 1796, mmt from the Company’s European regiments 
had normally been selected to serve as officers of the sepoy 
regiments, it being felt that they would thereby acquire a 
competent knowledge of their military duty as well as of the 
language, manners and habits of the inhabitants of the 
country. Since the new regulation of 1796 forbade any 
transfer between the two wings of the Company’s army below the 
rank of major, cadets for the sepoy units after that year had 
to join their respective regiments directly, thus being 
deprived of the very essential training phase. To correct this, 
the Directors of the Company made arrangements with the 
Military academy at Woolwich in England to train officers for
the Company*s service in India.
Woolwich did provide some officers from 179$ onwards, 
but a great majority of the infantry cadets still proceeded to 
India without any training whatsoever and were immediately
2
placed with their sepoy corps, of which they knew nothing.
This absence of training was a problem in itself, but it was 
rendered even more of one by the fact that the minimum accept­
able age for recruitment of a cadet for service in India was 
the tender one of 15 years and even this age limit was not
strictly adhered to, and many instances occurred of cadets
3
overstating their age at the time of embarkation.^ Indeed 
this practice became so widespread that the Home authorities 
decided to demand a copy of his birth or baptismal certificate 
as evidence of age from each future cadet. In cases where none 
was available, it was laid down that the party had to swear an 
affidavit that he was of the required age. But even allowing 
for this precaution, the Home authorities still failed to 
realise that fifteen was too young an age to send a boy to 
India, The situation was further worsened by the fact that 
^only five per cent of the whole had any elementary or pro­
fessional education at the universities or the large public
1. The Directors paid at the rate of £100 per annum for each of
their cadets at Woolwich in addition to a sum of £3000 for
providing the extra accommodation required. The average
length of stay was from two to two and half years,
V. C.P, Hodson - Officers of the Bengal Army (175&-1&34)
Part I Introduction,
2, Memoirs and correspondence of Lord Wellesley - Ed. M,Martin 
Vol. 2, p.186.
3o V.C.P, Hcd!son - op. clt? . introduction.
1
schools,” before sailing for India.
Confronted with such immature and ill-trained cadets,
the Bengal Government requested the Home authorities in 1802
to grant permission to start an institution for the training
2
of cadets at Baraset, a village 16 miles north of Calcutta.
It was proposed that all cadets should be required on arrival
to go through a period of training at this institution, *?for
the purpose of being instructed in the native language and in
their military duty previous to their appointment to their res-
pective corps.” In 1804, after the permission of the Court
had been obtained a cadet institution was started at Baraset
4under the authority of the Bengal Government. A cadet-company 
was formed under Captain Richardson as commandant or head 
master, and he was assisted by a second-in-command who was a 
professor in Hindi. A few other subaltern officers acted as 
professors of various subjects, one of them acting as a drill 
superintendent. The institution was designed to train cadets 
for both the infantry and the cavalry wings of the Bengal army.
Though based on sound principles and started with good 
intentions, the institution at Baraset failed to improve 
matters. The failure lay less in the institute than in the 
character of the cadet candidates. Immature in outlook and with 
20 rupees as monthly pay and one rupee per day as half batta
1- V., C. PtJ Hodson- - pp. cit. , introduction.
2, L. from G.G, in"Council 11 June 1802, M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol.l.,
3, from the G.G. in Council to the Court 11 June 1802.
M„LP received from Bengal Vol.l,
4, D* from the Court to the G.G. in Council at Ft, William.
20 June 1804. M,D. sent to Bengal Vol.®„l*
the young cadets were less interested in learning the necessary
military subjects than they were in the carefree pursuits of
shooting, drinking, gaming and smoking in accordance with the
prevailing image of a gentleman officer - one who drank hard,
1
used foul language, gambled and duelled. The authorities 
failed to ensure attention to study, and the cadets were too
often allowed to behave irresponsibly. Numerous were the ad-
*
verse reports on their escapades, and various acts of violence 
were committed by them on the inhabitants of the neighbouring 
villages. In fact John Grant, a cadet of the Baraset institu* 
tion, who had "obtained great notoriety on account of mis­
chievous tricks played by the CompanyTs cadets on the natives 
was tried by the Calcutta Supreme Court in January 1808 for 
wilfully and maliciously setting on a fire and burning a hut
at Baraset, the property of Keeno Bearer on the 24th October 
2
1 8 0 7 * G r a n t  was found guilty and was sentenced to death,
which was subsequently commuted to transportation to New South 
3
Wales, Even the officers of the school staff were not safe
from these cadets, four of whom were tried for an assault on
William Turner, the garrison sergeant of Fort William and were
convicted and sentenced by the Civil Magistrate to six months 
4
imprisonment. The Magistrate of the 24 Parganas reported that
1. W.H,Carey - The Good old days of HonTble John Company.
Vol.l, pp.224-225.
2. L. from the G.G, in Council to the Court 27 March 1809 
para 816. M.L. received from Bengal Vol.4.
3. L, from the G.G. in Council to the Court, 27 March 1809, 
para 846. M.L. received from Bengal Vol.4.
4. L. from the G.G, in Council to the Court. 20 April 1809. 
para 11. M.L, received from Bengal Vol.4.
the natives were much exposed to the oppression of the cadets,
and the police sergeant stated that ”he could not reside there
with safety”** Besides these acts of irregularity and violence
outside the school, the cadets broke much of the furniture of
2
the institution, and did not hesitate to behave insolently to
the authorities. Cadets J. Kern and C. Elison, for instance,
sent a letter to the principal, Captain Richardson, intimating
their wilful intent not to study the **black language,”  ^This
earned them the displeasure of the Government which ordered
them **to be suspended from the service of the Company unless
the pleasure of the Hon’ble'Court of Directors be known and
that these gentlemen be ordered to prepare to embark for
Europe by the earliest opportunity.^ The cadets also formed
their own code of law based upon duelling, until the Bengal
Government issued an order that duels were forbidden among 
5
the cadets.
Much of this misbehaviour by the cadets must be attri­
buted to individual foibles and the high spirits of youth.
Some can be attributed to mistaken notions of how to show one­
self to be an officer and a gentleman. Some - especially that 
part which related to ill-treatment of Indians and disregard
1. L, from the G.G,. in Council to the Court 17 October 1809* 
paras 324, 327 and 328. M.L. received from Bengal Vol.5*
2. L, from the G.G. in Council to the Court 17 October 1809* 
para. 328. M.L. received from Bengal Vol.5.
3. L, from the G.G. in Council to the Court 4 August 1809. 
paras 324-328. M.L, received from Bengal Vol.f.4.
4. L. from the G.G. in Council to the Court 19 August 1809. 
paras. 4 and 10. M.L. received from Bengal Vol.S. 4,
5. G.O.G.G. k May 1807. Carroll's/Code 1817. Sec.XI. /Bengal
for their customs - may be attributed to the general hardening
of European attitudes towards India which appeared in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One of the paradoxes
of the period was that the growth of evangelic Christianity all
too often led to unchristian behaviour. But a cadet who in
1797 read in Charles GrantTs work on TTthe Asiatic subjects of
Great Bri t a i n , t h a t  Indians were f*as a race lamentably degen-
1erate and baseJT was at least as likely to despise as to pity 
the villagers of Baraset or the sepoys of his regiment. If he 
was constantly reminded that everything Indian - religion, law, 
arts and sciences, habits and manners - was decadent, he was 
as likely to be filled with contempt as with reforming zeal. 
Attitudes of superiority in the cadet were further fostered by 
the obvious progress in Europe of the technological or indust­
rial revolution and the contrasts with the static nature of 
Indian society. The growth of English industry had opened up 
the prospect of transforming India into a vast market for the 
use of British Industry,na transformation which demanded a 
new expansive and aggressive attitude^ on the part of English 
industrialists,. The cadets, immature and impressionable as they 
were, all too easily caught the contagion of such attitudes.
The authorities at Fort William were most concerned 
over these developments and frequently reported such matters
1. Charles Grant -Observations on the state of society among 
the Asiatic subjects p„71*
2. Eric Stokes - The Englis^tilitarians _and India, p.xiii.
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to the Directors. But limited as they were by the regulations of
1796, without previous sanction from the Directors, they could
take no other step even in extreme cases but to suspend a
misbehaving cadet. To obtain such approval usually took a year,
so that in most cases the very object of punishment was lost.
Simple expulsion from the Baraset establishment would have
meant that the offender would be allowed to join his corps.
But expulsion, under those circumstances, could easily be con-'
sidered by the cadets, ”as the full attainment of their wishes
and as a triumph over their commanding officers and the Govern- 
1ment, Expulsion operated, indeed, as an encouragement upon
other cadets to seek escape from the Institution rather than
to obtain the approbation of their superiors by diligent and
regular attention to their duty. Only in such flagrant cases
as those of Grant^ in 1807 and Hatchet^ in 1809 did the 
authorities take the extreme step of ordering them to return
home in disgrace. In both these cases the Directors approved
CalcuttaTs actions. In numerous other cases, however, the
Directors asked a pardon for the offending cadets whom the
Bengal Government wanted to suspend. This weakened the Bengal
Governments resolve and as the events proved later, it would
1. L, from G.G. in Council to the Court 19 August 1809* 
para 9# M.L. received from Bengal Vol.®. 4.
2. See p|> 132. of this chapter.
3. Mr. Hatchet came to India with an appointment as a cadet in 
the CompanyTs service. He conducted himself with great 
irregularity, disregarded all military rules, was guilty of 
many crimes and was eventually tried for forgery. He was 
suspended from the service and was ordered by the Governor- 
General in Council to embark for Europe,
Europeans in India 1766-1824. Vol. 25. (no page mark)
have been wiser for the Directors to have been more strict 
rather than lenient, thereby ensuring caution and responsible 
behaviour from its cadets.
"Pained and disappointed at the numerous instances of 
misconduct" by the cadets, the authorities realised that their 
hope of earning the gratitude and obedience of the cadets, "for 
the care taken by the Government to make those young men useful 
and creditable members of their honourable profession""** would 
not be fulfilled* While recognising the virtue of a prelimin­
ary training for a cadet the majority of tne Directors decided 
that England was a better place for imparting this training. 
Accordingly, a new Military seminary was established at
Addiscombe for the training of the infantry cadets and by 1811
3
the Baraset institution had been closed down. The Directors 
however retained the age limit of 15 to 22 years for the 
admission of the cadets and instructed the Government of India 
to appoint graduate cadets from Addiscombe directly to the 
native regiments with the rank of junior ensigns.^ At
1. D, from the Court to the G.G. 27 February 1811. M.D. sent 
to Bengal Vol.3.
2. "Addiscombe - formerly called Edgecomb, Adgcomb, or Adscombe 
•situated about a mile east of Croydon on the Shirley Road"
Vibart - Addiscombe its heroes and men of note.p.9 
"It was established for the purpose of providing a suitable 
education for officers intended for the Scientific branches 
of the army and it happened to be able to accomodate a 
large number and therefore the excess not required for the 
engineers or artillery is sent to the infantry.
JpC.Melvill, Secretary to the Court of Directors before 
the Select Committee. P.P. 1852-T53. XXXI,(627), H.L.p.ljl
3. D0 from the Court to the G.G0 27 February 1811. M,Dw sent 
to Bengal Vol.3.
4. D. from the Court to the G.G. 20 April 1811, M.D. sent to 
Bengal. Vol.3*
Addiscombe the cadet was trained in mathematics, fortification, 
surveying, sketching and languages,1* but little attention was 
paid to the history, culture and the people of India. Thus, the 
ultimate result was similar to that of Baraset* At an age of 
fifteen or sixteen, with no thorough understanding of Indian 
ways, the cadet was sent forth to officer a hundred or more 
Indian soldiers about whom he hardly knew anything. What was 
thus gained on the upswing of organised training was lost on 
the downswing of the practice of direct posting, and the prob­
lem remained as acute as it had ever been. It is not surpris­
ing to find a gradual, yet marked deterioration in the relat­
ionship between the European officers and their sepoys through­
out the period of 1796 to 1852. As General Auchmuty acutely 
observed, *’The naturally high spirit of the great mass of the 
native army renders them disgusted with the careless and not 
frequently contemptuous conduct of their European officers,
p
particularly of the junior ranks, towards t h e m . * It was 
this deterioration, so closely linked with the inadequate 
training of young officers, which was to contribute so adverse­
ly to the later history of the sepoy army.
As has been said before, from 1797 to 1813 the Court 
did not send out any new plan regarding its army in India. The 
Directors were fully aware that the good intentions of Lord
1. Vibart - op.cit.. p,226.
2. L* to Commanding Officers particularly to those of Madras 
regarding relation of European officers to native ranks by 
Lt, General-Sir Samuel Auchmuty. 23 October 1813. Home Misc. 
Vol.88, p.955*
Cornwallis and the practical wisdom of Dundas as embodied in 
the reforms of 1796 had achieved only limited objectives, and 
had, indeed, created new problems in the place of the old ones. 
The Directors were not happy with the state of economy and - 
discipline, the Government at Fort William was irritated over 
the curtailment of its power and the serious results of poor 
cadet training, and the European officers, whose grievances 
the reform had sought to meet, remained unsatisfied over the 
reduction in their allowances and the curtailment of their 
regimental authority. (This was specially true of the subal- ■ 
terns, who were the worst sufferers. ) But the most damaging 
outcome of the reform was the fact that the officers felt that 
whatever benefits they had derived was owing to their own 
joint strength and policy of protest rather than to the good 
judgment and generosity of the Company.
However;, the question of military organisation and 
administration did not arise again until the charter was 
reconsidered in 1813. At that time the Directors established 
a special Committee for economy. On the principle that T?no 
office be continued which is not necessary for conducting the 
public business,the Committee planned retrenchments in the 
Company fs civil and military establishments.'*- The Directors 
accordingly submitted a plan to the Board for reorganising *th© 
the army in India which bhey hoped would reduce military 
expenditure. They suggested a decrease in the number of sepoy 
regiments and of the KingTs troops in India but recommended
1. Philips - op.cit,, p.197*
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an increase of one regiment of the CompanyTs European troops
both at Bengal and Madras.
They argued that this increase was necessary to provide
1
future European officers for their sepoy army units. But this
aspect of the plan, like every other feature, was ill-received
by the Board, which had become most hostile to the Court of
Directors. Buckinghamshire, in his capacity as the President
of the Board of Control, ”bluntly refused to consider any
change in the number of the King’s troops in India but sanc-
2tioned the reduction of the Company’s troops,” and upon this 
premise, the Directors were compelled to draw up a new plan 
which was duly forwarded to the Bengal Government in November 
1B14.
The measures recommended therein were justified by the 
Directors on a consideration of ”the conclusion of peace in 
Europe, the consequent return of the force employed in the 
settlements to be restored to the Government of Netherlands, 
the condition under which restitution is made of the possess­
ions in India formerly belonging to France and the inadequacy 
of the territorial revenue to meet the existing expenditure.” 
All these amongst many important considerations, had led them,
they wrote, ”most seriously to revise the state of our military
3
establishments.” On this occasion, however, the Directors
1.Plan submitted by the Directors to the Board, 1B14.
Home Misc. Vol.522. Draft 174.
2. Philips - op.cit., p.197.
3. Army plan sent by the Court to the Governor-General^in 
Council at Fort William B November 1B14, H*
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took special pains to impress on their agents in India that 
nin the attention that we have given to this subject we have 
not overlooked objects which though attended with some addit­
ional expenditure appear essential to the comforts of our
the double-battalion regiment structure of the Bengal native 
infantry and approved the increase in establishment that had 
already taken place. The Bengal native army establishment was 
allowed to have 27 regiments of infantry and seven regiments 
of cavalry. But, while the complement of field officers per 
regiment remained the same as that sanctioned in 1796, i.e. 
one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, and two majors, the com­
plement of officers of junior ranks per •regiment was reduced 
from 40 to 28 and was to be composed of eight captains, 14 
lieutenants and six ensigns. Thus, the post of captain-lieu- 
tenant was abolished and the number of subalterns was drastic­
ally reduced. It was also proposed that any vacancy for ensigns 
in the native army units should be filled by such senior 
ensigns of the European corps as should be agreeable to such 
a transfer, The issue of pay and allowance for officers was 
also discussed, and efforts were again made by the Directors 
to establish an uniform rate in the different ranks serving 
in the three Presidencies of India,
The attempt made to secure such an 
1796 had proved abortive. The European officers of the
European and native officers,tT The new plan sought to retain
1. Army plan sent ---, 8 November 1814. M,D, sent to Bengal.
Vol. 4.
Company*s army were very sensitive over this subject and Lord 
Lake, the Commander-in-chief, had warned the Government in 
1805 about the consequences of the reduction of their emolu­
ments. ??It becomes a question of great political importance 
how far it would be wise or consistent with the permanent wel­
fare of the state to reduce military men to a bare subsistence 
—  How such a policy of deductions is calculated to promote 
the ultimate benefit of the Company is a point which the
1
Commander-in-Chief entertains the most serious doubt of.w
In spite of such warnings, the Directors in 1814 again tried
to introduce a consolidated pay table and sought to equalise
the rates of allowances for the Company officers of the three
Presidencies. A table of allowances was drawn up which fixed
the rates for house rent, half batta and tent allowance for
all officers whether employed in the field or stationed in
2
garrison and cantonment. The table was as follows and indicates 
the comparative loss and gain in earnings over the rates intro­
duced in 1796,
Vol6449Ath0 927itary Secretary. 6 March I805. Home Misc.
2. Army plan sent ---. 8 November 1814. M.D, sent to Bengal
Vol.4.
Pay and Allowance of Native Infantry European officers 
in Garrison - In Sonaut rupees per month.
Rank Gratu­
ity
x
House
Rent
Pay- Tent Batta 
Allow­
ance
Total 1796
Total
Differ­
ence
Colonel(not 
a General 
officer or 
the staff)
300 200 750
(full)
1250 1230 + 20
Lt.Colonel 
Major
100
80
240
18©
150
120
300
(half)
225"
790
iosr 
4kpft
690
525
+ 100 
+ 80
Captain 36 50 120 75 90 " 371 321 + 50
Lieutenant 24 30 60 50 60 " 224 224
Ens ign 12 25 48 50 45 ’’ 180 185 - 5
The Directors also sought to remove the anomalies 
that existed in the various staff allowances received by the 
staff officers of the Bengal army, and while doing so to cut 
them drastically* The comparative statement given below 
indicates the extent to which measures of economy were 
proposed by the Directors in 1814 on this issue.
1. When in the field, the house rent allowance was ordered 
to be withdrawn but full batta was granted
Sonaut rupees per month
Rank Station Staff Establish- 
Pay ment Allow­
ances
Staff pay (all 
inclusive)
..Pre 1814 (1) . 1311 (?)
Barrack Berhampore 240 + 104 170
Master Dinapore 240 + 104 170
Cawnpore 240 + 223 170
Meerut 240 + 196 170
Fort Adju­ Allhabad 275 + 404 122
tant Chunar 275 + 147 122
and Agra 375 + 417 162
Barrack
Master
Buxar 112 (newly 
created)
Fort Major Fort William 1200 600
Fort Adju­
tant
Buxar 137 abolished
Judge Advo­
cate 
General
713 + 400 863
An additional allowance of 150 rupees per month, known 
as the Andaman Settlement allowance had been granted to the 
staff officer at Fort William in 1794. The Directors ordered 
this allowance to be stopped in 1814. Similarly the allowance 
of Rs, 250, per month received by the Commandant at Buxar 
since 1763 for examining passengers at Buxar was abolished in
1. Statements of all the Military staff appointments under 
the Presidency of Bengal and of the allowance annexed. 
Bengal Military Statement 1312/13. p.279.
2. Army plan sent ---, 3 November 1314. M.D. sent to Bengal
Vol. 4,
je p
1814.
Besides these proposed economies in the emoluments of
the staff officers, the Directors also endeavoured to do away
with the preferential batta enjoyed by the Bengal officers*
Before 1801 all the European officers of the Bengal native
army enjoyed full batta and full tentage, except those who
were stationed at Barrackpore, Berhampore, Dinapore and Dumdum
which were half batta posts. In 1801, as a measure of economy,
Government had ceased to provide quarters, and in compensation,
had raised the batta at the aforementioned stations to full 
2measure. Thus, after 1801, all the Bengal army officers had 
been paid at full batta rates, a privilege denied to 'the 
officers of Madras and Bombay who had continued to receive only 
garrison or cantonment allowance* In their effort to remove 
this anomaly, which had proved to be a bone of contention be­
tween the officers of the three Presidencies, the Directors 
resolved to reduce the full batta rates of the Bengal officers 
and to declare the stations at Barrackpore, Berhampore, Dina­
pore and Dumdum as again eligible for half batta only* By 
this measure, the Court felt, the discontent of the Madras and 
Bombay officers would be removed. The Directors also laid down
that all the extra allowances enjoyed by the Commanding Officer
3
of a native regiment such as the saddle contract, the
1. Army plan 8 November 1814. M.D* sent to Bengal Vol. 4.
2. Minute of Bentinck 19 January 1835* M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol. 39*
3* Saddle contract - Saddle, harness and bridles were supplied 
by the Government once in eight years. These were held by 
the Commanding Officer who received one rupee per set per 
month to keep these in repairs,
contract for the repair of arms and the allowance for
p
Hircarrahs or guides to be abolished. By curtailing these
allowances and by regulating the pay of the officers by the
newly drawn table the Home authorities expected that, tsin
Bengal, the officers would lose collectively about Rupees
5,15,400 a year, Madras will gain about Rupees 2,70,000 a year
3
and Bombay will gain Rupees 1,57,548 a year,™ an economy to 
the Company of about Rs. 87,700 per year.
Finally, the Directors, though they failed to review 
the emoluments of the subalterns and in some cases inadvertent­
ly reduced them, did show a desire to improve the situation of 
the officers in command of battalions and regiments. To that 
end they reintroduced the old Bazar allowance - the duties 
levied on spiritous liquor and intoxicating drugs - in a 
modified form. In 1796 the duties formerly levied in the mili­
tary bazaar by senior officers had been taken over as part of 
the Companyfs revenue and the officers had been deprived of 
any share in it. Consequently, the duty became unproductive.
On the supposition that if the officers had an interest in this 
source of revenue it would increase, the Directors in the plan 
of 1814 proposed that the duties should be thrown into a 
single fund, part of which would then be distributed amongst
1. Contract for the repair of arms, gun carriage and the supply 
of petty stores were peculiar to the Bengal army. Report 
from military finance committee, 21 March 1831. M.L. 
received from Bengal Vol.30.
2. Rupees 40 per month were allowed as Hircarrah or guide 
allowance, Bengal Military Statement 1812/*13.
3. Letter from the Military Committee (London) 26 February 1814. 
Home Misc. Vol. 522, p.337.
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the officers in command of battalions and regiments. They
argued that the additional income to be expected would both
enable the officers to meet their expenses and increase the
revenue of the Company as well.
To prevent a repetition of the kowtowing to the Bengal
officers such as had occurred in 1796 the Home authorities
issued their plan to Fort William with the specific order that
11 the new plan was the permanent establishment of our army and
that no alteration should be hereafter made therein without our
sanction being previously obtained.1’1 The Government of Bengal
was warned that, 11 they should pay proper attention to the
steady and vigilent execution of the regulations11 and not
attempt 11 to introduce improvements, however apparently useful,
by which the system may be disturbed and the whole rendered
fluctuating and uncertain.11 The Directors also thought
fit to remind their civil and military officers of the
11 absolute necessity of conciliating the minds of the native
officers and soldiers by the most mild and considerate 
3
treatment,11
The new plan reached Bengal in 1815. Lord Moira, the 
Governor-General in India, because of his Governments pre­
occupation with the Nepal war, thought it proper to suspend for 
its duration the promulgation of this plan,^ Meanwhile he
1. Army plan sent  . 8 November 1814, M*D. sent to Bengal
Vol.4.
2. Army plan sent 8 November 1814. M,D* sent to Bengal
VolP4.
3. Army plan sent  . 8 November 1314. NLD, sent to Bengal
Vol,4.
4. Philips - op.cit,. p.199,
referred the plan to a committee of civil and military officers 
in Bengal.
The Home authorities, with their ’’counting house
mentality1 , might have forgotten the vital role that the
Company’s army was then playing in India, for, after the
Napoleonic war, the other European powers in India had ceased
to offer any threat - the French and the Dutch having recog ~
nised for the first time British sovereignty over the Company’s
possessions and having agreed not to maintain troops or to
build fortresses in India. Moira, however, knew that other
threats remained and that there was little to be said in
favour of reduction of the military establishment in India and
that no major disturbance in the service could be then afforded.
The Ganges Valley from the Jumna to the sea, the whole of the
East coast and most of the VJest coast were British possessions
and, as Lord Moira wrote, if ’’within them all is quiet and
2
well on their borders the spirit is not so placid.” In the 
north the Company’s possessions touched Nepalese territory 
for some 700 miles, but the border remained ill defined and 
incursions by the Gurkhas were quite common,^ On 18 February 
1814, Moira had been advised by the Directors to declare war 
on Nepal, and that he had done on 1 November 1814. In the 
South, Moira had to extend protection to the State of Bhopal
1* Cambridge History of India Vol.V, p.596,
2. Letter from the Earl of Moira to the Prince Regent
19 October 1813. Letters of King George IV, 1812-1830.
Ed, A,Aspinall Vol.I, p.331,
3. Philips - op.cit., p.198.
to prevent its conquest by Sindhia and the Raja of Nagpur,
Thus, bo^ -h in the North and the South, the Company Ts army 
in India was called upon to bear an immense responsibility 
during this period. It was not to be wondered at, then, that 
Moira should have chosen to postpone the promulgation of the 
new regulations until his borders were secure. What was sur­
prising was that the Home authorities, while sanctioning the 
declaration of war against Nepal, should also have sent forth 
a plan of military reorganisation which called for a reduction 
in the army establishment.
The Committee, to which Moira referred the plan of 
1814, sat in deliberation over it for six years and forwarded 
its recommendation to the Bengal Government in 1820, a copy of 
which was also despatched to the Court of Directors, The Com­
mittee observed in its report that the state of politics in 
Europe should not have any effect on the scale of the military 
establishment in India, which should immediately relate to the 
needs of the local authorities in India, It also argued that, 
as the British territorial possessions in India were still 
expanding and the political map had not as yet acquired a final 
shape, it was unwise and impracticable to lay down such a 
final and permanent reorganisation as that conceived by the 
Directors^ It further emphasised that the reduction made in the 
complement of officers per regiment, after allowing for leave, 
under the plan of 18.14 would make the performance of even the
1, Philips - op_Q cit, T p, 198,
JP *! r *
most perfunctory regimental duties an impossibility. Commenting 
on the equalization of regimental allowances for the army 
officers, the Committee stated flatly that "Equalization of 
regimental allowances must not be obtained by reducing those 
of Bengal officers/7 and continued with the equally flat com­
ment that 77if the resources of India were found to be inade­
quate to meet the expenses, then the possible deficit must be 
supplied by the mother country."*** Furthermore, it referred 
to the arrangements of 1796 as permanent and warned that any 
change in the allowances of the officers sanctioned in 1796 
would be both inexpedient and impolitic. The Committee advised 
that the officers should be granted furlough twice within their 
service period and should be paid for their passage, and went 
so far as to condemn the Court7s arrangements for distributing 
the military bazar profits. In place of this bazar fund the 
Committee suggested a staff allowance drawn from the Company’s 
treasury. Finally, the Committee raised very strong objections 
to the Court’s proposals made for an overall reduction in the 
cost of the military establishment, noting that as 77the first 
duty of Government is to fix the amount of military force
necessary for the maintenance of India, it must fall upon the
2
civil charges of Government,77 In any case, the Committee 
argued, "in the four years elapsed of the present charter more 
has been contributed to England from Indian resources than had
1. Report of the Committee, para 28, 6 January 1820,
B,M. Addl, MSS. 38, 518.
2. Report of the Committee, para 40, 6 January 1820.
B.M. Addl. MSS. 38, 518.
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been furnished in the twenty preceding years in the proportion 
of 9 to 5 .5,1
The Court was both surprised and annoyed at this report.
It
feay sent a strong rebuke in 1823 to the Bengal Government and 
asked them immediately to carry out the orders of 1814, with 
only minor modifications to accommodate their criticism. Cen­
suring the practice of referring the Court’s orders to a Com­
mittee of Bengal officers, the Home authorities observed that 
”on no pretence whatever shall our orders be hereafter referred
for report to a Committee of our servants who may be more or
2
less interested in their non-execution*” The statement by the
Committee that the ’’Court of Directors cannot without breach 
of faith interfere with or diminish any of the scanty allow­
ances or advantages as they are called granted to the officers 
of the Bengal army by the arrangement of 1796,” which in the
eyes of the Company’s army officers had ”the sacredness of
3
almost a direct Royal and Ministerial pledge,” was refuted 
and strongly condemned by the Court. The Directors pointed 
out that they were not bound by the arrangements of 1796 and 
had paid reasonable attention to the fair claims and interests 
of their sen/ants in framing the reforms of 1814. They further 
observed that ’’the imaginary and unfounded doctrine of being 
bound to the orders of 1796 was at variance with the principle
1. Report of the Committee , para 68. 6 January 1820*
B.M. addl. MSS. 38, 518.
20 D< from the Court to the G„G. 25 November 1823# M. D0 sent 
to Bengal, Vol^Q,
3. Repcrt °£ the Committee para 69. 6 January 1820, B.M,
Addl. MSS. 38,518.
of the relations in which the employers stand to the employed." 
If such a doctrine were ever to be admitted, said the Court,
'"it would subvert all the control exercised by the East India
2
Company over its servants," In countering the remarks made by 
the Committee with regard to the financial implications of the 
plan the Court reminded the Governor-General that "all the 
expenses of the Companyfs Government both in India and Europe 
were supported by the revenues of India itself and that Great 
Britain had nothing to do with it."^ Further, the Directors 
argued that they had decided to curtail the military establish­
ment not so as to cope with possible deficiency of its revenues 
but with the "expectation of a surplus revenue, and to the 
appropriation of some portion of such surplus together with 
surplus commercial profits which would lead to the gradual 
extinction of d e b t . T h e  Home authorities reaffirmed their 
conviction that the allowance established under the plan of 
1814 were sufficient for all reasonable purposes. They count­
ered the argument advanced by the Committee that it was 
utterly impossible for an officer "to avoid incurring debt" by 
observing that "the embarrassment into which a few officers may 
be plunged at the commencement of their career by extravagance 
or mismanagement can afford no ground for a statement of that
1. D, from the Court to the G.G, 25 November 1823, para 9♦
M,D. sent to Bengal Vol,t(7.
2. D. from the Court to the G,G. 25 November 1823* para 11.
M.D, sent to Bengal, VolJ5.
3. D. from the Court to thc.G^O. 25 November 1823. para 40.
MCD. sent to Bengal VolJ9,
4. D* from the Court to the G.G. 25 November 1823. para 77.
M. D. sent to ^engal. Vol.t®.
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general nature., n For the same reason,the Directors ruled out
as inadmissable and inapplicable the suggestion of the Commit -
tee that the reductions should apply to future officers only,
and they firmly rejected the proposal to increase the number of
officers per native regiment, doing so on the ground that there
were neither European nor Indian enemies left to fight with in
India, They did recommend, however, that the shortage of
officers in the regiment should be dealt with by imposing a
limit of five officers per regiment who could be allowed to
hold staff or other appointments, and by forbidding military
officers to be employed in civil situations, wexcept in cases
2
of great urgency.Finally, the Directors abandoned their 
scheme of using the military bazaar profits and allowed 
instead a staff allowance of 400 rupees per month to be 
granted to the Commandant of each corps. The Directors also 
advocated that the double-battalion regiment system be aband­
oned and replaced by one of single battalion regiments, each of 
10 companies with each regiment having a complement of one 
colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, five captains, 
ten lieutenants and five ensigns and that promotion be based 
upon regimental seniority up to the ranks of major.
The reply of the Court of Directors reached Bengal in 
1824. Lord Amherst and the Supreme Government were then
1. D, from the Court to the G.G. 25 November 1823. para 22.
M. D„ sent to Bengal VollQh
2. D0 from the Court to the G^G, 25 November 1823. paras,28- 
123« M.D. sent to Bengal Vol.\(J.
3. from the Court to the G.G. 25 November 1823. para 148. 
M.D. sent to Bengal. Vol.10.
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occupied with the first Burmese War, and it was ostensibly for 
this reason that it was considered injudicious to carry into 
effect the CourtTs orders for a reduction in the strength and 
allowances of the Bengal officers. But in reality the Bengal 
Government strongly objected to the Courtrs counter proposals 
for a reduction because the expenses of the military establish­
ment had never exceeded the ever increasing revenues of the 
country. The Government of Bengal again raised the issue of 
the permanency of the 1796 arrangement and remarked that the 
regulation of 1796 had been universally accepted by the Com­
pany's army as a compromise introduced by the Government to 
cover, "certain sacrifices on the part of the army by a dis­
tant service of privation and banishment from their families 
1
and home," It warned the Home Government of the alarm and 
agitation which would inevitably result if the Court's recom­
mended measures were introduced, for these measures would 
certainly embitter those very officers "who have in a great
degree sacrificed their country, families and health to your
o
service in an uncongenial climate/' It further defended the 
higher allowance's enjoyed by the Bengal officers as compared 
to their colleagues in the Bombay and Madras armies, on the 
basis that there existed a vast difference between their way of 
living, in the climates of the three Presidencies, in the 
health of the officers, and the intricate pattern of
1, L. from the G.G. to the Court, 6 January 1825. paras 2-4, 
M.L. received from Bengal. Vol.20.
2. L. from the G.G, to the Court, 6 January 1825. para 11.
M.L, received from Bangal, Vol.20.
prejudices and distinctions of caste and customs prevalent in
Bengal which obliged Bengal officers to ?tmaintain four times
the number of servants that will serve an officer at Madras
and Bomba}', Not only were the expenses on servants higher,
but the Bengal officers stationed in the lower provinces
suffered a loss of pay amounting to 4^ per cent because they
2
were paid in Sicca rupees which formed the currency of the 
region and were held at premium whereas their wages were cal­
culated in Sonaut rupees* Finally, the Bengal Government 
argued against the simultaneous reduction of allowances and the 
reimposition of half batta, which in itself would cause a loss 
varying between 10 and 20 per cent to the Bengal officers.
The Directors were also criticised for their rigid 
adoption of the measures of economy which involved the loss 
of long recognised allowances on the part of the officers nat
the very time when your finances are known to the world to be
3
in a more flourishing condition than ever,”
The Supreme Government also expressed in very strong 
terms its indignation over the tone and content of the CourtTs 
letter. ”The reference to the relative position of master and 
servant would hardly justify towards an army of British
1, L. from the G,G, to the Court, 6 January l£25. para 11,
M„L. received from Bengal Vol.20,
2, ”Up to 1B35, a variety of rupees had been coined in the 
CompanyTs territories. The term sicca rupee had been applied 
to newly coined rupees which were at a batta or premium 
over those worn or assumed to be worn by use and these were 
termed as sonaut.” Hobson-Jobson , pp.&34-&35.
3,L, from the G.G, to the Court, 6 January 1&25* para 18.
M,L, received from Bengal. Vol.20.
officers and gentlemen the adoption of a measure which is cer­
tainly harsh, not called for by any urgency of your finances, 
nor by any political cause and which must appear a breach of a 
tacit or implied compact at least with all the officers 
actually in your employ, to whom you have not previously
1
announced so material an alteration in the terms of service.77
It is significant to note, however, that though the 
Bengal Government expressed in no uncertain terms their dis­
approval of the Courts order regarding a reduction of allow­
ances, they willingly accepted the changes in the organisation 
of the army structure therein proposed. On 6 May 1824} a 
General Order was issued in accordance with the instructions 
received from the Court ordering that the new organisation be 
adopted and promotions be made accordingly so as to increase 
the number of officers in each infantry regiment to the 
following strength: {0 colonels, lieutenant-colonels, two
majors, ten captains, twenty lieutenants and two ensigns. In 
cavalry regiments, the strength of officers was ordered to be 
half the above, The General Order further directed that !Tas 
soon as the above promotions are carried out, the infantry,
European and native, are to be divided into two regiments
2
each by the final separation of battalions77 and the officers 
were to be posted alternately to the two regiments. The regi­
ments so formed were to be numbered in the order in which they
1. Lc from the G.G. to the Court, 6 January 1825. para 20,
M.L. received from Bengal, Vol.20,
2, G.O.G.G. 6 May 1824. '
Bengal Mily. Cons, 6 May 1824. No.58.
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were first raised. A comparative table is given below showing 
the complement of officers for each regiment as sanctioned in 
1796, 1814 and 1823.
1796 (accepted and 1814(proposed) 1823 (accepted)
promulgated) Double battalion Single battalion
Double battalion regiment regiment
regiment.
1 Colonel 1 Colonel 1 Colonel
2 Lt.Colonels 2 Lt.Colonels 1 Lt.Colonel
2 Majors 2 Majors 1 Major
7 Captains 8 Captains 5 Captains
1 Captain-Lieu- 
tenant
22 Lieutenants 14 Lieutenants 10 Lieutenants
10 Ensigns 6 Ensigns 5 Ensigns
The table indicates very clearly how drastic had 
been the proposed cut in officer strength under the 1814 plan 
and how successful were the protests which led to its replace­
ment by that of 1823. The position in 1823 was little differ­
ent from that of 1796 - but where it did differ it was in 
favour of promotion, providing as it did for an extra colonel 
and two extra captains for each two battalions, with a loss 
only of two lieutenants. It was this slight gain over 1796 and 
very large gain over 1814 which led to the Bengal Government 
to lose no time in supporting this part of the Order while 
choosing to criticise the rest.
But after thus hastening to clinch the deal with the 
Home authorities, the Governor-General and the Bengal Council 
did nothing from 1825 to 1828 to implement the DirectorsT 
orders of 1823 and it was not until 1828 when the Earl of 
Amherst was replaced as Governor-General by Lord William
Cavendish Bentinck that the plan of 1814, as modified in 1823, 
was at last put into effect*
The promulgation of the order almost immediately gave 
rise to expression of reaction and discontent amongst the 
officers of the Bengal armyn In 1829 they sent some 76 memor­
ials, 63 from the European and native infantry regiments, 3 
from the native cavalry and 5 from the artillery, many of them 
lengthy, were sent to the Government by the officers* They 
used much the same terminology as in those previously sent
to the Government, praying for the repeal of the half-batta
1
order and other measures of economy. Besides the constant 
references were made to the financial plight of junior and 
subaltern officers of the Bengal army. Major Fraye of the 
13th native infantry regiment computed that a subaltern while
on the march, was forced to spend a minimum of 23u6^ a u^;
month as against his pay and allowances on the march of only
(b )
194 rupees. In garrison, Fraye reckoned, his expenses 
amounted to 181 rupees per month against his pay of 168 rupees
1. Summary of the statements contained in the memorials of the 
Bengal officers against the half batta regulations of 29 
ijc, November 1828./ Memoranda -of -Mily  ^■ Mi&e*. Vol. 6, No. 5^3 (no 
page mark). *
(a) Expenses of a subaltern (b) Expenses of an Ensign at
(on the march) Berhampore
Messing Rs, 90 Messing Rs. 60
Servants 50 Breakfast 16
Horse 16 House rent 35
Carriage of tent, Servants 40
baggage 40 Dress _ .JO
Cattle and camp
equipage 30
Rs,181,Rs. 2316
Income of an EnsignRs.194. Income of an EnsignRs,168
per month. Major Parks of the 49th regiment observed that the
initial cost of an EnsignTs equipment was not less than 1500
rupees to meet which he had necessarily to contract a debt, By
the time he had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, the
original sum would have been nearly doubled by interest accrued. 
Lieutenant
^  Gough of the 10th native infantry regiment deposed that 
TTfour-fifths of the Bengal officers are insolvent, and 
Colonel Kern of the 50th native infantry regiment remarked 
T?it will be most commonly found that after many years of 
service when an officer has arrived at the rank of a field 
officer, he is then commencing to liquidate debts which he un­
avoidably accumulated during his career through the junior 
grades by submitting to being placed under stoppages from, ihis 
allowances.Captain Wheeler of the 48th native- infantry regi­
ment wrote that T*it is to the rank of field officer alone that 
any military man can look for the means of either providing for 
a family or for retiring.^
The memorialists also referred to the loss sustained 
by the remittance of earnings to Europe at a time when the rate 
of exchange had depreciated from two shillings and six pence 
to one shilling and ten pence to a rup<pe, and they pleaded 
that *Tit would be a great boon to permit the officers1 families 
in England to receive the remittance for their use at two
1. Summary of the statements contained in the memorials of 
the Bengal officers against the Half batta regulation of 
kc ./ 29 November 1828,/Memoranda of—Mily^ Misc. Vol.6. No . 583
i 5 ^
i
shillings six pence per rupee," They reiterated their criti-
2
cism of the restriction on the rate of interest which they
might ask on loans which they made ? the promotion policy, and
bbe batta allowances. The Bengal officers brought to the
Directors’ notice, a letter of 1809 in which the Directors
themselves had stated that "Bengal, the first great territorial
possession of the Company had its establishment early settled
to its income and that country being the seat of the Supreme
Government, the centre of the British interest in India, came
to have a standard of public allowances which could not be
exactly imitated at the other Presidencies under their very
different circumstances," for which reason, as the letter went
on, "the Court have always resisted the idea of a general
equalisation of allowances and emoluments of the different
Presidencies," The Court had also commented in 1809 that
"if the comparative slowness of promotion at Bengal be taken
into the estimate it might not be incorrect to say that the
military service of Bengal has not been for many years past
upon a superior footing upon the whole than at either of the
4other Presidencies*" The memorialists argued that if such
1. Summary of the statements ,/Memoranda Vol. 6
No05£3. /
2, Ordinance was issued restricting the legal rate of interest 
on capital advanced by the officers to 12 per cent, [But 
this affected the field officers mostly as the subalterns 
could hardly meet their expenses,3
3, D; from the Court to the Government at Ft, St, George,
15 September 1809. para 16. M.D. sent to Madras Vol.16.
4. D; from the Court to the Government at Ft, Stf George 
15 September 1809. para 66, M,D, sent to Madras Vol,l6.
was the opinion of the Court in 1809, they failed to understand
why in 1811 or 1823 they could h?.ve recommended a reduction of
their allowances for the purpose of equalising pay scales in
the Presidencies.
The Supreme Government forwarded these memorials to
London on 22 December 1829* In spite of all the arguments
marshalled by the memorialists, the Home authorities expressed
their displeasure at "the want of military subordination which
1
was the first duty of the officers," and explained that "as
they did not want to impose new burdens upon the people of
India or to ask aid from the people of England and as they
wanted to promote the general interest of their servants,the
order for half batta regulations could be called a measure of
2
military policy and a general system of necessary economy."
Though the Home authorities stood fast by the 
decision, the Press showed considerable sympathy for the off­
icers and their grievances. The Times gave the lead when it 
commented, "the East India Gompany has so contrived it as to 
revolt against themselves and their monopoly the spirit of the 
whole English nation. If we felt any interest in the mainten­
ance of Hindustan then we might warn them against exasperating 
the whole body of instruments through whose sw'ords that Gov­
ernment of force and despotism had been so long preserved.
They were CompanyTs defenders, they undertook originally to
1. D. from the Court to the G.G. 31 March 1830. para 
M.D. sent to Bengal. Vol.®.\S<
2. D0 from the Court to the G.G. 31 March 1830* paras 5-6,
M.L. sent to Bengal, Vol.®,is,
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serve it on fixed and understood conditions, many of whom have
1
endured the toils of thirty campaigns.
That the imposition of these orders would bring forth 
determined opposition was not unknown to Lord Bentinck. He 
went to India with no illusions about what he should expect or 
what was expected of him. He was aware of the strong support 
his appointment had received from Lord Grey and his ’reform 
ministry' , he was conscious of the demands of the CompanyTs 
Directors for reforms with economy. Above all, he was most 
sensitive to the tugs and pulls of British administration in 
India, for it was there, in his early years while serving as 
Governor of Madras that he saw his bright future as an adminis­
trator momentarily swept away in the whirlwind of the sepoy 
mutiny of 1&06 at Vellore and found himself recalled in dis­
grace for blunders committed, but not acknowledged by others. 
Now, in his mature years, he viewed India and the Company, with 
caution, responsibility, tolerance and thoughtfulness.
It was with this outlook that Bentinck approached 
the troublesome conflicts existing between the Court of Dir­
ectors and the officers of the Bengal army. Being convinced 
of the determination behind the Directors1 policy of economy 
within the Company during Charter renewal year, he lost little 
time in promulgating and putting into effect the CourtTs edict 
of 1B23 regarding military reforms. .
So, simultaneously with his implementation of the
The Times - 17 October 1B29.
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Directors1 reforms, he instructed his Military Secretary,
Colonel Casement, to institute an enquiry into the economic 
condition of the Indian army with particular reference to the 
Bengal army and its officers. Colonel Casement did so and in 
March 1829, a Military Committee of Finance with Lt,-Colonel 
E# Frederick, Commissioner of Bombay in the chair, and with 
Lt.-Colonel T.H.S. Conway, Commissioner of Madras, and Major 
J* Craige of Bengal as members, commenced its enquiry. After 
almost two years of detailed study and questioning, the Com­
mittee submitted its report to the Governor^General in 1831
and a copy of the report was forwarded to the Court in the
^ 1 same year.
The report was not an unanimous one, for Major Craige 
dissented with the basic recommendation of the Committee that 
there existed no case for higher allowances for Bengal officers. 
He also questioned the validity of the estimates of expenditure 
submitted by the Madras and Bombay officers, and he expressed 
his opinion that the Committee had not adequately established 
its conclusions. This lack of unanimity amongst the Committee 
members limited the effectiveness of the final recommendation 
of its report, but the information it produced was significant 
and arresting.
The Committee reported that the emoluments of the 
subalterns in all the three Presidencies were not sufficient, 
f,even with the strictest economy to maintain them free from
1, Report from the Military finance Committee, 21 March 1831.
M.L. received from Bengal Vol. RI.33-
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debt and particularly in cases where they originally as cadets 
had no separate sum to provide themselves with their first 
equipment* The Committee then went on to consider the many 
circumstances which led the CompanyTs officers into debt - the 
need to provide against a tropical climate, the wide variety 
of duties which they could be called upon to perform, and the 
heavy charges involved in moving from station to station over 
the vast areas of Company territory - and returned once again 
to^theme of debt: Hit is with much reluctance we follow up 
this topic in seriously asserting as a fact that the great 
majority of the officers and particularly the junior classes 
are deeply in d e b t . T h i s  was especially true of the subal­
terns each of whom, the Committee noted, upon his arrival in 
India, was confronted witha formidable expense for equipment. 
This.sum he could rarely furnish himself and he was therefore 
obliged to borrow from the agency houses at an interest rate of 
about 10 to 11 per cent or, if refused, from the money lenders
at the rate of 24 per cent, A young officer was thus forced to
incur a debt of 1800 to 2000 rupees at the outset of his 
career when there was no probability of any quick promotion.
If he was posted at a half batta station, his emoluments were 
not even enough to maintain him, let alone to permit the re­
demption of any substantial portion of his debt, At a full
batta station, he could, with the strictest economy, pay off j  
some part of his debt, but such a posting never continued for
1. Report of the Military finance ftommittee, 21 March I83I.
M.L. received from Bengal Vbl.iH, 33-
long. His debts therefore tended to increase rather than dimin­
ish, for he had to supplement or replace his initial outfit in 
the course of years. Moreover, as the Committee noted, because 
of the uncertainty of a soldierTs life, it was usually necess* 
ary to provide a life*surety for any loan from the Agency 
houses which added another three or four per cent interest to 
the already existing debt. Thus by the time a subaltern reached 
the rank of captain, his original debt had more than doubled 
and he had no prospect of releasing himself from it. From his 
captain’s emoluments he would just manage to pay off the 
interest, and on obtaining his majority he would find himself
’’poorer by many thousands than he was when he entered the 
1
service, ”
The Committee therefore proposed that no cadet be 
accepted for service who did not receive,either from his 
parents or from guardians, his uniform and a credit of 1500 
rupees for equipment. A cadet properly provided for at the out­
set would be able to join his regiment free from pecuniary 
embarrassment and would be able to maintain himself, with 
economy, from his pay and allowances.
The Committee further pointed out how much a subal­
tern’s expenses varied from station to station and showed that
1, L. from the Major General Moore to the Finance committee, 
Barrackpore, 23 June 1829. Report of the Military finance 
Committee, 21 March 1831. M.L, from Bengal. Vol.1U.33,
the expenses per month of a Lieutenant at Cawnpore might be
2
as high as 355 rupees while at Barrackpore they did not 
exceed rupees. Commenting on the Directors’ often repeated 
phrase about the ’extravagance of the Bengal officers’, the 
report observed that the general tone of Bengal society was 
changing. There were far more married men in the army, with a 
radically changed pattern of living-luxurious if not extrava­
gant - and this had replaced the mere satisfaction of wants 
which had prevailed earlier in the eighteenth century. This 
could not, however, be said of the junior officers, who, in 
the opinion of the Committee, were more economical in their 
habits than in former days. Yet despite such economy ’’subal­
tern officers were generally in debt to nearly 7000 rupees 
eachf
Estimates of Expenses in Rupees
(l) at Cawnpore (2) at Barrackpore
Orphan and. military fund 8 8
Regimental Library 6 5
House rent 40
)
40
Breakfast is —^ — 4
45Dinner 56 - 4 )
Servants 81 59
Bunniah's bill 14 Horse 17
Wine etc. 48 35
Candles 6 Misc. 17 - 0
Postage 4 4 - 8
Cigars 6
- 6 *
a 3 #c 0
Clothing 39 - 2 34 -10
Tent etc. 31 ~ 11 --s. 8 -^0
2 
0
355 - 9 - 7  273 "  2 ”  2xv- rfftt i[ -■»■ ra i 11i n i i ii i i  i muuiFHTMnyuM H'lHirrnr
Report of the Military Finance Committee, 21 March I83I 
IvUlo received from Bengal Vol. 35*
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Regarding the controversial question of difference
in the grant of batta in the three Presidencies, the Committee
stated that though the Supreme Government might ”on special or
political grounds have deemed it necessary to maintain for
sudden emergencies a larger number of field stations in Bengal
1
than in the other Presidencies,” - which naturally gave the 
Bengal officers more opportunity to earn batta at the higher 
field rates - there was no other reason why Bengal officers 
should expect to receive more batta than Bombay and Madras 
officers. From this view Craige dissented.
Bentinck was not |H#»satisfied with the findings of 
the Committee and with its differing views. With the hope of 
rectifying the situation he wrote a Minute to the Court in 
January 1835, advising that, ?fEqualisation of only staff allow­
ance would not do, as the jealousy entertained by the officers 
on the Madras and Bombay establishments at the superior allow­
ances drawn by their brethern of the Bengal army is not res­
tricted to the staff. It pervades every rank and is more part­
icularly felt by Regimental officers than by any other class 
because their means are smaller and their prospects generally 
more confined.” He further added, TTIt was therefore essential 
to the complete success of the measure that with whatever fin­
ancial sacrifice it might be attended, one and the same rate of 
pay should be fixed at once for all with the understanding also
1. Report of the Military finance 6ommittee, 21 March 1831.
M.L. received from Bengal, Vol^Jft, .33.
1
of its not being liable to further a l t e r a t i o n , A s  his solu­
tion, Bentinck suggested that full batta and full tentage 
should be allowed in the field and that full batta and 
tentage should be allowed in cantonment throughout the three 
Presidencies, No comment, however, came from the Court before 
Bentinck relinquished his office in 1835.
Bentinck handed over his charge to Sir Charles 
Metcalfe, who had been much alarmed about the probable effect 
within Bengal of the equalisation of military pay and allow-* 
ances. In a warning letter to the Home Government he wrote 
nthe reduction will alienate the affections of the sufferers 
from the Government which deals out to them that treatment. It 
is not a light matter in a country which is held solely by the 
army. No object to be gained can be worth such a cost. It is 
neither rational nor prudent to risk it. ” While admitting 
that the Madras and Bombay officers were relatively underpaid 
in comparison to the Bengal officers, he argued that iTthis 
does not imply that the Bengal officers were overpaid. He 
saw no reason to reduce the Bengal allowances for the sake of 
equality, and quipped, VTThere would be no harm, for instance, 
in putting a high crowned hat on a short person in order to 
give him an equal appearance with another, but it would not do
to cut off a quarter of a manTs head with a view to equalise
2
him with his short neighbour. On 20 December 1836 Metcalfe
1, Minute of Bentinck 19 January 1835. (written on 4 August, 
1834). M.L, received from Bengal Vol. 59.35.
2, Minute of G.G, in Council to the Court 20 December 1836.
No.15. M,L. received from Bengal Vol.41.
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wrote again to the Home authorities asking them to accept
Bentinck !s proposals for full batta and tj- tentage at all
stations and full batta with full tentage in the field, while
1
marching or when posted at certain field stations. The Home 
authorities, at long last, gave their decision on the contro­
versial subject and agreed to allow officers 77 full batta when 
posted at any station exceeding 200 miles of direct distance
from the seat of the respective Governments and half batta in
2
garrison or cantonments within that distance. 77 The Home Gov­
ernment thus followed a middle path, and while the Madras offi­
cers and the Bombay officers gained in some respects, Bengal 
officers lost their stand for full batta throughout the Presi­
dency but succeeded in upgrading some half batta stations. It 
seems that the Home authorities made the rule effective from 
1837 and this arrangement, for better or worse, continued in 
force till 1857 when the Mutiny abolished all such existing 
conventions.
Thus by 1837} the question of reforms of pay and 
allowances of the Bengal army was considered by the Directors 
and Supreme Government in India to have been settled. Whereas 
the salary of the superior ranks had been increased either 
substantially or moderately, there had been hardly any increase, 
perhaps even some reduction, in the earnings of the junior 
ranks. The Home authorities maintained their doctrine that
1. L, from G.G. in Council to the Court. 20 December 1836,
No,15* M.L. received from Bengal. Vol.41.
2. D0 from the Court to the G.G, 20 September 1837. No.79.
M. D, sent to Bengal Vol. *2.2.,
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money should be in short supply with these young men to prevent
them from developing extravagant habits. The motive may have
been admirable, but the effect of the policy was questionable,
seeing that TTthe price of necessaries and the wages of servants
had increased at least 25 per cent throughout India between
the establishment of pay rates in 1796 and their reform in the
1late twenties of the nineteenth century,?f While so many cadets 
and subalterns found it virtually impossible to keep out of 
debt on their normal pay in a half-batta station, the effect 
of the Company’s parsimony was to force them to look beyond 
their normal duties for some better paid employment. Subalterns 
therefore continued to seek out staff appointments for the sake 
of the increased pay, prestige and influence attached to these 
positions and sought by all possible means to escape from the 
ordinary round of regimental duties. Those who failed shared 
the discontent and frustration fostered in their immediate 
seniors by the reduction In the privileges and allowances 
enjoyed by the Bengal officers.
Though the Directors’ views prevailed and achieved a 
modicum of economy, they did so at the price of some hardship 
■for the most junior and continuing rancour amongst all but the 
field officers of the Bengal Sepoy army. This discontent 
lingered on, In 184$ one finds a subaltern writing in a local 
paper, The Moffussilite, about the difficulty in paying ’’for
1, Minute of Bentinck to the Court 19 January 1$35.
M,L, received from Bengal, Vol.®,
the servants, rent, clothing, uniform, contribution for the
1 2 steps, and food from his paltry emoluments,” and of ”the
humiliation of knowing that nearly all the junior members of
the Bengal army were debtors.” Even in 1852, The Bengal
Hurkaru, another local paper, observed that ”an Ensign cannot
live upon his pay-—  with all their efforts to be at once just
and respectable-—  the Ensigns who had nothing to live upon
but their pay, have a very hard struggle to keep within
compass.1?
Indeed the grievance was not resolved until the 
mutiny sealed the fate of the East India Company. By that time, 
it had helped to form the frustration and the deterioration of 
the officers* pride and morale which contributed indirectly, 
yet significantly, to the alienation of the Bengal sepoys.
Though the issue of pay rates and allowances was 
obviously the most important grievance which shaped the atti­
tude of the Bengal officers, other grievances played a contrib­
utory role in framing their outlook towards the Bengal army.
1. From 179^ junior officers of the CompanyTs army bought out 
their seniors with a view to accelerate their own promotion 
and offered them sums of money to retire.”
Wellington Despatches. Ed^Owen, p.595.
All such transactions took place on a private basis. $tajor- 
General Sir Thomas T, Pears who was with the Indian army 
for 21 years (1840-*61) said ”a scale of contribution was 
fixed and agreed to by the officers constituting the regi­
mental cadre. There was a regular regimental fund and when 
an officer was to retire his brother officers were called 
upon to pay the money according to the agreed scale”.
P.P. I875, X (176) H.C. p.248.
2* The Moffussilite 10 November 1848,
3. The Moffussilite 10 November I848,
The Bengal Hurkaru 4 May 1852.
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Brief reference will be made here bo such grievances as retire­
ment and furlough regulations.
The retirement regulations were first introduced in 
the Company’s army in 1796. The full pay of the rank held by 
a retiring officer was paid to him as pension if he had served
his time of 25 years, which might include three years of fur-
1
lough. The rules were modified in 1823 when, following the 
regulations prevailing in the King’s army, half pay was 
sanctioned to those retiring before serving their full term. 
This applied to all ranks superior to that of captain. A lieu­
tenant was allowed to enjoy this privilege only after 10 years, 
though after six years service he was permitted to retire on 
the half pay of an ensign. If a subaltern had to retire, even
on medical grounds, before serving out six years, he was only
2
eligible for his share of Lord Clive’s Fund.
The retirement regulations, however, led to a major 
difficulty. Since senior officers of the Company’s army were 
not eligible for full retirement benefits before 25 years of 
service, it became a general practice with them to proceed 
home on furlough after serving a continuous term of 22 years 
in India and then either to retire from England or to rejoin 
the service. During the three years which an officer spent on 
furlough the authorities in Bengal were unable to fill the
1. D. from the Court to the G.G. in Council 25 November 1823. 
para 124. M.D. sent to Bengal Vol.Id.
2, Lord Clive’s Fund - amounted to £45 annually for a Lt, £36 
for an ensign provided they did not possess property of a 
value of £1000 for a ‘Lt. and £750 for an ensign.
Fifth report of select committee 1772-73# H.C. p.51&.
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vacant posts of the absentee senior officers since they could 
not know whether they would retire or return to India at the 
expiry of the three years. As a result junior officers had to 
be promoted temporarily to perform their duties, but without
1
the substantive promotion or emolument befitting such ranks.
This procedure naturally led to much discontent. Both the
Bengal Government and the Court of Directors attempted to deal
2
with the grievance over the years but with no success. Fin­
ally in 1&35 the Court introduced reforms in the retirement 
3
regulations, which proposed to grant the full pay of a
captain to an officer of any rank retiring after 23 years of
service, the full pay of a major after 28 years of service,
that of a lieutenant-colonel after 33 years and that of a
colonel after 3& years* It was also specified that the service
periods would include the permitted furlough period* This new
. „ 4
rule was promulgated in India in 1836.
The reforms only in part met the grievance of the 
Bengal officers, who continued to point to the much more 
liberal retirement privileges enjoyed by officers in the KingTs 
service and to the fact that as with pay and allowances nothing
1. L. from the G.G^ to the Court. 1 July 1822. M.L. received 
from Bengal, Vol.ly.
2. (a) G.O.G.G. 28 July 1824 ordered that an absence of more 
than five years would be considered as retirement.
(b) G.O.G.G. 7 August 1833 reduced the period of continuous 
absence to only three years.
3. D, from the Court to the G.G, in Council 23 December 1835. 
M.D, sent to Bengal Vol.ZD.
4. G.O.G.G, 4 May 1836. Bengal General Orders by Government
1836, p.320.
1had been done by the Court for the subalterns. After two 
years agitation, the Court was persuaded to extend the privi­
leges of retirement on half pay to sick or wounded subalterns
2
and they also slightly shortened the period of service in 
senior ranks for retirement privileges. Though these modifi­
cations f promulgated in I838 were more acceptable to the Bengal 
officers, the retirement regulations remained an issue of 
grievance for the officers until the mutiny of 1857.
The rules governing furlough privileges for European
. 3
officers hardly underwent any change after 1796, The regula­
tions of 1796 had sanctioned leave of absence for a period of 
three years after ten years service in India, During this leave 
the officers were eligible to draw their regimental pay. One or
two minor alterations were made in this regulation, one in 
4
1819 dealing with sick leave for one year without pay and
" 5
another in 1825 providing that an officer could enjoy his 
earned furlough in more than one instalment and allowing an 
additional three years leave for sound medical reasons. But by 
and large, there was little change in the regulation, and it
1. Memorial from Col. Raper and other officers 21 May I836.
M.L, received from Bengal Vol.4L.
2. For a Maj. 27 years, for a Bt,Col, 31 years and for a Col.
35 years (the three years furlough being inclusive in all
the cases), D. from the Court to the G.G, in/Council
20 September I83I, M.D, sent to Bengal Vol.IP,
3. !tThe system of furlough is the same since 1796”, ^r. 
Melville, P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627) H.L. p.131.
4. D. from the Court to the-G.G* in Council 26 August 1818. 
M.D. sent to Bengal VolJ|^7,(The order was issued on
26 June 1819).
5. D. from the Court to the G.G, in Council. 21 April 1825.
M. D. sent to Bengal Vol.11.
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was natural that the Bengal officers particularly the junior 
ones, should have taken issue with them.
In 1830 the officers sent a request to the Directors 
for an additional period of leave after twenty years service - 
the request was refused. Then in 1837 they sent another mem­
orial to the Court through the Bengal Government asking for 
the grant of regimental allowances in addition to pay during 
furlough, without which, they said, TTno man would dream of 
taking his furlough,[as] he had to pay for his passage, the
maintenance of his family and himself. This request too,
2
was refused by the Directors, In 1846 In replying to another 
memorial 3 Qf the Bengal officers on the same topic the Court 
severely censured the Supreme Government for its practice of 
forwarding memorials and ordered it to stop this practice,^ 
Throughout the 1840*s and l850fs such grievances continued to 
be a source of discontent among the Bengal officers. One can­
not but wonder whether the decision of the Home authorities not 
to act was wise, for as The Times commented in 1846, f*They ask 
for the amendment of an old law which however necessary it may
1. Memorial from the Bengal officers 13 January 1837*
M,L, received from Bengal Vol.42.
2. D, from the Court to the G,GP in Council 20 September 1837* 
M,D, sent to Bengal Vol.22,
3* Memorial from the Bengal officers 22 January I846,
M.L* received from Bengal Vol.$1,
4, ”It has long been a standing order in the army in England 
not to receive any memorial or address on general regula­
tions, and system of service and similar rule be established 
in India.” G.O.G.G, 9 September 1848,
Bengal Mily. Cons, 9 September 18^ .8. No. 344.
^  yrt-j r* *
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have been when it was first introduced has lost its original 
virtue by the lapse of time and change of circumstances^
The grievances of the Bengal officers, though of 
interest even when studied in isolation because of the partial 
insight they give us into the outlook of the officers during 
the period 1796 to 1852, only became fully significant when 
related to other problems connected with the Bengal army at 
that time* These include the failure to maintain an efficient 
and sound officer complement in the native regiments and the 
consequences this failure had for the discipline and morale of 
the native soldiers.
/ V f ' '  ^,
The organisational structure of the Bengal army 
introduced in 1824 fixed the complement of European officers 
for each native infantry regiment at 23* But the 1824 reorgani­
sation did not provide for the replacement of officers on leave 
or furlough or assigned to staff appointments or other posi­
tions. ^ Thus, the number of officers doing regimental duties 
was always less than that sanctioned. We have already seen how 
anxious officers always were, especially the inadequately paid 
junior ranks, to transfer at one period to full batta stations, 
at another to transfer to volunteer or irregular forces, to the 
staff or to civilian posts. Since from the end of the eight­
eenth century there had begun a vast expansion of the CompanyTs 
domain in India, the opportunites to make such transfer 
steadily grew. New prospects of civil appointments wore opened
1. The Times 22 April 1846.
2. D. from the Court to the G. G* in Council, 25 November 1823 
para. 119. M.D. to Bengal VolJW,
Jf Ur. t - *
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up, and attractive terms were offered to incoming recruits. The 
Government of Bengal had decided for reasons of exigency and 
economy to offer some of these civil appointments to interested 
army officers, for it was thought that with their education 
and experience, army officers would be well qualified to per­
form civil duties.“ Whenever such an appointment was made, the 
officer concerned continued to draw his regimental pay (but not 
his allowances,) together with his civil allowances. Since his 
name was retained on the regimental roster for purposes of pro­
motion, his post in the regiment had to be left unfilled. As 
Trevelyan observed T!the officers — - joining the civil or poli­
tical stations or detached troops or staff employments --  were
not to lose anything. On the contrary these appointments
enabled them to make money and reputation faster than their
2
less fortunate brothers who remained in the line.H The 
system provided for a saving in the military expenditure .for 
the Company and a gain in the form of increased earnings and 
improved status for the individual officer, but its effects 
upon the regiments were deplorable, for there was a steady 
drain from them of the most active and able officers.
The rate of depletion accelerated after the reorgan­
isation of 1796, principally because of the institution of 
staff appointments with very generous allowances. The financial 
attraction of these appointments, together with the prestige
1, L. from the G0 G, to the Court 20 January 1844.
M.L. received from Bengal Vol.49.
2. G. Trevelyan - Cawnpore p.40.
that they carried, prompted regimental officers of all ranks
to opt for such positions at the first available opportunity.
Added to this new attraction were the continued prospects of
civil appointments which were paraded before army officers.
By 1820 the regiments were under officered, and the Home
authorities, realising the seriousness of the situation, ruled
in 1823 that !Tno more than five officers shall at one time be
taken from any regiment, either cavalry or infantry on the new
establishment for staff or other duties,^
Though Lord Hastings approved this limit and observed
that the remaining officers would be sufficient to carry out
2
regimental duties, the restriction was never effectively 
applied and the drain of regimental officers to staff and 
civil appointments continued unabated. Further inducements to 
transfer were added in the Political department of the Supreme 
Government by the creation of more posts as residents and 
political agent^ and the creation of the Department of Pay and 
Audit opened up such posts as those of judge-advocate, military 
secretary. Then there were open to regimental officers staff 
appointments on the clothing, barrack, commissariat and stud 
boards. Regimental officers were also selected as Commanding
lj D. from the Court to the G,G& in Council 25 November 1823.
para 120, M.D. sent to Bengal’ V o l . K .  • IO >
2U Miscellaneous memoranda. Vol.5- No.435 (no date, no page 
number) it has been mentioned that tTthe Court in their 
arrangements of 1823, fixed five as the maximum number of 
officers who might be withdrawn from any one corps for staff
appointments,-—  Lord Hastings approved --  as an ample
supply of officers for Regimental duty.
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Officers of Irregular troops, bodies of sepoys over and above 
the sanctioned strength of the army which were used for emer­
gencies or for the temporary occupation of new territories. 
These appointments were most eagerly sought after, for to the 
temptation of independence was also added obvious financial 
inducement. A lieutenant of a regular regiment who could 
secure command of an irregular corps might receive a special 
allowance worth 1200 rupees a month over and above his normal 
pay and allowance, while he still remained part of the regular 
army establishment.
Since the withdrawal of officers from the regiments 
could not be stopped, the Bengal Government in 1825 asked the 
Court to increase the number of officers in each regiment. They 
pointed out that many regiments had no more than eight or nine
officers present for duty, others being on leave or having
1opted for alternative situations. Two years later the Bengal
Government repeated its request and suggested an increase of
five extra officers per regiment to deal with the depletion 
2
rate. But the Home authorities did not agree and replied 
that the deficiency had arisen not because of any inadequate 
allocation of officers under its 1821 scheme but because of 
the policy of the Supreme Government in granting staff and 
civilian appointments to its army officers. The Directors 
argued that even if nine officers were released from a regiment
1. L. from the G,G. to the Court, 6 January 1825 paras 53-60. 
M.L. received from Bengal vol.20.
2. L0 from the G,G0 to the Court 15 December 1827*
M,L. received from Bengal Vol026.
there should be ”available for duty besides a Field officer to
command, a larger proportion of Captains and Subalterns than
1
is equal to one officer for each Company,™ As the European
officers of the native regiments were assisted by the native
officers, the Court held that more than one European officer
per Company of native troops should not ™under ordinary
circumstances be required to preserve the native regiment in
2
a proper state of efficiency,™ The Bengal Government ulti­
mately agreed with the Court, and a letter of 1$30 promises
that ffmore moderation shall be exhibited and military men will
3
be selected for civil duties only when absolutely necessary, ™ 
The good resolution was soon abandoned, for only four months 
later Calcutta is found seeking sanction for an additional 
captain for each company and an extra field officer for a
4
regiment. This too the Court declined to sanction declaring 
that the state of their finances would not admit of their 
making any addition to their present military expenditure™
5
except under very peculiar circumstances,™
The Bengal Government was not alone in drawing atten­
tion to the problem of officer depletion. Its adverse effect 
upon the native army was strongly presented by distinguished
1, D. from the Court to the G.G. in Council 29 ^ay 1S2S.
paras 55-66. M.D# sent to Bengal Vol.®.(4.
2* D, from the Court to the G,G. in Council. 29 ^ay 1&28,
para 66. M.D. sent to Bengal Vol.S. 14.
3. L. from the G.G, to the Court 10 February 1330* M,L. 
received from Bengal Vol.$0.
4. L. from the G„G. to the Court, 26 June 1^30. M.L, received 
from Bengal Vol.J^} *
5* D. from the Court to the G,G. in Council, 19 October 1331,
M,D, sent to Bengal Vol.10,
military men like Sir William Keir Grant and Lt, Colonel Baker
In his comments before the Select Committee of 1832, Grant
observed J?the consequences are obvious, a relaxed state of
discipline, no connection between the officers and the sepoys
and dissatisfaction in the minds of the former from severe
duties falling on him in consequence of the paucity of officers 
1
p r e s e n t , B a k e r ,  who had served in the Bengal army for more
than 29 years, advised that this development be halted by
issuing a general rule that, 7?no military man should hold a
civil station, except in cases where necessity must supercede 
2all law,fT In spite of these warnings and promptings, the
Home authorities did not increase the number of officers per
native infantry regiment and the Bengal Government, in its 
turn, failed to observe moderation in staff and civil appoint­
ments of the officers, so that by I836 the increasing drain 
had reached serious proportions.
As the years passed the situation did not ease, but 
was worsened rather by the increased establishment of local 
corps for service in such places as Assam, Arakan, Tenasserim 
and Sind* The Bengal Government found it impossible to abide 
within the limit of five officers per regiment set by the 
Court, and in desperation appealed again in 1844 for the 
increase of at least one officer for each native infantry regi­
ment. Tired by these repeated requests, the Court in 1844
1, P*P* 1831-32, XIII, (735-V), H.C* Ap* B.N0.6.
2, P*P* 1831-32* XIII, (735-V), H* C* Ap. B*No*16.
XitSx
wearily stated that, "if the addition of one Gaptain only is
required for the permanent efficiency of the native infantry
1
of which the European officer is so vital," they were ready 
to sanction this increase as far as financial circumstances 
would allow. But in spite of this addition of one captain per 
regiment, which took effect in 1845? the deficiency of officers 
on active duty with the regiments continued to be felt.
This deficiency within the officer ranks of the Beng­
al army was widely known and commented upon by the Press of the 
period and it is instructive to take a random sampling of its 
comments. The Friend of India of March 1844 criticised the
Board of Control for not taking up this matter in earnest and
2
for not persuading the Court to arrest the shortfall. The
Bengal Hurkaru of June 1845 ? in commenting on the seriousness
of the situationt observed that "very many regiments have not
even one European officer at the head of each company on
parade [and that] we have even known the whole ten companies
held by three officers for six months at a time, on account of
3the absence of all other qualified officers." The Delhi 
Gazette reported in November 1846, that the 33nd regiment 
native infantry had not a single captain available for command 
duties because four were already on staff appointments and the
other had assumed command of the Sheikh^corps (an irregular
\ ^ corps),
1. D, from the Court to the G.G. in Council 15 June 1844,
M.D. sent to Bengal Vol.29.
2. Friend of India 12 March 1844.
3. Bengal Hurkaru 25 June 1845.
4. Delhi Gazette 25 November 1846.
This sad state of affairs was not only confined to 
the cantonments, for ar a letter published in The Times in 
November 1843 noted, ?,under the very walls of Multan, every 
captain as well as the two senior subalterns of the 51st regi­
ment native infantry were absent.7^  The Mofussilite , com­
menting on the same problem observed in June 1849 that TTthe 
charge of companies in all regular corps devolves with few 
exceptions upon the young and inexperienced. In every other
disciplined army, troops and companies are commanded by
2Captains, the Native army is the exception.fT
The validity and accuracy of these comments is to 
a large extent borne out by the following statistics gleaned 
from the Bengal military statement of 1849, Out of the 74 
regiments of Bengal native infantry, 21 regiments had between 
four and six captains absent; from another 21 regiments, at 
least three captains were missing and at least two captains 
were absent in the remainder. As regards subalterns, on an 
average only half the sanctioned number were present and
3
available for duty per regiment. When their number is added
to that of captains absent, a total is reached of about nine
or ten officers absent per regiment, a number even greater
than that which the Bengal Government forwarded to the Court
of Directors in I85O when it cited an absent officers figure of
4
six or seven officers per regiment.
I* The Times - 25 November 1848.
2- The Mofussilite - 26 June 1849.
3, Bengal Military statement of 1849.
4. ft V - C,
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It appeared by l£jO that the difference of opinion 
between the Court and the Bengal Government on the depletion 
of officers would not be wisely resolved. Again the Court 
turned down a request for an increase in the officer complement 
and instructed the Bengal Government to draw upon as many 
Madras officers as possible for staff appointments in the Ben­
gal army. 1 Since the limit of five was being consistently ex­
ceeded, the Court, while censuring the Government in India, 
sanctioned the rule that ”six officers could be withdrawn from 
any regiment” though laying down that the number should ”not
be exceeded without an absolute necessity, the particulars of
2
which are to be specially communicated to us.” But before
this decision could reach India, the Governor-General Lord
Hardinge, realising that the limit of five for withdrawal of
officers was too low and therefore unrealistic, had himself
3
issued an order raising the limit to seven. The Court was 
duly informed of this order and reluctantly sanctioned this 
raising of the limit, expressing the pious hope that the Gov­
ernment at Fort William would now be able to insist upon the 
maintenance of an effective number of officers in the sepoy
4
regiments. Such, however, was not to be the case, and the 
officer shortage continued to be acute throughout the army up
1. D. from the Court to the G.G, in Council 20 July I85O. 
para 20. M. D* sent to Bengal Vol.jJ-6 .
2. D, from the Court to the G.G. in Council 27 November 1&50.
No. 30, Para 11. M, D, sent to Bengal Vol.J-g.
3. Ly from the G.G. to the Court 22 July I85O. No. 122. para 4* 
M,L. received from Bengal Vol.5&.
4. D. from the Court to the G.G. in Council 15 January I85I*
para 5. M.D. sent to Bengal Vol. S .  37.
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to the Mutiny.
It was natural that this depletion of officers should 
ultimately affect the rank and file of the sepoy infantry regi­
ments,. This was pointed out with ample fullness by various 
senior officers before the Select Committee of 1852. Lt. Gen.
Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, observed that, ”the 
general staff of the army being very numerous, it withdraws 
from regiments of the line such a large number of officers as 
not to leave enough for the regimental duties of those regi­
ments and the consequence is that the regiments lose their 
1
discipline.” Major-General Pollock, alluding to the same 
problem, noted that, TtThe Bengal native army was not suffic­
iently officered by European officers* every company ought to 
have a Captain which they have not. The officers are taken off 
for other appointments and there are not a sufficient number 
of Captains on the establishment. Out of six Captains to a 
regiment some are taken for other appointments, some are on
furlough. I have known of regiments commanded by Lieutenants
2
sometimes in the field too.”
In addition to these comments, it can be generally 
stated that those officers chosen for civil and political 
duties were carefully selected men, qualified for such posts 
by their ability and linguistic attainments. Since ”from the
1. P.P. 1852-53*XXXIa(627) H,Le pD 331.
2* P.P. l852-53,XXXi;(627)?H.L. P-?-50.
3. For staff appointments, it was laid down that an officer
must have Sufficient acquaintance with the native language,” 
to be able to read, converse, answer and communicate freely 
in Hindustani,’D. from the Court to the G.G, in Council 
1 July 1838, M,D. sent to Bengal Vol.ZIv
instance a young man arrives in India, his thoughts seem to be
directed to how, instead of being with his regiment, he is to
1
get away from it in order to better his conditions/’ those 
who were left to serve in the regiments were by and large 
inferior officers, those least able to carry out their respon­
sibilities. Dissatisfied as they were with their service con­
ditions, and often compelled to manage permanently short 
staffed, they performed their duties in a grudging manner and 
the morale and discipline of the native units suffered in 
consequence.
Such then was the state of affairs which existed 
amongst the European officers of the native infantry regiments 
in I8j2# Gradually shorn of all their incentive, both finan­
cial and martial, and burdened with grievances, they became 
indifferent to their duties and ceased to take an interest in 
their sepoys. This would have been damaging in any military 
organisation based on !linef management principles, but it was 
specially so for the Bengal army in which the bonds of race, 
religion and esprit de corps usually existing between officers 
and their men had never been present.
The increased centralisation of authority within the 
Bengal army since the reforms of 1796 had also lowered the 
prestige of the regimental officers in the eyes of their sepoys. 
Hedged in by voluminous rules and regulations and by growing 
delegation of power to those in staff positions, the regimental
1. P*P. 1831-32., XIII, (735—V ) , H0C. Ap.B, No.23
A ^1 LJ i)
officer was continually placed in an embarrassing position. 
Indeed, the regulations had become so complicated with time 
that any officerTs actions were liable to censure and were 
acceptable and correct only as long as they were not challenged. 
Even the Supreme Government in India was not free from this 
questioning and more often than not were censured for their 
actions* In 1&24, when,, under the demands of the Burmese War, 
the Government of India took an emergency decision and raised 
six extra regiments for the Bengal army, they wanted to in­
clude them in the regular line. The Directors, for their part, 
ordered their disbandment. This led to an argument which con­
tinued till lB28\ The Court severely admonished their Bengal 
agents and observed, fTIt is your duty in the high and respon­
sible situation in which you stand to place before all our 
servants an example of obedience to our orders and of defer­
ence to our authority - with what seeming propriety can we 
retrench from the allowances of subordinate officers the amount
of all unauthorised expenditure, if the Supreme Government be
2
permitted in direct disobedience of orders to inflict upon
our revenue a great permanent charge, without incurring the
ordinary penalty which according to the custom of our service
3
attached to such conduct?n The Court had previously warned
the Bengal Government in 1814 not to act without receiving
1. T.R.E. Holmes - History of Indian Mutiny p.55.
2. This refers to the order of the Court to disband the six 
extra regiments.
3. D. from the Court to the G,Gf in Council 6 February 1&28.
MaD. sent to Bengal Vol.l^*
previous sanction of the Home authorities. Remarks made by 
the Court - TTon no future occasion whatever should an augmen­
tation by whole regiment be made by any of the local government 
without any previous reference to us,fT^  ??no commissions of
whatever rank is to be granted until a sanction and authority
2
be given to the same from England,T1 reveal the tone of control 
exercised by the Home authorities over the Government of 
Bengal* How far this policy of detailed control exercised by 
London authorities was wise is questionable. Any effort to 
exercise rigid control from a distance of many thousands of 
miles and to restrict the powers to improvise rules for meet­
ing the exigencies of an emergency must at times prove costly 
and disastrous. It encouraged a state of lethargy and the 
avoidance of responsibility and decision - making amongst the 
superior army officers, and this in turn embarrassed the junior 
field officers before their sepoys. Devoid of most of their 
authority, they were reduced to mere arbitrators of drill and 
dress and found solace in liquor, gambling and other delights 
of Anglo Indian society. The discerning sepoy was not at a 
loss to notice the situation.
It is significant that as this serious weakness came 
to the fore, other pressures playing upon the Bengal army made 
themselves felt. As the prestige and power of the Company 
in India had increased, and the memory of Maratha hardiness or
1, D. from the Court to the G.G, in Council 8 November 1814*
M,D. sent to Bengal Vol.S. ,5.
2, D. from the Court to the G.G, in Council 3 iViarch 1824,
M,D. sent to Bengal Vol.?. U,
Mughal splendour had faded, new racial attitudes had been 
emerging as between English and Indians, attitudes which were 
reflected in the relationships between European officers and 
their native sepoys* In the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, the attitude of the CompanyTs Government became per­
meated with imperial ambition, and superiority* The attitude 
of the average Englishman changed from one of disapproval of 
Hindu Tsuperstition1 and Mussalman bigotry1 to one of contempt 
for the ideas and beliefs of an inferior and conquered people, 
and there emerged in him a superiority complex which led him to 
regard India s,not only as a country whose institutions were 
bad and people corrupted but one which was by its nature in­
capable of ever becoming any b e t t e r . L i k e w i s e  the life of 
the English in India was becoming more Europeanised than it 
had been,and gradually but noticeably, the situation arose in
which there was "little connection with natives of either 
2
religion." Indians came to be excluded from important posts,
both in the army and the civil organisations and the friendly
intercourse between the two races disappeared* As Maria
Graham said, "Every Briton appears to pride himself on becoming
3
outrageously John Bull.11 and she noted in her memoirs that, 
"the distance kept up between the English and the natives (in 
Bengal) is such that I have not been able to get acquainted 
with any native familyc With the increasing influx of
m ^ ^ TWe. a^-.b.o-hi, „ ^1. T.G.P. Spear - m ; p* 136*
2. T* Williamson - East India Vade Macum. Vol.I, p.347.
3. Maria Graham - 'Journal of a residence in India p.136.
4* Ibid., p.139.
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Englishwomen into India, the social distance had become greater 
still and ”a herd psychology and an intense race consciousness,” 
flourished,,1 ’’The intense Anglo-Saxon spirit of self approba­
tion , ” commented Trevelyan, ’’unpleasantly noticeable among 
vulgar Englishman on the continent, became rampant in India*
It is painful to observe the deep pride and insolvency of race
2
which engrained in the nature of Europeans.” The European 
society at Calcutta was shocked when Lord Auckland, the Gov­
ernor-General accepted Dwarkanath Tagore’s invitation to 
3
dinner. The common expressions used about Indians were 
’ odious blacks’, ’the nasty heathen wretches’, ’the filthy 
creatures ’ etc, , and if it was ’’not that the English generally 
behave with cruelty [yet] they make no scruple of expressing 
their anger and contempt by the most opprobrious epithets 
that the language affords,” ^
The European officers of the Sepoy army were not 
immune to this changing social environment, and their behaviour 
towards their sepoys reflected the attitude of the period. 
Indifference and abuse became the order of the day, and social 
contact with the sepoys and the native officers was looked 
down upon. This feeling was further aggravated by the fact 
that inexperienced immature cadets fresh from England were sent j 
out to take command over native officers and men far older than
1. T. G, P. Spear - op. cit. , p.115*
2. G,Trevelyan - The Competition Wallah pp.441-442
3. E,Eden - Letters from India Vol,I? pp.215-216,
1, Observations on India - by a resident there many years,
p.149.
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themselves, whose tongues and customs were wholly unknown to 
them. In such circumstances it was understandable that they 
would assume an air of superiority. The sepoys, for their part, 
conscious of the inexperience and incapacity of their officers, 
felt resentful. Consequently, any bond of mutual trust, respect 
and attachment that had grown up between the sepoy and his 
European officer was replaced by a feeling of estrangement and 
mutual distrust. Even the native officers were looked down 
upon by their European colleagues because of their complexion, 
religion and language.^"
The Bengal officers thus increasingly sought outlet 
in the society of balls and suppers which had come into vogue.Lt, 
Colonel Sleeman, who was in India for a period of over 40 
years, wrote, "the subalterns exhibited little interest in 
their regimental duties and turned instead to Beer and Bill­
iards and their clubs* They became entirely alienated from
their men and betray signs of greatest impatience while they
2
listen to the necessary reports of their native officers."
Indeed, this attitude was so overwhelming, that, as an officer 
observed "it was almost impossible for any one to avoid be­
coming almost a different being in a very short time after 
arriving in India. I dare say I am wonderously altered among 
the regiment in my ways, while every griffin swears he"ll 
never get into such and such habits, that he sees everyone, in 
spite of their having made the same determination, dropping
1. Gleig - India and its army p.192.
2* Lt.Col.Sleeman - Rambles and recollections of an Indian 
official Vol.II, p.32.
into by degrees, they will be seen exactly as the rest of the 
1officers.” William Delafield Arnold, long in the CompanyTs 
military service, described these officers as ”mere animals 
with no single idea on any subject in the world beyond their 
carcasses. They were dishonest in money transactions and as for 
courtesy, such an idea never entered their heads. Their lang­
uage was disgusting, they took no interest even in their regi- 
2ment.” This withdrawal from and reaction to the sepoys placed
the Bengal officers in an increasingly dangerous vacuum. To
Lord Bentinck, this trend was very disturbing and he noted
with deep regret, the passing of the good old days when ”the
connection between the European and the native officers was
much closer, their dependence upon each other was greater and
a more cordial intimacy and union existed between all ranks
and the sepoys. They have never been so good as they were in
3
the earliest period of our careers*”
This deterioration of morale amongst the officer 
corps brought forth no positive action from either the Court 
or the Supreme Government in India. On more than one occasion, 
the Court sanctioned their Executive in India to show Court­
esy and observation of kindness and proper attention from the
L
Europeans towards the native soldiers,” and emphasised that
1, Eastern sketches or original letters from India, 27 May 1826 
to 11 July 1827 by an officer in the East India Company!s 
service. E.MSS. B.74.
2, William Delafield Arnold - Oakfield p. 12.
3* Minute of Bentinck 13 March 1835. M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol.39.
4. D, from the Court to the G.G. in Council 28 May 1828 
para 103* M,D. sent to Bengal Vol. 14„
that the Commanding Officers of native corps should impress 
upon their juniors ”the prime importance of zealous exertion 
on the part of our European officers in their manifesting an 
unceasing regard in the happiness, the good will and obedience 
of their men and of their possessing a common language and of 
their habit of intercourse with troops under t h e m . I f  such 
lofty statements could have arrested the demoralising influen­
ces at work amongst the Bengal army, history might have been 
differently written. But such was not the case, and these 
instructions went unheeded.
Throughout the period under review, 1796 to I852, 
two forces were at work in India. One was the driving force of 
able, ambitious governors-general, bent upon the extension as 
well as the consolidation of their Indian empire, very con­
scious always of dangers threatening and of the importance of 
the army which shielded them against those dangers. The other 
was the governing force of the Home authorities, of the 
cautious Directors, anxious at first about their trade and at 
all times about the finances of their Indian possessions and 
of the Presidents of the Board of Control, determined to 
impose Parliamentary control and often hostile to the preten­
sions of the Company in India. The officers of the Company*s 
armies in India found themselves and their prospects, private 
and professional, at the mercy of these conflicting forces. 
Sometimes they were able 00 play upon the feelings of one or
1, De from the Court to the G.G. in Council 3 August 1842,
M,D. sent to ^engal Vol.27.
other party, at others they became the victims of an access 
of pique in a President of the Board of Control or a particular 
Court of Directors, In either case their efficiency and integ­
rity -was impaired. Ill prepared for Indian conditions, young 
officers came out to India to find themselves plunged into the 
society of officers whose isolation from a wider society made 
them unduly preoccupied with their own past status and present 
difficulties. They Inherited a tradition of near-mutinies, 
officer combinations and constant memorials of protest. The 
difficulties of a subalternTs early years, when it was all too 
easy to fall into debt - especially in Bengal - led to much 
dissatisfaction and a continuous search for ways of escaping 
from regimental service. Financial considerations led to a 
distaste for the ordinary round of sepoy management and 
training - a changing climate of opinion might turn that dis­
taste into a positive dislike of the sepoy and of all things 
Indian, Frustrated and wallowing in his discontent, the officer 
drifted away from his regimental duties and his sepoys. Such 
a situation could be explosive. As Sir Henry Lawrence said,
*Tso long as all is smooth and quiet on the surface few 
enquiries are made. All may be rotten below, a mine may be 
ready no be sprung.n
1. H, Lawrence
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CHAPTER III
The Native Soldiery of the 
Bengal Native Infantry
(1796 - 1852)
The army reorganisation of 1796 affected the native 
soldiery of the Bengal native infantry as much as its European 
officer complement. It replaced the Brigade formation of the 
infantry introduced in 17^6 by one of Regiments, each of which 
was made up of two battalions. The strength of each regiment, 
European officers apart, was fixed at 20 Subadars, 20 Jamadars, 
100 Havildars, 100 Naiks, 40 Drummers and Fifers and 1600 
sepoys, their numbers being equally divided between the two 
battalions. Two drill havildars, two drill naiks and two native 
doctors were also sanctioned as staff attached to each regiment. 
The office of native adjutant was however abolished, in keeping 
with the policy of the army administrators who were reluctant 
to vest any major responsibility in the native officers. This 
structure of the native complement within a battalion remained 
substantially the same down to the year 1852,^ for the reorgan­
isation of 1824 did no more than replace the double-battalion
1. M 0G. 13 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulation 1799, p.131. 
Carrollfs Bengal Code 1817, Sec. XLI, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment I852. p.289.
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regiments by a larger number of single-battalion regiments. The 
only important variation, and this was irregular, was in the 
number of sepoys to a company. In spite of this continuity of 
the basic structure, the native soldiery was none the less 
affected by the various changes in regulations, service condi­
tions and circumstances that occurred between 1796 and 1852.
This chapter will deal with the reactions of the native soldiers 
to all such measures and also with the significant influence 
that these reactions exerted on the history of the Bengal 
native infantry.
Contrary to what the name would imply, the Bengal 
native infantry hardly drew any recruits from Bengal proper. 
Instead, its ranks were filled mainly by residents of Oudh and 
the upper provinces of the Bengal Presidency. Although Oudh was 
politically included in the Company’s domain only in 1856, its 
inhabitants were nevertheless welcomed into the Company’s mili­
tary service. The military establishment of the Vizier of Oudh 
was greatly reduced at the end of the eighteenth century when 
by the treaty of January 1798, he was made to cede the Fort 
of Allahabad to the Company. A great many inhabitants of Oudh, 
who had served as soldiers in his army were therefore thrown 
out of employment. The Calcutta Coxxncil thought it proper to 
tap this ready source of trained men well known for their 
soldierly habits, and they recruited as many as possible from 
the infantry ranks. In this, the Council received support from 
the Commander-in-Chief, who observed that such recruitment ’’will 
be attended with many beneficial consequences and it will
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furnish the army with a body of good and unexceptionable 
1
recruits*Although it is not clear what particular benefits
the Commanderln-Chief w,as expecting to derive from such a
policy} recruits were drawn from Oudh in 1800 and the system
persisted throughout the period under review. Besides Oudh, the
provinces west of Dinajpur jn 1810 also supplied many recruits
to fill the vacancies caused in the regiments by the raising of
2
volunteer corps for foreign service. Recruits were also
3
raised from the districts of Patna and Bihar, as Buchanan noted;
he also stated that a great many came from the north side of
the Ganges i,e. from the Shahabad and Bhagalpore regions.
During the Burmese war of 1824, men from the Benares, Buxar,
Cawnpore and Dinapore regions were also enlisted in the Bengal
A
native infantry. Since these areas adjoined Oudh, the 
statement that the Bengal infantry sepoys were recruited from 
the inhabitants of Oudh and Bihar, would sum up the position 
fairly enough. The deposition of Major-General Sir Jasper 
Nicolls, (who was in India from 1802 to I83O and was Ma little 
at each Presidency,”) before the select Committee of I83I that 
”the whole sepoy army of Bengal is drawn from the CompanyTs
5
province of Bihar and Oudh, with very few exceptions” supports 
the above conclusion.
Recruitment from Oudh was not without its disadvantages!
1, Bengal Mily.Cons, 29 May I8OO.N0.I and 1A,
2, Bengal Mily.Cons. 26 September 1810, No.28.
3, F, Buchanan - An Account of the district of Bihar and Patna. 
Book II, p.268.
4* L. from Bengal, 6 November 1824. para, 12. M.L. received 
from Bengal Vol.20.
5. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-V),H.C. p,l.
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however. When large scale desertion occurred in the Bengal 
native infantry units in 1830 during their march to the southern 
peninsula, the Bengal Government found itself unable to take 
any punitive action against the deserters, except by discharg­
ing them, as they hailed from Oudh which was not under the 
Company1s authority. This led the administrators to reconsider 
the policy of recruiting men from regions not under the Company|s 
jurisdiction, and as a result,orders were issued that "natives 
of the Company’s provinces only are to be entertained as 
recruits in situations where such can be obtained and as few
men as are possible be received into battalions serving in the
1
Vizier’s dominions from countries to the west of Benares.”
But from the depositions(before the Army Commission of 1859) of 
those European officers with long service in the Bengal infantry, 
it can be proved that this order of 1830 was little observed 
and that the Bengal infantry had continued to recruit its sepoys 
from the Vizier’s dominions. Colonel Keith Young, who had been 
with the Bengal Army since 1823 observed as a Judge Advocate 
General of the Army in 1859 that "Oudh and the adjacent dis­
tricts that were formerly under the Oudh Government furnish
2
about three fourths of the recruits for the Bengal infantry.”
Brigadier Troup who had been in the Bengal military service
since 1819 and who served as the Commander at Bareilly in 1859,
stated that "the Bengal native infantry came chiefly from the
3
province of Oudh, Buxar, Bhojpur and Arrah...” Henry Russell
1. Bengal Mily. Gon£r 9 August 1830. No. 1600.
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541 ), H.C. p.143.
3. P.P, 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p. 146
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also supported these officers by noting in his diary that,"a
great portion of the Bengal army in the old days [the pre-
1
mutiny days] came from the Byswara district."
The reason for this preponderance of recruitment from 
Oudh may be sought in the writings of various people who were 
personally attached to the Bengal military service in various 
capacities during the period under review. The Duke of Welling­
ton wrote to Lieutenant-General Stuart in 1804 that the Oudh 
recruits were chosen because they were of a better size and 
appearance than any others to be had in India. Major-General 
Sir Thomas Reynall who was with the Indian army from 1805 to 
1828 (1822 to 1828 in Bengal) stated before the Select Committee
of I83I that, "the Oudh men were thought of as the best 
3
soldiers.” Lord Bentinck wrote in connection with the composi­
tion of the native armies of India that the people of Oudh were 
"much more military in their habits and were considered more
4powerful than those of Bombay." Melville, the Military Secre­
tary of East India House observed in I852 that "the sepoys from 
Oudh are generally men of fine s t a t u r e , F o r  these, and for 
other reasons to be discussed later, this predominance of men 
from Oudh continued to be an important feature of the Bengal 
Native Infantry throughout the period. This narrow regional
1. W,H.Russell - My Indian Mutiny Diary, p.20.
2. Despatches of the Duke of Wellington -ed, Gurwood, Vol.II, 
p. 1045T
3. P.P. 1831-T32, VIII, (735-V), H.C. p.135*
4. L„ from Bengal, 16 March 1835* para.10.M.L. received from 
Bengal.'Vol.39*
5. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI,(627),H.L. p.230.
6. "The Bengal native infantry was mainly recruited from Oude, 
Bhojepore and Bihar," said Lt,Col,Coke-(who was with the 
Bengal army from 1827)P.P,1859,VIII,(2541 ) H.C. p.1279.
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basis of recruitment was to make its influence felt on more 
than one occasion during these years.
The fact that sepoy recruitment was confined to Oudh 
and Bihar also meant that sepoy recruitment was overwhelmingly 
from among Hindus, who formed the great majority of the popula­
tion of these areas. Hindus always enjoyed a marked numerical 
superiority over the Muslims in the ranks of the Bengal native 
infantry regiments. Although Clive had recommended in 17&5 
that native battalions should be composed of equal numbers of
Muslims and Hindus so that they might exercise an effective
1
check over each other, this policy was hardly followed at all
and from an early date the Hindus supplied the majority of
recruits for the native infantry regiments in Bengal. Thus
Captain Badenach, in submitting the returns of a corps raised
in 1811-15 at Benares, pointed out that there were only 92
2
Muslims against 801 Hindus J The Court of enquiry which sat in 
judgment over the sepoy mutiny at Barrackpore in 1821 stated in 
its report that only one tenth of the personnel of the Bengal
3 1native infantry regiments was Muslim, and the members^ of 
the Punjab Committee of 1859 commented in their report to the
1. Chap* I. p. 56= ,
2. Captain W.Badenach - Inquiry into the state of the Indian 
army, p.71,
3. Genl, observations of the Court of enquiry, Barrackpore,'
2 January 1825, para 22. Bengal Mily.Cons. 6 January 1825- 
No. 18.
1, Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier-General Chamberlain and Lt.Col* 
H*B0 Edwards. They were with the Indian army since 1828, 
1837 and 1810.
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Army Commission that ,!three-fourths of the Bengal native infant
ry [were] high caste Hindus and the rest one fourth consisted
1
of Muslims and low' caste Hindus,u The composition figures of 
seven sepoy regiments selected at random by the Army Commis­
sion of 1859, indicated that in 1857 there had been only 1170
2
Muslims as against 6572 Hindus and 54 Sikhs in the seven
3
regiments.
Again, of the Hindu sepoys in the Bengal infantry 
regiments, men belonging to the higher castes -Brahmins and 
Kshatriyas - formed the majority. Captain Badenach gave the 
following table of caste distribution in a regiment raised at
1. P.P, 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C, p.27.
2. Sikhs were enlisted as local army in 1846 by Hardinge 
but they were not enrolled in the line before I85O,
D, to Bengal 18 September I85O. para. 14, M, D,
sent to Bengal, Vol.36,
3. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H.C, Ap, 22,
Benares in 1814-15.
201
H i n d u s
Ranks Muslims iHigh caste Low castes
Sheik 5 Brah- Raj­ Koit Bur­ Ah- Kur­-Bhat Moo­ At­
Pathanjmin poots ie eer mi nee ect
(a). (b) lei (4) __LeJ (f) (g)
Subadar 1 4 2 1 1
Jamadar -3 6 2 4 1 - - -
Havildar 5 6 15 19 2 a* - •m *** «■*
Naick 4 6 24 12 2 1 1 - 1 - -
Sepoys 19 41 351 265 16 32 32 4 $ 3 1
Total- 32 60 392 304 23 34 34 4 9 3 1
92 696 108
1, Badenach - op.cit., p-74.
(a) Koit - It could be Kayastha, Kaet, Kait, Kayath, Kaya - the 
writer caste of Bengal proper and Bihar, or it could be 
Kayat, a synonym for Darzi (tailor). H. Risley - The tribes 
and castes of Bengal. Vol.I, pp. 440, 443? 214.
(b) Burie - Buri or Buru? Buri Samat, a sect of HO in Singh- 
bhum, or Buru a sect of Pans in Chota Nagpur. Hos. Lorka 
Kolh, a non-Aryan tribe of the district of Singbhum? Ibid., 
Vol.I, pp. 165, 319. Pan - a low,weaving, basket-making and 
servile caste scattered under various names throughout the 
north of Orissa and the southern and western parts of Chota 
Nagpur. Ibid., Vol.II, p.155,
(c) Ahir, Ahiri, Abhir,‘Abhiri - the cowherd caste of Bihar and 
upper India^ The name is also sometimes used to denote a sub­
caste of Goalas, Ibid,, Vol.I, pP14.
(d) Kurmi - Kumbi, Kurambi, a very large cultivating caste of 
upper India. Bihar, Chota Nagpur and Orissa. Ibid.. Vol.I,
P.528.
(e) Bhat - a caste of genealogists and family bards. Ibid.,
Vol.I, p.98,
(f) Moonee- Mundri or Munri? - a totemistic sept of Mundas in 
Chota Nagpur^ Ibid., Vol.II, p,108.
(g) Atect - Atit? Atith from Sanskrit atit - As used in Bihar, 
it includes two classes of persons. Sannyasi Atits Jwho adopt 
a purely ascetic and celibate life) and Gharbari Atits, whose 
manner of life is that of ordinary householders. Ibid., Sal. 
Vol. I, p.. 26.
202
It would thus appear that in the first quarter of the nine­
teenth century, recruits were drawn mainly from the Brahmins
and Kshatriyas 77in the proportion of eight to ten, with one
1 TT
tenth Mahomedan and one tenth Hindus of inferior caste*,T Henry
Russell, a Bengal officer, in his evidence before the Select
Committee of 1831 supported this view and said, 77among the
Bengal native infantry regiments, Hindus of the better class
2
greatly preponderate77. Lt. General Briggs while commenting 
upon the composition of the Bengal native infantry in 1842 
stated that the proportion 7?of different sects in the ranks of
the regular Bengal native infantry77
3
was as follows71.
Christians Mahomedans Brahmins Rajputs Hindus of 
inferior caste
No. 1076 12,411 24,840 27, 993 13,920
Thus throughout the period under review high caste Hindus con­
tinued to form the majority in the Bengal native regiments*
This view is supported by the report of the Select Committee of 
1852 which observed that 77in 1851 there were 70,129 Hindus in 
the Bengal native army. Among these Hindus, there were 26,983
Brahmins, 27,335 Rajputs, I5.76I Hindus of inferior description
4and 50 Sikhs.77
~  ....
1. Oenl. observation of the Barrackpore, 2 January
1825* para. 23, Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No.18.
2. P.P. 1831-32. XIII, (735~v),K.Go p..225.
3. J. Briggs - A letter on the Indian army, p.13.
4. P.P. 1852-53^ £ai. (627), H.L. p. 145.
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From the data listed above it is evident that in the
early part of the nineteenth century the Brahmins provided the
largest, or nearly the largest group among the Bengal infantry
sepoys. That predominance brought in its wake many a problem
for the army administrators, and measures were taken to arrest
the trend. Thus the Bengal Government observed in I83Q that,
?Tan unusually large number of Brahmins has of late entered the 
1service.w (This may have been brought about by the permission
granted to serving sepoys in 1823 to bring a Brahmin youth to
2
cook for them on their return journey from furlough; these 
youths, being present in the camp of the regiment, found it 
easy to secure employment in the army with the help of their 
sepoy masters.) To arrest this increasing trend the Bengal 
Government laid down in 1830 that, 1?it would be desirable, to 
follow the proportion which formerly prevailed by giving a
3
decided preference to the Rajputs and to the Mahomedans.” As 
a consequence, the enlistment of Brahmins was discouraged. This 
restrictive policy was however not very effective; it was det­
ected in 1834, for instance, that a number of sepoys who had 
been enlisted in the 59th regiment as Rajputs, were in fact 
Brahmins.^ Bentinck, however, thought it best, since it was 
impossible to prevent fraud, to revoke this restrictive order 
on Brahmin recruits and in 1834 issued a General Order that,
1. Bengal Mily, Cons, 9 August 1830, No.l600
2. G.O.G.G. 8 May 1823. Bengal Mily. Cons. 8 May 1823. No.197.
3. Bengal Mily. Cons, 9 August I83O. No„l600
4. L0 from commanding officer of the 59th regiment, 6 November 
1837. para. 7. BoardTs Collection, 60, 204, p.8.
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’’all objections to men belonging to the respectable classes of
the native community or preference among such classes on
account of caste or religion shall cease to o p e r a t e , H e  also
ordered the sepoys of the 59th regiment to be enrolled in their
2real names and castes. The Court of Directors being informed
of this measure approved it, and the restriction was withdrawn.
The earlier intention of the Government to reduce the proportion
of Brahmins seems somehow to have been met, for the report of
the Select Committee in 1852 revealed that the Rajputs by that
3time, exceeded the Brahmins in total numbers.
The basic fact however remained that the high caste
Hindus continued to form the majority in the Bengal native
infantry regiments during the period 1796 to 1852. There was no
Government order barring the enlistment of low caste recruits ,
yet, though the order of Bentinck in 1830 encouraged all castes
to seek service, the proportion of low caste Hindus in sepoy
regiments remained comparatively low compared to that of the
higher castes. For one reason or another the commanding offic-
4
ers of sepoy regiments preferred to enlist the higher castes. 
They thought that ’’the higher caste men are cleaner in their
5-
habits/’ As Lt,-Colonel Wyllie, who was in India for 25 years, 
from 1834 onwards, observed, ’’the feeling was that [in Brahmins]
1. G.O.G.G. 21 December 1834. Bengal Mily. Gons. 21 December 
1834, No.252.
2. L. from Bengal 22 December 1834. para. 10, Board’s Collectior 
60, 204. p.9.
3. See page 2*o2-.
4. P0P, 1831-32, XIII', (735-v), H.C. p. 18.
5. P.P. 1859, V, (2515),H.C. p.20.
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they have a more respectable man, in the same way as in our own
country you would rather have a farmer’s son than a man taken
1
from the streets,” Whatever the causes, the fact remained
that up till 1852, the Bengal native infantry was ’’chiefly
2
Hindus of the highest caste.”
These high caste men, had Lt.-Col, Wyllie reflected for 
a moment, were of course, very often themselves farmers1 sons, 
for Oudh and Bihar were the very heart of the great agricultu­
ral region formed by the Ganges valley. The districts from 
which the sepoys were recruited were predominantly agricultural 
in their economy, and the inhabitants mainly dependent upon the
land* That was true whether they were Rajputs or Pathans, with
3
a martial tradition, or Brahmins and Kayasths, If they were 
driven to seek employment as the mercenary forces of the Com­
pany by the oppressions and disorders of the Oudh Government,
they remained conscious of their status as !Ashraf* or gentry,
4
and as such -’soldiers by birth.” This was in the sharpest
contrast with the European regiments of the Company, for they
were composed of men, who, previous to their enlistment had
followed a whole variety of callings, as ”brick layers,
5
labourers, sailors, basket-makers and painters.” This strange 
conglomeration of men sought Company’s service either to escape 
disappointment in their own mother country or as adventurers in 
search of gold. Ned Phasele, a horse-artillery man in the
1. P..P, 1859,-VIII, (2541),H.C. p. 173.
2. I\P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627),H.L. p. 164.'
3. Ii,P„ Chattopadhaya - Sepoy Mutiny. 1857« its social study 
an J. analy sijs, p. 48.
4. Buchanan -■ op. cit. . p. 265.
5. The Mofussilite, 19 October 1847*
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Company’s service, in his description of his fellow recruits
described how one had enlisted because of a quarrel with his
father-in-law’ and another because of a disagreement with his
father’s coachman, Ned Phasele himself had had rather a
colourful career. After alternate hard reading and daring
breaches of all University rules and regulations, he had been
rusticated for two years. Being virtually alienated from his
family and disgusted and overwhelmed with debts he had joined
the Company’s army with the hope of returning with some of the
1
orient gold in his pouch.
Recruited as the sepoys were from all over the upper
provinces of Bengal Presidency a wide variety of local dialects
of Hindustani prevailed in the Bengal sepoy regiments. In 
2 3Benares, Ghazipur and in the whole district of Shahabad, 
the common tongue of the people was the western Bhojpuri dia­
lect of Bihar, while the Awadhi dialect of Eastern Hindi was
the general language of the whole of Oudh, In Bareilly dis­
trict the majority of the inhabitants conversed in western
5
Hindi, in some form or other, as their mother tongue. Since 
Hindustani was the one common language, it was accepted as the 
official language for the purpose of communication in the sepoy 
regiments of the Bengal army. The European officers attached 
to the sepoy army, from 1796 to 1852, were therefore required 
to master this language before being granted the charge of a
The Mofussilite 19 October 1$47
2. D:strict Gazetteer of the United Provinces, Benares. p.106
3. Ibid,, Ghaziporc, p.93.
Ibid,, Shahabad, p,97*
5o Ibid., Bareilly, p,3k*
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native regiment, From 1809, the year of inception of the semin­
ary, the cadets in the Military seminary at Addiscombe had also
1
to study Hindustani and this practice continued till 1852,
Such then was the material from which the Bengal native 
infantry drew its recruits. To summarise, the characteristics 
of the representative Bengal native recruit for the period 
under review can be expressed as follows: He was a Hindu of 
high caste, came from an agricultural community, was a resident 
of Bihar and Oudh regions and had Hindustani as his mother- 
tongue. He was a person of good physique and clean, sober and 
frugal habits. Religious in temperament, very conscious of his 
caste and social duties, much attached to his family, and sur­
rounded even in the regiment by his fellow villagers, the 
Bengal sepoy recruit was reluctant to take any steps which could 
be questioned on the context of social and religious practices 
and prejudices. In sharp contrast to his English fellow 
soldiers, he hailed from the peasantry and a station which 
possessed a social heritage. In fact, as like as not, he was of 
the landed gentry, and had land in his name. Unlike his Euro­
pean comrades, he did not seek escape in the ranks; rather by 
enlistment he gained status in his society to which he contin­
ued to retain his allegiance. He therefore remained a civilian 
at heart though becoming a soldier by profession. This distin­
ctive feature in the make- up of the Bengal recruit and sepoy 
necessarily exerted an influence over the happenings of the 
Bengal native infantry.
isc. Cadet Book,
Addiscombe Seminary, 1809-1860. p.236.
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It can be stated in a general sense that no special
agency was employed to recruit for the Bengal sepoy regiments.
In ordinary circumstances intending recruits were brought along
by the men already serving in a regiment while returning from
furlough.^ In times of urgency, however, reward money was
allowed to native soldiers who voluntarily exerted themselves
2
to bring in fresh recruits, or a reward in the form of pro-
3
motion was given. In addition, recruiting parties were
occasionally sent out, with the approval of the Commander-in-
Chief, and native commissioned officers and sepoys were granted
4
leave of absence to recruit men from their native villages. 
Whatever agency may have been employed in securing the recruits, 
it can be said that the intending recruits were by and large 
the fellow villagers of the serving soldiers of the regiment. 
That this self-operating procedure had the acceptance of the 
army administrators is borne out by a variety of evidence. Thus 
Colonel C. Eagan, the Adjutant General of the army, issued a 
circular (No.l600 ) on 9 August 1840, in which he asked the 
commanding officers of native regiments to ”avail themselves of 
the services of any intelligent and smart native officers and 
men, who are on leave of absence to obtain good recruits by 
their assistance.. . to keep up the strength of their 
regiments to 620 privates. Again, Major-General Hearsey,
1. Seetaram - From Sepoy to Subadar p.3.
2. G(. O.G.G, 5 October 1797. Grace Bengal regulations 1799. p. 210
3. G.O.G.G. 26 September 1810. Caroll’s Bengal Code l8l7.Sec.XLI 
G« O.G.G. 5 October 1797. Grace Bengal regulations 1799.p. 210.
5. Board’s Collection 60,204, pp.12-13.
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speaking before the Army Commission of 1&59 as an officer with 
over fifty years experience in India, and as commanding officer 
of the Presidency Division , stated that ”the great agency was 
that of native officers and men. When they went on their period­
ical furlough to their villages they were told to bring back
1
with them young and strong youths fit for recruits”. This
procedure was to a great extent responsible for the regional
character of the recruits of the Bengal native infantry and the
consequent influence that it exerted on its history of the
reviewed period.
For the ease of recruitment, which the Bengal Government
experienced, there was more than one reason. From the last
quarter of the eighteenth century to the first quarter of the
nineteenth, constant wars over a wide region and frequent
changes in the territories possessed by the ruling native
princes, caused disruption to civil life. Consequently, agri-
2
cultural labour was little in demand. Moreover, even when
with British conquests agriculture became more settled and 
flourishing, the simultaneous reduction in the size of the 
armies of the native princes flooded the country with people who 
were unaccustomed to any other avocation but that of a soldier 
and these people were ready to serve any one who could pay them. 
To these people, the terms offered in the Company's army proved 
attractive and especially so because the Company offered a fixed 
and regular rate of pay. There was yet another factor which 
temp bed young Indian recruits to enter the military service of
1. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.. 172.
2, R. Temple - India in 3.880. p. 39.
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the Company, For years, the Company!s army had been victorious
everywhere in India and there was no spell like victory to
benefit a soldier especially when victory meant prize-money 
1
and plunder.
As Viscount Gough said before the select committee of
the Parliament in 1852, nthe military service in India [was]
a very popular service.TT ^
As a direct consequence of this popularity, the question
of paying bounty money to potential recruits in the manner
which was prevalent in the Royal army, never arose in Bengal
during the period under consideration. Lord Bentinck rightly
observed-in 1830 that there was no other country in the world
in which men could be recruited ”with such facility and at such
trifling expense as that of the native army of the Bengal Pres- 
3
idency,t? and Melville, from 1837 the Military Secretary in
the India House, showed that this held true to the end of our
period when, in 1852, he reported to the Select Committee that
the recruiting for the native force was carried on wentirely
4
by voluntary enlistment without bounty.
Recruitment was thus allowed to be the responsibility of 
the serving native officers and men. Although procedures were 
laid down for recording details about intending recruits, upto 
the middle of the nineteenth century, the particulars furnished
1, John Jacob also related that the sepoy on the march in time 
of war normally expected to live off the country,
2. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.240. ~
3, L, from Bengal 14 October 1830, para. 59* M. L. received 
from Bengal Vol.32.
4. P.P. 1352-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.145-
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by these men during enlistment were not counter-checked* Presen-r
tation of false returns was therefore not unknown. Since the
Company *s Government could hardly take any punitive steps to
prevent desertion if their only evidence of enlistment was based
on such false returns, this laxity in procedure was at length
tightened up* In 1852, the Bengal Government ordered that ?Tin
future the persons through whom recruits are enlisted will be
held responsible for all these and they will be severely
punished in future if any errors are detected.^ The members
of the recruiting parties were also asked to be careful to draw
up a correct registry of recruits. On entering a district, they
were ordered to wait on the Civil authority i.e., the district
officer, who in his turn would adopt all necessary measures to
facilitate the enlistment of recruits. Each recruit after en~
, 2
listment, was to be taken to the tahsoeldar of his village who 
would verify his name, caste, parentage and residence. This 
verified list, with the tahseeldarte signature, was then to be 
shown to the district officer for re-verification. After the 
enlistment of the recruits at the regimental head-quarters, the 
Adjutant General was required to send to the District Commis. - 
sioner a complete return of all the recruits enlisted during * 
the month. These returns were again distributed among the 
district officers for cross-checking with their lists. The 
Adjutant General was also ordered to send a monthly casualty
1. G.O.G.G. 6 August 1852. Bengal Mily, Cons. 6 August 1852 
No.486.
2, Tahseeldar - nThe chief (native) revenue officer of a sub­
division (tahsil) of a district. Hobson-Jobson p. 888
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list to the commanding officers in order to enable them to
correct their registers and to prevent any dismissed men from
1
re-enlisting into the CompanyTs service*
To help the recruiting authorities in their task,
detailed specifications of physical requirements had been drawn
up in 1796 to guide the commanding officers in their selection
of recruits* These rules remained in vogue throughout the period
under review' being republished at regular intervals down to
1$52.^* The enlisting age limits were fixed between sixteen and
thirty years and the minimum height at five feet six inches*
Men below the standard height were permitted to be enlisted
provided they were of active make, athletic and not below the
acceptable age* Exceptions to these rules were only permitted
on the face of great demand and when additional recruits were
3
required to be raised within a very short time* It was also 
laid down that recruits before their enlistment were to be 
examined by the regimental medical officer* Those who were 
declared unfit by the medical officer were to be rejected with­
out any reference to army head quarters*
The Bengal Standing Orders further prescribed that after 
passing the medical examination, the first four Articles in 
section two of the Articles of War, dealing with desertion, 
were to be read out to the recruits in Hindustani, The c.ommand- 
ing officers of regiments were under orders to explain these
1. G^O.G.G. 6 August IB52* Bengal Mily* Cons* 6 August IB52.
No,4G6,
2. M,C. 3 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations, p*210. CarrollT: 
Code 1817. Sec LX* Standing Orders In Bengal regiment 1852 ; 
p.464*
3. Bengal Hurkaru. 14 June 1845.
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Articles to every recruit. Each recruit had also to take an 
oath of fidelity in front of the colours of regiment, and 
according to the tenets of his belief. By this oath he was 
required to declare that he would obey the orders of the Com­
mander, never forsake or abandon the colours, march whenever he
1
was so directed and would be a faithful servant of the Company. 
According to the declaration in the oath, a Bengal sepoy 
recruit was bound to serve within or beyond the Companyfs terri­
tories. But no mention was made about service beyond the sea; 
it being understood that unless a recruit was enrolled for gen­
eral service, he would not be bound to embark but only to march 
on any service. This understanding prevented the Government on 
more than one occasion from freely employing the Bengal sepoys 
for foreign service and at times even precipitated crises,
The Bengal sepoy recruit was enlisted with the under­
standing that after three years of service he might claim his 
discharge after giving two months notice, provided that at the
time there was no state of war, and no deficiency in the
2
strength of the army. This privilege apart, he was enlisted
3
for an unlimited period of service, though he could bo -dis­
charged by the Company if and when it was found to be necessary. 
The Bengal infantry recruit was always required to stay for his 
initial period of training at army headquarters. But he was not
1. M.C, 8 August, 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.210. 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, Sec.LX. Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852. p. 484. k Aj>.- E>*
2. M.C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.210. 
Carrollfs Bengal Code 1817; Sec.LX, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment I852. p.485.
3. P.P. 1852-53. XXXI, (627), H.L. p.324.
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housed by the army authorities there, nor even given any allow­
ance from which to provide his own accomodation. Instead it was 
expected that in the first year of his service he would be 
given a place in the hut of some relation or friend, while in 
the second year two or three of the recruits would usually join 
together and build a hut for themselves. Here was yet another 
example of the way in which the army authorities encouraged 
the growth of family or village ties within the army, handing 
over their duties toward and their control over the recruits 
to the semi -autonomous body of sepoys. While it is 
difficult to ascertain the expenses a recruit had to bear on 
account of hutting for all the period 1796-1852, there is a 
reference in a newspaper article on the Bengal army, to the 
cost of building a hut in the year 1845. The writer stated that
at that time ?rfour or five rupees will build a very decent hut 
1
for t w o . T h e  recruit, after completing his training started 
his career, then, by having to spend two or three rupees upon 
providing a hut for himself. This expense together with his 
other items of expenditure, the recruit had to meet from his 
daily allowance. By a regulation of 1796, a candidate before 
enlistment as a recruit, received from the Company an allow - 
ance of two annas per day. His pay and allowance together 
after enlistment were fixed at seven rupees per month. To 
ensure his attachment to the service and to prevent him from
X* Bengal Hurkaru , 24 August 1845.
2, M.C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations p.211.
Carroll Ts Bengal Code 18.19, Sec^XLV, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regnment 18309 1840 and 1852.
deserting the lines, a recruit received his pay in three 4
instalments. From this pay he 'was required to buy his kit. His
1
turban, kamar-band linen jackets and a pair of shorts were
supplied by the Regimental Quartermaster, but against the cost
of these articles two rupees per month for a period of four
2
months were deducted from his pay. The recruit had also to
pay for the service of washerman, barber and sweeper. From 1845
3
onwards, when the new post of Ghanty Pandy was introduced in
4
the Bengal army, the Bengal sepoy recruits were ordered to
5
pay for this service also. The recruits had thus to feed and
maintain themselves on the money that was left out of their
salary after meeting all these expenses* These rules remained
unchanged upto 1852.
The regulation of 1796 made no specific mention about
the period of training of a sepoy recruit. Presumably this
depended upon the strictness of the commanding officers of the
regiments and the aptitude of the recruits. Seetaram in his
6
autobiography stated that in 1814 he underwent training for a
7period of eight months, while the author of an article on the 
Bengal army wrote in 1845 that ,?the training period of a 
recruit lasted from six to eighteen months, during which he had
1. Kamar-band or Commerbund - a .girdle but any waist belt is 
so termed. Hobson-Jobson p.279.
2. M.C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations p.211.Carroil1s
I830a"^ "l840e ^d^l8528 C 9 standing Orders in Bengal regimen*!
3- Ghanty Pandy - The man appointed to strike the bell at every 
hour for denoting the time.
4. The Bengal Mily.Gons. 15 August 1845- Ho.52.
5- Ho rations were issued to recruits or sepoys, in cantonment ; 
or on active service — unless that service was beyond their 
Presidency.
6. Seetaram - op.cit., p.7.
7* Ihid., p. 17*7
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to undergo courses in drill and weapon instruction*Tt The 
drill havildar with the assistance of a drill naik was made
2
responsible to the adjutant for the training of the recruits.
One factor which must have made the training period longer than
3
it would be todays was that all orders were given in English, 
and that many officers seem to have known so little Hindustani 
as to need the services of an interpreter when addressing their 
men,
Seetaram commented upon the great difficulty which he
experienced in mastering this quite unfamiliar language -
especially since it was used to give orders for actions which
4
were themselves quite novel to his experience. In fact this 
language problem proved to be a formidable obstacle for the new 
recruits and was often blamed for their delay in completing the
5
training period, After completing his training period, the 
sepoy recruit was again required to take an oath of fidelity 
under the colour of the regiment to which he was to be attached. 
He was sworn in by the regimental interpreter before the whole 
regiment which would be on parade for the purpose of acting as 
witnesses to his oath. The new sepoy then took his arms from 
the havildar, who would march him to his company,^ Only then
1. Bengal Hurkaru, 14 June 1845.
2. M.C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.211. 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 181?,Sec.LX, Standing Orders in Bengal 
regiment I852, p*485.
3. Since Independence the Indian Army has abandoned the use of 
English words of command in favour of Hindi terms.
4. Seetaram - op.cit,, p.l5« ‘
5. Bengal Hurkaru.24 July 1845.
6. M. C. "8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799. p. 211. 
CarrollTs/Code 1817, Sec.LX, Standing Orders in Bengal /&ew>l 
regiment 1852. p.485,  ^ 6
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did the sepoy recruit become a full fledged member of the 
regiment and was supposed to take his share of duty.
A sepoy of a Bengal regiment on being so admitted into
the service of the Company received exactly the same pay and
1
allowances, seven rupees per month, which he had been receiv­
ing as a recruit. It is surprising to record • that a recruit 
and a trained sepoy both received the same amount of pay, and 
it is difficult to explain the reason for the adoption of this 
peculiar system by the Company, for as was stated in Parliament 
in 1859 1!a recruit cannot be worth as much to the state as a 
veteran soldier [and] no good purpose is answered by putting 
them on a level as to pay, ** Nor was this the only point of 
criticism over the pay scale of the native soldiers, In 1831 
Major-General Sir Henry Worsley who had been with the Bengal 
army since 1819, drew the attention of the Select Committee to 
the peculiar pay structure, saying nit is at this very day the 
very same in amount as when it was first fixed, which was in 
so early a period of our establishment in that country, that in 
a code of Pay Regulations, published by the Military Auditor 
General in 1810, it is stated that the same rates as therein 
stated of pay and batta have been always passed to the Native
troops, but that no record of the authority establishing them
3
in the first instance is anywhere to be found,VT What was true
1. M.C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799. p.230, 
Carroll Ts^engal Code 1817. Sec. XLI. Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852. p.174.
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p. 36.
3. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C. Ap.B. No.15.
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in I83I remained unchanged even In 1852 and the rate of pay of
a Bengal sepoy was held constant for three quarters of a
1
century at seven rupees or 14 shillings a month.
Although the ordinary pay of the sepoys in all the three 
Presidencies was the same in total* till 1837 that of the Bengal 
sepoys was issued under two heads: five and a half rupees as 
basic pay and one and a half rupees as an allowance - called 
half batta. The Madras and Bombay sepoys on the other hand 
received the sum of seven rupees per month without any reference 
being made to allowance money. Colonel Munro, who was in the 
Company1s Madras military service from 1791 onwards, said 
before the Select Committee of 1831 that just before the con­
quest of Mysore, there had been great difficulty in procuring 
recruits at Madras and in maintaining the battalions in a 
complete state. Desertions had been frequent and this had . 
induced the Madras Government, nwith the sanction of the Court,
to increase the pay of the native troops at Madras from five
2
to seven rupees a month.
In addition to this nominal difference in the division 
of pay, which existed till 1837» there was one major difference 
concerning the payments made to native infantry soldiers of 
the three Presidencies. A Bengal sepoy, when on the march or | 
in the field, received an extra allowance of one rupee eight 
annas per month as marching batta or field allowance. A 
Madras sepoy however, upon the same account received two rupees
1. P.P. 1852-53, XIXI, (627K H.L. p.144
2. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C. p.70.
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five annas four pies and a Bombay sepoy was granted two rupees
1
eight annas per month as field allowance. Further, f,the
Madras sepoys used to receive full batta (three rupees) beyond
2the frontier,tT of their Presidency, which increased the
monthly earnings on campaign of a Madras sepoy serving outside
Madras Presidency to twelve rupees five annas four pies
(Rs, 7 plus Rs.2-5-4 plus Rs.3). This difference in earnings,
which was always a sore point for the Bengal sepoys, continued
till 1&37 and, as Bentinck pointed out, existed not only in
the case of the sepoys but also in that of the native commis-
3
sioned and non-commissioned officers of the three armies.
Further a comparative table of the monthly pay and allowances
of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers in
infantry regiments of the three Presidencial armies in 1835
indicates the extent of the difference which existed in the
4pay roll of the soldiers.
1. L. from Bengal 28 May 1828, para 98, M.L,received from 
Bengal Vol.27.
2. L, from Bengal 28 May 1828. para. 98. M. L, received from 
Bengal Volu27.
3. L„ from Bengal 28 May 1828. para 98, M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol.27.
4. L„ from Bengal 28 February 1835. para 14. M.L. received 
from Bengal Vol.39.
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RANK BENGAL
j—  p-
Pay 7 0 0
Alice. 5 0 0
MADRAS BOMBAY
Rs. TUT,
a 12 0
Naik
Rs#
a
As,
12
P.
0
Jamadar
Subadar
Pay 9 
Alice, 5 1010
14
Pay 17 
Alice, 7 24
Pay 52 
Alice.15
toto
Both at Madras and Bombay the rank of Subadar was divided into
three ranks. Thus, those who were under six years in the post
received 42 rupees per month , those who had between six to
ten years of service received 52 rupees each month and lastly
those who were in the ranks for a period of above ten years
received 70 rupees as a monthly pay.
Lord Bentinck realising how much such discriminatory pay
scales antagonised the Bengal sepoys and the non-commissioned
officers of Madras and Bombay, proposed in 1323 to equalise the
1
pay and allowances of the three Presidency armies. The Court
1, L, from Bengal. 23 May 1323, para,102. M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol.27.
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though it understood Bentinck7s motives and agreed in principle
with his recommendation explained that 77 this difference was
granted because the price of rice was higher in the markets of
1Madras and Bombay than in any other market in India,77 and 
enquired therefore, whether it was feasible to introduce a 
common pay scale. Bentinck therefore formed a Committee of 
three Bengal officers, Major-General Whittingham, Colonel 
Casement and Major Taylor, to consider the question and to 
frame workable proposals. The Committee, after extensive en­
quiries in all three Presidencies, recommended the Government 
to equalise the batta of the three Presidential native infant­
ries at the rate received by the Bengal units. In 1335 Bentinck 
forwarded the recommendation of the Committee to the Directors, 
adding his own observation that ffrice or other grain as [ a] 
substitute is nearly of the same price in all the interior part 
of India where the great body of native troops are employed,ft 
and that therefore 57there is no reason why the allowance of
extra batta should be any longer continued to the native
2
soldiers of the other Presidencies.77 Reassured on this 
pointy the Home authorities were ready to admit that the equal­
isation of batta in the three native armies was very necessary, 
so that, as they said, 77when troops of different Presidencies 
met on service there would be no necessity for recurring to the 
embarrassing expedient of raising the pay and allowances of the
1, D* to Bengal 14 October 1330. para. 44. M.D. sent to 
Bengal Vol.fiM£«
2. L. from Bengal 23 February 1335c ^ara 16. M,#L.sent to 
Bengal Vol.39.
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lowest to those cf the highest rate in each class and again
taking away this advantage at the close of the service on which
1
the troops may have been so employed.77 Hence, with the appro­
val of the Directors the Governor-General in Bengal issued an 
order in 1837 directing that the pay and batta of all the
native soldiers in the Company7s army should be regulated by
2
the Bengal standard. By making this equalisation effective
Bentinck was able to remove a major source of grievance of the
Bengal sepoys.
Not only was Bentinck responsible for the equalisation
of allowances among the native infantry soldiers of the three
Presidencies, he also succeeded in increasing the rate of their
pay after some years of service. In his letter of 1828 he had
suggested to the Court that there was a need to award additional
3
pay to native soldiers after a few years of service. The
Directors however, at that time refused, pointing out that the
financial position of the Company would not allow it, and that
4
the measure was 77not one of urgent necessity.77 Before their 
letter had even been written, Bentinck expressing his high 
opinion of the morale and discipline of the native soldiers of 
the Company had sent yet another letter to the Court recommend­
ing 77an addition of one rupee to the pay of a native soldier 
after 15 years of service.77 Despite BentinckTs insistence it
1. D. to Bengal. 1 February l836.para, 9.M, D* sent to Bengal Vol. 141'
2. Bengal Mily Cons. 11 February 1837, No.89.
3. L,from Bengal.28 May 1828.para 46.M.L.received from Bengal 
Vol. 27. J
4. D, to Bengal„14 October l830.para 44.M.D. sent, Jo Bengal.Vol.1S
5. L, from Bengal 26 June 1830. para.11.M.L, received from
Bengal Vol.30.
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was only in l834; after an increase had been granted to the
King’s soldiers in England, that the Court accepted this
request and ordered the Bengal Government to increase the
monthly pay of a native infantry private by one rupee after 16
1
years of service and by two rupees after 20 years of service. 
This measure did not satisfy the humanitarian Bentinck. He 
argued that a period of sixteen years was far too long for a 
sepoy to wait for a rise of one rupee. The economic condition 
of the native soldier was not very satisfactory and such a 
delayed increase would not effectively alleviate it. He there­
fore proposed ”an increase of 1 d,, a day after seven years and 
2 d, , a day after 14 years of service*" Such a grant would be
not merely a just but a wise policy, for they were foreign
2
mercenary soldiers the Company employed in India, This small
increase in the opinion of Bentinck, would ’’increase the energy
and allegiance of the sepoys and .,. benefit both the state and
3
the soldiers.” The London authorities however did not approve
and the pay scale of the Bengal sepoys as established by the
' 4
Court’s order of 1834 continued unchanged up to the year 1852.
The maximum pay which a sepoy could expect after twenty 
years of service was thus raised from the year 1837 to nine 
rupees per month. This increase of either one rupee after 
sixteen years, or two rupees after twenty years of service was
1, D. to Bengal 8 September 1834. para.20,M.D. sent to Bengal 
Vol.H. 19.
2, L. from Bengal 28 February 1835.para29jM.Ii,received from 
Bengal. Vol.39.
3. L. from Bengal,28 ^ebraury 1835* para.30.M.L. received 
from Bengal Vol.39.
4. Bengal Military Statement 1852.
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however subject to the condition of a sepoy’s good conduct. A
sepoy could enjoy this increase in his pay only if he had not
at any time been tried by a oourt-martial and if his name had
not been entered in the regimental defaulter book during the
two years immediately preceding the date of his completing the
required period of service.^ It was not every native infantry
soldier then who gained by the order passed by the Court in
1834* Bentinck!s proposal of granting an increase of daily one
penny after seven years and two pennies after 14 years of
service might have excited ’emulation, ambition and satisfaction^
amongst the native soldiers, both privates and officers. As
the Panjab Committee rightly observed in its report, ’’great
vitality would be infused into the native army by a graduated
scale of pay in every rank, the effect of which has been found
2
to be very great in our own Civil Department,,.”
That caution seems even greater when it is realised that 
from the sepoy’s seven, eight or nine rupees, a series of 
deductions was made to meet the expenses of his dress and the 
other articles which were supplied to him by the Government,
The sepoy had to pay for one pair of coloured linen trousers, 
one pair of white trousers, three white jackets, a woollen coat, 
a set of beads, a full dress cap with wax cloth cover and two 
white linen covers, an undress cap with wax cloth cover, a 
haversack and a pair of shoes or sandals. Under the Standing
1, D. to Bengal, 8 September 1834, para* 20. MPD. sent to 
Bengal*- Vol.*#, IS. *
2, P.P. I859, V, (2515), H.C. p.36.
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Orders of 1796 only two articles of dress, namely one great­
coat and one pair of cloth pantaloons were provided by the Gov-
1
ernment and that only every other year. Even that privilege
was however shortlived for in 1823 the Court, because of its
financial difficulties, abolished the practice of supplying a
great-coat to the sepoys. From that year onwards everything
relative to the dress of the sepoys with the sole exception of
one pair of cloth pantaloons was ordered to be paid for by the 
2
sepoys. The expenditure that had to be incurred on account of 
the great-coat proved to be so heavy to a Bengal sepoy that in 
1824 Sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-Chief, strongly rec­
ommended to the Court that a sepoy should be furnished with
some articles of his dress, especially the great-coat, at
3
public expense. The Court did not approve of this suggestion. 
Rather it passed orders that the sepoy should supply himself,
4 rt
out of his pay with three white linen ungahs, three paxrs of 
white linen trousers, one pair of coloured trousers, one set of 
beads with clasps, one pair of shoes, one kamar-band with 
buckle and band, one turban and cover, one knapsack and great­
coat, It was also laid down that these things should be 
supplied to the sepoys under the superintendence of the 
quartermaster of the regiment and paid for by the stoppages
1. M, C, 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799# p#135* 
Carroll's Bengal Code 1817, Sec. XLI.
2. D. to Bengal, 22 September 1823# para 18, M.D. sent to 
Bengal Vol.10.
3. L, from Bengal 23 September 1824# para 8, M„L. received 
from Bengal Vol.20.
4. A tunic - like dress, worn off duty.
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from the men’s pay. But ”to make the economic condition of the
sepoys easy,” the Court told the Bengal Government that ”not
more than five rupees per annum might be deducted as stoppages
from the pay of the Bengal infantry sepoys” and gave order that
”one jacket and one pair of woollen pantaloons ... be supplied
1
in alternate years by the Government without any cost.” This 
practice, as can be gleaned from the Bengal Military regulations 
of various years, remained in force down to the year 1852.
In addition to these expenses incurred on dress, a sepoy 
like a recruit was required to pay for the services of a washer­
man, barber and sweeper. From the articles on the Bengal Army
3 4
published in 1835 and in 1845 it can be found that a sepoy 
incurred an expense of five annas six pies per month on this 
account. In addition to this expense, from 1845 onwards sepoys 
had to pay for a Ghanty Pandy too.
As can be imagined, after meeting all these expenses a 
sepoy had little enough money to live on. Captain Briggs, 
writing about the Bengal sepoys has stated, ”their pay on enter­
ing the service, after making allowance for the expense of
5 6linen, pipe-clay heel-ball and the stoppages made for the
7supply of small stones yields them little more than a day
1. D, to Bengal 29 October 1828, paras 78-81. M,D. sent to 
Bengal Vol.fr, l4f**
2. M.C, 3 January 1829. Standing Orders in Bengal regiment 1840 
and 1§52.
3. E.I.U.S.J. February 1835. p.121,
4. Bengal Hurkaru 23 September 1845
5. Pipe clay - clay used for whitening soldiefs belt.
6. Heel ball - Mixture of wax for polishing shoes.
7. Stones - Thesa may have been used for raising fire or for
the necklace worn by the Bengal sepoys, or it could be stores 
(sic.) which means to supply buttons etc.
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1
labourer and less than many menial servants.?? The order of 
the Home authorities limiting withdrawals or stoppages to five 
rupees only per annum seems to have been abused by the local 
authorities, for Durgadas Bandopadhaya, a clerk in the Com­
missariat of the Bengal army noted in 1847 that after clearing 
all such dues the sepoys often actually received only one rupee 
eight annas or even as little as one anna in cash. Indeed, some - 
times he did not receive any money at all and had to remain 
satisfied by learning that his pay had been spent in repaying 
all his dues. In comparison, the domestic servants employed 
by the European officers earned a sum varying from four to
3
twenty rupees, and the palankeen bearers, seven to eight 
rupees^ per month. The sepoys undoubtedly enjoyed other advan­
tages - promotion in the service, a pension for himself in old 
age or for his family in the event of his death in action, 
rations in the field, perhaps prize money in action, batta 
certainly - but still it cannot be said that the sepoys were 
favourably placed in terms of pay. It should be noted that 
the European soldier in the CompanyTs service was scarcely any
better off than his Indian counter-part. He received eight
5
rupees, nine annas and ten pies per month. Like the sepoys 
he also had to pay for his dress and the other articles supplied!
1. Briggs - op.cit.? p.12. _
2. Durgadas Bandopadhaya --Bidrohe Bangali, pp. 67-68.
3. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v )7H.C. pp,26-27.
4* Maria Graham - Journal of a residence in India p.2,
5. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v);H.C. Ap.65~.
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by the Government,
To establish the relative range of the earnings of the
sepoys it is essential to state the rates then prevalent in the
country, for other professions. Mufti Ghulam Hazrat, the Law
_  1
Officer and Sadr Amin of Gorakhpur district, stated that in
the first quarter of the nineteenth century, ordinary coolies
in the district did not get more than three pice and masons
and carpenters did not earn more than two annas a day. In
1831 Raja Rammohan Ray deposed before the Select Committee that
"at Calcutta artisans such as blacksmiths and carpenters (if
good workmen) get from ten to twelve rupees a month (that is
about 20 to 24 shillings); common workers who do inferior plain
works, five or six rupees (about 10 or 12 shillings), masons
from five to seven (10 to Ik shillings) a month; common
labourers about 3i and some four rupees a month and palanquin
bearers the same. In small towns the rates are something below
3
this, in the country places still l o w e r , I n  the first half 
of the nineteenth century a field labourer in Bareilly earned 
from two to six rupees per month. The earning of a carpenter in 
the same district varied between five and ten rupees and those 
of blacksmiths from five to twenty rupees.^ The free male
lv Sadr Amin - The designation of the second class of native 
judge in Bengal; Hobson-Jobson p. 862.
2. MSS. Per Ie0, 4540 p«29.(The volume contains the Persian 
MSS, and an English translation.)
3c Pe P. 183-1, V, (320A), H.C. Ap.40,
4. District Gazetteers of the United Provinces^Bareilly. p.62.
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domestics in Shahabad district were usually allowed from eight
to sixteen annas a month in addition to their food and clothes;
1
in Arrah their wages often rose to two rupees a month. The
native soldiers who served the Indian powers had been paid at
the following rates: under Shiva ji in the l660Ts "the pay
varied from rupees 9 bo 3 for the infantry and rupees 20 to 6
in the cavalry according to the higher or lower rank of the
2
soldier or trooper," and in the 18th century the monthly
scale of the infantry soldiers of the later Indian Mughals had
3
varied from six rupees and eight annas to ten rupees . The
Sikh sepoy, in Ranjit SinghTs day received between seven and
4
eight and a half rupees a month.
Comparing the pay rates enjoyed by the sepoys under the 
service of the Company with that of the soldiery of Indian
powers, or even with what was earned by different tradesmen, a
question may arise as to what made the service of the Company 
so much sought after. The answer most probably lies in the
regular payment of wages, the pension benefits and certain other
advantages that were enjoyed by the sepoys. During the Mughal 
and Peshwai administrations the soldiers often remained much 
in arrears. William Irvine states that the "pay due from the 
imperial treasury *.* from the mansabdars to the private 
soldiers, was always in arrears. I think*-* this was the case 
in the very best times. Nizam-ul-Mulk is credited with the
1* District Gazetteers of the United Provinces,Shahabad, p.90.
2. S.N. Sen - The Military system of the Marathas p.110.
3. W, Irvine - The Army of the Indian Mughals, p.172.
4. N.K. Sinha - Ranjit Singh, p.207.
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boast that he never withheld pay for more than three months,
Hazi Mustafa - * says the troops are wretchedly paid, twenty or
1thirty months of arrears being no rarity.T? The reasons for
keeping the men in arrears, Irvine suggests, %iay have been
that more men were entertained than could be easily paid, and
che feeling that they were thereby prevented from transferring
their services to some other chief quite as readily as they
2
might have done if there were nothing owing,n Surendra Nath 
Sen similarly comments that the Maratha soldier ”was allowed
3to fall in arrears in the Peshwa days.*1 Besides this practice 
of keeping men in arrears,under the Mughal and Maratha powers 
the soldiers were regularly deprived of one or two months pay 
in a year. Akbar deducted one month*s pay every year from every 
horseman on account of the horse, Irvine quoting Abul Pazl 
states that ??the Commander of every contingent is allowed to 
keep for himself the twentieth part of his menTs pay which re­
imburses him for various expenses.**^ In ManucciTs time the 
Mughal soldier did not get even ten months pay.5 The case of 
the soldiers under the Peshwa was similar, and much the same 
was true of the Sikhs in Ranjit Singhs day. N.K, Sinha records 
!fThe cash monthly payment was a system borrowed from the East
India Company But the monthly payments were not regularly
made, The troops as a rule, were in arrears for five to six
3.- Irvine - op. cit. , ppc 13-14.
2. Irvine - op.cit. f~p.13.
3. Sen - op.cit, , p. 57.
4. Irvine - op.cit.? p.29.
5r Ibid., p.29.
months, They were normally paid five times a y e a r , I n  compar­
ison therefore, the CompanyTs sepoys were better off as they 
had the advantage of enjoying a regular payment each and every 
month.
Besides the regularity of payment, a native infantry 
soldier of the Company was at times granted extra allowances 
either in cash or in kind or both, depending upon the service 
in which he was engaged, As the Bengal native soldiers were not 
recruited for general service, special volunteer corps were
raised from amongst them whenever required to proceed on a sea
2 „ . 
voyage and they received an additional allowance. Besides,
native infantry troops frequently proceeded on foreign service
involving crossing the limit of the Bengal Presidency by land
and then fighting in foreign territories. On such service the
soldiers were permitted to enjoy certain privileges. He could
secure a family certificate by which a certain portion of his
3salary was paid to his family every month. Rations were also 
allowed to the native soldiery on foreign service, although the 
ration issue was not of the same quantity in all the three 
Presidencies, Madras native soldiers ^received larger issues of 
rations when on foreign service than the corresponding classes 
of troops of the Bengal Presidency, ^  Since this difference 
proved to be a source of constant irritation to the Bengal
1, Sinha - op,cit, « p.208,
2, This order was rescinded by Dalhousie on 20 September 1852.
3o M,C, 28 March 1808. CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817. Sec,IX,
Standing Orders in Bengal regiment I852. p.96.
4. D, to Bengal 8 September l8lo, para,8 , M,D. sent to Bengal 
Vol.6.
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sepoyss the Court in 1816 ordered the Supreme Government to
introduce an uniform rate of rations for all the native armies
of India. The Supreme Government in its desire to carry out
this order thought fit to issue money in lieu of rations to the
2
Bengal troops when on foreign service. But even then the
3
rate did not exactly correspond with that prevalent at Madras,
The Directors being informed of this anomaly again asked the
Supreme Government ¥,to assimilate as nearly as possible the
practice of the three .Presidencies in the issuing of rations to
L
troops on foreign s e r v i c e . O n  receipt of this order the 
Supreme Government instituted an enquiry into the matter and 
forwarded the letter of the Commissary General to the Court in 
which it was pointed out that there is a material difference 
of caste (amongst the sepoys of the different presidencies) 
and this cannot be interfered with without giving rise to dis­
satisfaction as the High caste Bengal Brahmin is perfectly
content with the description of ration and any change would be 
5
impolitic,Tf
It was for this very reasons the Supreme Government 
argued, that they had decided to grant ?Ta money compensation 
equivalent to the difference in the allowances received by the
1. D* to Bengal 8 September .1816, para. 10.M.D. sent to Bengal 
Vol.60
2. Bengal Mily,Cons, 9 January 1818. No,19.
3. Geul. Observation of Court of enquiry Barrackpore, 2 January 
1825, para. 26. Bengal Mily.Cons, 6 January 1825* No.18.
4. D„ to Bengal 28 May 1828. para.23, M.D. sent to Bengal,
- Vol.14.
5. L. from Bengal 14 October 1830. para,56, M,L. received 
from Bengal, Vol. 32..
233
several ranks of native troops of different Presidencies
meeting on service*TT The practice prevailed in the Bengal army
upto the year 1837 when Bentinck*s proposals to equalise the
pay and allowances of the native soldiers of the different
Presidencies were implemented and the Bengal rates became the
standard one* Thus, from 1837 onwards the rations allowed to
the native soldiers of the three Presidencies became the same.
The sepoys in^Company * s service also enjoyed furlough
privileges which were first introduced in 1796. Furlough with
pay was allowed to each native soldier once in five or six
years* Under ordinary circumstances, at any one time ten to
fifteen sepoys and a corresponding proportion of commissioned
and non-commissioned officers from each regiment were permitted
to be absent on furlough. The commanding officer had, however,
the right to recall at any time any soldier from his furlough
if circumstances so demanded. The men generally proceeded to
their home in parties so as to escape attacks from dacoits and
thugs. A native soldier, while on furlough, enjoyed his pay
but not the garrison batta. Thus the pay rates in rupees per
month of the different ranks of the Bengal native infantry,
2
when on furlough, were as follows:
Subadar Jamadar Havildar Naik Sepoy
Rs.52 17 9 7 5i
1* L* from Bengal 14 October 1830. para*60. M.L* received 
from Bengal Vol.32
2. M.C, 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799* p.184, 
/cod# Carrollfs Bengal/ 5.817, Sec XXXVI Standing Orders in Bengal 
regiment 1852, p.175.
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The soldier while on furlough was furnished with a pay certi­
ficate by producing which he could claim his pay on return. 
Moreover, if he had to cross the limit of the Presidency on 
his way home he was provided with a passport written in his 
own language.
Besides this furlough privilege, which was enjoyed by the 
native soldiers, the award of pension was yet another attract­
ive feature of the Company’s service. ’’The pension is our
1
great hold on India,” said Viscount Gough before the Select
Committee of 1852. Malleson observed, ”one resource upon which
the Government relied above all others to influence their
sepoy” was ”the establishment of a pension list, by which a
soldier was enlisted to have a fixed monthly allowance after
2
his retirement,” This boon of a pension, enjoyed by the
Company’s soldiers, was generally unknown to the soldiers
serving under Indian Princes. Wounded soldiers of the Maratha
army received a special allowance in keeping with the nature of
their wounds, while widows and orphans of soldiers, who fell in
3
active service were awarded pensions by the State. Irvine is 
silent over the issue whether the Mughals like the Marathas 
paid any regular pension to the minor children and widows of 
soldiers killed in action, though he does mention that the
Mughal Emperor Humayun provided for the widows and orphans of
k
his soldiers who fell in service. Under Ranjit Singh there
1. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627),H.C. p.175.
2. G„B. Malleson - The mutiny of the Bengal army, p.3.
3. Sen - op. ciI;. , p., 7-1,
4. Irvine •« ojc?cjjb. , pp. 178-179.
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was no regular pension, though what N.K, Sinha calls ” a kind
of allowance” was sometimes granted to the families of the dead 
1
and wounded. It would thus be fair to say that no regular 
pension system had existed under the leading Indian rulers and 
that such a system was a fresh innovation, and a great attract­
ion at that, in the Company’s service.
Under the Company’s pension rule for its army personnel, 
every native soldier was allowed to enjoy a pension provided 
he had served for a minimum of 20 years. After completion of 
this minimum period, a sepoy was annually examined first by a 
Medical Committee and then by a committee of competent officers 
who had to report to the Government on his fitness. If he was 
found to be incapable of active service either from age, infirm­
ity or wound, he was pensioned and received an allowance at the
2
rate of three rupees per month.
Besides this money pension a jagir system was also in
3
vogue in the Bengal native army. The practice of granting 
lands however, fell into disrepute because of difficulties in 
obtaining land for assignment to the retired soldiers. Usually, 
plots of waste land were allotted to the pensioners but as these 
plots had to be developed prior to cultivation, the invalided 
or retired soldiers frequently found this task beyond their 
capacity. Further most of these waste lands were either swampy 
or densely forested and were unhealthy, so that the grant of
1, Sinha - op.cit., p.208.
2, M„ C, 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p,201. 
Carroll’s Bengal Code 1817, Sec.L, Standing Orders in Bengal 
regiment 1852 p.182.
3, It was introduced in 1782. See Chapter I, p.S3 ,
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such plots of land frequently failed to be of any use to either 
the Government or the receiver. Moreover, the conferring of 
jagirs attracted and drew the immediate relations of the 
assigned party from their village to the places recently re­
claimed, In addition, the Police authorities complained to 
the Government that the invalids and their families were 
troublesome and were suspected of harbouring offenders against
public peace. In the face of such adverse criticism, the auth-
1
orities decided not to continue with this practice and they
2
withdrew the privilege in 1811, The money pension was however 
continued.
The major reform on this issue as on so many others,was
initiated by Bentinck. In 1835 Bentinck, in his attempt ”to
improve the general condition of the native soldiery' and to
increase their efficiency and contentment which have of late
3
years been very much impaired,” suggested to the Court that 
the rate of pension among the native soldiers should be in­
creased and that it should be made uniform in the three armies
of India. The Court in its reply agreed to his proposals and 
ordered that, ’’the rate of pension of the three Presidential 
armies should be uniform and it would be regulated by the 
Bengal s t a n d a r d . I t  was also laid down that native soldiers 
would be entitled to enjoy a pension after either 15 years or
1. D. to Bengal 4 June 1810, paras, 7-10. M.D, sent to Bengal 
Vol.3.
2. M. C, 30 july 1811. Carroll’s Bengal Code 1817. Sec.L.
3. L. from Bengal 28 February 1835. para 19, M.L. received 
from Eengal Volc 39„
4# D# to Bengal 13 January 1836. para 8. M.3X sent to Bengal 
Vol.21.
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40 years of service and not: after 20 years only as had been the 
practice in the past. This regulation was published and promul­
gated in 1337 and continued in force till 1352. The monthly
1
rates sanctioned were as follows.
After 15 years After 40 years
of service of service
Subadar Rs, 25 Rs* 40
Jamadar 12 20
Havildar 7 12
Naik 7 12
Sepoy 4 7
Gompared to the pay earned by a native officer and a 
sepoy, their pension rates were widely disproportionate. In 
effect, the sepoy on pension was much the better off. The rates 
were such that to a sepoy to be transferred to pension list and 
to get out of the service was a great inducement since the 
pension of four rupees was free of any deduction. To a native 
officer however, transfer was a severe loss. A large number of 
sepoys therefore entered the army with the intention of retir­
ing on their pensions at the end of fifteen years service. Since 
a sepoy could easily earn four or five rupees a month in his 
village, over and above his pension of four rupees a month, he 
could proceed on pension without any loss to himself or even 
with a positive gain. fTIt was a matter of surprise to see young 
and strong men in the full enjoyment of health and vigour 
relinquishing a service which offered to them certain promotion
1, G.0.G,G. 1 February 1837# Standing Orders in Bengal 
regiment, 1840 and 1852.
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and increased pay, in order to retire upon this scanty pittance. 
And yet it was so. Men starved themselves for months and became 
weaker and emaciated solely to pass for invalids."’*' For a 
native officer, however, the situation was different because 
the pension granted to him was not adequate for his position. 
Further being an old man, as almost any native officer necess­
arily was, it was not possible for him to earn his livelihood 
by some other occupation. Besides this, the difference between 
the rate of pension granted for a service period of fifteen 
years and that granted for forty years was wide enough to make 
the longer service more attractive for a native officer though 
not so for the sepoys. For whereas a sepoy had to serve for an 
additional period of 25 years, to secure an increase of three 
rupees, the increase for a Subadar after the same period was 
one of 15 rupees. This wide difference made it sufficiently 
attractive for the native officers to continue to serve and 
qualify for the higher rates.
Further to the system of pension based on years of 
service, yet another pension scheme was suggested by Sir John 
Barlow, the Governor-General, in his letter of 25 July, 1805, 
this time for wounded men. He requested the Home authorities 
to approve his suggestion "on principles of policy and humanity" 
and proposed that "the sepoys who have lost their limbs or have 
been disabled by wounds received on service shall be allowed 
a pension of five rupees, instead of three rupees per month and
1. M.R, Gubbins - An account of the mutinies in Oudh and of the 
siege of the Lucknow Presidency pp. lG£Ul09b
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a proportional increase shall be made to the pensions of native
commissioned and non-commissioned officers too for the same 
1c a u s e , T h e  Court, on the grounds of financial difficulties
2
did not approve of this measure, Long after, in 1835i the
question of wound pensions was again brought to the notice of
the Directors by Bentinck, who though unpopular with the
European officers for his measure of economy, made a determined
effort to improve the condition of the native soldiers. In his
minute of 1835 he proposed to grant a pension for any wound
3
received by the native soldiers, The Court, in this instance,
approved the recommendation but on condition that the wound in
question must completely disable the soldier and that he must
L
have served the Company for at least fifteen years. This pre­
condition was however withdrawn in the middle of the 19th 
century. During the Sind (1843) and Panjab (1849) wars when 
desertion became rampant in the Bengal native infantry the 
Court ordered the Bengal Government to revise the regulation 
regarding its wound pension scheme. From 1852 the wound pension 
was thus granted to any native soldier wounded in action or
injured on duty, ??without any reference to the period of 
5
service,,?
Besides these privileges, the Company also instituted
1. BoardTs Collection, 4227, pp.89-90,
2. D. to Bengal 19 March 1807, para,9, M,D. sent to Bengal,
Vol.2.
3. L, from Bengal 28 February 1835. para.30. M.L, received 
from Bengal Vol.39.
4. G.O.G.G. 1 February 1837. Bengal Mily.Cons, 1 February 1837, 
No.65.
5. D, to Bengal 3 March 1852, para. 2, M.D, sent to Bengal 
Vol.39.
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a system of honours and awards for its soldiers for meritorious
service. Medals were awarded to commemorate participation in
important battles. In fact the Company!s Government was the
first in India to grant campaign medals and so to recognise the
part played by the bravery of the sepoys in securing victory.
In 1834t Bentinck proposed to introduce the Order of Merit in
the native army, He argued that, 11 as natives are now employed
in important civil situations with corresponding salaries,
justice and policy alike require that some improvement be
1
effected in the condition of their military brethren,11 This
letter reached England in 1835 and the Court in 1837 sanctioned
Bentinck1s request. From that year onwards the Order of Merit
was open to all ranks of the native army for conspicuous
gallantry in the field or in the attack or defence of fortified
places. The object of the institution of an Order of Merit,was
11 to reward personal bravery without reference to claims founded
2
on mere length of service or general good conduct.11 The Order 
consisted of three classes and it was necessary for a soldier 
to obtain the third class before any act of bravery could 
entitle him to the second class and in like manner the award 
of the second class was considered as a condition of eligibility 
for the first class. A native soldier having an Order of Merit 
was allowed to enjoy, over and above his pay or his pension on 
retirement, an allowance equal either to one-third or two-thirds
1. L„ from Bengal 24 October 1834. para.5? M#L. received from . 
Bengal Vol.38,
2, D. to Bengal 2 May 1837. para 18, M,D. sent to Bengal.Vol.Zz>
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or to the entire amount of the ordinary pay of the soldier!s 
rank, depending upon the class of the Orderc After the death 
of the recipient of the Order his widow was allowed to enjoy
1
the pension conferred by the Order for a period of three years,
2
This innovation was introduced in 18 38.
Though introduced with the best of intentions, this 
measure evoked little or no enthusiasm amongst the native 
soldiers. Although the award was not positively limited, there 
were many restrictions to its obtainment. Consequently, ftthe
3
decorated were so few as to be hardly discoverable, ** Moreover
this honour did not bring in its wake any relaxation of the
rules of promotion. The soldier who had obtained an Order of
Merit was still considered and remained nothing but an
ordinary sepoy, naik or havildar. Further, since this order
was freely conferred on civilians it ceased to be treated as a
strictly military award and lost much of its grandeur among the
4
native soldiers, Besides, there being no special Order for
general merit, the Order of Merit was frequently given for
meritorious general service and not only for conspicuous
bravery. This practice lowered the prestige attached to it to
such an extent that the Panjab Committee, in 1359? described
5
the system as ^inappropriate,
1. D* to Bengal 2 May 1837. para, 20, M.D, sent to nengal Vol. %%
2. G.O.G.G. 3 January 1838, Bengal Mily.Cons, 3 January I838 
No.36.
3. Lawrence - op.cit. , p#98c
4. Lawrence - op.cit,.~ p.98„
5. P.P. I859 ? VIII, '(2541), H.Cf p. 19.
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Special distinction and honours were also at times insti­
tuted by the Company for its native army. Under the regulations 
of 1796 a native officer could expect to achieve the ultimate 
rank of Subadar in his regiment through a promotion strictly 
regulated by seniority. The Bengal Government, criticising this 
state of affairs, in I813 observed of their subadars that ??once 
thay have attained the rank of Subadar they have nothing more
to look to, and having got all that they can get, they have no
1
further inducement and are dissatisfied,Tt It was suggested
that nthere ought to be some higher object kept in their view
2
to which by diligence and fidelity they may still a t t a i n . I t
was therefore recommended that one Subadar in each regiment of
native cavalry and one in each battalion of native infantry
should be granted the rank of Subadar Major and be made
entitled to an extra allowance of twenty five rupees per month.
The Home authorities sanctioned the proposal and ordered that
?tthe rank of Subadar Majorship should be awarded on the most
distinguished and deserving Subadar and an allowance of twenty
five rupees per month in addition to the pay and allowance as
3
a Subadar would be attached to this post.,r While sanctioning 
this proposal, the Court, however, imposed a condition that the 
post of subadar major should be recommended by the officers 
commanding regiments to the Commander-in-Chief and that the
1, L„ from Bengal 17 October 1813, para 20, M, L, received 
from Bengal Vol,7.
2, L, from Bengal 17 October 1813, para 21. M,L, received 
from Bengal Vol„7.
3, De to Bengal 8 November 1814. para 44. M,D. sent to Bengal 
Vol. 5
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rank should ??not continue after his (the Subadar-Major)
1
transfer to the invalid establishment.n The Governor-General
in his reply dated 21 July l8l8 suggested that ?tthe pay of the
Subadar Major should accompany him in his retirement- , [and]
if this stipend so dearly purchased, so honourably earned by a
whole life of meritorious service on the part of a few selected
veteran officers was not to be continued to them, during the
short remainder of their lives and when age and infirmities did
but augment their claims on the state, whom they served in
their days of youth and vigour, the whole scope and object of
the institution would be defeated. That admirable regulation
2
would indeed become worse than nugatory* * ?f But the Court
did not approve the proposal of the Governor-General on the
3
ground of cost. The rank of subadar-major instituted as it
was in 1814, therefore remained unchanged during the
4remainder of our period.
The award of a subadar-majorship was purely an honorary 
one given in recognition of the most meritorious service* But 
it did not confer any superior authority upon the occupier 
though he was generally looked upon as the first among the 
native soldiers of the regiment. On general duties, therefore, 
a subadar-major, by virtue of his rank, was required to take
1, D. to Bengal 8 November 1814, para 44, M.D. sent to Bengal 
Vol,5.
2, BoardTs Collection, 14,396, p.57.
3. D. to Bengal 23 December 1819. para.22, M,D, sent to 
Bengal, Vol, 8 .
4. G.O.G.G, 16 February 1816, CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817,
Sec. XLVII, Standing Orders in Bengal regiment 1830, 1840 
and 1852.
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precedence of all other subaiax^s even in the case of their 
having a date of commission earlier than his.
There was yet another award open to the native commiss­
ioned officers of the sepoy army - the*Order of British India1. 
This order was suggested in I835 by Bentinck who argued that 
ffto increase the respectability and to improve the prospects 
of the native commissioned officers, honours, distinctions and 
superior emoluments should be placed within their reach without
imparting to them such additional power or influence to the 
1
authority,T* Bentinck further claimed that an **Order or other 
corresponding measure appears to be absolutely indispensable 
to India,w because in the native regiments, f*all the usual 
incentives to great deeds are almost wholly wanting, the con­
nection is altogether mercenary and the strongest bonds of such
a connection, all the higher honours, emoluments and commands
2are necessarily w i t h h e l d . T h e  Directors accepted Bentinck*s 
suggestion and the Order of British India was instituted for 
the native commissioned officers from 1837 onwards. This order 
consisted of two classes, the first class was confined to 
subadars only while the second class was open to both subadars 
and jamadars. The conferring of this honorary award rested with 
the Governor-General of India, who was guided in his selection 
by the representation of the local Governments, The title of 
1Sirdar Bahadur* and that of * Bahadur* with an allowance of two
1, L. from Bengal 28 February 1835, para 29. M.L. from Bengal. 
Vol. 39.
2. I, from Bengal 28 February 1835, para 31, M. L„ from Bengal, 
Vol, 39.
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rupees and one rupee respectively per day over and above the
regimental allowance and retiring pensions, were conferred on
the holders of the first and second class of the order respect- 
1
ively, But the best intentions of Bentinck were not fulfilled
because of the nature of these awards - the greatest drawback
being that the Government wrongly adhered to the line of
seniority in conferring the order. As a consequence, it had a
very limited effect. Moreover as the order was granted only for
good service, it virtually became a reward of old age, "The
2
wearers were mostly invalids at their homes" and hence the
institution lost much of its value as a stimulant to
a  the native soldiery,
In contrast to the pension regulations, the practice of
awarding rewards and honorary titles was by no means unknown in
the armies of princely India, Renowned warriors and commanders
of brigades of the Maratha army were given horses and elephants
as reward. Some were awarded ornaments while others were
assigned villages. Following the Muslim precedent, titles were
3
also conferred on successful Maratha generals. According to 
Irvine, jewelled ornaments, weapons with jewelled hilts, palan­
keens with fringes of gold lace and pearls, horses with gold 
mounted and jewelled trappings and elephants were presented by 
Mughal Emperors to their military officers in acknowledgement 
of their service to the state. A soldier in the Mughal army
1, G.O.G.G. 1"February 1^37. Bengal Mily. Gons. 1 February 
1537, Wo,6$.
2, Lawrence - op.cit., p.34.
3, Sen - op.cit., p.110*
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might also be awarded, among other distinctions, the right to
carry a flag or simple standard and the right to use kettle-
1
drums and to beat the naubat. The Chaughadas granted by
Maratha rulers were nothing but kettledrums and the principal
2Maratha sardars had their naubats as well. Familiar as the 
native soldiers were with such awards and honorary titles, the 
institution of these orders by the Company failed to impress 
them very much, the more so because of the very limited award 
of the orders.
It becomes obvious from the details listed above that the 
honorary distinctions available to the native soldiers were 
unlikely to fill them with any great enthusiasm. The award of 
the Order of British India was very limited and was given only 
for long, faithful and honourable service. The other award, the 
Order of Merit , instituted to honour personal bravery, irres­
pective of rank or grade or length of service was so often 
given for general service that it lost its original purpose.
Consequently, there was no order or any other form of recogni-
3
tion for valour alone for an ordinary native soldier. This 
state of affairs did not permanently escape the attention of 
the administrators, Sir Charles Trevelyan correctly summed up 
the problem by stating before the Army Commission of 1859 that 
,?in governing a body of men you must have in view the ordinary 
motives of human conduct and if we give our native troops
1. Naubat - Big drum,
2. Sen - - op.cit., p;110,
3. P,P„ 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.19,
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nothing to expect, no reward to hope for from consistent 
fidelity and good conduct* we cannot expect those qualities 
from them* ^
In addition to the systems of reward and pension, the 
native soldiers while in the CompanyTs service also enjoyed 
certain privileges in civil life* From 1796 to 1815, in any 
civil court of justice both in the CompanyTs territories and 
those of Oudh, a sepoy’s representation for any wrong done to 
him or his family found precedence over all other cases* This 
preference may have been granted by the Company while it was 
busy fighting the Indian powers and could ill afford to sane - 
tion frequent or long leave of absence to its sepoys* To the 
small landholders however this facility was considered to be as 
great a privilege as any and they were anxious to have their 
sons or relations in the Company’s native army so that they 
might secure it.3 With a sepoy in their family they expected 
to gain some influence over the collectors and other civil 
authorities in pushing through their own law suits. This 
measure was considered as an interference by the civil author­
ities* and in 1815 the Directors ordered the Bengal Government 
to issue an ordinance prohibiting army officers ’’from furnish­
ing- native officers and soldiers going on furlough with any 
letter or other writing to the Magistrate in whose districts
1. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H.C. p. 108.
2, G.O.C.C* 14 December 1789, Grace Bengal regulations 1799, 
p.293, CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, Sec. L.
3* G, Tucker - Review of the financial situation of the East 
India Company. p#105.
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their families reside with a view to an early adjustment of
and Panjab wars, however, when desertion in the native infantry
regiments increased to a great extent, the Court, in its
anxiety to make its military service as attractive as it used
to be, retracted this order and asked the Bengal Government to
reintroduce the privilege of early hearings for sepoys in the 
2
civil courts. Again, the Hindu soldiers of the Company were
exempted from the taxes usually levied on pilgrims at Puri,
3
Gaya and Allahabad. Further all native soldiers, like their 
European colleagues, were allowed to send letters to their 
families once a month without any postal charge, provided each
4
letter weighed less than one ounce.
The sepoys undoubtedly benefitted by all these privileges 
but when considered in the proper perspective, it has to be 
realised that they were really more interested in their immed­
iate earnings and more important still, in their future promo­
tion prospects. In terms of relative importance, the rules and 
regulations governing promotion occupied second place only to 
the pay rates. The special character of the interest taken by 
the sepoys in matters of promotion may be explained by the fact 
that all the native officers in the CompanyTs army rose from
1. D. to Bengal 20 October 1815. para.26, M.D. sent to Bengal 
Vol. 5
2. G.O.G.G, 6 November 1$52, Bengal Mily.Cons. 8 November 1$52, 
No. 78,
3* M. C. 13 March 1$10. CarrollTs Bengal Code l8l7.Sec.L# 
Standing Orders in Bengal regiment I852, p.172.
4. M. C. 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations, 1799, p.234. 
CarrollTs Bengal Code I817, Sec.L, Standing Orders in Bengal
1
such suits as they may have in his Gourt.rf During the Sind
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the ranks so that every sepoy could aspire to occupy those 
posts. This was in sharp contrast to the practice followed in 
the European wing of the CompanyTs army as also in the royal 
army. In those two armies, officers almost never rose from the 
ranks but were directly recruited as cadets. Usually these 
cadets hailed from the middle and upper classes, whereas the 
European privates were recruited from the lowest rank of 
society."*” Because of this distinct classification, European 
privates had very limited scope for promotion. The case with 
the native soldiers in the CompanyTs army was however different 
as any sepoy could rise to the seniormost position available to
an Indian in the Company!s army. It was no wonder therefore
2
that they took a very close interest in this issue.
Even before 1796, promotion amongst the native soldiery 
in Bengal regiments was generally made on the basis of 
seniority. The regulations promulgated in 1796 restated the 
Companyfs determination to adopt this practice as a general 
rule, although it was agreed that merit should also be taken 
into consideration. It was laid down by this order that in the 
case of a vacancy In a regiment, the commanding officer was to 
recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the seniormost soldier in 
the next lowest rank and that TTin all recommendations for pro­
motions the fullest consideration and attention should invaria­
bly be given to the claim of seniority in every grade where no
1. ™ m ..  ^ ? sh Social hbstory. A . Survey of six
2. C,J. Napier - Defects Civil and Military of the Indian 
Government p,257.
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such disqualifications as -want of respectability of character
or other equally proper and just cause of objection to the
advancement of the seniors should exist. ^  This rule remained
effective upto 1852, and in actual practice, more and more
emphasis was placed on the seniority aspect in the granting of
promotion, so much so that promotion on merit became a rarity
in the Bengal native infantry regiments. The universality of
the practice was amply testified to in the depositions of the
European officers before the Army Commission of 1859- "In the
native regiments of the Bengal army the system of promotion
was based on seniority, for the senior was never passed over
2
unless he was imbecile/7 or f7in the great bulk of the Bengal 
army the promotion of native officers was entirely by senior­
ity; they went up by a sort of routine. They felt themselves 
under no obligation to their commanding officers for their
3
promotion.77 ^For such a state of affairs, which was to earn
severe criticism at the time of the Mutiny, the Home authori­
ties no less than those in Calcutta were responsible. They 
wrote to the Bengal Government, first in 1837 and then again 
in 1850 warning army officers for disregarding this system of 
promotion by seniority. The Government of Bengal followed the 
lead thus given and issued a General Order to its military 
officers in 1837 mentioning the letter of the Court and point­
ing out with disapproval i?cases where disregard of the long
1. M. C. 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.288, 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, Sec. LVIII, Standing Order in 
Bengal regiment 3.852, p. 175*
2. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H0C. p.34.
3. P.P. 1859, V , (2515), H.C. p. 107.
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service had been made regarding promotion in the non-commiss- 
1
ioned ranks. n Again in I85O the Bengal Council censured its 
army officers and noted that in defiance of the system of pro­
motion by seniority? 77 a Naick superceding 17 seniors ? and a
sepoy 23rd on the roll of the Company and 216 on the gradation
2
roll of the regiment, were promoted/ 7 The Council also re­
iterated its order that 7Tfull consideration be given to the
3
point of seniority,77 It may well be that it was for such 
occasional ^lapses1 that the Council thought fit gradually to 
denude the commanding officers of native infantry regiments of 
their authority to promote, Prior to 1796 sepoys were promoted 
within the battalion at the will and pleasure of the commanding 
officer. The regulation of 1796 vested the commanding officer 
of a regiment with the authority to promote the native soldiers, 
but according to seniority, and such promotion was ordered to 
be published in the Regimental Orders, In 1834, however, the 
Court in its effort to centralise the administration, 
curtailed the authority of the commanding officers of the 
native regiments, so that only the Commander-in-Chief at each 
Presidency was empowered to order wthe promotion of Native
4Commissioned officers in the Company7s army/7 This measure 
was adopted to make the system conform with the prevalent
1. G.O.G.G, 5 May 1837. Bengal Mily, Cons. 5 May 1837. No,47.
2, G.O.G.G, 18 October I85O, Bengal Mily. Cons. 18 October
1850. No.89,
3* G.O.G.G. 18 October I85O, Bengal Mily, Cons. 18 October
1850, No.89.
4. Bc to Bengal 5 August 1834. para 11, M.D, sent to Bengal 
5 August 1834. Vol.19.
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system of promotion of the European officers. In the opinion of
the Court the procedure of promotion should rest with the
Supreme power of the state,^  Accordingly from 1834 onwards,
"the promotion of the native soldiery to the several orders of
Commissioned officers, were made by the Government of the
2Presidency to which the individuals belong," their commissions 
being signed and issued by the Governor and Council, The Dir­
ectors, in lending their support to this order, argued that 
"this will bring their merits and services to the frequent 
notice of Government through the recommendation of their
3
immediate commanding officer and the Commander-in-Chief."
The practice of basing promotion purely on seniority
which found favour with the Home authorities proved to be a
very controversial one. Experienced army administrators were
sharply divided in their opinions over the influence that such
a policy exerted on the attitudes and morale of the native
soldiery. Thus, Sir Charles Napier, a supporter of the practice,
in his evidence before the Select Committee in 1852, observed
that "the Bengal native soldiers enlisted with a pledge on the
part of the Government that they were to look to seniority for
their promotion and it would have been a complete breach of the
promises of the Government to those old and respectable men to
4
be put aside." But there was constant criticism of its effect
1, D, to Bengal 5 August 1834, para,11, M.D« sent to Bengal
5 August 1834', Vol. 19.
2„ D, to Bengal 5 August 1834. para 14, Ibid.
3, D* to Bengal 5 August 1834 para. 14, M„D. sent to Bengal
5 August 1834, Vol. 1$.
4. P.P. 1852-53. XXII, (627), H.L. p. 243.
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in India, The court of enquiry, assembled at Barrackpore in 
1824 reported that this practice of promoting by seniority 
obviously led to a state of affairs in which the native sold­
iers, at the fag end of their lives, occupied the stations of 
native officers when they were physically unfit for any active
service, and incapable of either strict performance of duty or
1
maintenance of discipline. Captain Macan, who had been with
the Bengal army for 23 years from 1805, giving evidence before
the Select Committee of I83I blamed the practice of promotion
by seniority for producing "a great feebleness of character
and physical incapacity, arising from age and infirmity, in the
2higher native officers of the service," The press of the 
period also criticised the system. The Friend of India 
commented that fifty-seven or sixty years, the average age of 
a gamadar or a subadar might not be considered too old for 
efficiency among officers in England but in the Indian climate
3
the men broke sooner than in Europe and rendered them quite 
certainly unfit, by that age. The Athenaeum agreed that an 
exposure of more than one third of a century to all the labour 
of sepoy life quickly undermined an Asiatic constitution/1. Lord 
Dalhousie.described the system as "the bane of the Indian 
service,"^ He advocated instead, the adoption of efficiency
lc Genl. Observations of the court of enquiry Barrackpore
2 January 1825, para. 29. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825 
No. 18.
2. P.P. 1831-32. XIII,(735-v), H.C. p.150,
3< Friend of India, 29 March 1849*
4* Athenaeum 12 April 1849#
5. William Lee-Warner — Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie 
Vol.II, p.287*
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as the main ground of selection for promotion and wrote ffthe 
claims of old officers stand high, but the interests of the 
state are', above all, and ought to be, paramount in the eyes 
of those who are entrusted with the charge of them. No system 
can prevent the intrusion of occasional incapacity or ineffic­
iency among officers who hold regimental command, A rigid 
system of seniority must of necessity increase the probability 
of such deficiencies and must multiply instances of them 
the governing principle should not be „, , the rejection of no 
man unless he is notoriously and scandalously incapable but 
rather the selection of no man,.,, who is not confessedly 
capable and e f f i c i e n t . J o h n  Jacob commenting on the Bengal 
army wrote in 1859 that the evident and unavoidable consequence 
of promoting according to the seniority system had been the 
paralysation and ultimate ruin of the army. Talent, skill, 
energy, high principle and soldier-like pride were crushed, 
and Tfold men with three or four medals on their breast but as
unfit.., as any old woman taken as haphazardly out of a village
2are recommended for promotion. ” The author of the Red Pamph­
let called the seniority system a ^soulless system”, because 
promotion, being regulated merely by the length of service 
without any regard to efficiency, reduced regimental life to 
a dull routine. A sepoy entering the service at the age of 14 
could not expect to become a Subadar before he was 60, when
1P William Lee-Warner - opf cit,, Vol.II, p.287.
2. John Jacob- The views and opinions, pp.212-213.
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?rthe blood in his veins and the marrow in his bones were dried
up or wasted by constant exposure to the trying climate of 
1
India. ” Holmes observed that ?7though he might give signs of
the military genius of a Haidar,” a promising and ambitious
sepoy knew that he could never attain to commissioned rank
before some thirty odd years of faithful service. On the other
hand, the dullest man knew that if he served out his time, he
was certain to succeed to the highest ranks on a vacancy occur- 
2ring. The criticisms made did not turn on the issue of old 
age alone. It was also argued with emphasis that a native 
officer, rising as he did from the ranks, being connected by 
ties of blood and the obligation of caste with his subordinates 
and having daily intercourse with his comrades amongst whom he 
lived and passed his time, could seldom be respected or feared. 
This view finds support in John Shored observation on the 
royal army wherein he stated that, ”in the British army when a 
man was promoted from the ranks, although he was separated from 
the men and associated with the officers, it is generally 
several years before he could acquire the habits of the latter 
or before the men considered him with the same respect that 
they did the other officers.” This was very true with the 
Bengal native infantry, wherein the native officers were with­
out exception promoted from the ranks and were rarely able to
The Red Pamphlet p.5.
2* T.R, Holmes - A History of the Indian Mutiny, p.51.
3. The deficiency of European officers in the Indian army, p.17 
1, John Shore - Notes on Indian affairs. Vol.II, p.414.
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establish the social differential considered by some to be so
very necessary for gaining the respect of their subordinates.
The blame for such a state of affairs was not to be borne by
the Indian officers - the defect lay in the system itself.
Events which occurred during the period would suggest that
there was a great deal of truth in this criticism.
Besides this controversial aspect of regulating promotion
by seniority, the very slowness of promotion robbed it of much
of its attraction and value. It was neither extraordinary nor
exceptional to see a long list of men who continued as sepoys
1
even after a service of twenty to twenty five years. A sepoy 
entering the service at the age of 16 could not generally 
expect to become a naik before he attained the age of 36, a
2
havildar before 45 * a jamadar before 54 or a subadar before 60. 
Military spirit and ardour could hardly be retained by the 
native soldier faced with such bleak prospects of promotion.
As if this was not enough, he was most likely to be increasing­
ly irked by the nature of his duties. Year after year, he would 
have to face the monotonous round of peace time duties; fore­
noon parades for cleaning his arms and accoutrement, evening 
parade for orders, guard duties, a brigade exercise once a 
week, regimental exercises four or five times a week, and would 
have to carry out these tasks as a sepoy with years to serve 
before he could expect promotion. There were interesting tasks,
10 Genl. Observation of the court of enquiry Barrackpore
2 January IS2 5, para 25 3 Bengal Miiyv, Cons. 6 January IS2 5, 
No.IS.
2. The Red Pamphlet p. 5.
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such as the target practice, gun handling, drill and manoeuvre 
in battalion and brigade, and instruction in the duties of 
outposts and picquets and in the art of escalade. But it so 
happened that after the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
campaigns during which all that he had learned could be put 
into practice were waged at less and less frequent intervals 
and the native soldiery was restricted to duties which it 
considered to be monotonous and tiring.
To make matters worse, while the submission of one 
native power after another and the steady annexation of terri­
tory reduced the opportunities for active service, the very 
same acquisitions led to an increase in the demands for police 
to control the newly won districts. In an effort to meet this
growing need, the Home authorities decided to deploy soldiers
2from its native armies for the purpose, seeking thereby to 
save the expenditure on a new police force as well as to uti­
lise the native soldiers during peace time. Thus, from 1814 
onwards, the sepoys were called upon to escort treasure, to 
guard prisoners, and to carry out a variety of similar police 
duties. These duties were not only non-military in nature but, 
as Bentinck observed, the duties of the sepoy corps were often 
very liarrassing and distressing* The Court, however, paid no 
heed to this remark of Bentinck and the native soldiers
1. M.Ca 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.314. 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, Sec. XXX, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852, p.185,
2. D. to Bengal, 8 November 1814, para.2 8, M.D, sent to Bengal 
Vol.H, 5 *
3. from Bengal 13 March 1835, para.39. M.L. received from 
Bengal Vol.39.
258
continued to be loaded with police duties which ought by no 
means to have been expected of them as sepoys. In 1649-50 more 
than 30,000 Bengal native soldiers were engaged in guarding
1
treasure, and that too for a total period of fifteen months. 
These escort duties often proved to be very trying and disturb­
ing to the sepoys. Napier forcibly took up the issue after 
Bentinck*s initial comment and warned the Supreme Government of 
the damaging effect of such a policy on the morale of the 
native infantry. Napier wrote to the Duke of Wellington on 27 
November 1649, stressing that the great principle to follow in 
India, as regards armed forces, was this: ”to have a large well- 
organised police to do all those duties for the civil branches 
of the Government, [that required] armed men; such as occasion­
al guards for civil servants, escorts of treasure, putting down 
robbers, arresting men by order of the civil power; in short a 
constabulary force [that would] leave the military to their own 
duties,” In I652 he again raised the problem before the 
Select Committee and observed from the constant harrassing and 
performance of escort duties, the army had not generally speak­
ing above two nights in bed in a week. In many cases there were
?Tpermanent guards, who, having done duty every night had not
3
been relieved for months.”  ^ This was nothing but bad manage.- 
ment and served only to lower the spirit of discipline amongst 
the native soldiers. While it has to be granted that during the
1. The deficiency of European officers in the native army -p.23*
2. p,TTaS57,' XXIX7T2I9VTC. p. 12.
3. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.88.
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period under review the political picture of India had under­
gone a complete transformation, so that not a single native power 
remained to oppose the Company, which therefore could only em­
ploy the armed forces upon garrison and frontier duties, the 
actual use to which this body of men was put proved to be 
greatly detrimental to its morale. In effect, ™The sepoy army 
was chiefly employed, not so much in the support of the civil
power, as in the actual performance of civil duties, such as
1
guarding the kutcheries, gaols, and treasuries, furnishing
escorts etc. All these services ought to be executed by a
police force organised on the principle of the Irish constabu-
2
lary and the English county police.™ In addition to these 
harrassing and monotonous civil duties, there was the problem 
of long and sustained marching. With the accession of new 
territories, the limit of the Bengal Presidency extended far 
beyond its original confines and the infantry units were fre­
quently required to march to distant places. Frequently the
native troops who were ™very hardly worked™ were found to be
3
™three or four months upon the march™. This naturally im­
posed endless hardship on the men and also put them to a very 
considerable expense,^
The rules of conduct framed for the governance of the 
native soldiery became yet another source of irritation. These
1. An office of administration, a court-house, Hobson-Jobson 
P. 287.
2. Reconstruction of the Bengal Army, p. 13. (Supposed to be 
written by■Sir Charles E. Trevelyan.)
3. P.P. 1852-53, XXXP, (627), H.u. p. 31.
1. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H0C, Ap.70.
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rules were regulated in common with the Articles of War of the 
royal army. Also known as TArticles of War T, these were printed 
in English and in Hindustani and were read out to all the serv­
ing sepoys by the interpreter of the regiment - some of the
Articles being read every month while the rest were read 
1
quarterly. Borrowed as these were from those of the royal 
army, the suitability of these rules to regulate the activities 
of the native troops was open to question. The authorities 
seemed to have forgotten the potent fact that the royal army 
in England and the CompanyTs sepoy army in India were two wide­
ly different entities and that the regulations which suited one 
might not be suitable for the other. The press of the mid­
nineteenth century criticised the formal reading of the 
Articles of War as one of the greatest farces which were 
enacted in the routine of the native army. To the military 
authority the custom of reading out the Articles of War may 
have appeared to be one of vital importance, *!a solemn warning
against the commission of crime and ... a stimulus to zeal for
2
John CompanyTs Service,M but to a native soldier it meant
3
practically nothing and left him, if anything, rather confused, 
A native soldier never took the slightest trouble to follow the 
intricacies of English military law, neither was he capable of 
doing so. Consequently, the framing and reading out of the 
Articles of War had very little effect on the thinking of the
1. M, C. 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations.p,70. CarrollTs 
Bengal Code 1817, Sec.X. Standing Orders in Bengal regiment 
1830, 1840 and IS52.
2. Athenaeum, 6 July 1844,
3. Ibid.-,
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sepoys. Almost all the European officers of the Indian army, 
giving evidence before the Army Commission of 1859, questioned 
the utility of the Articles of War in the native army. As 
Major W.L, Merewether of the Bombay army put it, to read the 
Articles of War was to treat ”the Indians with a code which was 
made up for Anglo-Saxons,ELB.Eo Frere, the Commissioner 
in Sind, observed that, ”a code like the Articles of War and 
army regulations by giving rise to vague notions of some ill 
understood rights which some unknown authority [was] apparently 
suspected of wishing to subvert,” created a ”vague feeling of
p
suspicion and discontent,” Major-General Sydney Cotton*s
comment was that ”these Articles of War were beyond the compre-
3
hension of a native soldier,” and that of General John Jacob 
that ”the Articles of War, which were in force in the native
4
army were entirely opposed to every oriental idea of Government,” 
Not merely were the Articles of War difficult reading in 
English or in Hindustani - they were necessarily useless in 
either language to an illiterate sepoy army.”Had the Articles 
of War been read half a dozen times a year to the troops, it 
would not be of any purpose,” said the Adjutant General of the 
army, Lieutenant-Colonel Mayhew, who from his experience of the 
Bengal army from 1825, estimated that ”not above.ten men per
r 5company [could] read in the vernacular dialect,” Moreover the
1. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H,C, p. 58. ■
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541). H.C. p.58,
3. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541); H.C. p.130.
4. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.98.
5. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C, p.141.
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Hindustani ox the Articles of War, which had a great deal of
Arabic and Persian words in it, made it difficult even for a
lettered sepoy to understand,, Consequently when the Articles of
War were read out to the sepoys, the great majority of them
probably never understood even a sentence of what was being
read. Indeed the situation was so anomalous that The Times
after criticising the Articles of War aptly observed, ”we
should much like to have a really intelligent native’s opinion
1
or ideas on the Articles of War as read to him.” Authorities
2 3
like Henry Lawrence and John Jacob were even of the opinion
that the reading of these Articles before the new sepoys put
into their minds ideas of desertion, mutiny and disobedience by
the constant occurrence of references to them in these Articles*
They argued that instead of preventing the men from committing
these offences, the reading of these Articles corrupted them
instead.
Not only the Articles of War but the oath of allegiance 
which every sepoy was bound to take was also severely criti­
cised by some of the European officers who testified before the 
Army Commission in 1859. According to Keith Young, the Judge
Advocate-General, the oath served no purpose and ”a sepoy’s
4
fidelity could not be ensured by administering it,.” because, as 
was rightly observed by Sir John Grant it was ’’nothing but a 
form to them. ” Some other officers also expressed their views
The Times, 15 January 1849.
2. Lawrence - op,cit.,~p.132.
3c P.P. 1859. VIII, (2541), H.C. p.79. 
4. P.P. 1859'p VIII, (2541), H.C, p.143.
5. P.P. I859, VIII, (2541), H0 C. p.276.
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that in the prevalent form the unconscientious -would boldly
disregard it while the conscientious would find loopholes in it.
A mutinous sepoy could take the colour or the gun with him and
stand against his officers with the impression that he had kept
the pledge not to desert the colour. He could also argue, Major
General Sir Hugh Rose pointed out, that an oath to the English
masters was not binding because they were of a faith, country
1
and colour different from his ownu The observations of these
officers, with an experience of twenty or thirty years of
service in the sepoy army prior to 1859, clearly revealed that
although the sepoys never objected to taking the oath of
allegiance, they never regarded it as anything more than a mere
formality and the seriousness of the occasion was hardly ever
realised by them. It is evident therefore that on this issue
the Company, in its management of the native army, resorted to
European standards of discipline to a far greater extent than
L
was necessary.
Such being the state of affairs, it would not have been 
illogical to expect the Bengal native soldier to have taken a 
carefree attitude towards the rules of conduct of his army life. 
This, however, was not the case. On the contrary incidents of 
crime and individual disobedience amongst them were quite 
negligible in number. Desertion of men from the lines was not 
unknown on occasion but such cases amongst the Bengal infantry 
sepoys occurred only under special circumstances. Thus, an 
increase in desertion was recorded in 1824 during the Burmese
1. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H.C, p. 73.
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war, and may well be ascribed to the fact that "the private 
soldier and native commissioned officers of the Madras native 
infantry received higher pay when marching in the field and 
larger issues of rations when on foreign service than the
1
corresponding classes of troops of the Bengal Presidency."
Consequently, when the Bengal native soldiers came in contact
with their colleagues of the other two Presidencies on the
march or on campaign, desertion took place - a sign of their
protest against such discrimination. Increased desertion was
also experienced in the Bengal native infantry whenever "the
troops were placed under the uncertainty in regard to their
future destination." The Bengal Government in an effort to root
out the evil adopted "flogging and other forms of severe and
2
degrading punishment." This practice was strongly criticised
by the Enquiry Committee of 1824 as being an impediment to
recruiting. It also pointed to the "imperious calls of religion
and caste which [compelled] the higher classes of these men to
visit their homes periodically, as affording great excuse for
an act (desertion) which however culpable in a military view
[was] deemed by them to be comparatively venial and in many
3cases inevitable." The Court when informed of this criticism
1, Genl, observation of court of enquiry Barrackpore, 2 January
1825* para 23, Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825, No.18.
20 Genl. observation of court of enquiry Barrackpore
2 January 1825, para 23, Bengal Mily Cons. 6 January 1825
No.18.
3, Genl. observation of enquiry committee Barrackpore
2 January 1825. para 24, Bengal Mily Cons. 6 January 1825 
No.18.
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ordered, the Bengal Government not to inflict severe punishment
for desertion and also to enquire into the causes of the
desertion which had occurred in the Bengal army in 1824']' The
Bengal Council in its letter of 1830 informed the Court that
the Bengal Sepoys had been ordered in 1824 to march from the
northern regions of India to the north of Bengal proper to
invade Cachar, Assam and Arakan. This marching order was the
main reason for the increased desertion as in those days of
slow communications the Bengal infantrymen were reluctant to
march to so great a distance from their families in Bihar or 
2
Oudh. Besides, the Bengal sepoys, recruited as they were from
wheat eating regions, disliked service in the eastern provinces
of India where rice was the staple food and the climate was
humid and unsuitable for them. Desertions frequently increased
3
whenever troops were ordered to the Eastern provinces.
Although, according to the authorities both in Bengal and in
England, the number of desertions was high during the Burmese
war in 1824, Captain Hough has shown that over the years 1825
to 1833 only 16 men deserted from all the sepoy infantry regi-
4
ments in Bengal. Indeed so insignificant is this number that 
it could easily be ignored, especially as the deserter might 
often be a guilty sepoy anxious to escape punishment. A young 
sepoy lost very little by desertion, since he could join
1. D. to Bengal 18 May 1828,para.115, M,D, sent to Bengal,Vol.1
2. L# from Bengal 14 October 1830. para 57, M. La received from 
Bengal. Vol.32.
3c L. from Bengal 14 October 1830, para,5^. M„L. received from 
Bengal. Vol.32.
4. W 0 Hough - The practice of court-martial and other 
military <. carts, table no, 2.
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1
another regiment and start life afresh. During the Sind and
Panjab wars, the number of desertions increased again. The
2
Government on this occasion tightened up the enlistment rules.
But all the same it can be concluded that desertion was never
3
a great problem to the military authorities in Bengal.
The tally of other military crimes committed by Bengal
sepoys who were brought to trial was also very low, as will be
4seen from the following table:
Number of Military cases tried in ten years 
in Bengal (Officers"'not"included)
1825-33. Ab-
sence
Deser- To Drunk- Embez- Maling-Misc. 
. tion. enemy, enness. zle- ering.
ment.
Mut-Sleep 
iny, ing.
Brahmins 4 - - 1 - 2
Rajputs 10 2 1 1
Other
Hindus 1 — -  ~
Muslims 1 1 6 3
Total- 1 16 - - 1 8 6 1
In 1825 and 1826 the Bengal native infantry was composed of 73
and 76 regiments respectively. After 1827 there were 74
^  E.I.U.S. J. May 1834, p. 504,
2* 'See pp. ‘ an- -
3. P.P. 1852-53^ XXXI, (627),H.L. p.220.
4. W, Hough - Military Law authorities p. XIII.
5. P.P. 1831-32/ XIII (735-V)", H/C. Ap, A,No. 29 and 31 ^
267
regular native infantry regiments in the Bengal establishment 
and each of these regiments had about 1000 men on an average. 
The figures mentioned in the above table, indicating the crime 
rate of about 48^,160 men over a nine year period, establish 
beyond all doubt that the incidence of crime amongst the 
Bengal native soldiers was extremely slight. It will also be 
of special interest to note that between 1825 and 1833 not a 
single Bengal sepoy was tried for drunkenness - which speaks 
highly of the moral standards of the Bengal native soldiery. 
Evidence given by Major-General Nicolls before the Select 
Committee of 1831 also supports this conclusion. He deposed 
that, TTin three years of 28,000 men I had three instances of 
intoxication ... and two of those were from the immoderate use 
of opium.M ^
The following statistics, covering the period 1824 to 
1837 indicate an almost similar picture of the very low inci­
dence of military crimes amongst the native officers.
Number of officers (native) tried.
Regular and Irregular regiments
18?4- 33 ----  37 ?
1834- 37   20 4
1. In 1825 and T26 there were 68 regiments with 1000 sepoys in
each but in 1827 while the number of regiments remained the
same that of the privates was reduced to 680 in each regi­
ment, Again in 1828, the number of regiments increased from 
68 to 74 but with 680 privates in each. Thus, in 1825/26  
there were 68,000 sepoys, in 182$ - 46,240 and from 1828 to 
1833 Bengal native infantry establishment consisted of 
301,920 sepoys. Bengal Military Statement,1825-1833.
2. P.P. 1831-32, XIIlj735-v), H.C. p.17.
3. Hough - The Military...p. XIV.
4. Hough - The practice...p.XIII.
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Besides military crimes, the Bengal native soldiers were also
liable to be tried by Civil Courts for crimes such as arson,
burglary, child stealing, embezzlement, counterfeiting, forgery,
1
theft, highway robbery and murder. But whatever might be their
incidence, neither the Select Committee of 1852- 53 nor the
Army Commission of 1859 (both appointed by the House of Commons)
asked the Army officers who appeared before the enquiry a
single question on the problem of crimes or drunkenness amongst
the Bengal infantry soldiers. This silence itself supports the
view expressed by the Press of the time that 7Tthe Bengal sepoys
2
were of sober habits,17
Generally for a minor offence a native soldier was pun­
ished with either extra drills or extra guard duty. The command­
ing officer of a company could punish his men by ordering ten
3
days of the former or four of the latter. But if an offence
demanded more severe punishment, a report was required to be
sent to the commanding officer of the regiment for a trial by
a court-martial. This procedure of trial by military courts,
though prevalent in some form or other before 1796, was formally
4
established and promulgated in the reforms of that year. By 
the regulations of 1796, three types of courts-martial were 
established to sit in judgment over the accused native soldiers.
1. Hough - The practice ... p.XIV.
2. Bengal Hurkaru 25 June 1845.
3. M, C. 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799. p. 304.. 
Carrollfs Bengal Code 1817. Sec, XLIX, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment I83O, 1840 and I852.
4. McC. 8 August 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.310.
Carroll7s Bengal Code 1817, Sec. XLIX, Standing Orders in
Bengal regiment 1830, 1840 and 1852,
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These were known as the regimental, the district or garrison, 
and the general courts-’'martial. (Those- wore 'Native Courts' as 
distinct from courts which sat in judgment over the European 
soldiers). Native officers were selected to sit with European 
officers as judges in these courts. This honour was given only 
to those native officers who had qualified themselves in an 
examination in the Articles of War governing the native soldiers 
and had obtained certificates to that effect from the Adjutant- 
General of the native army. A general court-martial was the 
only tribunal before which a native commissioned officer could 
be tried, the other two being authorised to try sepoys and non­
commissioned officers only. Moreover, only a general court- 
martial had the power of awarding the penalties of dismissal or 
death. Every soldier brought for trial before any native court- 
martial was at liberty to ask to be tried only by European 
judges. But in that case no'appeal was to be allowed from one 
court to another. The composition of these courts was as 
follows:
(a) general courts-martial (native)were formed of five to nine 
native commissioned officers, appointed only with the sanction 
of the Commander-in-Chief. Sentence of death could only be 
passed by a two third majority. One European officer was to 
superinbend the proceedings of such courts.
(b) garrison courts-martial were also similarly composed, with 
the exception that their officer members were drawn from the 
different native regiments in the garrison.
(c) Regimental courts-martial were appointed by the Commanding
270
Officer of a regiment and tried all crimes that were not 
capital„ This Court consisted of five to nine native officers 
under the superintendence of a subaltern officer.
Decisions of the regimental and garrison courts could be 
approved and carried out by the officers commanding a regiment, 
who had to convey this information to the Headquarters. The 
decision of a general court-martial had, however, to be app­
roved by the Commander-in-Chief before it could be carried out.
The constitution, jurisdiction and power of the native 
courts-martial came under the severe criticism of the press and 
the European officers of the Indian army. The Mofussilite
wrote wa native court-martial was often found to be unacquainted
1
with the principles upon which it was convened” According to 
Brigadier-General John Jacob the system involved ”the unspeak­
able absurdity of an assembly of native officers judging
2
between the English commandant and the men -under his command.u 
The Panjab Committee commented that, ^native courts-martial 
[were] a farce because native members [were] always guided by 
the superintending European officer.n It is difficult, 
however, to accept such sweeping remarks without limitation, 
for Major-General Hearsey giving his opinion to the Army 
Commission of 1859 stated that a native officer was generally
4as well qualified for such duty as the officer of any army.
Most probably confusion arose because the military codes were 
foreign in origin and concept to the native officers. As Major-
The Mofussilite, 8 June 1847.
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.98.
3. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H.C. p.34.
4. P.P. 1859, VIII (2541), H.C. p.176.
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General Hancock observed *?the native mind [was not] a whit less
acute than the European and if left to follow pretty much their
own way of examining witnesses and of sifting evidence, as
1
under their own system of punchayets, these officers would be
much better enabled to form a just decision whatever might be
2
the case submitted to their investigation,But under the
accepted official English system, the European officer, who was
assigned to superintend the court proceedings, exerted so great
an influence, that the native officers were found to readily
3
give their assent to his findings and conclusions. The proceed­
ings were thus often reduced to a farce, as one manTs conclu*- 
sions carried the day.
Native courts-martial were authorised to deal out any 
form of punishment ranging from simple imprisonment, corporal 
punishment or even capital punishment depending upon the 
gravity of the crime. Since the infliction of corporal punishnen 
caused much resentment amongst the native soldiers, Gornbermere, 
the Commander-in Chief of the Bengal army, impressed as he was 
by the orderly habits of the native soldiers, endeavoured in 
1826 to win the Directors to his belief that, it could nvery 
seldom be necessary to inflict on them (Bengal sepoys) the 
punisiiment of flogging [ and that it might be] almost entirely
4
abolished with great advantages to their character and feelings,
1. Punchayets - A Council assembled as a Court of Arbiters or 
Jury, or as a committee of the people of village, of the 
members of a caste or what not, to decide on questions 
interesting the body generally, Hobson-Jobson, p.560,
2. P,P, 1859, V, (2516), p.33.
3- P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541) ,p.l33.
4. 1. from Bengal 26 January 1826. para 20, M.L* received from 
Bengal Vol.23.
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He succeeded in winning the approval of the Home authorities 
and in 1827 ordered that TTno native soldier [ should] in future 
be sentenced to corporal punishment unless for the crime of 
stealing, marauding or gross insubordination, where the indivi­
duals [were] deemed unworthy to continue in the ranks of the 
1
army,n It was also laid down that in case of an award of cor­
poral punishment, the divisional commander should be referred 
to and given every detail of the prisoner before the sentence 
was carried into effect and if he confirmed it and did not see
cause to remit the punishment he would at the same time direct
2
the man to be discharged from the service. This was but the 
first restrictive step taken to curtail the award of corporal 
punishment. In 1832 Sir Edward Barnes, the Commander-in-Chief, 
ret.raced the step, and the power to sanction the sentence of 
corporal punishment was no longer confined to the divisional 
commander. Instead, the officer who assembled the court-martial 
was permitted to confirm the proceedings and then to carry the
3
sentence into effect or to remit it altogether. Sir Edward 
obviously issued this order to uphold the authority of command­
ing officers of native regiments. But as Bentinck pointed out 
in 1835? it was these very officers who in the past had abused 
their power* Bentinck also took exception to the action of the 
Commander-in-Chief on this issue and remarked: nthe power 
should not be left to the caprice of an individual but to be 
settled by the Legislative C o u n c i l * A c t i n g  on this belief
1. G.O.C.C. 19 March 1827. Bengal Mily. Cons. 19 March 1827.No,71
2. Ibid.,
3. C.O.C.C. 15 June 1832.Bengal Mily,Cons, 1832, No.65.
4„ L, from Bengal 16 February 1835. para.11, M.L, received from 
Bengal Vol.39.
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and. on his conviction that corporal punishment was a degrading 
measure he referred the issue for detailed investigation to 
three Presidential committeesc These committees after enquiring 
into the matter were unanimous in their opinion that though 
there must be some restriction in inflicting corporal punishment
upon the sepoys, that punishment ,?however degrading and injur-
r , 1 
ious, l could not] entirely be abolished.” Bentinck*s humani­
tarian views were not satisfied with the finding. He criticised 
the observation of these committees and stated, ”an insuperable 
terror appears to reign over the imagination of all and like 
the native superstition which sees in some charm or amulet the 
only protection against all evils that can affect the body or 
haunt the mind, so corporal punishment is venerated as the sole 
security against every military distemper and as the sole
2
guarantee for the efficiency and good regulation of the army.”
He answered the apprehension of the committees - that the aboli­
tion of the corporal punishment would bring disastrous conse­
quences - by reminding them that the abolition of Suttee had 
beer, advocated upon the grounds of humanity, that danger had 
then been apprehended, unnecessarily as it now appeared, and 
that fears of ill consequences from the present measure be held 
to be equally unreasonable. Advancing his reasons for the total 
abolition of corporal punishment, Bentinck argued that the 
Bengal native soldiers were already subordinate to all superior 
authority and were proverbially faithful to their salt.
1. T_u from Bengal 16 February 1835? para 1, Ibid.
2. La from Bengal 16 February 1835> para 19? Ibid.
274
Moreover, as the CompanyTs Military service was greatly
esteemed by the Indian soldier, "discharge” he said, was "the
1
most complete substitute for corporal punishment,”
The Directors were convinced by the argument of Bentinck
2
and approved the total abolition of corporal punishment. An
order was accordingly issued in 1837 discontinuing the practice
of punishing native soldiers by using the cat-o-nine-tails or
rattan. It was also ruled that ”a soldier was to be sentenced
to dismissal from the service for any offence which might now
3
be punished by flogging,” This order abolishing corporal
punishment almost immediately met with severe opposition and
criticism. "Letters and articles appeared in almost every
Journal in the country. An old Bengal Subadar who had served
the Company from 1804 remarked that lFauj be dar hogya,iC (the
. 4
army has lost its fear)*” Colonel Alexander said before the 
Select Committee of 1852 that the abolition of corporal punish­
ment and the introduction of hard labour in irons for serious
5
offences had "told on the discipline of the native army," Not 
that BentinckTs measure went unsupported. Colonel Sleeman 
observed that "it had a very good effect [a sepoy knew] that 
these courts [could] sentence him to be dismissed from the 
service, [that he was] liable to lose his bread for ordinary
1. L, from Bengal 16 February 1835. para* 20. M, L, received 
from Bengal Vo3.39*
2. D„ to Bengal 16 June I836, para,4, M0D0 sent to Bengal,
Vol.21.
3. G,0eG.Gc 24 December I836. Bengal Mily.Cons. 24 December 
1836, No,50.
4« Cardew - op.cit. , p„l64 fn.
5. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.92*
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transgressions and be sentenced to -work on the roads in irons
1
for graver ones...VT
This controversial order however, was a shortlived one.
In 1845? Hardinge noticing an increase in the number of mutin­
ous incidents and consequent courts-martial in the Bengal 
native army held that this unsatisfactory state of things had 
mainly come to pass because of the abolition of corporal pun­
ishment. Hence, with the approval of the Directors, an order 
was issued in 1845 corporal punishment was again introduced 
in the native army of India and remained in force down to the 
year 1852.
The validity of HardingeTs conclusions, supporting the 
reintroduction of corporal punishment, may well be questioned. 
Detailed statistics presented by Bentinck in his letter of 1835 
indicated that the number of cases of flogging in the Bengal 
native army had always been very low. Over a period of five 
years from 1829 to 1833, it was in fact as low as three per 
regiment of about 1000 men. Bentinck had also remarked that 
this was so because Bengal sepoys were mostly drawn from people 
of high caste who were responsible and sober in their habits.
To them flogging was a degrading experience and as Bentinck 
argued ”the relatives of native officers and young men of res­
pectable connections [were] deterred from entering the ranks by
3
the existence of corporal punishment. Hardinge, on the other
1, N0H, Sleeman - On the military discipline of the Indian army,
p, 3.
2, G.O.G.G, 16 August 1845. Standing Orders in Bengal regiment 
1852, p3 98,
3, L. from Bengal 16 February 1835. para.22, M/L. received from 
Bengal Vol.39.
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hand, reintroduced corporal punishment on the mere supposition
that its retraction had led to the increased incidence of crime
which might well have been caused by various other reasons,
■Whether it did or did not lessen the incidence of crime, its
retention certainly was held degrading by the sepoys, and so
affected their morale.
The rules and regulations about the dress of the sepoys
was another source of irritation to them. The Company dressed
its native soldiers in the fashion of the British troops of
the royal army. Of that fashion Fortescue has observed: *?in a
general way their clothing itself was bad. The coatee, or
swallow-tailed coat, was in itself an ill-designed garment;,..
The pack was hard, rigid and quadrangular; and was so adjusted
as to arrest circulation. Round the neck was worn a stiff black
leather stock, which the men rather delighted in for its
smarter appearance, though they always took it off and hung it
1
in their musket-stocks when hard work was in prospect.n From
the list of things mentioned in the regulations of Bengal
2
native infantry relating to the dress of sepoys it can be said 
that an Indian soldier in the CompanyTs service, except for his 
sandals and turban, was accoutred like his European comrades, 
and was equally inconvenienced. He had a heavy unwieldy shako 
on his head, upon his left arm a heavy musket was placed and on 
his back was slung a great knapsack which contained all his
1, J.,W, Fortescue - History of the British army, Vol.XI, p. 12.
2. M.C. 8 August 1795^ Grace Bengal regulations 1799/ p.105. 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817 Sec.XXXII, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment, I852. p,223«
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regimental necessaries* Across his chest he had two broad belts 
in criss-cross fashion held together by a brass plate. To one 
of these his bayonet was fastsned and to the other his pouch 
or cartouch box, a huge leather thing which was large enough to 
contain some sixty rounds of ball ammunition. There was yet 
another belt round his waist which was intended to keep the
1
others together. On his feet he had a pair of clumsy sandals.
With this dress on, when the regiment was under arms and in
heavy marching order at an inspection parade, a native soldier
could hardly stand still and often earned the criticism of
2
being 'unsteadyT from reviewing Generals, Shore criticising
the mode of dress of the native soldiers observed t?the native
soldiers bedizened after our English fashion, reminded me of
3the monkeys who accompany the dancing bears in England.i? Henry 
Russell, a Bengal Officer, also criticised the dress of the 
Indian soldiers before the Select Committee of 1831 and com­
mented that the authorities nthought that everything depended 
on show and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment 
of outward smartness and uniformity, The full dress cap of 
a native soldier was of the inverted bell shape and consisted 
of a wicker frame covered with blue cloth. The upper and lower 
rims were bcund with brass. It was also furnished with a thin 
strap of brass scales (which was never worn down) and a device 
and number of the same material. The average weight of this cap
^  Bengal Hurkaru, 24 June, 1845.
2* Captain Ae Hervey - Ten Years in India, Vol.II, p.29.
3. John Sbox~e - op, cit. , Vol. II, p. 414,
4. P.P. 1831-32,'“XIII, (735-v), H.C. p. 29.
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1
■was from two and a half to three pounds,, This cap was so 
heavy and unsteady that a native soldier could rarely move with­
out being obliged to raise his disengaged hand to his head to
2
keep the cap on. If Fortescue was critical of the mode of
dress of the British troops in England, his conclusions were
still more valid and justified in the climate of India. In fact,
such a mode of dress most literally oppressed the native
soldiers of the Bengal infantry. Even in a temperate region,
no one would willingly buckle round his throat "that rigid
apoplexy-endangering stock or impede his action with braces
(not inappropriately called by them gallows) or squeeze his
limbs into the closely fitting trouser or the tightly buttoned
cloth or superadd to these the cross and waist belts - the
heavy knapsack, with its chest cramping, arm galling belts, a
3
heavy cartouch box ,.. and a haversack." Napier stated before 
the Select Committee in 1852 that "their own native costume 
would be far better, then he would look as well in rank and be 
far more efficiently clothed for service than in the European
4
dress." The Times also observed that it would have been 
better for him to be armed, accoutred and dressed in native 
fashion so that he could do his work with ease. "The soldier 
ought to be so clothed that his natural acquirements may be as 
little cramped as possible. Every exception to this rule
1<• Athenaeum •26 May,1843,
2. Celhi Gazette., 24 April, 1832.
3* The Times, 12 January, 1853.
4. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.135.
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i
diminished his utility and rendered him ridiculous.19 The
European officers in their evidence® before the Army Commission
of 1859 also criticised the European mode of dress of the
sepoys. The Panjab Committee observed that ”a sepoy in his
European dress could neither stoop to the ground nor take rest
2
in his accoutrements.” Sir Charles E. Trevelyan commented
that it was ”by no means necessary that they should be dressed
according to the European fashion; on the contrary there would
be great advantages in dressing them according to the native
3
fashion, it would make the service more popular. v? In fact, 
he was critical of the very basic idea which brought about such 
a measure and warned that ^particular care should be taken to 
avoid the pedantry of European discipline.”*1" Indeed, in full 
dress a native soldier wore a ludicrous and almost pathetic air 
of uneasiness and rigidity. His clothes hung on him as though 
he were a very angular wooden frame. Besides, f,from a distance 
a sepoy in his scarlet coat and black trouser, presented a 
sufficiently military appearance but on closer inspection it 
was not pleasing to the eyes. The coat ... was as old fashioned 
and uncouth an article as could be conceived. The pantaloon was 
as primitive as possible,”  ^Moreover, as ”no oriental [seemed] 
at ease in tight European costume, least of all in the English 
uniform,” it often happened that during a long march, the 
sepoys often requested to be allowed to wear their own native
The Times 12 January, 1853.
2. P. P7”1§59VIII (2541), H.C. p. 28,
3. P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H.C, p. 106.
4. Ibid.
5. G, Trevelyan - Cawnpore, p.14.
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dress. In addition to all this, some of the officers even
pointed out that the knapsack and the English musket were both
too heavy for a sepoy. Sir Mark Cubbon, who served in the
Indian army from 1810, said because of the introduction of
present knapsack in 1817 more men had been ^invalided and
pensioned from the chest-foundering action of the knapsack than
2
ever would have been the ordinary risks of the sepoys.
Napier remarked that the weight of the sepoyTs musket ought to 
3
be reduced. Again Colonel Alexander observed ,?the natives 
carry from 47 lbs, to 49 lbs,; you may take their own weight at 
from 100 lbs., to 120 lbs., or 125 lbs,? and it is extraordin­
ary the marches that they make, and the powers of endurance 
4
they exhibit,M This statement is proof enough of the harrassing 
nature of the sepoyTs dress.
While the organisational pattern, the rules of governance, 
the Articles of War, the method of training and even the mode 
of dress of the native soldiery were mainly modelled on the 
practices followed by the British troops of the royal army, the 
Bengal native infantry could claim to be as widely different as 
was possible from its model body, if not unique in itself, in 
one respect - in its social habits. Whereas the accepted 
practice in European armies was to house the troops in barracks
1. G. Trevelyan - Cawnpore p.14.
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.106.
3. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. p.89.
4. ?*The weight of the bayonet is ll| lbs. ; the weight of the
knapsack is about 12 lbs., his accoutrements, with 12 rounds
of ammunition is 6..1bs. ; but in field service he would
carry 60 rounds, which would be about 6 lbs. itself - includ­
ing the clothes and accoutrements,
P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L, p.141.
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and provide them with food from a common mess, the mode of
living of the Bengal native infantry soldier was diametrically
the opposite* The Company did not provide the native soldiers
with any built up accommodation at cantonments. Instead of
barracks, certain ground was allotted in a cantonment for the
1
residence of the native regiments. On this allotted ground a
native soldier had to build a hut for himself, and though
Madras and Bombay native soldiers received hutting money for
the erection of new huts^ the Bengal sepoys never enjoyed any
such privilege. Not till 1846 did Hardinge in his efforts to
equalise the service conditions of the three Presidential
armies, ordered hutting allowance to be granted to the Bengal
2
sepoys, but only on their changing stations,
3
The military regulations, an article on the Bengal army 
published in Bengal Hurkaru in 1845 and G. Trevelyan in his 
book Cawnpore all throw light upon the hutting lines as well as 
the living condition of the native soldiers* Each native 
private was alloted a space of 30 x 10 feet and the commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers were allotted slightly larger 
plots. In the ground allowed to a regiment, lines were marked 
out and divided into ten rows, one per company, with a street 
between those of each company and a broader one to separate the 
two sections. Those huts belonging to native sepoys and non­
1. M„C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations p0319. CarrollTs 
Bengal Code 1817, Sec, LVI, Standing Orders in Bengal 
regiment 1852, p0175.
2. G,O.G.G. 15 July 1845? Bengal Mily# Cons. 15 July l845?No*68.
3. M„C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations, p.184?
Carroll^ Bengal Code 1817, Sec, XLIX, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852, p.182*
commissioned officers in a cantonment consisted of quadrangular
buildings with mud walls generally surmounted by chuppar or
thatch of grass or palmyra leaves, with a small enclosed yard
or compound in front.'1' The huts of the native officers were
attached to the company lines. An officer had two or three huts
round a tiny court-yard, fenced in with a mud wall a few feet 
2in height. The Quartermaster of the company or the regimental 
officer was responsible for the cleanliness of all the huts of 
the soldiery. As cases of fire were quite frequent and often 
dangerous, every man was ordered to keep two pots of water out­
side his door. The furniture and fixtures in a native soldierTs
3 4
hut consisted of a charpoy, a daree and a few cooking vessels. 
The native officerTs domestic arrangements differed very little 
from those of a sepoy, except that there would be a few more 
cooking vessels and perhaps a Tboyf to cook for him,5
The public buildings attached to a native line consisted
of a barrack for arms, the stores, the Sergeant's quarter and 
the congee housed A barrack or Bell of Arms was built immed­
iately in front of the line of each company. The arms and
accoutrements of the native soldiers were lodged in this build­
ing and a native non-commissioned officer was placed in charge.
A guard-room and a prisoners cell were also attached to the Bell 
of Arms. The colours and cash chest were lodged in the guard
1. Bengal Hurkaru, 25 June 1845*
2* G, Trevelyan - Cawnpore% p.12,
3. A charpoy - A bedstead.
4. A daree - A mattress.
5. Bengal Hurkaru, 25 June 3.845*
6. Congee House, Conjee House - VThe cells (temporary lock-up) 
of a regiment in I n d i a . Hobson-Jobson, p. 245*
room while prisoners, under trial by court-martial, were con­
fined in the prisoners? room.
On a change of station, a Bengal native soldier required 
carriage for transferring his personal belongings such as his 
cooking pots, bedding and clothes, A regiment often moved to a 
station at a distance of five, six, seven or even eight hundred 
miles. The usual march was ten or twelve miles per day with a 
halt every fourth day.^ The Company provided tents for the men 
during the march, and these tents were pitched in continuous 
lines with a small street between each and a broader one, 
dividing the sections, in front of all the small streets. The 
arms of each company were piled in front of the tenth company
of the regiment. Immediately in the rear of the companies tents
2
the Sholdarees of the native officers were pitched, and be­
hind these again were ranged in three lines the tents of the 
subalterns, captains and of the commanding officers and staff.
The regimental bazaar was pitched in the rear aloof from the 
3
camp. Arriving at the new station, a native soldier had to 
buy or build for himself a new hut. When a regiment was about 
to quit a station, a committee of valuation composed of native 
officers under the superintendence of an European officer, 
assembled to value the huts,. The relieving regiment, if there 
was any, usually took the lines on that valuation. The huts
were then apportioned to the men of the relieving regiment and
1* Bengal Hurkaru, 25 <June 1845.
2, Sholdaree - A tent - Hobson-Jobson, p.680.
3. G. 0. C.C. 8 February 1802,, Carroll ?s Bengal Code 1817* Sec.XI, 
Standing Orders in Bengal regiment 1852. p.95.
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the value was deducted from their pay. The money realised was
proportionately allotted to the owners of the huts.
This system of housing for the native soldiers was
vehemently criticised by the press of the time. Sir Charles
Napier was requested to bring the subject to the notice of the
Government and to take immediate measures to abolish the
1
*fwretched huts.',? The authorities were asked to build barracks 
for the native soldiers at public expense and to do away with 
the antiquated and most unmilitary system of lodging them in 
their own huts. The lines of a native regiment were described 
as a relic of barbarism. As permanent habitations, even for 
native soldiery, these huts were described as a disgrace to any 
army. They were constructed in such a manner that if a single 
hut took fire, as frequently happened, the entire lines of 
several regiments were burnt out. Moreover, these huts, partic­
ularly at certain seasons, were extremely unhealthy. In the 
rainy season they were wet. Because of defective drainage most 
of the native lines remained swampy almost throughout the year. 
In addition, the ground allotted for the construction of huts
was generally limited and the consequent overcrowding caused a
2serious lack of ventilation. Criticising the state of affairs, 
in a letter' dated 27 November, 18495 Sir Charles Napier informed 
the Duke of Wellington: ”the disgustingly filthy nature of the 
source from which the water used at Bangalore [was taken, had 
been] brought to notice scores of times by me during the last
T* The Times 15 January 1849.
2. Ibid., 15 January 1849.
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four and a half years but as usual nothing [had] been done*”
Analysing the causes of illness amongst the European soldiers,
he 'wrote in the same letter, there was ”scarcely any illness,
which the troops [suffered from, that might] not be traced to
want of room in barracks. Besides this, the bazaars were allowed
to spring up near barracks, and the stench from the bazaars
2
affected the health of the troops.” Florence Nightingale, 
while expressing her concern with the unsatisfactory condition 
of the European barracks in India, remarked, ”But all these 
conditions paled before what was endured by native troops. The 
native troops had no barracks, no lavatories, no baths, no 
kitchens, no sanitary supervision of any kind. They used the 
ground round them as privies without hindrance and left cleans­
ing to the rains. The squalor of their huts was indescribable, 
bodies of animals and of human beings were left unburied for 
days; the water they drank was stinking. Consequently, though 
temperate, the Bengal native soldiers were decimated by disease.” 
In spite of such requests and criticisms, conditions re­
mained as unhygienic as ever until after the Mutiny of 1857.
The sanitary arrangement of all army stations under the Company, 
was described in the Report of the Royal Commission in 1859 as 
!quite infamous*. The Report further observed, ”none of the 
stations had any subsoil drainage and there were no other means 
of removing the rainfall, except surface gutters. The ground 
about the lines* was often broken in pits and hollows filled
1. PoP, 1857, XXIX, (219), H..C« p.125.
2. P.P. 1857, XXIX, (219), H.C. p.125*
3. C.W.Smith - Florence Nightingale, p.48.
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with stagnant waters.”
It was however to be admitted that the Company was not 
completely indifferent on this issue. To look after the health 
of the native soldiers the Army administrators had attached two
native doctors with one surgeon and one surgeon*s mate to each
2
sepoy regiment. These men regulated the hospital service
attached to the unit in all situations. The native soldiers
while in hospital had to pay for medical service and the charges
for a day were four annas for a subadar, two annas for a
jamadar, a havildar or a naik and one anna for a sepoy, this
sum being recovered from their pay. Since complaints were often
received that native soldiers in order to avoid duty, pretended
illness and tried to get admission into the hospital, the
Government, in 1840, increased the hospital charges and the
daily rate for native soldiers was raised to eight annas for
a commissioned officer, three annas for a non-commissioned
3
officer and two annas for a sepoy. For a soldier wounded m  
action or on service, however, there was no hospital stoppage. 
Durixig the time of a war or in a distant campaign, general 
field hospitals were also established whenever necessary at 
fixed situations. The issue of a stringent order by the Govern­
ment in 1816 to keep the hospitals clean^ makes it evident that 
before that date not much attention had been paid to the clean-
1. J, Martin - Report of the Sanitary Commission in India, p.63.
2. M.C, 8 AugustT 1796, Grace Bengal regulations 1799, p.284* 
CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, Sec.XLVII, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852. p,l6o.
3. G.O.G. G. 8 June 1840, Standing Orders in Bengal regiment
1852, p.1680
4. G.O.G.G. 6 April 1816. Bengal Mily.Cons. 6 April 1816. No.62.
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llness of the hospitals. Not that this order improved matters 
appreciably, as was proved by the report of the Sanitary Com­
mission of 18591 which stated; 7TThe native hospitals were al­
most altogether in a hopeless state. They were lacking in means
1
of cleanliness or bathing, in water supply and drainage* *?
Though there were two native doctors and one Brahmin and one 
Muslim cook to prepare medical prescriptions which required 
boiling and to prepare the food of these native patients who 
were unable to cook for themselves, the Sanitary Commission 
observed that ?fthere was no trained attendants on the sick. In 
brief there was want of everything, but strangely enough, ex­
cept of medicine. By management and conciliation much might 
have been done to improve the state of native hospitals.)T Even 
in construction, the hospitals, for both the native and Euro­
pean soldiers, were inferior to the much criticised barracks of 
the European soldiers. The hospitals were built TTwithout any
3
through draught between the floors and the g r o u n d s t a t e d  the
Sanitary Commission in its report. In fact matters were so bad
that as Florence Nightingale observed ,Tthe troops would conceal
4their illness rather than go into hospital.TT
Such then was the state of affairs regarding housing and 
medical facilities. As for food, the native soldier while in 
garrison had to purchase his requirements of food grains and 
other eatables for himself from the regimental bazaar. When in 
the field; there was a general bazaar to which he had access
1. J* Martin - op. citr , p. 69,
2. Ibid., p.74.
3. Ibid., Po74c
4. Smith - op,clt., p.48c
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to purchase," said Napier before the Select Committe in 1852* 
Prom the description of rations supplied to the native sold­
iers while on foreign service, it may he concluded that flour,
dal or dhall (split peas, lentils etc.) and rice were the
2
staple food of the Bengal infantry sepoys. Consumption of 
meat was not unknown, excepting of course by the Brahmins, 
but was very uncommon because of its high cost. Beef, of 
course, was not taken by the Hindu soldiers, but goat's meat 
or mutton or fish was at times included in the diet. However, 
the pay of the native sepoy was such that he usually had 
nothing more than chap at is and cooked dal. He could hardly 
afford to purchase fish or meat or even vegetables for his 
curry and had to be satisfied with a curry made of the cheap­
est possible vegetables, known in India as fKachu1^  It was 
not unknown for a sepoy to live only on cakes of ragee or
pr
jowar (cheap grains) with a little pickle. Except when on
foreign service, the native soldiers received no ration
from, the G-overnment and was left by himself to pay for and
procure his provisions. In 1847, on the receipt of a report
from Hardinge that the native troops were suffering
1. P.P. 1852-53-XXXI, (627), HcC. p.29o Napier accepted an 
Indian commission in 1841. This view was also supported by 
Durgadas Bandopadhaya who 3°ined the Bengal Army in 1851.
2* The sepoy used to draw his daily rations from the grocer of
his regimental bazaar5 some used to draw three fourths of a
seer of Attah(flour) or rice, some a seer, others seer and a 
quarter. Besides 1/8 seer of dal, 1/16 seer of ghee and 
1/64 seer of salt were also drawn by him daily. The sepoy
was also extended a credit of two pice a day,(This, along
with the price of provisions, was recovered from his pay) 
which he spent in purchasing firewood or vegetables if he 
could so afford. - Bandopadhaya - op.cit., p.6 8.
The Bengal Hurkaru, 25 June 1845*
4. Bandopadhaya - op.cit., p.6 8.
5, Hervey - op.cit.y plll5.
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from the high price of grains? the Court permitted the Bengal
Government to declare that "native troops, whenever the price
of provisions forming their diet [should] exceed rupees three
and annas eight per maund,?f would get a compensation for the
1
high price of provisions. Although this privilege was granted 
from 1847, how far this concession helped soldiers is difficult 
to ascertain because the price of rice or flour seldom exceeded 
this limit between 1847 and 1852. Detailed statistics about the 
expenses incurred by a sepoy for food are not available but 
Durgadas Bandopadhaya estimated that the average expenditure of 
a Bengal sepoy on this account varied between three to five 
rupees per month. He also observed that if a sepoy was anxious 
to send a remittance to his family, he would often live for 
much less.^
The other aspect of the social habits of the native sol­
diery which bestowed uniqueness upon this body of soldiers was 
the influence exerted on the men by their social and religious 
prejudices. Durgadas Bandopadhaya observed that so deepseated 
w'ere the caste prejudices amongst the Bengal sepoys that even
in the field they used to carry their own cooking pots and each
3
individual prepared food for himself. Lord Gough told the 
Select Committee of 18J2 r,?The sepoy generally carry (sic) his 
cooking pots - three brass pots himself and two upon the bag­
gage cart;Tf the three which he carried with him were i?one to
4draw water, two for cooking his food.77 To partake of food
1, GBO.G.G. 17 December 1847, Bengal Mily. Cons, 17 December 
1847. No.78.
2. Bandopadhaya - op,cit., p.69- 
3« Ibid,
4, P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H/Cf p*145.
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cooked by a low caste man was taboo and so strong was this 
caste consciousness amongst the Bengal sepoys, recruited as 
they were mainly from high caste Hindus, that they often starved 
rather than take any cooked food from polluting hands. Pollock 
stated in 1859 that, duri.ig the Sikh war, the men of three 
native regiments had lost their cooking pots0 The Commanding 
officers of the regiments had arranged to supply them with pro­
visions in the camp but found themselves in a strange predica­
ment. "They had had nothing for twenty-four hours, they were 
very hungry, but they would not, even one of them, touch the
provisions because they had not their own cooking pots and
1
they would not cook in the cooking pots of others.77 Indeed so
strong was the hold of caste over the Bengal sepoy, that a low
caste Hindu subadar of the Bengal native army might be found,
while on off duty, crouching to a Brahmin non-commissioned
2
officer or to a Brahmin private. Such a slave was the Bengal 
native soldier to his rigid social prejudices, that he would 
strongly resent without fear of consequence, any intrusion made 
upor his social arrangements. As Colonel Pennington, who had 
served the Bengal army for 40 years from 1783 to 1823, while 
testifying before the Select Committee of 1831, observed: 
"treated, kindly, [one might] rest assured of their devoted 
attachment; But [one] must not interfere in their religion, nor 
in their prejudice regarding caste. Any wrong done to them on 
these points [could not] be atoned for by apologies or express­
ly P.P. 1859, V, (2515), H#C, p.8.
2- The Red Pamphlet, p,l6.
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1
ing of regret, ” The Army administrators were fully conscious 
of this peculiarity of the native character. In fact, many con­
cessions had been made in the mode of governance of the Bengal 
native army to accommodate these prejudices, and the army was 
considered by some authorities for that very reason, to be quite 
"unreliable and unmilitary. The Calcutta Review explained the 
situation by saying, ”if Queen Victoria engaged in an attempt 
of governing Ireland by the help of a Romish native army, 
swarming with Jesuits and officered by Protestants, she would 
have been in a situation somewhat similar to that of the East
India Company relying on a Brahminic Bengal army for the secur-
2
ity and stability of their Empire.” These doubts about the 
reliability and efficiency of the Bengal army were, however, of 
questionable validity. Though described as caster-ridden and 
otherwise prejudiced a Bengal sepoy hardly ever allowed these 
factors to lower his military efficiency. A great majority of 
the European officers in their evidence before the Select Com­
mittee in 1&31 were of the decided opinion that the Bengal
sepoys, in spite of their caste prejudices, had well performed
3
their military duties. It was stated before the same Committee 
that though working in trenches was considered to be unsuitable 
and undignified work for a high caste man, yet during the war 
at Bhurtpore in 1804, ”'the sepoys worked in the trenches at 
very laborious employment in direct contradiction to their own
4religious feelings,” Again Hardinge said before the Select
1. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C, Ap.B.
2. Calcutta Review Vol.XXIX, 1857, p.417.
3. P.P. 1831-32,'"XIII, (735-v), H.C.p.XIV.
4. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C. Pol8.
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Committee of I852 that even amongst the men of the highest
caste in the Bengal aray, there were very few occasions when
1
they had shown disinclination to work in the trenches. It may
therefore be concluded that though concessions might have been
made to their caste prejudices it is doubtful if these had any
seriously detrimental effect on efficiency.
In fact, the general state of discipline in the Bengal
native infantry was normally very good. The Duke of Wellington,
in his letter of 17 March, 1804, described the Bengal sepoys as
2
”not to be objectionable on the score of discipline.” In I83I
Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal army
praised the discipline of the Bengal sepoys in his report to
3
the Directors. Sir Charles Napier said in 1843? T?if these 
sepoys were not the best men in the world, they would give
4
their commanders much trouble,” and again he.could ”never
5
think of them without respect and admiration.”
Indeed the fidelity of the Bengal native infantry soldiers 
was something proverbial,, In the Maratha wars of 1803 and 1804 
their pay was seven months, and in some instances as much as 
thirteen months, in arrears. To make the situation worse, the 
sepoys were also exposed to starvation and great hardship. Yet 
not a single complaint was heard. ”There are no men more
6
patient in submitting to privation than the Bengal sepoys,”
1. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.Lc p.212.
2. Wellington Despatches eck Owen, p,1103.
3. L„ from Bengal 19 October 1831, para*9? M.L0 received from
Bengal Vol. 34.-
4. Mapier - Life ... Vol.Ill, p.72,
5. Ibid., Vol.IV, p. 312,
6. Tucker « op„cit., p.103.
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It was also stated that during the Punjab wars in 1849 Sikh
emissaries tried to tamper with the loyalty of the 5000 to
10,000 native soldiers then stationed at the cantonment at Per-
ozepore by "holding out to them the greater advantages of
double pay and high rank like Major, Lieutenant-Colonel and
General - it- could shake the fidelity of our troops, but the
1
Bengal sepoys stood the trial."
Loyal and faithful, the Bengal native soldiers, on more
2
than one occasion, "proved that they yield to none in bravery."
At the storm of Bharatpore in 1804 the Bengal sepoys gave
3
astonishing proof of chivalrous gallantry. In 1841 during the
Afghan war the Bengal sepoys fought bravely under Nott and
Pollock, Again in the Conquest of Sind, in 1843} "the sepoys
earned the praise of a Commander who knew, better than any man,
how to guage a soldierfs qualities. And within the next five
years, the native army covered itself afresh with glory in the
4
two wars against ... the formidable warriors of the Khalsa."
Indeed, for his fidelity, gallantry and devotion to duty 
the Bengal native soldier was much lauded. Though he gave ample 
proofs of having deserved this praise, how far he remained 
happy and content with his service conditions over the period 
under review is open to question. It has to be accepted as a 
major premise that he was a mercenary soldier and had joined 
the service of the Company not for any patriotic motive but
mainly, if not only, for its monetary and other practical
1. P.P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627), H.L. pe76.
2. Wellington Despatches - Gurwood, Vol.II, p.1046.
3. J.S.Hodgson - Opinions on the Indian,army, p.90.
4. Holmes - op.cit., p.57.
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attractions. Since a Bengal sepoy, unlike the Madras and Bombay 
sepoys, left his family at his native village, he wanted regu­
larly to remit a large part, even as high a proportion as three- 
fourths of his pay to his family for their maintenance. Indeed 
so strong was their sense of responsibility that "if he failed 
to do this he was a marked man in his regiment.""*" For this, if 
not for other reasons as well, the money earned by the Bengal 
sepoy assumed vital importance. From his monthly pay of only 
seven rupees in a cantonment, a Bengal infantry sepoy had to 
meet his personal expenses for food, stoppages for clothing, 
medical and other services. With his remittances to his family 
which assumed the importance of a sacred duty, he found himself 
in strained financial circumstances indeed. As Durgadas Band­
opadhaya had observed, a Bengal infantry sepoy after paying
2
all the dues for his food and dress, at times received nothing 
3
in cash. It was no wonder, therefore, that he lived on the
cheapest kind of food, chapatis and dal, to economise and thus
remain in a position to remit money to his family. It had also
been said that a Bengal sepoy at times starved so as to fulfil
4
this social obligation. If such was the state of affairs m  
the cantonment, the Bengal infantry sepoy was no better off 
during a march. Though he received an additional sum of one 
rupee and eight annas per month during a march, he had to clear
1. J.W.Kaye - A History of the Sepoy War in India, Vol.I, p.334
2. The credit position of the Bengal sepoys was so hard that the 
grocer of the regimental bazaar refused to give any more food 
grains than that could be covered by his monthly receipts,
3. Bandopadhaya - op,cit,, pc68.
4. Hodgson - op.cit., p. 82.
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1his debts before setting off from cantonment, pay for his food 
and also for the carriage of his baggage. Since the hire of the 
bullock-cart usually used for carrying baggage was about one 
rupee eight annas a day, the consequent expense to a sepoy,
(the carriage being shared by about 30 or 40 sepoys) was about 
one rupee eight annas to two rupees per month. The additional 
marching batta, therefore, did not relieve his financial condi­
tion in the least and he was, in fact, put to more strain. 
Further, in the latter part of the iSth century, the sepoy regi* 
ments were rarely ordered to change cantonments before three 
years, but afterwards from the early 19th century changes of 
station became so frequent as to be a real burden to the Bengal
3
sepoys on account of the expense which they had to incur on 
carriage and hutting. Besides, the pay rates of the Bengal 
sepoys remained static throughout the period(despite an 
increase in the cost of living) whereas the wages of the hus- 
bandman and the labourer increased between 1796
4
and IB52.
Nor could the sepoy look to early promotion for relief. 
All promotion being regulated by seniority under the rules en­
acted in 1796, a sepoy could rarely receive his first promotion 
as Naik before completing 20 years of service as a sepoy. Thus 
there was hardly anything in the service to stimulate his am­
bition, It was no wonder therefore that a great majority of the
1. Seetaram - op.cit., p . 65 and Bandopadhaya - op.cit., p.64.
2. Bengal Hurkaru 26 June 1&45.
3. P,P. 1852-53, XXXI, (627) H.L.p.73.
4. Ap.-dX
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sepoys sought to retire and enjoy a pension after completing
the minimum period of service (i.e. 15 years). Ambition and
love of military glory is strong in the hearts of the Sepoys
till long service renders them desirous of rest and when it
comes they reflect on the bitter disappointment of their youth-
1
ful ambition," Although steps were taken by BentinckTs admini­
stration to grant the sepoy a nominal increase in pay after a 
certain period of service, this measure did not remove his dis­
appointment over not securing promotion and the money and pres­
tige that went with it.
Added to this disappointment, the Bengal sepoy also 
brooded increasingly over the security of his job, a feature 
which used to be considered as one of the greatest attractions 
of the CompanyTs service, Lieutenant-General Sir William K#
Grant said before the Select Committee of 1831: it "ever 
been the system in India to recruit with a lavish hand, ... on 
every probability of hostilities; the occasion over, the force 
so raised and disciplined, [was] with as lavish a hand dis­
charged,  A policy so short-sighted as this, so composed of
shifts and expedients, [could] never be calculated to impress
2
our own subjects with respect " In 1847/ 48 Hardinge, by
discharging a number of sepoys, reduced the strength of each
native infantry regiment from one thousand to eight hundred 
3
men. Nor were these the only examples. Rather in their desire 
to economise, the Bengal Government resorted to the policy of
1. Napier - Defects Civil and Military .. . ■p,256,
2. P.P. 1831-32, IIII, (735-v) , H.C. Ap'.B. 2541.
3. P.P. 1859, VIII (2541) H.C. p,155.
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decreasing the internal strength of their native infantry regi­
ments at every possible occasion. Such retrenchment naturally
2
caused a feeling of insecurity, Moreover the policy adopted 
by the Bengal Government after 1$25 - of raising irregular 
corps in which the sepoys were granted only temporary appoint­
ments - caused even greater uncertainty in their minds about 
their future prospects. The old Bengal sepoy was prone to com­
pare the security of his job to that of the appointments offered 
to his son or relative in the irregular corps and drew his own 
conclusions about the deterioration in the CompanyTs service.
The sepoy also had his grievances regarding the system of 
rewards instituted by the Company,It may well be questioned 
whether the grant of rewards was made on considerations of true 
bravery or on favouritism and the principle of rewarding the 
already honoured. Sir Henry Lawrence observed that ”Sir Charles
Napier was the first of our Generals who mentioned a native
3
private soldier in his despatch.” He further commented, ”How 
rarely [had] the good example been followed ... NapierTs and a 
very few other cases excepted,” nobody remembered ”ever seeing 
a native soldier Tin Orders7, though we could narrate scores of
4
instances of individual valour,” Indeed, the Order of Merit 
which was open to all ranks of the native army for ”individual 
gallantry was worn by only a dozen or so in the entire army”
1, Lawrence - op.cit., pp.137-13$.
2, It also happened that whole regiments were disbanded* In 1&24 
26 six regiments were raised and were ordered to be dis­
banded because the Court, on the grounds of economy, was 
unwilling to maintain them. See Chap. II, p
3. Lawrence - op. cit, * p. 193*
4. Ibid., p.193*
298
r 1
and Sir Henry ncould not recollect ever seeing a golden one,!? 
[the first class of the Order.].
Besides these causes of dissatisfaction, changes that 
were made in the nature of duties assigned to the sepoys irri­
tated them no less. A Bengal sepoy rarely grumbled at an onerous 
duty that might be allotted to him in time of war and put up 
with many privations. But on his return to the cantonment, 
instead of enjoying the rest to which he was eagerly looking 
forward he was again required to attend all the regular drills 
and to perform tiring and unattractive police duties like * 
escorting treasure or guarding prisoners, putting down robbers,
arresting men by order of the Civil power and even occasionally
2
mounting guards for civil servants. These non-military
assignments irked the sepoys very much as they considered these
tasks to be oppressive and not befitting them.
The peacetime discipline of the army was yet another
cause of dissatisfaction, because so much attention was paid
to pettifogging ceremonial and show, nOur system of discipline^
said Captain Macan from his 23 years experience in the Bengal
3
army, was Magainst the habits of the sepoys and though as
Macan said they did assimulate it, many officers noted the
sullen antagonism of the sepoys to the imposition of the rigid
4
European system of discipline. Henry Russell, from his person­
al experience of the Bengal army, said in 1831 77with respect to
1. Lawrence - op.cit., p.193*
2, P.P. 1837, XXIX, (219), H.C. pn25,
3, P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C, p.156.
4. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H„C. p.164.
the sepoys, much of that care -which ought to have been bestowed
on securing their attachment and improving their efficiency**
had beenl,wasted in a frivolous vexatious attention to outward 
1
forms.*1 1?The details of the army*1 Russell added **had , 
fallen into the hands of a school who thought that everything 
depended on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the 
attainment of outward smartness and -uniformity. ... the disgust 
which such a system as this could not fail to excite is mani­
fest. ...it was the fashion of the day to enforce everything 
with rigour, and the sepoys were already in a frame of mind 
ill suited to bear the trials they were exposed to. ...discon­
tent and disaffection had been growing for a length of time ;
by degrees the mine was charged, and any accidental spark was
2
sufficient to inflame the mass.*1 John Jacob wrote in 1854,
1?the assimilation of everything to an European model, however
absurd that model might be, had enabled the native army to
accord in all outward appearances, ceremonies, and forms, to
the European armies, but its real efficiency [had] been thereby 
3
destroyed,11
Thus the Bengal infantry sepoys, with miserable pay, long 
delayed promotions, tiring civil duties and hardly any incent­
ive or opportunity to show their valour, were left to brood 
over their status. Brigadier Troup said in 1859 his
personal knowledge *vit was not that the material was bad, it 
was first rate, it was the system that ruined it, as it would
1, P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C. p.162.
2, P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C. pp.161-162.
3, Jacob- op.cit,, pp.128-129.
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have ruined any other . *., 0 ” A sepoy, *?were he allowed ten
rupees a month on enlisting,T to cover everything in the shape
of marching batta, etc*, in fact to be the maximum of a
soldier’s pay in all situations, with the chances of promotion
and good conduct pay, . would even gladly forego a service 
1
pension*” The comment relating to the foregoing of pension is
difficult to believe, but from the discussion of the service
conditions of the native infantry under Bengal establishment,
it can be said that Brigadier Troupes other remarks were not
far from the truth.
Indeed it had become a common theme amongst the sepoys
to discuss the gradual deterioration of their service conditions
and to this the hereditary character of the recruitment in the
native infantry contributed in no small measure, ’’Often, indeed,
in one household you might see the Past, Present and the Future
2
of this coveted military service,” There was the old pen­
sioner who talked about the glories of service under Coote, the 
sepoy on furlough from the military service with his story 
about ’Lick Sahib’, (Lord Lake) and the young boy who looked
3
forward to the day when he could step in his father’s shoes. 
Experiences were exchanged and talked over and it was not to be 
wondered at that the past glory was sadly recounted and compared 
with the unfavourable state of affairs then existing, A question 
may arise as to why, if conditions in the Company’s military 
service had deteriorated so much, the Company never failed to
10 P3P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C* p.155.
2, Kaye - The Sepoy War, p.255.
3. Ibid., p,255.
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raise enough recruits whenever it so desired. The only plausible 
answer to this query is that however bad the service of the 
Company was, it was still the best in the field and the only 
one with some semblance of future prospects for men interested 
in martial activities. 1 It should be pointed out, however, 
that the elite of the Indian society, who in the fag end of the 
eighteenth century had eagerly sought to enter this service, 
gradually turned their attention to other fresh fields to show 
their ability, The Company7s ranks thus came to be filled by 
the common peasantry of which there was an unlimited supply.
Such then was the case with the sepoys. The native offic­
ers, who rose from the ranks, fared no better if not positively 
worse. Under the system of promotion by seniority the situations 
of native commissioned officers in the Bengal native infantry 
came to be regarded as a reward for past services and good con­
duct. To be promoted as a non-commissioned officer after serving 
as a sepoy for twenty-five years and to be appointed as a com­
missioned officer at the age of approximately fifty-five - 
such unfavourable terms of service made T¥the deserving native
soldiers of all ranks suffer and they were often driven with
3
disgust from the service, ' 7 Moreover, the pay of a subadar, 
the highest rank that a sepoy could achieve in an infantry regi­
ment, was only 67 rupees a month - against that of a freshly 
imported English s-ubaltern at 180 rupees a month. The native 
officers, with years of service, resented this wide difference
1. J, Raj - British land Policy in Oudh 1856-68. p. 2.3 , (Thesis 
submitted in London University for PhcD. 1957).
2. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.C, p.156.
3. Lawrence - 00.cit., p.190.
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in earnings. The award of the superior title and rank of
subadar-major which was introduced in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century no doubt granted the recipients of this
honour some additional allowance, but on the whole, honours and
distinctions were so tardily bestowed that the native officers
feeling that they had ”that in them which elsewhere would raise
1
them to distinction” looked towards other avenues of employ­
ment or served slackly and without interest.
In addition to this tardiness of promotion and of awards 
of distinctions and honours, the different treatment meted out 
by the Government to the European and the native officer of the 
Bengal infantry became yet another sore point. Thus when an 
award of campaign medals was made in 1824 after the Burma war,
separate TAvaT medals were minted for the European and the
2
native commissioned officers. The native soldiers regarded 
this distinction as degrading and unjustified, Napier echoed 
their view when he observed that the sepoys were given npecu- 
liar decorations indeed; but they were eager to share oursj
And why not? They [had] shared the danger  Equality between
Native and European gentlemen [was] being ceded in the civil
3
service; so it must be for the military. T?
The native officers were also aggrieved over the gradual 
curtailment cf their authority. This trend had been visible in 
the Bengal native army from 1786 onwards when f,an European 
Subaltern was appointed to every company and the native officers
1. Lawrence - opc cit., p,190,
2. I\, P. 1631-32, XIII, (735-v). HeC. p. 128.
3. Napier - Defects pp.256-257.
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1collapsed into something little better than a name,™ By in­
creasing the number of European officers in native infantry 
regiments, both in the line and on the staff, and by codifying 
military regulations, the reforms of 1796 denuded the native 
officers of the remnants of the authority that had rested with 
them, ”As soon as the English ventured to acknowledge to them­
selves the fact of their supremacy, the same self-assertion 
which led to the substitution of their own for native adminis­
tration in Bengal, showed itself in their growing tendency to
add to the number of their officers with each battalion, and to
2 „
concentrate all real power in their hands,<v From being 
leaders of their men. the native officers were reduced to play­
ing the role of contact-men between the sepoys and the command­
ing officers of their regiments. Their main duties were the 
reporting to the commanding European officers the condition of 
the sepoys in the lines and cantonment, the conveying of any 
grievances or reactions of the sepoys to the officers, and the 
transmitting to the sepoys of the sentiments of the officers 
and the Government. They had virtually no effective authority 
and merely served as go-betweens, go-betweens who however dis­
tinguished in service were at the command of the juniormost 
European subaltern. This feeling was further aggravated when 
the native officers of the infantry compared themselves with 
their native civilian colleagues who received a much better
1, Kaye - The Sepoy War, Vol. I, p.211.
2, Holmes - op.cit., p.120.
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deal. A Munsiff and a. Sadr Auin was vo.ry much. noro
2
favourably placed in respect of pay, promotion or authority.
Indeed so acute was this feeling that, ”a comparison [was]
often drawn by native officers, 57 between these civilian ranks
and those of themselves, ,Tat the station where their corps
[might] happen to be located.*^ The monthly pay of the native
civil officers, in almost every district of Bengal, was on an
4
average 250 rupees, with two or three on 400 or 500 rupees, 
whereas even with the grant of the subadar-majorship no native 
army officer could earn more than 92 rupees per month. Their 
complaints did not stop only at comparisons with the native 
civilians but also with the Europeans. If the sepoys won a 
country by the sword, they bitterly said, these cowardly civil 
Sirdars entered that country and ruled over it, and in a short 
time filled 'their coffers with money ... but if a Sepoy 
[laboured ^ ,11 his life, he is not five couries the better."'* 
Bentinck realised this disparity between native military and 
civil officers and requested the Court to place the two classes 
of service on an equal footing. He argued, Has advantages [had]
1. Munsiff - In British India the title of a native civil judge 
of the lowest grade, established in 1793. Hobson-Jobson
P.581.
2. Pay scale of Sadr Amins and Munsiffs in Bengal per annum.
Sadr Amins - from £300 to &720
Munsiffs - from 1-100 to £200
( 1 rupee .» 2 shillings)
P.P, 1852-53, XXXIIi; (627-11), H.L, Ap.c.
3. A General Officer - Memorandum re: our native army, p.4.
4. Lawrence - pp.cit., p.191.
5. Kaye - The Sepoy War Vol.I. p.263.
305
been conceded in the civil department of administration, namely 
increase of rank, authority and emolument, [it appeared] indis­
pensably necessary to the well being and contentment of the 
native troops to provide in their case some comparatively
1
economical and acceptable substitute for those advantages,"
The Court however seemed to be indifferent to this important
suggestion and the service condition of the native army officers
remained almost the same in 1852 as it had been in 1796,
It was often said that the native officers were dull and
inefficient. But as John Jacob pointed out in 1854 "the
native officers of the Bengal army [had] been purposely made
powerless for evil or for good," It was wrong to "blame these
poor old gentlemen." The remedy was in the Governments own
hands, "Make them really efficient, by promoting, not the
3
oldest, but the most able and deserving men; ..." The failings 
of the native officers could to a large measure, be laid at the 
door of the defective system itself, rather than of the 
individuals.
The native officers of the Bengal infantry were made to 
feel their inferior status and they greatly resented the harsh 
and contemptuous behaviour of the European officers towards 
them. Indeed, the deterioration of relationships, which much 
increased during the period under review, overshadowed all
1. L, from Bengal 24 October 1838, para. 5. M.L. received 
from Bengal Vol.'43.
2. P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735-v), H.G. p.3 8.
3- Jacob - op.cit.. p.211.
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other grievances and more than anything else caused the native
officers to lose all interest in their profession. Instead of
**the strong sense of comradeship between them, which atoned for
the absence of other ties,^ na wide chasm [separated] the
2
European officer from his native comrades.,., The personal 
contact between the European officer and the native soldiers of 
his company had ceased with the passing of the 13th century and 
the officers knew very little of their men, or what was going 
on in the native lines. The contempt for and irritation with 
the native soldiers which was felt by the Europeans, was shown 
in a multitude of ways.^ Further, meetings between an European 
commanding officer and a native officer, which had once been 
informal, gradually became so formal and official that the 
native officers were expected to come and meet the regimental 
officer always in full dress uniform.^ Commanding officers had 
no feelings for their old and veteran native officers and to 
converse with native soldiers off parade and enquire about their 
welfare was beyond the imagination of most European officers. 
Subadars and ^amadars, whose military experience extended over 
30 or 40 years might be T? commanded, bullied and abused by a 
fair-faced beardless Ensign just arrived from England... but 
ignorant of military matters,™ ' The native officers, thus ill 
treated and abused by the European officers, often wondered if 
the nSahib logue who now came to India [were] of different
1, Kaye - The Sepoy War Vol.I, p.257,
!%20 Hod/son op,citc , p. 103,
3C H, Bevan - Soldiers life (1803-1838). p.89.
4. Napier - Defects .... p.254,
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1caste to those of former days.?T SeetaramTs comment indicates 
the frustration and resentment felt by the native soldiery over 
this rude and undignified behaviour.
Unlike their European colleagues, the native infantry 
soldiers of the Bengal establishment did not send any memorials 
or letters to the Government, But this should in no way lead to 
the conclusion that the Bengal infantry sepoys and native 
officers had no grievance or cause of complaint with the mili­
tary service of the Company, The absence from the India Office 
records of such communications is perhaps to be attributed to 
the fact that it was a general practice among the native sold­
iers to send their complaints or grievances to the European 
commanding officers through their native officers. The repre­
sentations seem to have stopped at that level. But their griev­
ances night bo voiced in the letters the sepoys wrote to their 
villages or to their comrades in other regiments, Henry Lawrence 
had rightly stated, *TIf the correspondence of Native soldiers 
was as patent to us as that of our European comrades we should 
better understand their feelings. Those who associated with
them could testify [he said], to the disgust of the very best
2
at their present position,Statements by officers with two 
decades or more of service in the Indian army made before the 
Army Commission of 1$59, show that many of them had been well 
aware of the disaffection and discontent that prevailed in the 
native infantry regiments.
1, Seetaram - op.cit., p. 20.
2, Lawrence - op,cit., p.191.
John Jacob commenting on the Bengal army said, ”all vital 
power, all good feeling, all personal attachment, all binding 
force of reason and moral sense had been eradicated from our 
native army,, The outward appearance, the showy form, the mech­
anical discipline were greatly improved; but the ties which
formerly [bound] the sepoy to his English officer were complete-
1
ly destroyed.VT Brigadier Coke from his long experience of
Bengal infantry (since 1827) expressed his opinion ”it appeared
that of late years there has, generally speaking, been a great
want of sympathy between the European officers and his men, a
great deal too much of the ?damned black niggerT style of 
2
speaking.” As H.B.E. Frere, the Civil Commissioner in Sind 
observed, ”the native soldiers should be treated as men with 
feelings, passions and prejudices, capable of being developed 
and worked on for good or for evil not as mere machines or
3
animals obeying some invariable instinct of caste or race.”
A variety of reasons had conspired, by 1852 "to make the 
Companyfs military service steadily less attractive to sepoys, 
non-commissioned and commissioned native officers alike. Discon­
tent was not often openly expressed, though as will be seen, a 
number of warnings had been given before 1852 of the widespread 
alienation from the service. But those warnings were not heeded* 
the superficial calm was blindly expected to continue, and it 
required the storm of 1857 to sweep across North India and
1. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H0C. pe 92,
2. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541) p.282.
3. P.P. 1859, VIII, (2541), H.C. p.65.
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through the whole Bengal native army before the importance, 
even the reality of the sepoys grievances was grasped. Only 
after the whole fabric of the army organisation had been 
shaken were the first remedies applied, and the Augean stables 
given their much-to-be-desired, much postponed cleansing.
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CHAPTER IV
THE MUTINIES (1796- 1&52)
In preceding chapters the reorganisations that were 
carried out in the Bengal native infantry over the period from 
1796 to I852 and the effects of these measures on the European 
officers and the native soldiers have been discussed. During 
that period, the Bengal native infantry had often been 
required to help the Company in its expansion and more than 
once it had covered itself with glory. But side by side with 
the laurels the sepoys wore, were evident the marks of a 
deterioration in their morale and discipline. While earning 
plaudits for their military activities, the Bengal sepoys had 
caused alarm by giving vent to their discontent with the 
military service of the Company - a discontent at times 
expressed in an open defiance of authority. The purpose of 
this chapter is to recount occurrences of and the reasons for 
these variant outbreaks, and by an examination of the 
campaigns in which the sepoy armies took part to provide the 
background from which these outbreaks emerge.
It may be recalled that even before 1796 the 
loosely-joined collection of military units which constituted 
the East India Company’s native army in Bengal had often 
proved rebellious. Thus, in 1764 closely following the 
European mutiny more than one native infantry battalion| had
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risen in protest over the reduction of prize money and batta 
and Major Hector Munro had had to crush this incident severely. 
Again, in 1782 and in 1795 several sepoy corps had stood in 
open defiance of authority over the question of their being 
transported to Madras by sea. Though the offending sepoy units 
were dismissed with ignominy, the Government failed in its 
attempt to persuade the Bengal sepoys to proceed by sea to 
the field of action. Thus, even before 1796 standing against 
authority and trying thus to win a point had not been an 
action unfamiliar to the Bengal sepoys. Indeed one of the 
reasons for the army reorganisation in 1796, - the year it 
might be said, when the .Company’s native army came of age - 
had been to improve the European Officer strength of each army 
unit and to inculcate a European discipline amongst the native 
soldiers. Thus from a handfull of untrained men employed in 
emergency the Bengal sepoy army gradually grew into a major 
force, equipped and disciplined in the European way and provid­
ing the greater portion of the British strength in Bengal.
The army reorganisation of 1796 allowed a Bengal
establishment of 12 double battalion regiments of native
infantry. Each of these battalions consisted of 800 sepoys
divided into ten companies, giving a total army strength of
19,200 men. Though ’’the closing years of the eighteenth century
were peaceful ones in Bengal, the rapidly increasing influence
of the British and the responsibilities which it involved
together with indications that yet another struggle was at
1
hand in Southern India”, soon made the strength fixed in
1, Cardew - op. cit. ,p.70
1796 inadequate and further additions had to be made. In O ±
October 1797 the Governor-General ordered ”that the native
regiments now serving under this Presidency, be augmented each
1
battalion one hundred privates.” Each Commanding Officer of 
a regiment was asked to employ one European officer on recruit­
ing service. The recruiting officers were to raise new 
recruits at Fatehgarh, Cawnpore, Chunar, Dinapur, Gaya, 
Kishanganj, Berhampur, Midnapore, Chittagong and Dacca. But 
it was soon felt—  the presence of the Afghans under Zaman Shah 
in the Panjab in 1796 probably decided the issue - that an 
addition of 200 men per regiment was not enough for the purpose. 
Hence in November 1797 two new sepoy regiments (the 13th and 
14th) were ordered to be raised at Benares, Dinapore and 
Buxar. To officer these new regiments every existing sepoy 
battalion was asked to furnish a proportion of Jamadars, 
’fcavildars, Tfaiks and Sepoys who were to be promoted to the 
next higher rank in the new regiments. Vacancies thus caused 
in the old battalions were to be filled by promotions within 
the respective battalions.
The European officers, detached on recruiting service, 
were allowed 100 sonaut rupees per month to answer all con­
tingent expenses of every nature. These officers were also 
ordered”as soon as practicable to commence with the drill and 
formation of the recruits” and they were furnished ”with a due 
proportion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers
1. G,O.G.G, 12 October 1797.Grace Bengal Regulations 1799. 
p.196. ■
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under the orders of commanding officers of stations from the
1nearest corps.” The authorities expected that -when it should
be known throughout the country that new regiments were to be
raised for the Company, men desiring to serve would report, in
great numbers, to the Head Quarters of the different 
2
regiments. In this, the Company proved to be correct, as it
encountered hardly any difficulty, not only in finding
additional sepoys for the old regiments but also recruits for
the 13th and 14th, and within the year men for three more
sepoy regiments (the 15th, 16th and 17th), for service against
the enemy in Mysore. The recruits for the 15th were raised at
3
Buxar, Sasaram and that neighbourhood while those of the 16th
4
and 17th were recruited at Jaunpur, Gaya and Dinapur. As 
was the practice, a proportion of native officers and privates 
was also drafted from the old regiments to serve ”as a found­
ation for the new regiments.” The Commander-in-Chief laid down 
that ”as much” would ”depend upon their qualifications for j
bringing on the new raised men no native officers or sepoys 
[should] be sent who” would ”not be useful or not trained !
1
soldiers and good duty men”.
Before the enlistment of these three (the 15th, 16th 
and 17th) double battalion regiments the Bengal sepoys had 
been called upon to volunteer for service in the Madras
1. G.O.G.G. 14 November 1797. Grace Bengal Regulations 1799.p.19c
2. G.O.G.G. 14 November 1797. Ibid.
3. G.O.C.C. 15 September 1798.Ibid.
4. G. O.C.C. 30 November 1798. Ibid.
5. G.O.C.C. 30 November 1798, Ibid.
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Presidency against Tipu Sultan. About 3000 men were raised 
from whole sepoy army. A bounty of one monthTs pay and full 
batta was given to each man, and the Commander-in-Chief 
assured them that every possible attention would be paid to 
their comfort and convenience on board ship and that the 
greatest care would be taken in laying in their water and
1
provisions under the inspection of their own representatives.
As a further inducement promotion was granted to a few of the 
Jamadars, llavildars, *flaiks and Sepoys who offered their service 
for this expedition.
The Bengal Council in its minute of 29 October 179$ 
ordered these volunteers to sail for Madras under Major-General 
Popham. The 10th Bengal native infantry regiment, then
stationed in the NizamTs dominion, was also ordered to march
2
from Hyderabad. The whole force assembled at Ambur for the 
invasion of Mysore under General George Harris. In this siege 
and capture of Seringapatam all the five battalions of Bengal 
sepoys (two from the 10th regiment and the three battalions of 
volunteers) were employed. After the treaty of Seringapatam 
of 1799 these Bengal sepoy forces helped Colonel Arthur 
Wellesley in reducing refractory chiefs in* the country on 
the northern frontier of Mysore. The whole detachment returned 
by land to Bengal in May 1S00. The soldiers were received with 
honours and at a special parade medals were awarded 
to the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and
1, G.O.C.C. 31 August 1798. Grace Bengal regulations. 1799. p. 230
2. M.C* 29 October 1798. Ibid. p.220
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*]
to the privates of the three volunteer battalions. x It
was also declared that the native soldiers would be allowed
to enjoy dividends of Seringapatam prize money. But the
actual amount was unknown to the soldiers in 1800 and the
2prize money was not issued till October 1808.
The three volunteer battalions were formed into two 
sepoy regiments of the line - the 18th and 19th.
In North India, during these years nothing of much
military importance happened. Zaman Shah did not advance
3
beyond Lahore and with the threat of immediate danger 
removed, the Government busied themselves with their measure 
of economy. As an immediate step all recruitment to the 
Bengal native infantry regiments was stopped in February 1802
1. G.O.G.G. 19 June 1800, CarrollTs Bengal Code, 1817. 
Sec. XLVI.
2. The shares eventually allowed to each rank of native 
infantry were as follows:
Subadar - 6 shares = 378 rupees
Jamadar - 2 shares = 126 rupees
Havildar - 1 share - 63 rupees
3epoyan<^  )eac^ ^ share = 42 rupees
The amount of each share was 18 pagodas, one pagoda 
being equal to 3i rupees.
G.O.G.G, 10 October 1808. CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817, 
Sec,LIX.
3. Oxford p<,554.
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and five months later^ every sepoy battalion of Bengal
2
infantry regiments was reduced to a strength of 700 men,
3
a reduction of 200 men per battalion.
This reduction however was shortlived, for in the very 
next year the disturbed nature of the CompanyTs relationship 
with the Maratha power and the possibility of a general war, 
caused the strength of each battalion to be raised to 900 
privates again. Besides this, two additional regiments (the 
20th and 21st) were added to the line of native infantry <-
recruited at Cawnpore, Gaya and Benares and officered by
• 4
drafting from the existing regiments.
The Maratha war began in 1803 and soon after two more 
regiments, the 22nd and 23rd,were raised at Fatehgarh and
1. In February 1801 an expeditionary force was despatched by 
Lord Wellesley to Egypt to co-operate with the British 
army there under Sir Ralph Abercromby to fight against the 
French. A battalion of native infantry volunteers was 
furnished by the Bengal sepoys for this force. The event 
was specially remarkable as being the first instance of 
Indian troops being employed out of Asia, Alexandria, the 
last stronghold of the French in Egypt, had already 
capitulated before the arrival of the Indian troops who 
did not see any actual fighting but during their stay in 
Egypt ”the smartness and high state of discipline of the 
Indian contingent excited general admiration and astonish­
ment.” The troops returned to India in July 1802,Medals 
were promised to all ranks employed on the exped ‘.tion and 
were actually awarded by G.O.C.C, 13 May 1811 for their long 
and toilsome march through the desert from Kosseir to Keneh 
in May and June 1801. It was after the return of these 
volunteers that the strength of the native battalions was 
reduced
2. G.0.C.C„8 July 1802,CarrollTs Bengal Code,1817.Sec.XLI.
3. By G.O.G.G. 12 October 1797, sepoy battalions consisted of 
900 sepoys but the two new regiments the 18th and 19th had 
only 750 privates in each,
4. G.O.C.C. 13 July 1803. Carroll*s Bengal Code l8l7,Sec.XLI.
a X (
Cawnpore.^ ,TThe two main theatres of the war were to be the
Deccan under Colonel Arthur Wellesley and Hindustan under
2General Lake* *T But subsidiary campaigns were also planned in
Bundelkhand and Orissa, in order to secure the southern
frontier of Hindustan and the districts lying between the
3
boundaries of Bengal and Madras, Bengal sepoy regiments 
joined in all these campaigns against the enemies of the 
Company, The operations were speedily successful. The victories 
of Assaye in September 1803 over the Raja of Bexar and of 
Laswari in November 1803 over Sindhia forced both of them to 
sign treaties with the English, But then, when the campaign 
had seemed at an end the invasion of Rajputana by Jaswant Rao 
Holkar of Indore caused the Maratha war to continue. In 180A 
Lord Lake and Colonel Monson marched against Holkar and on 
16 May captured Rampur, 60 miles south of Jaipur.
Because of the intense heat Lord Lake, leaving Monson 
with his detachment to guard the Jaipur frontier, returned with 
his troops to Agra. Monson, however, refused to accept a 
passive defensive role, and he followed Holkar reaching Kotah 
in June l80Ar Still following up the success Monson next 
month captured the fort of Hinglasgarh. Then Holkar, with his 
whole army, turned, and advanced upon Monson. MonsonTs long 
pursuit, inadequately supported, had been a blunder. Now, with 
the rains upon him, the country flooded to an extent that 
rendered all movements difficult and precarious, and with
1. G.O.C.C, 30 September 1803. CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817,
Sec., XLI.
2. Roberts - op,cit., p„256,
3. C.H.I. Vol. V7p374.
supplies hard to come by Monson and his small force had to
face the whole strength of Holkar. He decided to retreat and
after a march of great difficulty and suffering, which was
increased by the harassing attacks of Maratha force and of the
hill people and banditti of the country, the detachment
1
arrived at Rampur on the 27th of July. w Here Monson was
joined by a detachment under the command of M^ulloch. The
country was destitute of provisions and Holkar was advancing
in considerable force. Accordingly, Monson decided to leave
some of the troops behind at Rampur and to march again with
the bulk of his force towards Agra, "But the last days of the
disastrous retreat proved even more trying than the earlier
portion^ for the attacks of the enemy became more vigorous
2
and incessant and food became daily more scarce." Yet with 
all these haraasments throughout the retreat the sepoys 
remained remarkably steady. On 31 August 180A straggling 
remnants of the ill-fated force reached Agra. Major Thorn 
reported that the sepoys of ?TColonel Monson ?s unfortunate 
division . had lost nothing of their discipline and 
gallantry; and though a partial disaffection existed, which 
caused this desertion of some companies it did not appear to
3
have been very extensive. " Immediately after Monsonfs 
arrival Lord Lake marched from Cawnpore with all the force 
available at that station and after reaching Sikandra he was
1. Cardew, op. cit. ,pc91*
2. W, Thorn, Memoir of the War in India---p. 365
3. Ibid., p. 369
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joined by the troops at Agra and Mathura. The troops under him 
thus consisted of ten sepoy battalions with other artillery and 
cavalry forces. At the same time to weather the crisis the
Bengal Government ordered the raising of four additional
1 2 
regiments (the 24th, 25th 26th and 27th ) at Cawnpore and
3
Fatehgarh, principally from levies which had been organised 
at these places.
Monsonfs retreat encouraged the CompanyTs enemies.
Sindhia showed a disposition to fight again and the Jat Raja 
of Bharatpur who had signed a treaty with the English in 
September 1803 joined with Holkar in an attempt on Delhi, Lord 
Ochterlony, however, repulsed this attack. In November 1804 
HolkarTs armies were defeated - one at Deeg and another at 
Farrukhabad-by Lord Lake, Four successive assaults were 
launched on Bharatpur," all of which were beaten back", and
Lake, "was driven to make a peace with the Raja of Bharatpur
“ 4in April 1805", leaving him in possession of the fortress.
During this period Colonel Burn had been employed in the 
districts to the north of Delhi against the Sikhs. After 
several skirmishes the British detachment defeated them on 
23 November 1804, In the next year Holkar being driven from
1. G.O.C.C. 24 September 1804, CarrollTs/Code 1817.Sec.XLI,/(WgaL
2. G.O.C.C, 26 October 1804. Ibid. 1
3. These were irregular levies, "The raising of Irregular 
forces was a common recruiting expedient. They served 
temporary purposes, were cheaper, easily disbanded after the
purpose was served. --  The Irregular system was a great
relief, to Indian finance, as the great levies which the 
nature of Indian warfare demanded in those times could be 
quickly reduced when peace returned,"
M. Ruthnaswamy - Some influences that made the British 
Administrative system in India, p. 179.
4. Roberts, op.cit,,P26l.
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Farrukhabad entered the Panjab hoping to induce the Sikh to
join him against the English, But Lake chased him to the banks
of the Beas where he finally surrendered.
In all these campaigns Bengal sepoys took part and they
earned praise from almost all the army leaders. The Duke of
Wellington described their achievement in the storming of
Aligarh (4 September 1803) as fTone of the most extraordinary
1
feats” he had heard of in India.” Colonel Burn wrote from
Shamli to Colonel Gerard on the 3 November 1804, ”notwithstand­
ing the sepoys were almost destitute of everything, too much
credit” could ”not be allowed them for the patience with which
2
they supported it for four days.” Lake wrote to Wellesley 
from Ketowlie on 7 November 1804, expressing his confidence 
that ” every instance of the good conduct firmness and steady
attachment of our native troops” would ”afford your Lordship
3
sincere pleasure It would appear that the measures
adopted by the Company to inculcate discipline, when coupled 
with the leadership of the Duke of Wellington and General Lake 
yielded considerable profit.
Prize money and medals were promised to the troops 
employed at Aligarh, Delhi, Laswari and Deeg. ^
The prospect of peace was immediately followed by ex­
tensive reductions and retrenchment in the army. The Directors 
were opposed to any extension of their Indian empire, the more
1. Cardew, op. cit. P*82.
2. P.P.1806. XVI, (257), H.C. Ap.D,
3. Ibid., , .
4. G.O.G.G, 30 January 1806. Carroll *s /Code 1817. See. LIX.^cv^,
so as "the Indian debt had increased by almost £20,000,000 -
a rate of increase which frightened the home government.
Naturally the axe fell on the strength of the army. Each sepoy
2
infantry battalion was reduced from 900 to 800 privates.
It is easy to understand the attitude of the Company.
In the opinion of the authorities "Englandfs conquests were
3becoming too large for profitable management.” MonsonTs 
disaster and LakeTs failure before Bharatpur had broken the 
spell woven by Wellesleyrs continuous series of successes and 
had given new point to the alarm felt by the Directors at the 
scale of his activities. As a necessary preliminary to a change 
of policy, they determined to reduce the army, to recall the 
Governor-General and to entrust the task of making peace with 
the various Indian powers to Lord Cornwallis,
Cornwallis, however, could effect little, for he died 
in October 1805 within three months of his arrival in India.
He was succeeded by Sir George Barlow, the senior member of 
the Council, during whose administration the treaty with 
Holkar was concluded.
In 1807 Lord Minto assumed the post of Governor-General 
in India, The Bengal sepoy regiments, since January 1806, had
1. It was only in 1829 - 25 years after these wars - that the 
prize money was actually distributed to the survivors of 
those who had taken part in these actions* The respective 
regiments were allowed in 1829 (G.O.G.G. 30 November 1829) 
to bear Aligarh, Delhi, Laswari and Deegon their colours. 
Medals for these wars were granted in I85I (G.O.G.G, 14 
April 1851) - 47 years after the battle of Deeg,
2, G.O.C.C. 16 January 1806. CarrollTs Bengal Code. Sec.XLI.
3. C.H. I. Vol.V, p. 375.
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been kept at a minimum strength - that i© 27 double battalion 
regiments with 800 men in each battalion. But the demands upon 
the weakened regiments, curtailed in strength, was very great 
for the Maratha wars of 1803 - T05 had added much territory to 
the British possessions. Along the Jumna and Ganges much 
Maratha territory had been acquired, (This did make communica­
tions easier - possession of Delhi, Agra and Kalpi secured the 
free navigation of the Jumna). Then in the east the greater 
part of the province of Bundelkhand, and Cuttack in Orissa 
had been acquired, and in the west much valuable territory in 
Gujarat,
1
All these far-flung new territories, most of which 
were added to the Bengal Presidency required garrisons - to 
be supplied by the reduced number of weak Bengal sepoy regi­
ments. In addition to these garrison duties the Bengal native 
infantry were also employed in reducing forts in Bundelkhand 
and various refractory zamindars in Oudh. Moreover in 1808 
Ranjit Singh, the Sikh Chief who had used the death of Zaman 
Shah to build up his own power over most of the Panjab, 
crossed the Sutlej and attacked Sikh chiefs who were under 
British protection. Early in 1809 a British force (including 
three Bengal sepoy regiments) was ordered to assemble in the 
vicinity of Ludhiana. The threat was sufficient to induce 
Ranjit Singh to conclude a treaty by which he acknowledged the 
Sutlej as boundary to his ambition, and in May 1809 the force
1, From Dacca to the Sutlej Bengal troops were deployed over 
nearly 1200 miles of the Ganges valley.
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returned to cantonments. In 1810 a similar demonstration of
strength, mainly provided by Madras forces, but aided by five
1
Bengal native regiments, put a stop to the attacks on the
Raja of Berar by Amir Khan,
In January 1809, on account of such increasing demand,
2
an increase of ten sepoys per company had been ordered. It 
was well that their relief was granted, for a series of expe­
ditions outside India now began, for all of which Bengal 
forces were used.
In 1808 volunteers had been furnished by the Bengal 
native infantry soldiers for an expedition to the Portuguese
island of Macao, "the object of which was to occupy that place
3
in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the French.!f 
In August 1810, two volunteer battalions of Bengal sepoys were 
despatched with an expedition against the H e  de France or 
Mauritius. Further in December 1810, five more volunteer 
battalions of Bengal sepoy infantry were raised, this time for
T 4 service in Java.
1. M, C, 18 January 1810, CarrollTs Bengal Code, 1817. Sec.XLI.
2. G.O.C.C. 8 January 1809. Ibid.
3. Cardew - op.cit., p, 105,
4. By 1810 France and Russia were at war again and the Indian 
Government .turned its attention from defensive diplomacy to 
offensive warfare, Expeditions were undertaken, not only 
against French possessions in the East, but also against 
those of other nations forced into unwilling alliance with 
Napoleon, When Portugal seemed likely to pass under French 
control, Goa was occupied, and in 1809 Macao, a Portuguese 
station in China, was seized. France still held the lie de 
France and the lie de Bourbon in the southern Indian ocean 
and controlled the Dutch East Indies through her supremacy 
in Holland. The French frigates and privateers that made 
their headquarters at the Isles de France and Bourbon in­
flicted damage on British shipping. In 1811 an expedition 
under Sir Samuel Auchmuty, with which Minto himself sailed, 
wrested Java from the French - controlled Dutch Government 
after severe fighting. Oxford, pp. 560 - 561.
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It is surprising that so many volunteers for all these
overseas expeditions were available from the Bengal sepoys to
whom a sea voyage was a social and religious degradation.
Special arrangements were made for their food and water on
board ship, arrangements which were inspected by the volunteers
themselves, and presumably found satisfactory. The award of
the bounty money - one months pay and full batta which was
granted to each man before embarkation in all these expeditions
also seems to have encouraged these volunteers. Moreover,
these battalions were officered by drafts from existing
regiments and a number of Jamadars, "havildars, iflaiks and
Sepoys were promoted to the next higher rank. The Government
always promised that as far as possible these volunteers would
not be separated from their own officers and that they would
1
return to India soon after the fighting. Even so the dis­
comforts of the sea voyage, and the danger and difficulties of 
such distant expeditions might have been expected to discourage 
volunteers.
Politically all these campaigns were successful and 
within India itself there was no actual conflict from 1805 
until 1813, when Minto sailed for England. But by the latter
1, In this respect the Government broke its faith with the 
Java volunteers and a mutiny was the consequence. In Sept­
ember 1811 on the surrender of Java the Bengal troops with 
the exception of three volunteer- battalions returned to - 
India. These volunteers remained in Java till October 1815 
when they became discontented and broke into open mutiny.
18 sepoys were tried by Court martial for having conspired 
with other volunteers at Djocjocarta, and were found guilty 
and sentenced to death. W. Hough - India as it ought to be.- 
p. 88,
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date it was becoming clear that action to check the encroach­
ments of the Gurkhas, the outrages of the Pindaris and the 
aggression of the Burmese could not be long delayed.
Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
Gurkhas in Nepal had been pressing hard on the ill-defined 
frontiers of Bengal and Oudh. In 1314 they seized some dis­
tricts in the southern lowlands claimed by the East India 
Company and hostilities began in November 1814* No new regi­
ments were added to the sepoy establishment though the strength 
of each regiment was augmented again from 800 to 900. New 
recruits were ordered to be raised in the Dinapore, Buxar,
1
Benares districts, and at Allahabad, Cawnpore and Fatehgarh.
2
Further, in the middle of the campaign local auxiliary troops 
3
were raised. The total forces employed in the Gurkha wars 
consisted of 42,000 men (including 12 native infantry regiments 
in four divisions) who were assembled under Ochterlony, Major- 
Generals Morley and Wood advanced upon the Gurkha capital, 
Katmandu, from Patna and Gorakhpur, while Major-Generals 
Gillespie and Ochterlony started from Saharanpur and Ludhiana 
respectively. They expected an easy and speedy victory. But 
the forces employed, like their commanders, had no past exper­
ience of fighting in hill country.^ There were no good roads 
and the difficulties of transport were exceptionally great. 
Hence, the first campaign of 1&14-15 came perilously near to
1. G.O.C.C, 31 December 1814. Carrollrs Bengal Code 1817 .
Sec. XLI,
2. Two Nasseri and one Sirmur and one Kumaon battalion were 
raised in Sabathu, Nahan and Kumaon,
3. G.O.C.C. 24 August 1815, Garroll!s Bengal Code 1&17* Sec.XLI
4.CaH. I,., Vol. V, p. 37S.
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being a failure. Fortunately after Morley, Wood and Martin- 
dale had failed Ochterlony succeeded in inflicting a severe 
defeat upon the Gurkhas at Makwanpur on 28 February 1816. The 
English army advanced to within easy reach of the Gurkha 
capital. Hostilities were immediately suspended and the treaty 
of Sagauli was signed in March l£l6.
The conclusion of the Nepal campaign gave the authori­
ties an opportunity of lightening the strain on their reduced 
exchequer. Thus following the practice of previous years the 
men who had been recruited and disciplined with a lavish hand 
and at an immense expense were immediately discharged after the
treaty of Sagauli _ and the Bengal sepoy regiments were once
1
again reduced to 1600 privates only.
But the reduction of the army strength, on the termina-
tion of the Nepal war, was premature. The authorities seemed
to have ignored the fact that ™the Pindarees, consisting of
2
lawless persons of all castes and classes™ had already ™dev-
3
eloped into a formidable menace to the whole of India,™ More­
over behind the Pindari question loomed the Maratha question. 
With the murder of Gangadhar Sastri, the minister of the 
Gaekwar at Poona in July 1S15, the conflict between the Peshwar 
and the Gaekwar became bitter. Besides this, the Peshwa Baji 
Rao was engaged in laying plans for a general Maratha combina­
tion against the British,
1. G.O.C.C, 10 April lBl6, Carrollr s/Code lSl?. Sec, XLI. / fce-hgal
2. In 1S12 they had raided the Company fs territory at Mirzapore 
and the southern districts at Bihar, In iGlJ and 1816 they 
attacked the Northern Sarkars, plundering, torturing and 
killing the inhabitants, while Amir Khan and his Pathan 
followers over-ran Berer. Roberts - op. cit, , p, 283
3. CtH,I. Vol. V, p.377
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Such was the situation in September 1816 when the Board ,
1
in England reluctantly allowed Lord Hastings to fTplan a com-
1prehensive drive for the cold weather of 1817- T18,?T designed
2
to exterminate the Pindaris.
Confronted by the Pindari menace, the hostile intrigues 
of the Peshwa and dangerous unrest among the other Maratha 
chiefs,Lord Hastings thought it better to deal with his prob­
lems piecemeal* He therefore concluded subsidiary treaties with
3 L £
the Maratha and Rajput chiefs and with Amir Khan. Lord
Hastings then proceeded to attack the whole Pindari group. The 
plan was to surround the Pindaris in Malwa by a large army con­
sisting of a northern force of four divisions and a Deccan 
army of five divisions* Local troops were also raised and^with
all the previous wars, the strength of each sepoy regiment in
6
Bengal was immediately increased from 1600 to 1800 privates.
In November 1817, 100,000 men including 15 sepoy regiments
marched against the Pindaris. By the close of 1817 the Pindaris
had been driven across the river Ghambal and by January 1818,
7
they had been dispersed for over.
The Maratha problem alone remained to be solved. Already 
the Peshwa on 5 November 1817, and the Holkar or rather his
Oxford, p. 568
2. Philips., The East India— -- p.217.
3. Treaties weresigned with Bhansle (May 1816), the Peshwa/ 
(June 1817), and Sindhia (November 1817).
4. Treaties were concluded with Udaipur, Jodhpur, Jaipur, 
Bhopal, Kotah, Bundi and 13 other Rajput states.
5. Amir Khan was granted the principality of Tonk as the 
price of neutrality.
6. G.O.C.C, 18 July 1811. CarrollTs Bengal Code 1817. Sec.XLI
7. Oxford,P571.
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his government (because he was a minor) in December 1817 had
risen against the English. However Elphinstone, the Resident
at Poona had beaten off the Peshwa* at Kirkee and the Peshwa*
had fled southwards from Patna. British forces had followed
him and eventually on 18 June, 1818, the Peshwa Baji Rao had
surrendered to the British. The commanders of Holkar's army,
being defeated at Mahidpur on 21 December 1817, had signed a
treaty on 6 January, 1818, When, therefore Appa Sahib, the
regent for the Young Bhonsla raja in his turn was defeated,
1
first at Sitabaldi (27 November 1818) and again at Nagpore
(16 December 1818) and when in March 1819 Asirgarh (the com-
2
mander of which fort had afforded help to Appa Sahib) fell, 
the Maratha bid for power and freedom was plainly at an end.
Thus, by 1819 the Company had successfully disposed of 
two great enemies, the Pindaris and the Marathas, and had 
succeeded in establishing its hegemony in the northern India 
up to the Sutlej.
These years had not seen any major change in the 
Bengal sepoy infantry regiments except for the addition of 
three new regiments, to the line - the 28th, 29th and 30th, 
raised at Cawnpore, Fatehgarh, Benares, Dinapore and Buxar.
This addition was unusual. Hitherto the Government had always 
raised new regiments and increased the strength of each sepoy 
battalion at the beginning of a war but as soon as the war was 
over had disbanded the new regiments and reduced the old
1. Oxford, p. 571-
Vol. V, pp.- 380-381.
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battalions to a minimum strength. But in 1819 at the close 
of Lord HastingTs campaigns the strength of the battalions not 
only remained unaltered but also these three new regiments 
were added to the sepoy establishment. The expansion was 
required by the immense acquisition of territory after the 
Nepal and Maratha wars, which made the extremities of the 
CompanyTs territory, and especially those of the Bengal Presi­
dency so distant that very often fTarmies were required to cover 
districts double the size of those originally intended for 
them.fT ^  Moreover, in addition to the ordinary duty of main­
taining peace the native forces, from 1814 onwards, were often 
required to do what were really police duties. These were the 
reasons which led to the retention at full strength of all the 
old military forces. What is mere, not only were three regi­
ments added in 1819 but a further four new regiments were
raised in 1823 at Cawnpore, Dinapore, Mainpuri, Mathura and 
2
Benares.
Thus, in August 1823 when Lord Amherst took office at 
Calcutta the Bengal army had 34 double battalion sepoy regi­
ments in iua establishment. In thirty years the Bengal sepoy 
forces had all but trebled .in strength.
Lord Amherst had been told by the Directors that there 
was now no occasion for further wars and that a period of 
peace was expected. But no sooner had he arrived in India than
1. Badenach - op.cit., p. 6.
2 , G.O.C.C. 28 June 1823. Bengal Mily. Cons. 28 June 1823.
No.38.
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a fresh war cloud rolled up from Burma. But before proceeding 
to consider the cause of the Burmese War it is necessary to 
mention certain important changes which were made in 1324 in 
the organisation of the CompanyTs army in India.
In 1324 the existing system of double-battalion regi*- 
ment was abandoned in favour of single battalion regiments. 
Between the army organisation of 1796 and that of 1324 the 
Bengal native infantry establishment had grown enormously. A 
force of 12 double-battalion regiments in 1796 and of 34 in 
1323 now became one of 63 single regiments.^ This change was 
introduced mainly to improve the promotion prospects of the 
European officers attached to the native regiments under the 
Company. This was necessary because an army career had 
begun to seem less attractive to officers at the very 
moment when many military officers already serving the Company 
were being attracted to non-military pursuits. The Bengal army 
in the 1320Ts experienced all the outside pulls which the 
Bombay army was to feel in the 1330Ts. The new commitments of 
the army were not merely military. The administration and 
development of the vast accretions of territory were mostly 
undertaken by the army officers, ,7In the newly acquired terri­
tories there were roads and bridges to be built, surveys to be
made, land revenue to be settled, and districts to be ahminist 
2
ered.?? Hence, all the qualified army officers were tempted
1, G. O.G.G. 6 May 1824# Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 May 1324.
No. 23.
2. H.T.Lambrick - John Jacob of Jacobabad. p.13.
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to look outside the regular service for emoluments and 
reputation.
While the changes of 1324 were introduced to improve 
the position of the European officers, the authorities obvious­
ly did not give much thought to the state of the native 
soldiers. It was left to the sepoys of the Bengal army to show 
that they were not satisfied with their service condition.
When Amherst arrived it might have seemed nto those
who desired peace and the maintenance of equilibrium that a
1
period of quiescence had arrived,77 but appearances were mis­
leading. By 1322, the British possessions in Bengal had every­
where made contact along their ill-defined north-eastern 
frontier with the Burmese, and the Burmese, ignorant of the 
Company^ strength were in an expansionist mood. The immediate 
cause of rupture was an attck made by the Burmese on the small 
island of Shahpuri off the Arakan coast, which was occupied by 
a detachment of Bengal troops, but Burmese threats to Assam, 
Cachar and Manipur were also felt. War was immediately 
declared, and as the swamps and jungles of Manipur and Arakan 
were considered too difficult to allow a successful attack on 
that side, the Bengal Government decided to send an expedition 
to Rangoon by sea.
Since the aversion of the general mass of Bengal 
sepoys to crossing the sea was well known only a small detach­
ment of volunteers was sent from the Bengal sepoy regiments 
and the Madras Presidency. The expedition reached Rangoon in
1. Roberts - op« cit.,p292.
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May 1824 under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell to find 
the town entirely deserted. This was a great blow. The boats 
for an advance up the river Irrawaddy were unprocurable, and 
supplies failed. As the authorities expected to find abundant 
supplies of meat and vegetables at Rangoon the expedition had 
been sent out with little more food than was sufficient for the 
voyage. But nothing was obtained at Rangoon and the soldiers 
suffered from want of supplies. Their privations increased with 
the onset of the monsoon and they suffered greatly in health. 
Large numbers of soldiers, both Europeans and native, perished 
from fever, dysentery and other diseases incidental to the cli­
mate and locality The loss of life in the few engagements with 
tne Burmese forces was not great - it was ”the want of the simp­
lest articles of dietTf, the sickness, the effects of leechbites, 
which for want of medical stores, developed into hideous ulcers
and were arrested only by amputation, which kept the rate of
2
mortality high. But still the British force did not fall to 
pieces. In August 1824 Tennasserim was reduced and Campbell 
waited anxiously for October when the rains should come to an 
end, so that he could attack Lower Burma.
Meanwhile, another disaster was being experienced by 
the British on the south-eastern frontier of the Bengal Pres­
idency. A force of about 1100 native soldiers (500 from the 
regular infantry line and 600 irregular levies) under Captain 
Norton had assembled at Ramu, 90 miles to the north-west of
1, J.Jr Snodgrass - Narrative of the Burmese War .... p.88.
2. Fort^escue - op.cit., Vol.XI, p.292,
Arakan. On 17 May the irregulars abandoned their defence, the
position of the Bengal sepoy detachment became untenable.
Norton began to retreat while the Burmese pressed him hard.
About 250 sepoys were either killed or taken prisoners and of
nine European officers only three including tv:o who were
1
wounded made their escape.
The news of the disaster at Ramu as well as that of
the detention and high rate of mortality of the detachment at
Rangoon caused wild panic at Calcutta. "The very name of
Burmhan spread dread and terror among the native population.
The peasants on the frontier fled in dismay from their
villages; ... and the native merchants of Calcutta were with
difficulty persuaded to refrain from removing their families
2
and property from under the very guns of Fort William."
All this disturbing news from the theatres of war 
naturally led to serious concern amongst the army authorities 
and it was decided to rush up reinforcements. Since Madras had 
already supplied the bulk of the expeditionary force employed 
in this war the Supreme Government decided the Bengal sepoy 
army ought to be called upon to furnish these further troops.
The choice fell on the 26th, 47th and the 62nd sepoy 
regiments of Bengal army which were then camped near Mathura. 
These troops were ordered to march to Barrackpore near 
Calcutta from where they were to march again for Rangoon one 
after the other at an interval of a few days.
The three regiments reached Barrackpore in July 1824,
1. Cardew - opa cit. ,p„148.
2. Snodgrass - op. cit. ,pt74.
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Many had deserted during the march from Mathura and as far as
possible new recruits were enrolled in these vacant places.
The regiments also suffered for want of food en route - though
the Collectors and the Magistrates had been informed betimes,
supplies of the most common articles of food had been found 
1
wanting.
After reaching Barrackpore Lieutenant-Colonel Cart - 
wright, the commanding officer of the 47th regiment was told 
by Major-General Dalzell - the Commander of the Presidency 
Division - that though the 26th regiment had originally been 
scheduled to march first, the programme had been changed be­
cause a company of the 26th was absent at Midnapore, Hence, it 
had been decided that the 47th regiment should lead the way 
starting on 28 October. As the regiment was to proceed by land 
to Chittagong, Cartwright requested the local Magistrate to 
procure 120 bullocks as carriage cattle for the use of his men
and received the reply that the cattle would be secured later
2
i.e., by the end of October 1824. In September Cartwright 
again tried to draw the attention of the Magistrate to this 
point, but on this occasion, he replied that it was impossible
3
to hire bullocks and that it would be better to purchase them. 
The Commissary-General also supported the view of the
1. Bolton before enquiry committee Barrackpore, 17 November 
1824. Bengal Mily, Cons. 6 January 1825. No, 18.
2. Cartwright before enquiry committee, Barrackpore 15 November 
1824. Bengal Mily. Cons, 6 January 1825. No.18.
3. Letter from the Magistrate 13 October 1824. Produced before 
enquiry committee. Barrackpore 15 November 1824. Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No.lo,
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Magistrate. The Adjutant-General of the army, being informed
of this matter "wanted to know from other Regimental officers
what measures they had taken for obtaining carriage cattle
1
for their respective units. It appeared that no other 
Regimental officer had given any thought to the question. Mean­
while, Sir Edward Paget, the Commander-in-Chief had been 
informed of the difficulty of hiring carriage cattle and of the 
suggestion of the Magistrate* In his reply Sir Edward advised 
the Commanding Officers to remember, ”that the efficiency of 
the army would be destroyed were the troops taught to depend 
on the commissariat for the carriage of their private baggage” 
but at the same time he admitted that ”the only alternative 
left” was ”to purchase bullocks as recommended by the Commiss­
ary-General”, The Commander-in-Chief went on to advert to the 
liberal pay of the troops and his confident reliance on the 
zealous exertions of the officers and to express the hope that 
the necessary purchases could be made without imposing too 
heavy a burden on the soldiers or any delay upon the expedition. 
Much would depend upon proper steps being taken to prevent the
men taking with them anything beyond what was actually 
2
necessary.
On 25 October Lieutenant-Colonel Cartwright, through 
the Subadar-Major of the regiment informed his men of the 
order of the Commander-in-Chief, The sepoys in a body refused
1, Cartwright before enquiry committee. Barrackpore 15 Novem­
ber l$2^w Bengal Mily, Cons. 6 January 1325. No.18.
2, Quarter Master Genl, to Dalzell. Calcutta 23 October 1824.
No.861. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No. 18.
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to purchase the cattle. Cartwright tried to persuade them to 
do so, **for which they had ample time'1*, but **finding the men 
determined not to purchase the bullocks and considering the 
importance of the service on which the regiment was ordered,** 
he told them that he would try to induce the Government to 
purchase 100 bullocks for the sepoysT sole use, The non-com­
missioned officers and drummers were at the same time informed 
that they should not expect the use of any of these bullocks 
as their pay was **fully sufficient to enable them to supply 
themselves*1 though Cartwright, **was willing to make them any
1
advance of cash out of his own private funds for this purpose**. 
After all these explanations the Lieutenant-Colonel dismissed 
the parade of the day.
Next day (26 October) Cartwright wrote to the Commis­
sary-General and requested him to purchase 100 bullocks and to
hire a sufficient number of drivers, saying that he himself
2
would be responsible for the payment.
On the next afternoon (27 October) Cartwright **having 
urgent business at Calcutta**, left Barrackpore. But before 
starting for Calcutta he informed his sepoys through the 
regimental Havildar that ten bullocks per company would be 
made available for them. He also advanced 300 rupees to the »  
non-commissioned officers and drummers of the regiment 
according to his promise of 25 October.
1. Cartwright before enquiry committee. Barrackpore 16 Novem­
ber 1624. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1625. No. 16
2. Cartwright to Commissary General, Barrackpore 26 October 
1624. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1625. No.16
Just a few moments before his departure for Calcutta 
Captain Bolton, the officer commanding the second Grenadier 
company of the 47th regiment reported to Cartwright that his 
company had behaved in an improper and insubordinate manner,
Cartwright, asking him to write to him at Calcutta, advised
1
him to appeal to the good sense of the sepoys.
At Calcutta the Lieutenant-Colonel came to know that 
the Commissary-General had been partially successful in his 
attempt to purchase the bullocks and that **he hoped to succeed 
to the full extent**. Next morning (28 October) a letter arrived 
from Barrackpore informing Cartwright that the second Grena­
dier company of the 47th regiment, without any order, had 
assembled at the bell of arms and had requested the Subadar- 
Major and the Havildar of the regiment to inform the Command-
ing-Officer of the company that *¥it would be impossible for
2
them to march with their things’*. The sepoys further 
stated that during their journey they would not undertake even 
a short passage by boat: rather they would halt in their march 
and proceed no further.
This letter came with a covering letter from Captain 
Winfield, the Adjutant of the 47th regiment, who also incident­
ally conveyed the news that the men of the 62nd native infantry
3
regiment had T7refused to purchase the bullocks.VT
On the same afternoon another letter reached Cartwright
1. Cartwright before enquiry committee, Barrackpore 16 November 
1824. Bengal Mily. Cons, 6 January 1825. No.18
2. Bolton to Cartwright, Barrackpore, 27 October 1824. Bengal 
Mily Cons, 6 January 1825. No.. 18
3. Winfield to Cartwright Barrackpore 27 October 1824. Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No.18
informing him that Bolton himself had appealed to his company,
expecting his appeal to reconcile the sepoys to the arrange­
ment. But to his utter surprise when he had ordered those 
sepoys who still refused to obey to step out in front, the
entire company had stepped out to show their resolutions of 
1purpose.
Next morning (29 October) Cartwright met the Adjutant- 
General, who, on learning about the conduct of the 47th regi­
ment, thought it proper to inform Paget. Meanwhile he advanced 
4,000 rupees to Cartwright for the purchase of bullocks.
On his return to Barrackpore on the afternoon of 29 
October Cartwright was informed by the Subadar Major and the 
Havildar of his regiment that since his departure for Calcutta 
nightly meetings had been held among the sepoys of the 26th, 
47th and the 62nd regiments.
On the following day (30 October) Cartwright attended 
parade to inform the regiment that 100 bullocks would arrive
next day from Calcutta and that the regiment was to march on
2
the day after that. On the morning of 31 October the Subadar- 
Major came to Cartwright, and told him about meetings of the 
sepoys of the three regiments, and also of the great disaffec­
tion which prevailed among the native soldiers. He ascribed 
the causes of this discontent to the insufficient number and 
weak health of the bullocks, the poor pay, the order of march
1. Bolton to Cartwright Barrackpore, 28 October 1824. Bengal 
Mily.Cons. 6 January 1825, No.18.
2. Cartwright knew before that his regiment was to march on
1 November but strangely enough he did not inform the 
sepoys of this before"30 October.
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on 1 November and the rumours -which prevailed that the troops 
would be put on board ship and sent by sea to Rangoon.
Cartwright asked him to explain to the sepoys that 
they had no right to disbelieve the Government about their 
destination and that he "neither expected nor would hear any 
further complaints respecting carriage". He also asked the 
Adjutant to call to his quarters such sepoys as had any griev­
ance and he himself went there to listen to them* The sepoys 
who came to state their grievances repeated the points made by 
the Subadar-Major* Besides this, it was also evident that "none 
of the whole regiment was inclined to join the first batch."
It seems that Cartwright, though he listened to what they had 
to say to the Adjutant, did not himself speak to the sepoys 
and after hearing from the Adjutant he advanced four rupees to 
each native soldier and paid the balance of their pay for 
September,
In spite of these attempts to still their fears, 
another remonstration was staged by the 47th on the morning of 
31 October, The sepoys were specifically ordered to bring their 
knapsacks to the parade. But they came without them. Being 
asked to explain their conduct they stated that their knapsacks 
were not in a condition to be produced - and that most of them 
had given them in for repairing, Cartwright informed them 
that new knapsacks were on the way and repeated the order to 
the sepoys to bring their old knapsacks. But the sepoys per­
sisted in their refusal. All efforts made to win over the 
sepoys proved futile* They started complaining that though
stoppages had been made from their pay a long time ago, they 
had not so far received the new knapsacks* They also reiterated 
that they were not willing to embark for Rangoon or anywhere 
else. The explanation of Cartwright that the Government had 
neither passed nor contemplated any such order and his attempt 
to remind them of the liberality of the Government in sanction­
ing a cash advance of 4,000 rupees, for the purchase of 
bullocks did not pacify the sepoys. They then claimed double 
batta like the Syces and Drummers who had been granted 
increased allowances, arguing that the provisions were very 
expensive on the Burma, front. Cartwright, in reply assured 
the sepoys that "on no account would they have to pay more 
than a rupee for 15 seers of rice." But all these assurances
proved to be of no avail and the sepoys continued with their
1
demand for double batta. B0ing disgusted, the Lieutenant- 
Colonel left the parade ground with the remark, "it would be 
seen who would march on the following morning," The regiment 
was left on the parade ground as Major-General Dalzell was 
expected to come direct from Calcutta to the parade. The regi­
ment remained the whole day on parade till seven o*clock when
Major Pogson the Brigadier-Major of the Presidency Division
3
took the responsibility of dismissing the parade.
At four o!clock on the next morning (1 November) the
1. Cartwright to Dalzell Barrackpore. 31 October 1324. Bengal 
Mily.Cons, 4 November 1324. No.7o.
2. Cartwright before enquiry committee, Barrackpore, 17 Novem­
ber 1324. Bengal Mily, Cons. 6 January 1325. No.13
3. 0artwright before enquiry committee. Barrackpore, 17 Novem­
ber 1324. Bengal Mily.Cons, 6 January 1325. No.13
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47 th regiment was called to parade. But not more than 360 men 
turned out. Consequently one of the officers, Lieutenant Mac­
donald proceeded to the sepoy lines. The sepoys asked him to 
turn back. The Subadar Major warned Cartwright that if he made 
any attempt to turn out the sepoys by force they would not 
hesitate to open fire. Dalzell accompanied by Pogson then pro­
ceeded to the sepoy line. Seeing him advancing the men came 
out in a tumultous manner and seized the colours of the regi­
ment, There was complete disorder and a mutiny in the regiment 
was obvious. One sepoy told Winfield that if the Government 
would neither grant his discharge nor allow him a family cer­
tificate on which his family could subsist on during his 
absence, he would desert.
The sepoy was imprisoned but was immediately set free 
by his colleagues. The attitude of the sepoys was most threat­
ening, and as Cartwright later testified only the presence of 
other troops prevented violence. "The 26th regiment was drawn 
up in close column on the right flank of the 47th and the 
steady and imposing appearance it presented* * * • greatly over­
awed the mutineers who would otherwise ... have fixed upon
1
the group of officers in their front", Dalzell, in spite of 
all this chaos, wanted to drill the regiment. But after con­
sidering the seriousness of the situation this idea was 
dropped. Instead the regiment was sent "circuitously to 
Colonel Cartwright!s quarters with an European officer not of 
that corps". The Major-General retired from the parade ground,
1. Cartwright before enquiry committee, ^arrackpore 17 Novem­
ber 1824. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825* No.18
and though their grievances had already been repeatedly 
stated, Cartwright again "went among the men in order to 
ascertain the cause of discontent." "The causes," as he later 
reported before the enquiry committee "were trifling - the 
want of knapsacks, the great influence possessed by the Subadar 
- Major over the Lieutenant-Colonel, and all his predecessors 
in command, the great increase of pay made to every descrip­
tion of people while their pay was continued at the same rate." 
Cartwright was accused of forcing them to sell everything in­
cluding their quilts because of the want of carriage cattle, - 
the Subadar Major was accused of telling them that they would 
have to proceed on shipboard to Rangoon and that "he would 
there and then make them eat from the same dish." Cartwright 
offered to bring the Subadar Major to punishment provided the 
sepoys could prove his guilt. The sepoys did not answer this 
and the Lieutenant-Colonel,stating that all their statements 
were false, wanted to know about their real want. After some 
hesitation, the mutineers stated that, "if the Government" 
would "provide them with carriage cattle, double batta and
if the Subadar-3Major and the Havildar were put to death, they 
1
would march." During the whole discussion the mutineers as 
Cartwright observed, were respectful in their behaviour but as 
soon as they saw that one of the regiments (the 16th sepoy ) 
was coming close to them, they became suspicious and requested 
Cartwright and other European officers who were with them to 
leave them. Cartwright, however, instead of leaving them asked
1. Cartwright before enquiry committee Barrackcpore, 17
November 18-24* Bengal Mily, Cons, 6 January 1825. No.l8
them to go back to the parade ground. 343
After reporting the matter to Dalzell, Cartwright
again came back to the parade ground. The 47th mounted guard
as usual and pledged itself that no harm would be done to any
officer either European or native while on parade.
Meanwhile Dalzell ordered a court of enquiry to be
held at 11 o Tclock in the morning (INovember). According to
this order two sepoys from each company of the mutinous regi-
1
ment were asked to state their grievances before the Court.
But the mutinous sepoys refused to go before the Court without
their arms, because they were afraid of being arrested, and
expressed a wish to send a petition instead . Finding that he
could not prevail upon the sepoys any more, Cartwright left
the sepoys till the Commander-in-Chief arrived from Calcutta,
The regiment thus stayed the whole night on the parade ground.
Sir Edward Paget arrived at 12 ofclock at night and
found the 47th in a state of "daring mutiny and there was such
a degree of ferment and wavering among the men of the other
regiments at the station as warranted strong doubts of their
2
continuing steady and firm in their duty to the State." Under 
the circumstances, Sir Edward did not deem it proper to take 
any steps until a sufficient force had arrived from. Calcutta 
to subdue the mutinous regiment as well as to overawe the 
others who were wavering. Early in the morning the required 
troops (the 68th native and two European infantry regiments, a
1. Order of Dalzell, Barrackpore, 1 November 1824. B e n g a l  Mily. 
Cons, 4 November 1824. No,76.
2. Pogson before enquiry committee, Barrackpore 20 November 
1824. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No, 18
detachment of horse artillery and a troop of the body guard) 
arrived from Calcutta.
At about the same time a Persian petition had been 
sent by the mutineers to the Commander-in-Chief. The petition­
ers accused the two native officers - the Subadar Major and 
the Havildar - of threatening them that the regiment would be 
forced to embark on board ship for Rangoon. Referring to the 
rumour that the Government had obliged five companies of sepoys 
to embark on board ship without their consent the petitioners 
pointed out that because of their caste they would never sail 
in a boat and they had actually pledged themselves to that 
effect with Ganges water and Tulsi. The petition ended with an 
admission that they had drawn on themselves nmuch ignominy and
disgrace” and a request that their names ”be effaced and that
1
every man” be allowed to ^return to his home.”
The Commander-in-Chief replied to the petition through
Captain Macan, the Persian interpreter of the regiment. He dec­
lared that he had ”never required any sepoy to embark on board 
ship, unless by his own consent,” and that he would be ready
to listen to the sepoys if they lay down their arms uncondi- 
2
tionally. But the mutineers refused to obey the order to 
ground arms. Moreover, though hitherto they had been steady and 
silent,now they began to murmur. Two companies of the 62nd and 
about 20 men from the 26th sepoy regiment had also joined the 
mutinous - 47th. The mutineers suddenly seized the colours of
1. Persian Petition submitted by 47th and translated by Macan 
dated Barrackpore 1 November 1624. Bengal Mily.Cons. 4 
November 1824. No.77.
2. Reply of the C. in C. to the petition of the 47th. Barrack­
pore. 1 November 1824. Bengal Mily.Cons. 4 November 1824.
No.78,
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the 26th and destroyed it.
As Macan had failed, two guns were ordered to fire upon
the mutineers who after a few seconds broke and fled in all
directions throwing down their arms and leaving their uniforms
behind them. Few were killed but a considerable number fled.
About 80 were taken prisoners. On 2 November a native court-
martial sat in judgment and 41 prisoners were sentenced to death
Of theoe 12 were executed on the following day and the
sentence upon the rest was commuted by the Commander-in-Chief
to labour in irons for terms of years proportionate to the
gravity of their crime* The number 47th was erased from the
list of the army with a warning to the other native regiments,
”to profit by the example of the 47th who” had ”drawn down on
1
themselves a punishment they most justly merited.” Further 
the native officers were severely censured because the Govern­
ment thought they had indirectly encouraged the men in their 
mutinous conduct and had been indifferent to their duty. The 
Gommander-in-Chief hoped that the discharge of these officers 
would leave ”as a salutary example to the ^ative officers of 
the army in general”, who would thence be made to feel that
their all depended ”on the good conduct and fidelity of their
2
respective regiments,”
Lord Amherst immediately ordered a special committee
1. G.O.C.C, 4 November 1824* No.335* Bengal Mily. Cons.
4 November 1824. No.81.
2, Adj. Genl. to Mily, Secy, Barrackpore. 4 November 1824 
Bengal Mily, Cons. 4 November 1824. No.81.
of enquiry ”to examine all the European officers of the late 
17th regiment and such other witnesses, European or native” 
as they might deem proper to ascertain not only the points 
which might have led to the mutiny” but also of putting Govern­
ment in possession of information that no want of attention or
2
of exertion of zeal” had been manifested by the officers.
On 21 November 1821 the enquiry committee after a 
thorough investigation into the matter submitted its report to 
the Government.
According to the report, the evidence of the witnesses 
and the letters submitted to the committee the causes of the 
mutiny of the 17th regiment could be divided under various 
headings as follows:
The Bengal sepoys, being recruited mainly from Bihar, 
Benares and Oudh, were never willing to come down to Bengal, 
They were more disinclined still to proceed to the eastern 
frontier ”the climate of which”, they were aware ”from sad 
experience to be extremely hostile to the constitution of 
strangers and to have proved lamentably fatal to multitudes of
3
their brethren.”
The public feeling regarding the nature of the 
war and the difficulties which the sepoys expected to meet
1. Major-General Dick Commander of the 13rd native regiment 
was appointed President of the committee„ Bengal Mily. Cons, 
11 November 1821, No.171,
2. G.O. G.G. 11 November 1821, Bengal Mily, Cons. 11 November 
1821, No.171.
3. Genl, Observation of enquiry committee, Barrackpore,
2 January 182$. Para.10. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 182$ 
No. 18
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1
also influenced the 47th to refuse to march. From the time 
when Colonel NotonTs detachment was defeated at Ramu, most 
disheartening reports had prevailed in the country. Besides 
this, nthe powerful influence of popular superstition in 
ascribing to the people of Assam and the countries to the east­
ward, the employment of supernatural agency in destroying their 
enemies?T and the barbarous and ferocious treatment meted out 
by the Burmese to their enemies added greatly to the reluct­
ance of the sepoys to proceed against them.
The aversion to embarking on board ship formed another 
cause of discontent. The Bengal sepoy regiments were mainly 
constituted of Hindus. It was strictly forbidden for any Hindu 
to eat anything which had not been prepared on land. nThe 
distress and privation they consequently^ had to undergo when
embarked on board ship could hardly be believed and caused
2
*Ttheir great aversion to go by sea, n
In addition to the distress and calamity which the 
sepoys often experienced on sea voyages, there was another 
cause which influenced the Hindu sepoys and made them TTview 
with horror the idea of embarking on board ship.T? This was the 
long absence from their native villages and families which 
overseas campaigns entailed. Various religious rituals and 
customs often required them to visit their families. The
1. The sepoys did not refuse to march by land provided the 
Government supplied the carriage cattle,
2. Gen.Observation of enquiry committee. Barrackpore
2 January 1325. Para. 15. Bengal Mily, Cons. 6 January 1825 
No. 18
extension of the British empire had already scattered the 
native army into most distant positions and caused difficulty 
in obtaining leave of absence* Hence the service in Rangoon, 
whether the sepoys believed they were going, excited them to a 
great extent.^
The next cause, the main cause as the Committee 
believed, was the want of carriage cattle. Each Hindu sepoy 
cooked his own food, and so had to carry a variety of bulky 
articles for its preparation,, As the sepoys had also to 
carry the most essential things like uncooked food sufficient 
for two or three days, their arms and accoutrements and 40 
rounds of ball ammunition in the knapsacks, it had always been 
customary for the Government to furnish hired carriage to the 
marching sepoys for their other baggage - at the sepoysT own 
expense. This baggage consisted of Ma few linens, a carpet 
which they spread in the straw allowed them in camp and on 
which they reposed, a quilt to wrap themselves with in cold, 
damp weather, with five or six brass vessels for boiling rice, 
pulse etc., and for drawing water.
As the Government was buying carriage cattle by the 
thousands for various purposes, the price of cattle had 
increased at least fourfold. For the sepoys to purchase 
bullocks and hire drivers was thus made impossible.
1. Genl. Observation of enquiry committee, Barrackpore,
2 January 1825. Para 16, Bengal Mily,Cons. 6 January 1825,
No. 18
2, Genl. Observation of enquiry committee, Barrackpore 2 January 
1825, para 18. Bengal Milyc Cbnn, , 6 January 1825. No,18.
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Cartwright, as the committee observed, being prompted 
by zeal for the service tried to secure cattle. But even he 
could do nothing without the assistance of the civil authori­
ties, Moreover, when after considerable correspondence and 
delay, he secured cattle, as Cartwright himself said, they 
were not sufficient and 11 the old age of them rendered them 
very inadequate to the wants of the men,11 The committee 
further expressed its opinion that 11 in spite of every discour­
aging circumstances, if the means of carriage had been forth­
coming at the proper period and in proportion adequate to the 
necessities of men marching on such arduous and trying service, 
more of the other points of complaints would have been heard
and the late 47bh regiment would now have been contending
1
against the enemies of the state.’1
The demands of the public service for the prosecution 
of the war especially in the Rangoon and Chittagong Quarters 
were great and urgent, flGattle provisions, extra establishment 
of every description and all kinds of non-military retainers 
were more numerous even than the fighting men11, These people 
were provided and entertained at the Presidency at wages 
’’double the ordinary rates.11 The Madras sepoys serving at 
Chittagong had not only higher rates of pay than those of 
Bengal, but were also supplied with rations at the expense of
1, Genl. Observation of enquiry committee. Barrackpore,
2 January 1825* Para, 20. Bengal Mily, Cons, 6 January
1825, No.18
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the state* Obviously the Bengal sepoys had compared their own
situation with that of all these people* When they were then
told that the Government was not in a position to grant double
batta and at the same time were required to march on a
certain day without any appearance of the carriage cattle,
they were nfilled with the impression that Government bestowed
1
their care and attention on every body else but themselves.
The deductions from the pay of the sepoys in the 
Lower Provinces had been another source of dissatisfaction to 
the sepoys. In a cantonment a Bengal sepoy received seven 
sonaut rupees per month and eight rupees eight annas when 
marching or on service. In the Upper Provinces where the 
sonaut rupee was current he received the full amount but in 
the Lower Provinces of Bengal and Bihar where the sicca rupee 
formed the currency, his pay was discounted at a loss to him , 
of abouif 4i Per cent. It was a serious deduction in the pay of 
a sepoy and the committee remarked that it was ^unquestionably 
a cause of discontent.T* As the committee pointed out from 
that seven rupees the sepoy provided himself with a great 
variety of articles - some of which like his white trousers 
and jackets, were required to be kept spotlessly clean. He 
also paid for his uniform, the expense of hiring carriage
1, Genl* observation of enquiry committee, Barrackpore
2 January 1825. Para. 22, Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825
No. 18
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while changing stations, erection of his hut, for keeping the 
line clean and for his subsistence too* To meet all these 
expenses, the sepoys received nothing else but their monthly 
pay and a regimental jacket (only worn when dressed for duty), 
a pair of woollen pantaloons every other year and tents when 
marching* ??In no service in the world” was ??the soldier
1
required to contribute so much towards his own equipment* n 
The discontent about knapsacks had the same origin; 
their cost was deducted from the sepoysT pay at two rupees a 
time for two months* But ™the general demand for the convey­
ance of troops, stores etc., caused the delay in procuring 
boats for their transportation from Futtyghur to Barrackpore.T? 
Consequently, the sepoys were asked temporarily to use their 
old knapsacks. Unfortunately all of them had not got knapsacks 
and those which some of them had, were in such bad condition 
as to be almost useless. Without paying much attention to all 
these facts the sepoys were ordered ”to patch up their old ones 
the best way they could do so as to make them temporarily
servicable and those who had none were asked to make up any
2
sort of ones out of old trousers, pantaloons, etc.fT
Sir Edward asked the sepoys to leave their superfluous 
property behind at ^arrackpore and Dalzell gave a store room 
for the purpose. But the men on account of the numerous white 
ants and from previous experience of keeping their things in 
store objected to leaving their things behind* They were not
h J.ann­
2* Genl. observation of enquiry committee, Barrackpore 2
January 1825* para* 25* Bengal Mily.Cons, 6 January 1825.No.1£
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in a state to afford to throw away their things and there were 
no purchasers either."*-
Another cause of discontent was the undue influence of 
the Subadar Major on the Lieutenant-Colonel and the irregular­
ity mi promotion. The Subadar Major was an efficient officer 
but being a Muslim and being extremely vituperative and 
abusive he was unpopular with the sepoysAttempts had been
made*to burn his hut and several suspicious persons had been
2
turned out of the line.TT
Because of the Subadar MajorTs influence with the
3
commanding officer two of his relatives (one was the Havildar)
had been promoted without any regard to seniority. Naturally
A
the sepoys had become discontented.
In addition to such favouritism there had been other
irregularities in promotion in the 47th regiment. During the
march from Mathura some desertions had taken place. But Major 
5
Henley wanted to show that the regiment was superior to 
others. He had therefore not only withheld the reports of
desertions from the Government but also had not altered the
1. General observation of enquiry committee Barrackpore 2 Janu­
ary 1825* para.25. Bengal Mily.Cons. 6 January lB25.No.25
2. General observation of enquiry committee Barrackpore. 2 Janu­
ary 1825. para.26.Bengal Mily.Cons. 6 January 1825.No,18.
3. According to Bolton, "in 1806 the Havildar was a little 
boy not in the service of the Company, But in consequence 
of his relationship with the Subadar Major he was rapidly 
promoted to his present position - superseding a number 
of older men.”
4. Genl. observation of enquiry committee Barrackpore,
2 January 1825* para 27. Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825.
- No.
5. William Henley was with the 24th native regiment in 1823.
As Cartwright started for Barrackpore earlier than his 
regiment Henley came on in charge of the 47th regiment.
After reaching Barrackpore he became Political Agent at 
Bhopal..
353
rolls. "New men were entertained who were posted to fill 
vacancies in the names of their predecessors who had either 
died or deserted. One Jalina Singh died and another Jalim
Singh a recruit was placed in his situation and consequently
stood high in the roll."
Men had also often been passed over for alleged low­
ness of caste which had naturally irritated the sepoys to a
2
great extent.
Again the date of marching had been shifted from 29 
to 1 November, The reason behind this change was never ex­
plained to the sepoys. The committee mentioned that "as the 
scale of mutual estimation between the European officers and 
the sepoys" had "greatly fallen" the sepoys imagined that 
there was some peculiar hidden cause for the change in date. 
They thus demanded to know why the 16th regiment, which was 
already in the station, had not been ordered to go when "the 
47th had already had the fatigue and expense of coming all the
3
way down from Mathura,"
The committee also pointed out that the European 
officers familiar with the language, manners and customs of 
the sepoy army had been employed in civil and diplomatic situa 
tions, on the staff of the army, in local or irregular corps 
or even in the service of the allies of the British Government
1. Pogson before enquiry committee Barrackpore. 18 November 
1824, Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. No,18
2. Ibid.
3. Genl. observation of enquiry committee. Barrackpore 2 
January 1825. para. 28, Bengal Mily. Cons. 6 January 1825. 
No. 18
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Besides this, because of the recent reorganisation of the army 
new officers had been attached to the different sepoy regi­
ments. "This being the case it was not a matter of surprise 
that the European officers of the 47th, 62nd and 26th regiment 
had no influence in preventing this mutiny and they had no 
knowledge some till the 31st October, others not till the 
1st November, of the discontents which existed and irregular*- 
ities committed by the sepoys in their companies many days 
previous to the mutiny." It also appeared that the European 
officers of the companies never attended the roll calls of 
their sepoys and very seldom attended the regimental parades. 
They were not acquainted with the sepoys under them, did not 
know1 their names and never spoke or communicated to them 
excepting through the native officers. Besides this, the 
European officers knew nothing of the orders signed by the com­
manding officers of the regiments. They did not take any 
measure to see them executed or take any part in the command 
or discipline of the troops. Under the circumstances, as the 
committee wrote,it was unnecessary "to seek for curious 
reasons the falling off in the discipline, efficiency and 
attachment to the Service of the native army in Bengal when 
such a state of things" existed "among the European officers
in one of the favourite corps   the 47th regiment
Referring to Lieutenant-Colonel Cartwright the commit­
tee said that "he had not the art of gaining esteem but 
seemed to have an unhappy factious disposition - on parade he 
managed ill, got angry and harassed the men fey continually
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doing the same thing, ... and by keeping the corps out unusu­
ally long in hot weather.” The men thus finding themselves 
deprived of their old officers and having little or no con­
fidence in their successors, felt disheartened. The committee 
also pointed out that for one reason or another ”the military 
profession was no longer considered an honourable one” either 
by the European officers or the sepoys. With the permanent 
establishment of the British empire and with the gradual re­
duction of powerful opponents the Military Authority had 
yielded to the civil authorities. European officers losing all 
their powers and importance to the sepoys were anxious to get 
rid of their regiments. On the other hand, the sepoys found 
the English laws and regulations irritating. Their pay 
remained the same but the demands upon their pay had consider­
ably increased over the years with the different changes in
regulations. Besides this they were often required to pay 
for one thing or another without any compensation for the 
additional expense.^ Hence, a sepoy felt himself held in a 
lower degree of public estimation with more circumscribed 
means of subsistence and reduced facilities in the supplies 
and exhibited less zeal for the service, Moreover, the severe 
and constant duties where relief was only effected by the 
change of one duty for another - ”the Fort duty particularly 
included” where they were ”constantly annoyed by the European 
sergeants and women and by all new comers” had greatly tended
1. It can be said for example that the colour of the cap and
sash had often been changed and the sepoys had to pay for
it.
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to lessen the zeal of the sepoys. In addition to all such 
harassment and annoyance, there was the question of slowness 
of promotion among the native troops. The committee thus ex­
pressed its opinion: ”did. quicker promotion exist ... a spirit 
would be revived in all classes of our native troops” and so 
in a great degree make the sepoy ”what he once was, a soldier.”
The committee while thus criticising and analysing 
each and every probable question, did not forget the native 
officers of the 47th* They were accused of ”tacitly approving 
and consenting to every act of the misguided men” and of 
only separating themselves from them on the morning of 1 Nov­
ember.
The report concluded by pointing out that though each 
mutineer had had 40 rounds of service ammunition on him, not 
one had attacked or hurt a single individual. Considering all 
the causes of the mutiny of the late 47th regiment the Commit­
tee further remarked that ”the whole incident seemed to have 
been the ebullion of despair at being compelled to march with­
out the means of doing so”, and neither the loyalty nor the
1
fidelity of the men to the Government could be suspected.
The committee had thus fully expounded the probable 
causes of the mutiny, and there is nothing more to add to 
their verdict. It was obvious that by 1824 the sepoys were 
discontented with the military service of the Company and that 
for various reasons their morale and discipline had deterior­
ated to a great extent.
1. Genl. observation of Barrackpore. 2 January 1825.
para,30^ Bengal Mily.Cons, 6 January 1825. No, 18
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The Directors were informed about the mutiny at 
Barrackpore and the raising of a new regiment in place of the 
47th. This new regiment, as the letter from the Supreme Gov­
ernment said, was numbered the 69th to which the European
2
officers of the 47th were posted. The report of the enquiry
3
committee was sent to the Directors in 182$, The Court ex­
pressed satisfaction at the information that the 26th and 62nd 
sepoy regiments had condemned the mutinous conduct of the 47th 
and in order to remove the stigma thereby cast on the native 
troops had offered their service ”as General service regiments 
beyond sea”. While expressing satisfaction the Court censured 
the Supreme Government for ”the delay in sending the report”, 
and pointed out the necessity of following as far as possible 
one uniform rule regarding the issuing of rations in all the 
three :Presidencies, The Directors ordered that ”when troops 
meet on service compensation money should be given to bring up 
the lowest to the highest”. Besides this order, the Home Gov­
ernment asked the Bengal Government to take adequate measures 
to improve the feelings between the European officers and 
native soldiers.
The Burmese war was still demanding attention from the 
British Government. The last months of 1824 witnessed the
1. In 1828 the number 47th was given to this regiment,
2. L. from Bengal 29 December 1824. M,L. received from Bengal
Vol.20.
3. L. from Bengal 1$ March 182$, M,L. received from Bengal 
Vol.21.
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massing of a large force at Sylhet for an invasion of
Burma through Manipur. Another, still larger army was ordered
2
to march from Chittagong into Arakan and thence to the
Burmese capital. To supply troops for all these expeditions
there took place in January 1825 a general augmentation of all
native corps, not sent to the field, all being ordered to
3
recruit an additional 20 sepoys. Soon after, a still more
extensive measure was resorted to and 12 additional sepoy
regiments of 1,000 men, were raised. Of these new regiments
the first six were fully officered, the others receiving only
4
three officers each - borrowed from the other corps.
The Sylhet force never came to grips with the enemy 
for the difficulties of the route and the incessant rain proved 
more formidable than any human foe. After experiencing great 
difficulty in February and March of 1825 it became evident 
that it was impossible to reach Manipore and consequently
5
Sh^uldham with his force came back to Sylhet.
The force for Arakan started its march from Ghittagong
1. The Sylhet force under Brigadier-General Shuldham with 
other European force included the 7th, 14th, 39th, 44th,
45th and 52nd native regiments.
G.O.G.G, 20 June 1824. Bengal Mily,Cons. 20 June 1824. 
ho. 37.
2. The 33^d, 43fcL, 59th and 63rd sepoy regiments - each 
contributed a grenadier and a light company to the army 
ordered for Chittagong. G.0,C.C. 12 July 1824. Bengal Mily. 
Cons. 12 July 1824. No., 40,
3. G.O.C.C. 23 January 1825. Bengal Mily0 Cons. 23 January 1825 
No. 18. -
4. G.0.C.C, 21 February 1825, Bengal Mily.Cons. 21 February 1825 
No. 27.
5. Cardew - op. cit. , p. 149*
359
i
on 1 January 1825. On 26 March the Arakan was attacked and
the place was taken on 1 April 1825. As the passes over the
Arakan mountains were unknown to the British troops no further
progress was made, and the whole of the monsoon season was
passed at Arakan. Fever of a most destructive type spread
through the force and by autumn nothing but a mere skeleton of
2
the array remained fit for work.
Meanwhile Campbell, after staying nine 
months at Rangoon on 13 February 1825 had started his march 
towards the capital of Burma. After two successive attempts
3
Donabyu was occupied on 25 April. But though both the India
and the Burmese Government desired peace nothing actually
4materialised and hostilities continued.
The effective force at Prome at this time was six weak 
European battalions numbering altogether about 2,800 men of all 
ranks and seven native battalions with a total strength of 
rather over three thousand of all ranks besides a proportion 
of artillery and a troop of the Governor-GeneralTs body guard.
1,”The city of Arakan - Myohaung —  it is situated in a valley 
on the banks of a small branch of the Arracan or Kuladyne 
river and in about fifty miles frommthe sea”,
Thornton's Gazetteer. p*43 
”The old capital of Arakan was situated in the interiors of 
the country on a branch of the Kaladan river. But shortly 
after our taking possession of the country, from the regret­
ted unhealthiness, Inaccessibility, and distance from the 
old city, a new site was chosen on a large land-locked 
estuary at the mouth of the Kaladan river, forming a safe 
harbour.” Fytche - Burma Past and Present I Vol.I,- pp.87-88 
Quoted by A. C. Banorjeo - Tht. Eastern Frontier p. 350. footnote 
2^  Oardew - op.cit.,p.151*
%  Snodgrass - op, cit. ,'p44.
4. Roberts - op.cit. p.50.
360
At Rangoon there was a garrison of about 3,000, chiefly native
troops and at Pegu were stationed three battalions of sepoys
with one European regiment.^
The renewal of the war in Burma made those troops (the
46th and 57th) which since May had been stationed at Rangpur
anticipate their own employment in Burma, The prospect filled
them with foreboding.
On 14 October 1625 Lieutenant Colonel Richards of the
46th was informed by Captain Horsborough that he had overheard
whispering amongst the sepoys and that in all probability a
2
mutiny was brewing in the regiment. On the next morning about 
37 men of the Grenadier Company of the 46th regiment went to the 
pay havildar of the regiment and stated that if they were ord­
ered to march they would refuse to do so. The Havildar took then 
the names and informed Captain Horsborough, The mutineers then 
went on to the lines and tried to persuade the other sepoys of 
the regiment to refuse to march, Horsborough immediately came to 
the sepoy lines, asked the Gr nadiers to lay down their arms and 
ordered the arrest of the ringleaders. Four ringleaders were 
accordingly arrested and the Captain then left the lines. But 
the rest of the Grenadier company now came to the quarter guard 
and asked to be confined with the prisoners. They were ordered 
by the Captain to return to their lines ~ orders which were
3
obeyed with extreme reluctance,
1, Snodgrass - op.cit., p, 50.
2, Horsborough to Richards, Rungpore 14 October 1825. Bengal
Mily. Cons, IS November 1825. No,34.
3, Horsborough to Richards 15 October 1825. Bengal Mily. Cons,
18 November 1825. No,34.
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Horsborough, reporting this, stated that it was not 
their wants that had "led the men to this .*„ so much as the 
discontent at remaining so long in Assam and a pretended 
inability to march from recent s i c k n e s s , T h e  Lieutenant- 
Colonel on receiving these letters went from G-oalpara to 
Rangpur on 21 October to exercise his personal influence over 
the sepoys. He ordered a parade and there appealed to the 
good sense of the sepoys. The regiment responded to his 
appeal and declared its readiness to march wherever and when­
ever ordered. But at the same time the sepoys explained that 
a few amongst them simply could not march because of their 
bad health. They further declared that they merely wanted 
their weak physical condition to be known to their officers. 
The parade was dismissed. The sepoys of the 1st Grenadier 
company requested the Lieutenant-Colonel to release the 
prisoners, but this was not granted.
Richards, informing the Adjutant-General of the 
incident observed, "indeed they did not appear to be able to 
support the weight of their own muskets." The climate of 
Assam had played havoc with the constitution of the sepoys 
and had led to heavy mortality and sickness in the corps and 
those who remained were "reduced in energy and in personal 
appearance "were mere shadows of their former selves". As for
the fatigue of marching he wrote "in their present state,"
2
they did not seem to be "capable of undergoing it."
1. Horsborough to Richards. Rungpor'e 15 October 1825. Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 18 November 1825. No, 34
2, Richards to the Adj. Genl. Rungpore 21 October 1825.
Bengal Mily. Cons. 18 November 1825. No.35.
The Adjutant-General, instructed “by the Commander-
in-chief, asked the Lieutenant-Colonel to hold a general
1court-martial* To this court the medical officer of the 
corps submitted a medical report on the health of the 46th 
and 57th regiments* The report said that since May 1824 the 
cases of both death and sickness in these two regiments had 
greatly increased and the medical officer "was frequently 
under the necessity of permitting members to proceed to their 
homes on medical certificates as the only means for the pre­
servation of their lives." He further suggested that as those 
who were still in the garrison were much reduced in strength
and energy," the regular regiments in Assam should be relieved
2
by a strong efficient corps as speedily as possible." The 
Court after receiving this advice, and reviewing all the 
evidence sentenced the four ringleaders to death. But the 
Lieutenant-Colonel did not execute the order immediately. 
Instead he referred the matter to the Commander-in-Chief 
pointing out certain discrepancies in the proceedings of the 
$ our t-martial. The Commander-in-Chief in his reply ex -
pressed his regrets at the outbreaks of the mutiny and his 
satisfaction at the prompt action taken by the authorities 
stationed on the spot. But he censured the action of the 
Lieutenant-Colonel for not carrying out the sentence of the 
(9 our t -mar t i al.
1. Adj. Cenl. to Richards. Council Bhambar 18 November 1825.
2. Bengal Mily. Cons. 8 November 1825. No. 36*
3. Richards to the C.in.C. Rungpore 26 November 1825. Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 18 November 1825. No.37.
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By then a considerable time had already elapsed since 
the court-martial, the death sentence upon the four prison­
ers were therefore commuted to transportation for life.
Besides this, the 46th which had been scheduled to be re- 
lieved was ordered to remain in Assam as a punishment for 
its disgraceful conduct and the 57th was directed to be re­
lieved in its place. The Governor-General meanwhile had 
approved the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and had 
expressed his deepest regret "at a conduct so unsoldier-like 
and so unaccountable in a regiment on whose exemplary discip­
line, zeal and entire fidelity the Supreme Government had
2
every right to place the most implicit reliance,"
The Directors hearing about "the existence and sup­
pression of insubordination in the 46th native infantry regi- 
ment, severely censured Lieutenant-Colonel Richards for not 
carrying out the order of the Court-martial and "for not 
punishing the whole Grenadier company and others who had been 
active in fomenting a spirit or had committed any overt act 
of insubordination.1,4
There the matter ended. There was no query as to why 
the excessive sickness in the regiment had not been earlier 
reported, ho comment was passed on the fact that the medical 
officer had only made his report when asked to do so by the 
Court martial. No comment was made upon the company commanders
1. The regiment was in Assam from January 1824.
2. Mily. Secy, to the Adj.Genl. 28 November 1825. Bengal 
Mily, Cons. 18 November 182So- No. 35*
3. L. from Bengal 30 July 1826. Para 375. M.L. received from 
Bengal Volt 23*
4. D. to Bengal 31 April 1828. Para 60. M.D. sent to Bengal 
Vol.* M  .
who had apparently failed to make clear "before the unrest the 
state of their men's health. The regiment was left at Rangpur 
until 1826,
Meanwhile Sir Archibald had continued his movement 
and he defeated the whole Burmese army at Pagan on 9 Febru­
ary 1826. A treaty was finally concluded at Yandabo on 
24 February 1826, The flank battalions from Arakan had by 
this time returned to Dinajpur, and then were allowed fur­
lough from six to eight months after which they were ordered
1to rejoin their regiments.
Permission was given for the words 1Ava', 'Arakan'
and 'Assam' to be borne on the colours of corps engaged and
2
a medal and six months batta was granted to the troops.
The territories that were granted to the British by 
the Burmese were Arakan and Tenasserim. Cachar and Manipur 
became British protectorates.
The war was enormously expensive for it had cost 
thirty millions Stirling - more than twelve times the charges 
for the PAndari and Maratha campaigns. Moreover the pro­
tracted operations, the occasional defeat and tardy success 
of the Company's troops in Burma had lowered the prestige of 
the Company in India, so that several attempts were made by 
subject powers within India to rise against the Company,
Among these outbreaks the most serious was at Bharatpur.
1. G-.O.C.C. 11 November 1825. Bengal Mily. Cons,, 11 November 
1825. No.80.
2. G-.O0G-0G-. 20 ‘November 1826, No,86. Bengal Mily. Cons.
20 November 1826, No.89.
3. Roberts - op.cit.,p298.
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In 1824, Baldeo Singh, the Raja of Bharatpur, in 
order to secure the succession of his son, Balwant Singh, 
placed him under the immediate protection of the British 
Government. He appealed to Ochterl&ny, the British resident 
at Delhi who consented to invest Balwant Singh as heir- 
apparent. Early in 1825 Baldeo Singh died and four weeks 
later Durjan Sal a nephew of Baldeo Singh seized Balwant 
Singh and usurped the throne. Ochterlony, failing to receive 
an assurance from Durjan Sal that he would restore Balwant 
Singh to the throne, promptly collected all the troops with­
in his reach and prepared to march upon Bharatpur. But he 
was suddenly stopped hy an order from the Governor-General \ 
Durjan Sal took his opportunity and claimed possession of 
Bharatpur as legal heir. nThe hope of every adventurer of 
every malcontent, of every ambitious little chief and of
2every prince who had been defeated and despoiled, ran high." 
To all of them the British Government appeared to be too 
busy in the Burmese War to maintain order elsewhere.
Sir Charles Metcalfe who had succeeded Ochterlony at 
Delhi insisted on maintaining the right of Balwant Singh. 
Amherst being convinced by him "gave orders to the Commander- 
in-Chief Lord Combermere for military preparations to be 
pressed forward with all possible a c t i v i t y . f o r c e s  were 
assembled under Major-General's Eicolls at Agra and Thomas
1. Oxford p# 5^6
2, .Forte scue - op .cit. 9 Vol. XI, p, 355
3* Ibid., Vol* Xl, p. 358
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1Reyn all at Mathura - some 16 sepoy regiments together with 
other European and native troops. These sepoy regiments 
marched from different stations like Lucknow, Shah^ahanpur, 
Benares, Jaunpur, and other nearby places. On 5 December 1825 
Lord Combermere marched against Bharatpur and in January 
1826 took the fortress by storm. The troops engaged in the
siege and storm were authorised to bear the name 'BharatpurT
2 3on their colours. Medals were also promised to them.
The fall of Bharatpur restored tranquility, proving 
indeed to be the last campaign in which the Bengal army was 
to be engaged for many years, The Government then turned its 
attention on to reduction and retrenchment on all sides. The 
campaigns of 1 8 2 4 -'26 had necessitated additions to the native 
army and since 1 8 2 3 - '2 4 there had been an increasing deficit^ 
in the Company's budget account. Six of the twelve newly 
raised regiments were accordingly disbanded, and the whole 
army was reduced to a peace establishment - a full strength
1. G. O.C.C. 17 September 1825 Bengal Hily0 Cons.17 September 
1826. ‘No*70,,
2. GrtQ.fi„G. 7 June 1826. Bengal Mily. Cons. 7 June 1826,
No. 43.
3. Medals were granted to all survivors by G.O.G. G. 14 April 
1851, Bengal Mily. Cons* 14 April I85I0 No*34.
4. Year Deficit
1823-'24 - £ 847,091.
1824-'25 - £2,961,147.
1825” '26 - £4,953,918.
P .N .Baner3ie - Indian finance in the days of the Company. 
Ap.A.
5. G.OoG.G. 9 April 1826, Bengal Mily. Cons. 9 April 1826. 
No.52,
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of ten non-commissioned officers and 82 privates per company.^"
By December all the 74 single battalion sepoy regiments of
the Bengal Presidency had been so reduced.
With the retirement of Amherst in 1828 Bentinck came
out as Governor-General of India and as "a man of peace, a
2
man of discipline and a man of economy," Following the
directions of Ellenborough, who warned him that if he would
not make the reductions "some one else" would, Bentinck
introduced stringent measures of economy in Bengal,^ Ignor-
xng his extreme unpopularity with the European society he
reduced the batta of the officers and so cut down the yearly
expenses of the Company as to secure a balanced budget for
the first time in many years.
Though Bentinck thus succeeded in pleasing the Home
Authorities he failed to raise the morale of the sepoy army.
He gauged the discontent of the sepoys and did his best, by
grant of h o n o u r s a n d  of financial rewards for long service
7to raise their spirits, But the extensive retrenchments,
the policy of utilising regular troops for police and other 
civil duties,^ and the^ill Example of near mutiny by the
1. G,O.G0G. 15 May 1826 Bengal Mily, Cons, 15 May 1826,
No, 38.
2. Oxford ~ p« 587.
3* kllenboroughts Political Diary Vol* I, p,265,
4 . Philips - The East"In(Ha~TTlir5 p»262.
5. K .H .Pandey - nofd William Bentinck and the Indian States. 
ISPS-’BS* p.207 ("Thesis submitted in the London University 
for PhlD. 1954)
6. See Chapter III. pp,
7. See Chapter III. p.
8. See Chapter IIlI p.
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officers undid his good work. One writer in 1835 under the
name Of 'S’ summarised the ’points in which the condition of
the native army had deteriorateds (1) decrease of pay as
compared with the increase of expenses, (2) increase of duty,
(3) decrease of consideration, (4) want in general kindness,
1favour, and notice from the governing power.”
Bentinck returned to England in March 1835 and Met­
calfe acted as a Governor-General for the months of 1835-*36 
till Auckland was installed in office in April I836. The 
period of comparative tranquility of nearly eleven years was 
in his day again replaced by one of turmoil. This time
trouble started in Afghanistan, In 1833 Ranjit Singh had 
<£•seized Peshj/var from its Afghan ruler. Dost Mahammad, the 
Amir of Kabul failing to reconquer it had appealed to Britain 
for help. Metcalfe had declined to help and Auckland follow­
ing a policy of non-interference, also refused any help to 
2
the Amir. He did send Alexander Bunns on a commercial cum 
diplomatic mission to Kabul, but denied him the power to 
conclude any political treaties, "Dost Mahammad had no use 
for purely commercial ones" and the Amir turned to Persia 
and Russia for help.
Auckland then made a treaty (26 June 1838) with 
Ran jit Singh and Shah Shuja, the former Amir of Afghanistan
1. E.I.U.S.J. February 1835* p.1.25*
2. Auckland believed that the Sikh alliance was more import- 
and than any Afghan link,
3. M.E.Yapp - British policy in Central Asia l83Q-»43« p.129. 
(Thesis submittecFin the London University for Ph'7l).1959)
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at that time a British pensionary at Ludhiana* Under the 
treaty Shah Shuja was to he assisted to the throne of Afghan­
istan hy a British expeditionary force* The 'Army of the
Indus' as the force was styled was ordered to assemble at 
1Karnalc A whole brigade moved up from Meerut and another 
from Agra while several sepoy regiments starting from more 
distant points approached Perozepore at as rapid a pace as 
circumstances of climate would permit* Prom Karnal the route 
of the Bengal force lay through the Sikh territories to 
Perozepore a spot within four miles of the river Gharra.
The large-scale movements of troops thus represented 
a considerable upheaval for an army long accustomed to 
garrison or police duties* There was another feature of the 
approaching campaign which was half expected to cause trouble 
- the crossing of the Indus* To Hindu troops the river marked 
the boundary of holy India as surely as elsewhere the ocean 
did.
The army had been long inactive* Except for some 
small affairs in Rajputana no field operations of any import­
ance had taken place since the capture of Bharatpur in 1826* 
Besides this, "it was doubted whether" the sepoys "would be 
willing to cross the Indus*^ Hence, in order to induce them 
to do so they were informed that they would receive, beyond 
the Indus, the same allowances as were formerly granted in
1* J.H. Stoqueler - Memoirs and correspondence — — *Voi»I* 73*
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1824 to troops beyond the Burmah frontiers? that is, in 
addition to the sum of eight rupees and a half, a further 
allowance under the name of 'money rations' that is,
either rations or a payment in money equivalent to their 
price in the camp market" ^  would be given to them.
The sepoys were not the only ones to receive possible 
advantage in the Afghan campaign. The prospect of war in 
Afghanistan, perhaps even of war "against the European 
cohorts of the Czar in regions beyond the Indus" whetted 
ambitions and "tempted the commanding officers of distant reg­
iments to put in claims to be transferred to those which 
were likely to be employed." Unhappily most of the officers
who so petitioned for posts sought them with "such irregular
2
and special corps as might be formed for the occasion."
The result was a drawing away from the line regiments of
their best officers. Nott had thus to complain that of the
three ^  fine regiments under him two were "most wretchedly 
t?4commanded.
With hopes thus raised the Army of the Indus set out 
from Karnal for Perozepore, arriving in November 1838. Before 
their arrival news had come through that Persia had raised 
the siege of Herat, It was therefore thought possible since 
only an Afghan enemy had now to be faced, to cut the size of
1. Ellenborough to Wellington* Calcutta 20 March 1844.
History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough 
in~Kis correspoiidenoe with the“Buke~~of^^Weilihgton.lB5^ ~
C olche ster ,ppll6-ll8 ~
2. Stoqueler - Memoirs .Vol. I, p. 73.
3. The 31st, 42nd and 43rd"native regiments were under Nott.
4. Stoqueler - Memoirs ,,.t Vol. I, p. 80.
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the forces which were to cross the Indus * One division was 
accordingly left to watch the Sutlej while the remainder of 
the force, selected as a result of the personal observations 
on tour by Sir Henry fane proceeded. It was thus a picked 
force which advanced from Ferozepore.
Some of its constituent units had already had a 
trying time while marching to the rendezvous. The mandate 
to prepare for active service had found the 2nd and 43rd at 
distant Lucknow and Cawnpore, the 53rd at Meerut, the 16th 
and 48th at Delhi, the 42nd at Bareilly, the 37th and the 
28th at Agra and Mynpuri. The 31st had had to be pushed up 
from Allahabad and the 5th from Benares while the 27th and 
35th had marched from Karnal. Painful marches at a most in­
clement season of late rain and along flooded roads had had 
to be performed by some of these chosen regiments before they 
could reach Karnal.^
On 26 November 1838 the Bengal force reached Feroze­
pore, Captain Havelock said of it, a force had "never been 
brought together in any country in a manner more creditable 
and soldierlike than was the Bengal portion of the army of 
the Indus, Many of the regiments had harassing marches to
2perform ..., but all arrived there in the highest order,n 
On 12 December 1838 , the Bengal contingent "drawn out in 
close column of battalions, stretching over ground of nearly 
two miles in length,"^ marched from Perozepore to Bhawalpore,
1. H, Havelock - Narrative of the War .., p, 20
2. Ibid., 40,
3 . HE'.'Fane - five Years in India. Vol. II, p# 3
There it was to meet the Bombay troops and the command was to 
devolve upon Sir John Keene the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Bombay army* Before the Bengal troops started from Perozepore 
several native officers were invested with the order of 
British Indian " a boon attended with some extra expenses to 
Government", but one which was "amply repaid by the zeal of 
the native troops,M which had "never been greater than on the 
service on which they were now employed in a foreign country; 
and with the prospect of a long absence from their native 
land*
The Bengal troops on their way to Bhawalpur suffered 
from various difficulties. As they proceeded the desertion of 
camel drivers and camp followers was reported morning after 
morning .and "scarcely had the army completed six marches, 
when the loss of private baggage and the unavoidable abandon­
ment of the bedding and camp equipage of the soldiers had
2amounted to a serious evil*"
Marching day after day and starting before the dawn, 
first by torch and starlight and then under the powerless 
December sun the army reached Bhawalpur on 27 December I8 3 8* 
Advancing again on 1 January 1839, the Bengal force reached 
Bukkur on 24 January, crossed the Indus, and fixed its
1* W. Hough - A Narrative of the March and Operations.*..*9*
2. Havelock - op * cit* , p T W ”'
3* The troops suffered from mismanagement in the Commissariat 
department. Nott wrote to Sir William Cotton on 18 January 
1839, "At Surwal the Commissariat officer purchased Attah 
at 24 seers the rupee..* and offered to retail it to the 
sepoys at only 17 seers . * Dire wood was bought
at 10 maunds for the rupee and was sold to the men at 
only 3 maunds and 5 seers."
Sto^queler - Memoirs *ypll.p99*
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headquarters at Shikarpur, which was reached on 20 February
1839 on their way to the Bolan pass through Rajhan and Dadur.
Since the crossing of the Indus the troops had suffered much
frontier clima.te and the effects of a failing commissariat.
The camels had died by scores. Water and food had been scarce
and in addition to these difficulties, Baluchi plunderers had
1been active. The dooly bearers had run off to a man though
p
most of them had later been caught and flogged. The 146 
miles from Shikarpur to Dadur had been accomplished by the 
Bengal columns in 16 painful marches. The Bolan pass was 
nearly 60 miles in length and it took six days for the Bengal 
troops to push up through it. Baggage was left behind, tents 
were abandoned for the lack of carriage cattle. Quetta was 
reached on 26 March 1839* By this time the scarcity of forage 
and water was appalling. At Quetta the price of Attah (flour) 
had risen "to two and a half seers (four and three quarter Pounds 
English) for the rupee. There was a corresponding scarcity of 
condiments for the native troops and ghee was sold at an 
exorbitant rate. Neither rice nor any other vegetable
l.Open palanquins for the sick.
2. Pane - op.cit,, Vol.II, p. 75.
3 . When the Bengal detachment started from Ferozepore on 12 
December 1838, J .H.Stoqueler who spent some time with the
force at Perozepore wrote (Memoirs pp0O™92), "Sir Henry
Pane’s injunction, in the circular to commanding officers, 
that the troops should be able to mov^ disencumbered of 
every article of baggage which could, without compromising 
the efficiency of the corps, be dispensed with,had been 
read as a mere matter form and every advantage taken of 
the qualifying or conditional phrase. Jams, pickles, 
cheroots (two camel-loads of the best Manillas), potted 
fish, hermetically-sealed meats, plate, glass, crockery, 
wax-candles, table-linen, dressing cases, perfumes, 
windsor--soap, and eau-de-cologne etc. all deemed indispen­
sable to the efficiency of a corps." They little dreamt 
that these articles would soon be used by the Beloochees.
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1substitute for flour was to be procured on any terms*M To 
face tills crisis the ration of the soldiers was reduced* The 
native soldiers was allowed only half a seer of flour per 
day and had thus to "contrive to support existence and per­
form his arduous duties, upon an allowance of food barely
2sufficient to preserve him from starvation." Boththe Euro­
pean and native soldiers were reduced to half rations but the 
Europeans had meat served out to them besides - one pound a 
day. The Muslim soldiers also had meat but the Hindus a con­
siderable majority in the Bengal native regiments, generally 
did not eat meat,^ There were neither vegetables, milk nor othei 
kinds of food considered necessary by them and for some time 
they had no dhal (lentils) either,^"
Nevertheless, Kandahar was reached in April 1839 and 
on 8 May Shah Shuja was installed on the throne of Afghanist­
an without any fighting, leaving the 37th Bengal sepoy regi­
ment at Kandahar Sir John Keene marched towards Kabul on 27 
June with the rest of the troops. These troops in addition 
to a shortage of food now suffered from the climate, for the 
temperature varied from 56° in the morning to 102° in the 
afternoon. Capturing the fortress of Ghazni on 23 July the 
army reached Kabul on 30th of the same month. Dost Mahammad 
fled and on 7 August Shah Shuja entered the city.
The first phase of the Afghan War was thus concluded. 
With Shah Shuja installed, arrangements were made to withdraw
1,Havelock - -op,cit, y Vol.I. p. 254.
2, Ibid,, pe 256
3, Hough - op.cit.b Pp 64-65.
4* Ibid., Ap.I.
375
a great part of the army to India. The Bombay forces left
Kabul on 18 September 1839 but the whole of the Bengal
infantry remained in Afghanistan, posted at different places
such as Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad and Kalat.^
As the object of the expedition to Afghanistan seemed
now accomplished the troops engaged beyond the Bolanpass
were rewarded. Permission was granted to inscribe the words
2 • 3•Afghanistan1, 'Ghazni1, and'Kalat}  ^ on the colours of the 
respective regiments and a gratuity of six months' batta was
4
also allowed to these troops.
It soon became apparent, however, that Shah Shuja 
depended entirely on British support. The feeling of the 
people was so hostile to Shah Shuja that even after the sur- 
render of Dost Mohammad in November |L84CV outbursts took 
place all over the country and "by the autumn of 1841 the 
country was seething with rebellion and intrigue."*'* The 
interference of British officials in the civil administration 
of the country did nothing to make their infidel presence 
acceptable, and eventually the army of occupation at Kabul
was overwhelmed by the outbursts. On 2 November 1841 Sir
A
Alexander Bur^p, the British envoy at Kabul was murdered and 
a tumult broke out in the city. The commissariat fort was
1. Kalat was taken from Mehrub Khan in November 1839* 
Lambrick - John Jacob ---. PP.38, 39, 357.
2. G.O.GoG 19 November 1839* Bengal Mily. Cons. 19 November
1839. No.58,
3. G.O.G.G, 15 February 1840. Bengal Mily. Consc15 February
1840. No.28.
4. G. 0rC. C, 15 February 1840. Bengal Mily. Cons, 22 November 
1839. No.57*
5. Roberts « op.cit,t p.320.
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lost to the mob without any fighting and on December 11, a 
treaty was concluded with Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mahammad 
by which the British force was to evacuate Afghanistan. Dost 
Mahammad was to be set free and Shah Shuja was to be at lib­
erty either to accompany the British or to remain in Afghan-
1istan with a pension.
On 6 January 184-2, after giving up many of their 
stores and guns, the British forces including the three Ben­
gal sepoy regiments, (the 5th, 37th and 54th ) commenced 
their retreat to Jalalabad, Scarcely had the troops left 
their cantonments when the Afghan tribes began to attack 
them. Gradually the number of the British force "grew less
and less before the bullets • * - and**, knives of the Afghans
2
aided by the bitter cold and the deep lying snow," There 
was no shelter, no firewood, no food. The sepoys, who had no 
former experience of such hardships were ignorant how they 
might best provide against snow without either shelter, fire 
or food.^ They burnt their caps and accoutrement to get a 
little temporary warmth. Soon discipline in the native regi­
ments collapsed. Throwing down their arms the sepoys rapidly 
swelled the disorganised rabble of camp followers. "Their 
hands were frost-bitten; they could not pull a trigger; they 
were paralysed, panic-stricken; they rushed forward in aim - 
less desperation scarcely knowing what they did or where
1. Roberts - op.cit. ,p#320.
2. Cardew - op,oitT, p.182.
3. Maj.Genl. Byre - The Kabul Insurrection of 1841-r 42,pi55
377
1
they went." The Afghans watching all the time from the
hills, came down and slaughtered them like sheep. The last
despairing stand was made at the pass of Jagdalak, where 12
officers laid down their lives. One man DT Bryden, half-dead
with wounds and exhaustion entered Jalalabad on 13 January
1842, He was long believed to be the sole survivor of the
16,000 men who had set out from Kabul a week before.
The news of this disastrous retreat reached Calcutta
and General Pollock was ordered to assume the command in
Afghanistan, Meanwhile, efforts had been made in the Panjab
to push up reinforcements and by the middle of January 1842
a brigade consisting of the 30th, 53rdr 60th and 64th sepoy
regiments with other European troops had been formed under
Brigadier Wild, On 15 January the 53rd and the 64th regiments
were sent under Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley to take possession
of Ali Masjid and Wild himself with the rest of the force
moved forward towards Khyber Pass, Though Ali Masjid was
taken easily, Moseley was compelled by incessant Afridi
counter attacks to evacuate the place and retreat to Jamrud.
The loss in Moseley's detachment was heavy, Brigadier Wild in
his attempt to get through the Khyber Pass was also beaten
back to Jamrud. This second defeat had a fatal effect on the
force and it was not until Pollock arrived at Peshawar on 5
April 1842 and assumed the command that any real progress was
made in preparing for an advance.
Brigadier Wild's brigade had by that time withdrawn
1. J.W.Kaye - History of the War in Afghanistan,
Vol.II, pp.366-367
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to Peshawar where Pollock found them. Abotit 1,000 men of the 
four sepoy regiments in Wild's brigade were sick mainly 
because of "the inclemency of the weather and the exposure to 
which the sepoys had been subjected during Wild's disastrous
i
advance." In addition to this sickness, Pollock also not- 
iced much bad feeling among the sepoys. The unhappy feeling 
among the troops was most noticable in the Hindu sepoys. That 
was because "a number of the unfortunate creatures from 
Cabool", had made their way to Peshawar and had spread what 
he described|las exaggerated stories of their sufferings •- <* 
that although they were Brahmins, food was thrust down their 
throats by Mussalmans, and they were spit upon." Some men had
"also shown mutilated hands and feet, having been frost
bitten. Though each of the commanding officers of the 30th, 
53^ 3-, 60th and 64-th seemed to consider his own regiment free 
from any taint, the panic among the troops was " taking a 
more decided appearance, and that the Hindoos of the 60th, 
and also of the 53^&, 1 had said they would "not go to Cabul 
to be made Mussalmans of, and such like speeches,"^
It was not the native soldiers only who were near 
mutinous. The European officers also were equally d i s c o n ■ .
tented. They freely expressed their often gloomy^ opinions at 
mess-, table and voiced such opinions as that "it was impossible 
to force the pass without a loss of more than half your force",
1. C.R.Low - The Life and (Correspondence of Pield-Marshal 
Sir George Pollock. pT^H>
2. Ibid.,p.227
3* H,B.Edwards and H, Merivale - Life of Sir Henry Lawrence 
Vol.I, p0 330. "  "
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A captain of the 53rd sepoy regiment said n±n the event of any
advance being again ordered, he would use his utmost endeavours
to prevent a sepoy of his company from even entering the pass'*.
An officer of another sepoy regiment in the very presence of
his men said of the expected advance 57Well ne^er mind .. * none
of us ever return again71.
The internal economy also of the sepoy regiments failed 
2
to satisfy Pollock. He, therefore, tried his utmost to help
the men to recover their spirits. He visited the hospitals
3frequently and by adding a few things to their comforts tried
A
to make them realise that he felt an interest in them.
By degrees his personal example began to take effect so 
that when on 20 August 1842 Pollock marched with his troops 
from Peshawar much of their discipline had been restored. The 
force under his command included the 6th, 26th, 30th, 33rd, 
35th, 53rd, 60th and the 64th Bengal native infantry regiments 
with European and other native troops. Of these troops only
the 6th was fresh from down country while all the others had
already been either at Peshawar or Jalalabad. The Afghans 
were defeated at Jagdalak and on 16 September, 1842 the 
British flag was hoisted over the Bala Hissar, the palace 
citadel of Kabul. Meanwhile, Nott had started from Kandahar in 
August and destroying the fortification at Ghazni on his way, 
he joined Pollock at Kabul on 17 September with a force which
1. Low - op.cit.. pp.230, 234.
2C Low - op0 cit. , p.229.
3. Worsted gloves and stockings were supplied to the native 
soldiers.
4. Low - op.cit., p.225*
in addition to the artillery and cavalry included five Bengal
sepoy regiments - the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd and the 43rd. The
city of Kabul was sacked and was then evacuated on 12 October.
Lord Ellenborough provided a magnificent reception for the
returning troops at Ferozepore and a further donation of six
monthsT batta was granted to all troops employed in the
2second campaign. Besides this, troops engaged in the actions 
around Kandahar, Jalalabad, Kalat-i-Ghiljai, Ghazni and Kabul 
received permission to bear those names upon their colours. 
Medals were also promised to the troops garrisoned at Jalalabad
3
and Kalat-i-Ghiljai.
The most successful conclusion of the Afghan campaign,
showed that the native soldiers had been brought to a better
temper by the "sound discretion and excellent tact of Pollock,"
so that they had "entered into dreaded passes, and, confiding
in their leader, carried victory with them up to the walls of
3
the Afghan Capital," Of their bearing when they retired
Ellenborough wrote to the Duke of Wellington from Ferozepore
on 29 December 1842, "the army [was] in the highest spirits -
justly proud of its actions, and proud too of its force as
4
exhibited in this camp," Again, "the whole army, officers 
and men, feel that they serve under a Government which [could] 
appreciate good service and [would] always do justice to them"',
1. Cardew - op,cit., p„l89*
2. G.O.G.G, 1 8 December 1842, Bengal Mily. Cons. 18 December 
1842, No.64,
3. Kaye - A History of the Sepoy War in India; vol.I, p,275. 
History of-the Indian Administration ,..ed. Colchester,p.316
5, Ibid., p.250
Of the other regiments present, who had not been employed in
the Afghan campaign the Governor-General wrote "nothing could
1
be better than the spirit which animated them all."
In spite of these compliments, the succeeding years
pointed out the gradual deterioration in the Bengal sepoy army
establishment, "which had been growing since the early years
2
of the century. "
Scarcely had the campaign in Afghanistan ended and 
scarcely had new recruits been raised at Allahabad, Cawnpore 
and Etawah to make up the losses of the Afghan campaign? when 
the Indian Government found themselves involved in a war in 
Sind. The war commenced in February 1843* The battle of Miani 
was fought on 1? February, Hyderabad fell and a month later 
another victory was won at Daba over the Amir of Khairpur.
Thus, war was practically over and Sind was annexed in August 
1843. It was not the Bengal army but that of Bombay took 
part in the Sind War.
After the Sind War, the Indian Government was involved 
in another war - the last of the wars with the Maratha powers. 
Sindhia, the Maharaja of Gwalior had been assasinated in 
September 1 8 4 3 a minor had acceded and disturbances had 
immediateDy started.^ In December 1843 & Hritish force was 
assembled at Agra and Jhansi to make sure that a regent favour­
able to the British should be installed. In addition to other
1* History of the Indian Administration...ed. Colchester,p.287.
2. Cardew- op.cit., p.202.
3. "General Pollock's army lost about 1500 men.,.and the loss
fell principally on the native regiments." History.....
Ellenborough, p.315.
4. Roberts - op.cit., pp.330-331.
troops, 12 native regiments were included in this expedition 
or military demonstration as it was expected to be. On 29 
December 1843? the Gwalior army having unexpectedly taken 
action was defeated by the Company's army at the twin battles 
of Maharajpore and of Puniar and the Gwaliar campaign was 
terminated.
Before the conclusion of the Gwaliar campaign the Gov­
ernment of India realising that the Bombay army was barely
sufficient to meet the regular commitments of its own Presi- 
1
dency, had decided, "with a view at once to efficiency and
2economy to garrison Scinde with Bengal troops only." The
Commander-in-Chief was instructed to make all necessary ^
arrangements for this change over. Four Bengal sepoy regiments
(the 4th, 34th, 64th and 69th) with other cavalry and artillery
troops who were encamped near the Sind frontier "received
3
orders to hold themselves in readiness to move." The order 
further made it clear that those who were thus called for 
duty in Sind had been chosen because they "had not^ been 
employed on foreign service and [they were the regiments]
5whose actual tour it was to proceed to that Province."
The sepoys at once displayed an unwillingness to 
proceed to Sind by presenting a petition which was received by
1. Lambrick- Sir Charles Napier and Sind, p.274.
2. Ellenborough to the Queen. Calcutta, September 19, 1843. 
History of- Ellenborough. ed. Colchester, p. 94.
3. GcO.C,C. 15 September 1843. 'Bengal Mily. Cons. 15 September 
1843, No.53.
4. The 64th which was called to march0 was employed in the 
Afghan War.
5. G.OwCcC-, 15 September 1843* Bengal Mily. Cons. 15 September 
1843. No. 53.
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the Adjutant-General of the army in October 1843. The petition
1
was worded in inflamatory language. It stated that the regi­
ment (the number of which was not mentioned) had served in 
Kabul and now, after only staying seven months at Ludhiana it 
was being ordered to proceed to Roree Buklcur, which was 
neither proper nor usual. The petitioners demanded that "there 
were other regiments who should go" before them. Besides this, 
the petitioners also ventilated their dissatisfaction with the 
Colonel, Adjutant Flyter, Subadar Durga Prasad and a Havildar 
Seetaram, The petition further threatened these officers that 
if the order of march was enforced they would "know the conse­
quences. " The accusation was made that the Havildar had been 
promoted improperly by superceding many old candidates and 
that since the Colonel had been appointed the regiment had not 
received one months pay complete. Subadar Durga Prasad had 
undue influence upon the Colonel, while since "the appointment 
of Adjutant Flyter the petitioners have not had any peace of 
comfort." After requesting the Government to investigate all 
these grievances the petitioners asked for the transfer of 
these European and native officers and expressed their desire 
to be discharged from the Company's service. An immediate 
enquiry was held and it was established that the petition was 
written and posted by the 64th regiment, stationed at Ludhi­
ana. It was also proved that nightly meetings were being held 
in the sepoy lines of the regiment. No enquiry was made, how­
ever, about the validity of the complaints of the petitioners.
1. Bengal Mily, Cons, 23 February 1844, No,392.
The 64th was marched on to the parade ground but in spite of
all inducements, 77the identity of delinquents was studiously 
1
concealed/7 A sepoy, who was suspected to be one of the
leaders of the mischief was discharged by Major-General Hunter
2but still the attitude of the regiment did not change.
The Commander-in-Ghief in a determined effort to 77mark
his sense of the misconduct77, ordered the regiment to march to
Barrackpore ^preparatory to the adoption of ulterior measures
3
of the most stringent nature/7 To prove to the native 
officers that they would be 7theld responsible for the mainten­
ance of discipline and good order amongst the men in their 
lines/7 all promotion and furlough in the native ranks of the
64th was suspended, Further no native soldier of the regiment
4was allowed to obtain his discharge from the service.
The 64th meanwhile, on 6 February 1844? had started
its march from Ludhiana and reached Ambala on 15 February,
Major-General Fast, Gommander of the Sirhind Division in his
77concern for the good of the service and in.the emergency that
5had arisen out of the refusal of some other native regiments 
to proceed to Sind/7 sounded the feelings of the native 
officers and the sepoys of the 64th regiment. Convinced that 
the whole regiment was ready to proceed to Sind unconditionally 
the Major-General begged the Commander-in-Chief to revoke his
1, Bengal Mily.Cons. 4 April 1844. No.45*
2, Hunter to Adj,Genl,Ludhiana 7 January 1844, Bengal Mily. 
Cons. 23 February 1844. No,392.
3, Adj. Genl. to Hunter., Simla 19 January 1844. No. 98, Bengal 
Mily, Cons, 4 April 1844. No,45.
4, Mily.Secy.to Adj. Camp Kathagaon 14 February 1844.Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 23 February 1844, No, 392*.
5, The 34th Regiment refused to march by this time.
previous order and to permit the 64th to march back to 
1
Sukkur,
The Commander-in-Chief agreed to permit the 64th to go
to Sukkur and thereby gave them an opportunity ”of blotting
2
out the stain” which attached to them. The Major-General was 
asked to remember that in case of the slightest demur exhib­
ited by the regiment he was to take it direct to Benares and
3
thence to Barrackpore.
The 64th started from Ambala for Mumdote on 29 February
marching, it was said, with perfect discipline, and then
4
embarked for Sind on 17 March 1844. This heartening inform­
ation prompted the Commander-in-Chief to inform Moseley that 
the conduct of the 64th in proceeding unhesitatingly and un­
conditionally towards Sukkur was ”so creditable to the corps 
and so indicative of an earnest desire to retrieve its former 
high character as to induce the Commander-in-Chief strongly 
to recommend to Government to pass to the several grades, in 
addition to the full or marching batta always allowed to regi­
ments serving in Scinde, still higher advantages in regard to 
pay, together with the benefits of the regulated family pension” 
to the heirs of those who might die from ^disease contracted
in that province.” Moseley replied that, ”the generosity
1. Fast to Adj.Genl. Amballa. 18 February 1844.No.143*
Board Collection, 94,623. pp.107-111.
2. Adj.Genl.to Fast, Kutabminar 21 February l844.No.4l6.
Bengal Mily.Cons, 8 March 1844, No.96,
3. Adj.Genl.to Fast, Kutabminar 21 February 1844. No,416.
Bengal Mily.Cons. 8 March 1844. No,96.
4. Moseley to Adj.Genl., On the river Sutledge near Mumdote 
17 March 1844. Bengal Mily, Cons. 29 March 1844. No.132,
5. Adj.Genl, to Moseley Chilkana 13 March 1844 No. 5^1.
Bengal Mily. Cons, 4 April 1844. No.39.
displayed by His Excellency” had been ”most fully and most
warmly appreciated by all ranks under my c o m m a n d . H e
further stated that the men had stood fast to their colours and
had paid no attention to the provocation of the sepoys of the
34th when they had met during the march. These instigators, so
Moseley wrote, had tried their best to spread a mutinous
spirit but the 64th, ”in the midst of all these base and black
designs”, had maintained a steadfast and true adherence to the
2
English Government.
The Commander-in-Chief on 19 March wrote to the 
Governor-General that ”the steadiness with which the 64th regi­
ment had resisted the importunities with which it had been 
assailed by the disaffected corps” deserved the highest com­
mendation, He therefore urged that the ”money ration and 
family pension which were originally allowed to the army of 
the Indus and which up to the 10th October 1843, were enjoyed 
by every native soldier of the Bengal Army whoever served in 
Scinde” might be granted to the 64th ”as a fitting reward for 
the praiseworthy conduct of the corps on the present occasion
and the excellent example of obedience to authority” which it
3had exhibited to the whole Bengal army.
The Governor-General on receiving this letter expressed
his highest approbation of the conduct of the 64th regiment.
1, Moseley to AdGenl., On the river Sutledge near Mumdote 
17 March 1844* Bengal Mily, Cons,, 29 March 1844. No* 3-32,
2* Moseley to Adj.^enl. , on the river Sutledge near Muildote 
17 March 1844. Bengal Mily. Cons. 29 March 1844. No.132.
3. AdjGenl., to Mily, Secy., Amballa 19 March 1844 No. 276.
Bengal Mily. Cons, 29 March 1844. No. 132.
But at the same time he pointed out that the 64th had not been
engaged in Sind before and that the extra allowance had not
been enjoyed there by the Bombay troops since 1 July 1843? as
by the Bengal soldiers since 14 October 1843. Consequently
the Governor-General did not agree to the proposals of the
1
Commander-in-Chief. He also pointed that these advantages 
could not be granted to the 64th only - all the other regiments 
who were proceeding to Sind would be justified in demanding 
them.
It is to be noted that on receiving this negative reply
on the question of extra allowances, the Commander-in-Chief
did not take any step to inform either1 Moseley or the soldiers
of the 64th that they could not be granted.
In April the 64th reached Sukkur where the 69th already
in a mutinous state, was still stationed. It was reported to
Sir Charles Napier, the Governor of Sind, that the 69th had
come to blows with each other. Though the 64th remained steady,
Major-General Simpson wrote on 29 April that the regiment (the
64th) ought to be discharged and hazarded the guess that it
2
was ?Trather a lull than a calm with the Bengal troops, 17
In May 1844 the 64th marched from Sukkur and early in 
June reached Shikarpur. A few days later, on 18 June Major 
General Hunter arrived there on a visit of inspection. He was 
77led to believe that a perfect understanding on the subject of
1. Mily.Secy,, to Adj, Genl,, Fort William 29 March 1844, No. 
739. Bengal Mily, 90ns. 1844', No.133.
2. Adj.Genl, to Napier. Simla 5 June 1844. No.1252. Bengal 
For, Secret Cons. 23 November 1844 No.8,
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pay and contentment prevailed m  the corps,n But on that
very evening at about 7 o Tclock the Major-General was 
surprised to hear that the 64th had refused to accept their 
pay for April ,Twhich included nine days of Scinde allowances,!? 
He immediately went to the parade ground. Without showing any 
sign of dissatisfaction one company of the regiment took their 
pay. Thereupon Moseley proposed that as all the companies had 
agreed to take their pay the officers might be allowed to dis­
burse the remainder, At first Hunter refused to allow this, 
but afterwards he agreed and the officers started to pay their 
respective companies. Immediately there was a roar among the 
men and as Hunter himself described it *Tin an instant the
whole were off to their lines making use of most abusive
2
language and declaring they had been deceived,!? Hunter went 
among them and tried to restore order but to no avail. The men 
did not want to fall in and continuing to utter most abusive 
words, began throwing stones and bricks at their officers. The 
Major-General realising that it would not be wise to excite 
the men any more that night left the parade ground with the 
other European officers.
Next morning another parade was ordered and Hunter him­
self started paying the men. The whole regiment, except for 
ten men who were ordered to be put in prison, took their pay. 
Then, when the day seemed won, and the regiment had been
1. Hunter to Adj, Genl.Shikarpore 21 June 1844. Bengal For,
Sec.Cons, 13 July 1844. No.146,
2. Hunter to Adj,Genl.Shikarpore 21 June 1844. Bengal For,
Sec.Cons, 13 July 1844 No.146,
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ordered to take their arms and fall into line, the regiment 
again mutinied. Hunter -with all the other officers tried to 
bring his men to a sense of their duty but failed. The mutin­
eers informed him that they had been deceived by Lieutenant-
Colonel Moseley and Captain Burt who had promised to pay the
1
sepoys General Pollock!s batta, of 12 rupees per month for
each man. Instead of that amount the sepoys had been paid at
the rate of eight rupees eight annas. As they had agreed to
march to Sind only on that assurance of extra money, the
sepoys declared that if that sum was not granted to them they
preferred to be discharged and to return to their own country.
Hunter being puzzled at this information assured the
mutineers that he had no power to discharge them but that he
would soon relieve them by the 69t>h. As he could neither grant
extra pay nor discharge them, the men remained the whole day
and night of 19 June on the parade ground ?fin their full dress,
2
walking about by their piled arms.^
3Next morning Hunter with Captain Shortreed again went 
to the parade and found that the men were ready to obey every 
order and seemed to be sorry for their conduct. Perhaps, as 
Hunter said ”hunger and fatigue might have played a part in 
bringing about this change,TT A parade was held at about 10 o T 
clock that same morning and at this parade Hunter asked
1, Pay and allowance received by the sepoys in General PollockTs 
force while serving in Afghanistan.
2* Hunter to G.G, Shikarpore 22 June 1844. Bengal For. Sec.
Gons, 13 July 1844 No.136,
3, A.B.C. to Hunter.
390
one man from each company of the regiment to come forward and
to state his grievance. The Matior-General himself took down
the evidence given by these sepoys. From that evidence, and
from his conversations with the officers he realised that the
men had been misled into believing that they weie to get extra 
1
pay. He was also convinced that Moseley and Burt had actually 
promised the men the extra pay. So, considering TTthe excite­
ment and turbulent state?? of the 64th, Hunter removed Moseley 
from his command and granted him leave of absence. Further, he
suggested to the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General
2
that the 64th should be replaced by the 69th, Napier, the 
Governor of Sind, was also informed of the happenings at 
Shikarpur.
On 25 June 1844, Hunter marched the mutinous regiment 
from Shikarpur to Sukkur, Being convinced that the regiment 
was feeling contrite and submissive for its past conduct he 
thought it proper TTto give the soldiers one more chance of 
saving themselvesTT and asked the native officers to produce on 
the next day the leaders of the outbreak, threatening that in 
case of non-compliance with the order the native officers 
would *Tby force be deprived of their arms.T? Reporting this 
measure to the Governor-General as well as to the Commander - 
in-Chief and the Governor of Sind, Hunter concluded his report 
by pointing out that there were a number of infamous characters
1. Beng$lFor, Sec, Cons. 17 August 1844. No.102.
2. Hunter to G,G. Shikarpore 22 June 1844. Bengal For. Sec, 
Cons. 13 July 1844, No,1360
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in the regiment - enough to lead to destruction any native
regiment - and further commented that the sepoys did not1
TTunderstand mutiny in anything like the same light our idea
of the matterCwasJV1
Sir Charles approved all HunterTs measures and requested
the Governor-General to bring Moseley to a General court- 
2martial. He also asked Hunter to put Burt under arrest and
3
to order Moseley to remain at Sukkur.
The Commander-in-Chief, however, censured Hunter for 
removing Moseley from the command of his regiment and said 
that na measure of such severity towards an officer of high 
rank and long standing ought not to have been resorted to with-
4
out the most conclusive proof.”
By the time these letters reached Sukkur Hunter had 
paraded the mutinous regiment and addressed it himself, asking 
the men to give up the ringleaders and so to save the regiment 
from disbandment, assuring them that their grievances had been 
taken down and were being sent to the Commander-in-Chief and 
the Governor-General. Immediately after this address, 39 ring­
leaders were pointed out who were put under arrest by Hunter.
The whole regiment (except these 39 prisoners) were pardoned
5
and the parade was dismissed. Hunter then issued a circular
1. Hunter to G.G. Sukkur 25 June 1844. Bengal For,Sec. Cons.,
13 July 1844. No0155„
2. Napier to G.G.Karachi 27'June 1844 No.98 Bengal For. Sec, 
Cons., 13 July 1844 No.152,
3. Napier to Hunter Karachi 27 June 1844 No.637 Bengal For.
Sec.Cons. 13 July 1844. No.154.
4. Bengal For. Sec. Cons., 17 August 1844. No.98,
5. Hunter to G.G.Sukkur 27 June 1844. Bengal For. Sec, Cons,,
17 August 1844, No.97.
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to the European officers of the 64th, informing them that the
regiment was to be marched on 28 June to the lines occupied by
the 69th where they would take a share in all duties. Besides
this, the officers were asked to give the strictest attention
to the performance of their duties and were told that "the
mere getting over a duty", was not sufficient, "diligence,
%eal, and firmness without severity" - were necessary and "the
tue/fej
most vigilant care that not in the most trifling degree eaa the
men to be allowed to remain in ignorance of the genuine purport
of any order respecting themselves ..... Had this been always
done in the 64th the present unhappy occurrence," the Major-
General observed "never would have taken place." The lack of
unity among the officers was deplored, and Hunter concluding
the order, commented that it had been their want of unanimity
which had made it "impossible for them either to command the
respect, or hold that power over soldiers which a strictly
united body of officers always could *wield with so much 
1
effect."
On the receipt of all the reports and letters of Hunter
Sir Charles Napier asked him to try the 39 ringleaders by a
2
general court-martial. He did not wish, however, to disband 
the whole regiment, for, as he explained in a letter to the 
Governor-General, already within a short period two native 
regiments had been disbanded. Another disbandment would make
1, Division Order by Hunterr Sukkur 27 June 1844 Bengal For.
Sec, Cons., 17 August 1844 No,98,
2. Napier to Hunter Karachi 1 July 1844 Bengal For, Sec. Cons,
17 August 1844 No.99.
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that great punishment too common to the .native regiments.
Moreover, if they knew they were to be disbanded? there would
be a danger of the mutinous regiment not obeying the orders
yTto march from Shikarpore where they were masters and march
to Sukkur where they knew they would be prisoners; and ex-
2
posed to severe p u n i s h m e n t . B y  another letter Sir Charles
informed the Governor-General that he had ordered Hunter to
deprive the 64th of its colours since y*no regiment had a right
to bear colours after a mutiny till either a course of good
conduct or some brilliant action in battle,had given the
3
regiment the right to reclaim their honour. The Commander-
4 5in-Chief and the Governor-General^agreed with Napier!s order
to punish the 39 prisoners tried by court-martial. But the 
Commander-in-Chief did not support the order to take away €he 
colours, for as he pointed out, according to the regulations 
which prevailed in the army a native soldier was required to 
swear under the colours and to take an oath of allegiance
that he would not abandon or forsake the colours of his regi­
ment. Hence, to deprive a regiment of its colours seemed to 
the Commander-in-Chief virtually to cut the bond by which the 
sepoy considered himself bound to the state.
1. Napier to G.G. Karachi 30 June 1844 No,99 Bengal For.Sec.
Cons,, 17 August 1844 No.101.
2. Napier to G.G.Karachi 3 July 1844 Bengal For, Sec, Cons.,
17 August 1844 No.104,
3. Napier to G, G,. Guzree hills 12 July 1844 No. 102, Bengai
For. Sec, Cons., 17 August 1844 No,107,
4* Adjf - Genl. to the Mily, Secy., Simla 12 August 1844 No.7^3
Bengai For. Sec. Cons, 11 May 1844 No.33#
5. G.G. to Bapier. Fort William 27 August 1844* No,577 Bengal
For. Sec. Cons. 27 August 1844 No.33.
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But before these letters reached Napier, news had come
that the colours of the 64th regiment had been taken away and
1
that the action had produced ”a good effect, ”
The Supreme Government then pointed out to Sir Hugh 
Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, the necessity of bringing Mose­
ley to trial. He had deceived the regiment, by ^perverting the 
meaning of the Adjutant-General *s letter of 13 July.” Nothing 
could ”justify the misconduct of the regiment but if the 
allegation against this officer” were true, then the trial of
the officer would ^demonstrate the impartiality and equal
2
justice of the whole proceedings,” '
The court-martial was ordered to be held on 22 July 1844. 
Before the first session of the court took place Hunter sent a 
report to the Adjutant-General giving his observation on the 
whole question of the mutiny of the 64th regiment at Shikarpur. 
According to the report the 64th had proceeded to Mumdote in 
a discontented mood and that mood had prevailed during the 
whole march. Further , the regiment had often expressed its 
dislike of the Sind posting and once at Mudki it had been in 
open mutiny - ”some of the soldiers having seized their colours 
and insisted on going to Ferojepore instead of Mumdote.” These 
incidents had never been brought to the notice of the Govern­
ment. They ”were passed over by the officers from a wish to 
keep up the name of the regiment.” The Major-General also
1. Napier to the Mily. Secy, Karachi 31 August 1844 Bengal 
For. Sec. Cons. 23 November 1844 No, 5.
2. G.G, to the C.in C. Fort William 27 August 1844 No.577 
Bengal Fora Sec, Cons. 27 August 1844 No.33.
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believed that the 64th had always had the idea that T?it was 
to receive more pay than others . *. and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Moseley had never made the Commander-in-Chief acquainted with 
the real state of his regiment.ff Moseley was further accused 
by Hunter of being ”of an imperious and abusive nature.It 
was only to be wondered at, Hunter wrote, that the sepoys had 
not been ^driven to extremities before.M Moseley either by way 
of pleasantry or in ridicule had often called the men of his 
regiment Tfthe black goralog which displeased the sepoys very 
much.” Hunter described the feelings of the native soldiers 
by quoting the expressions used during the loss of all discip­
line at Shikarpur against Moseley, f,one must have out that 
lying tongue and that lying right hand must be cut off.
Hunter had never known sepoys to act and speak in the way they 
did at Shikarpur. Moseley had also hurt the feelings of the
native officers of the regiment by promoting a naik instead of
1
appointing a havildar to the post of drill havildar.
The court-martial duly passed judgment on the 39 pris­
oners sentencing six of them to be immediately executed, seven 
to imprisonment for life with hard labour, ten to imprisonment
for 14 years, seven others to imprisonment for ten years, five
2
for ‘seven years, three for five years. One sepoy was acquitted. 
The Governor-General confirmed the sentence. While expressing 
great approbation of HunterTs handling of the mutiny, the
1, Hunter to Adj. Genl. Sukkur 2$ June 1844. Bengal For. Sec. 
Cons., 23 November 1844 No. 6.
2. C -ifc-C to G.G.Simla 21 August 1844. Bengal For. Sec.
Progs. 21 September 1844.
Governor-General expressed the hope that the punishment of the
ringleaders would "have the effect of impressing upon an army
so distinguished for its valor that obedience to the orders of
its Commanders, [which was] the first of all military duties,
without which the other admirable qualities" it possessed
1
could be of little value.
Hunter also demanded that another 71 men of the 64th 
should be dismissed. These men, old sepoys of another regiment, 
had all been in jail serving sentences passed by another court- 
martial, and their recruitment into the 64th had been a mis­
chievous blunder. As Hunter wrote "how could they have been 
admitted as recruits into the 64th I should not give an 
opinion further than had the Havildar Major (improperly so 
styled) been fit for his place they never could have been 
entertained without him and the commanding officer's knowledge 
of their history....,"
Hunter also accused Captain Burt, in the harshest terms, 
of neglect of his duty. He had seldom appeared on parade, and 
even after the mutiny of the 64th, he had left his companies 
to be paraded by the native officers. The Government could 
well judge his neglect and mismanagement by referring to the 
roll of the men in his companies. "Gould it be imagined," 
Hunter enquired, after all that had happened "that two sepoys 
should still be in those companies known to be dismissed by 
sentence of courts-martial from other regiments" and that
Captain Burt had so little pride in the regiment, he had
G.G, to C. Fort William 1 September 1844. No. 593.
Bengal For, Sec. Progs. 21 September 1844.
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lately been commanding, tTas not to have made himself acquainted 
with the cause of their former dismissal, The Adjutant- 
General reported the contents of this letter to the Governor- 
General but though 71 men were dismissed no other step was 
taken.
Lieutenant-Colonel Moseley, who had already been removed 
to the 2nd European regiment was tried however, by court- 
martial and was cashiered. The colours of the 64th were soon 
after returned to the regiment by order of the Governor- 
General.
While the 64th regiment thus kept the attention of the 
Government engaged for nearly a year other native regiments 
were refusing to march to Sind. The 34th regiment had marched 
out from Meerut and reached Ferozepore early in February 1844* 
On 9 February Major Wheeler, the commanding officer of the 
regiment informed Major-General Vincent, Commander at Feroze­
pore that his men had refused to march to Sukkur, unless they 
receive the additional pay granted on former occasions to
4
native troops employed in Sind. The men of the 34th seemed 
to have received the news of the withdrawal of the allowances
1. Hunter to Adj.Genl,Sukkur, 9 September 1844. Bengal For. 
Sec,Cons, 23 November 1844. No.7.
2. Adj.-Genl. to G.G.Simla 1 September 1844. No,593. Bengal 
For. Sec. Progs. 21 September 1844.
3. Under secretary to the Govt, of India to the Govt, of Sind. 
Ft.William 19 September 1844. For, Sec. Progs. 21 September 
1844.
4. Vincent to Capt. Shortreed Ferojepore 9 February 1844 No , 56 
Bengal Mily. Cons. 1 March 1844 No.288.
from a detachment of the 38th Light infantry which had lately 
arrived from Sind. The Commander-in-Chief, reporting this to 
the Government remarked it would hardly be expected that troops 
would proceed ^contentedly to an entirely new country (to them 
at least) beyond the frontier, where every necessary of life 
[was] far more expensive than in the provinces** when they had 
learnt that the advantages had all been curtailed. Sir Hugh, 
as ready to obstruct the policy of the Government as ever, 
added his comment that the policy ,Tof diminishing the advan­
tages of pay and pension of the troops serving in Scinde*T and 
of ^placing the soldiery on a worse footing than formerlytT was
most inexpedient. He therefore recommended that the old allow-
2ances should be continued under some.new designation.
Meanwhile all the persuasion and appeals made by 
Wheeler to the 34th proved of no avail. Major-General Dick 
Commander of the Meerut Division, who on 9 February had been 
only a few miles away from Ferozepur hurried to Ferozepore.
He paraded the regiment on the morning of 14 February and 
tried to exercise his personal influence. But this effort also 
proved futile. The regiment while refusing to march to Sind 
expressed **their willingness to follow their officers, not
1. Light infantry - **A company of active strong men, carefully
selected from the rest of the regiment The object of
the light infantry movements whether in battalion or in 
company, is to protect the advance and retreat, and to 
cover and assist the formation of larger - bodies, *?
J,H.Stoqueler - Military Encyclopaedia p#157
2. Adj.Genl. to Mily,Secy. Camp Peertellao 17 February 1844 
No.157. Bengal Mily Cons, 1’March 1844. No,268,
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dismayed by any sickness or death, 77 but declared that they
could not exist in a country ,7such as they conceive Scinde to
1
be without the increase to their pay. 77 Dick reporting to
the Commander-in-Chief, stated that this attitude was not 
confined to the 34th but was widespread among the other native 
troops ordered for Sind.
On hearing of these incidents at Ferozepore, the Govern­
or-General authorised the Commander-in-Chief to exercise all 
the power 77which could be exercised by the Government for the
repression of mutiny even to the extent of disbanding a 
2
regiment. 77
The Commander-in-Chief in the meantime had instructed 
Dick to try again to influence the sepoys of the 34th and to 
explain to the troops, with the help of the best qualified 
linguist available, the punishment which awaited them for 
persistent refusal to obey orders. If the sepoys should be 
found willing to obey the orders in an orderly and cheerful 
manner in keeping with the tradition of the 34th then His 
Excellency would be ready to forget 77their present misconduct 
and to submit any respectful and well founded representation 
of disadvantages to which troops in Scinde77 would be exposed
3
77to the favourable consideration of the Government of India. 77 
Should the order to proceed to Sind be disobeyed Dick was to 
march the 34th to Meerut (where it was raised) prior to its
1. Dick to Adj. Genl., Ferojepore 14 February 1844 Bengal Mily. 
Cons. 1 March 1844. No,289.
2. C. in 'C. to Dick. 18 Febraury 1844. Board Collection 
94, 623. pp.65-67.
3. C, in C. to Dick 18 February 1844. Board Collection 94, 623
pp. 90-91.
complete disbandment with dishonour. To this instruction Dick 
replied that it would be impossible to march the 34th back to 
Meerut if the intentions of the Government became known to 
the sepoys, for it was even rumoured that the men of a Euro­
pean regiment on the Frontier had been ”heard to declare that 
they would not act against the sepoys who were properly > 
asserting their rights and no m o r e , O n  hearing this the 
Commander-in-Chief retracted his previous order and merely 
asked that the 34th regiment be marched back to Meerut, But at 
the same time he severely censured Dick for entertaining a 
doubt as to his ability to coerce the regiment. His obvious
course should have been to bring other European regiments
2
”whose loyalty could not be questioned” from Ludhiana, While 
the Commander-in-Chief was reproving doubt in Major-General 
Dick, he himself was voicing doubts to the Governor-General 
about the wisdom of disbanding the 34th, saying that the evil 
could not ”in any degree be remedied by the adoption of this 
measure,” Sind, he argued, might be included in the CompanyTs 
province but yet it was considered ”a foreign country by the 
native troops and increased advantages having been held out, 
and given as an inducement, to serve in that quarter, the men” 
were impressed with the conviction that they were entitled to 
them, ^However erroneously” they looked ”upon the attempt to 
withhold them as almost a breach of faith toward them on the
1, Dick to Adj, Genl. Ferojepore 22 February 1844. No,70
Bengal Mily,Cons, 8 March 1844. NoP99.
2, Adj, Genl, to Dick, Camp Bephi 25 B’ebruary 1844* No.448.
Bengal Mily. Cons., 8 March 1844 No,990
1
part of the Government” which they !thad a right to resist.”
It was now the Governor-GeneralT s turn to silence doubt. 
He reminded Sir Hugh Gough that the extra allowance of money 
rations first granted to the troops beyond the Indus ( 18 Dec­
ember 1838) had been withdrawn on 31 December 1839. Again 
granted to the troops on 1 January, 1842, it had again been 
withdrawn from 1 July 1843 by order of 30 May, 1843* That 
allowance had thus been extinguished* He pointed out that the 
regiments ordered to Sind had enjoyed the allowances granted 
to troops in the field, while others in the province enjoyed 
only cantonment rates* He therefore issued peremptory orders 
to disband the 34th and made plain his displeasure that ”the 
promptitude of decision and of action essentially required 
under the circumstances at Ferojepore” had been unfortunately
2absent in the conduct of Major-General Dick and the officers.
On 2 March 1844 the 34th regiment started its march
from Ferozepore towards Meerut. During his march the Commander-
in-Chief asked Wheeler to offer it another opportunity to
3
follow the regiment* But on 16 March Wheeler reported that
”he had no hope of the regimentTs returning to the sense of 
4
their duty.” He also stated that he had reasons to believe
1. Adj.-Genl. to Mily* Secy. Camp Shahderah 26 February 1844. 
No.187* Bengal Mily. Cons., 8 March 1844 No.99.
2. Mily.Secy, to Adj*Genl., Fort William 5 March 1844 No.152. 
Bengal Mily. Cons* , 8 March 1844 No.100.
3. Adj*GenlQ to Wheeler. Delhi 9 March 1844. Bengal Mily,Cons,, 
4 April 1844 No,49.
4. Bengal Mily* Cons,, 18 April 1844. No,109.
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that the 34th had entered into an agreement with other muti­
nous regiments to stand firm and refuse to march to Sind
unless the extra pay were granted to them and a pension were
1
sanctioned to the heirs of those who might die in Sind.
It was also reported to the Commander-in-Chief that on 
its way to Meerut the 34th having met the 64th regiment had 
tried to dissuade their colleagues of the 64th from proceeding. 
But the 64th did not waver and resolutely marched to its des­
tination. On 17 March Wheeler reported to the Commander-in- 
Chief that the regiment possessed detailed information about 
the curtailing of the allowances received by the troops in 
Sind from detachment of sepoys returning from Sind. This in­
formation had so completely shaken their sense of honour, 
obedience and faith that he much feared it would never be
o
retrieved.
On 22 Fiarch 1844 the 34th was camped at Sirdanah, on
march from Meerut, Wheeler gave the sepoys a last chance,
asking them to identify and surrender the instigators of this
spirit of insubordination. None of the sepoys came forward and
Wheeler now became convinced that ”the greater part if not the
whole of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers
3
of the regiment” were in sympathy with the men.
The 34th arrived at Meerut on 23 March9 Three days 
later all the other regiments stationed at Meerut were ordered
1. Bengal Mily, Cons., 18 April 1844. No.109.
2. Bengal Mily. Cons., 18 April 1844. No.109,
3. Wheeler to Adj. Genl., Sirdanah 22 March 1844.
Bengal Mily.Cons., 4 April 1844. No.49.
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to form three sides of a square and then the 34th regiment was
marched from its camp to the centre of the square. Then a
translation of the general order of the Commander-in-Chief was
read out. This, after referring to the bad spirit which from
the first had possessed all ranks, and the failure of every
effort of the officers to recall the regiment to a sense of
its duty, ordered that ”the 34th regiment be struck out of the
army list and the native commissioned and non-commissioned
officers, drummers and privates discharged^the service as
totally unworthy of the confidence of the Government or the
1
name of soldiers.” The 34th was then deprived of its arms,
accoutrements, and the uniform ”on which they had brought such
disgrace.” The men were paid up their arrears and were ordered
to march round the square. Having completed the circuit they
2
were placed under the charge of a troop of the 10th Light 
cavalry which conducted them about half a mile beyond the 
boundary of the cantonments and there left them. Two sick men 
of the dismissed regiment were allowed to stay in the station 
hospital, the rest dispersed quietly. 3
But the disbanding of the 34th did not prevent the 
spread of the contagion, and the Government soon found itself
dealing with two more mutinous sepoy regiments, the 69th and
1. Wodehouse to Adj. Genl.Meerut 26 March 1844 No.140. Bengal 
Mily,Cons. 12 April 1844, No,90,
2. Light Cavalry - mounted soldiers which were lightly armed 
and accoutred,” Stoqueler - Military Encyclopaedia p»157
3. European officers under the rank of a major of the disbanded 
regiment were ordered to join several regiments of native 
infantry in the Sirhind and Meerut Divisions whose officers 
were absent on staff or civil duties.
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the 4th.
These two regiments had been marching up to Ferozepore 
during February, from Shahjahanpur and Bareilly respectively. 
Major-General Dick, to prevent their making contact with the 
mutinous 34th had ordered the two regiments to halt at some 
intermediate point on their march. But at no point were there 
sufficient supplies available to permit a halt of any duration. 
The 69th arrived therefore on 24 February, the 4th on 1 March, 
some weeks before the disbanding of the 34th.
Boats were ready for the passage down the Sutlej and on
the arrival of the 69th the attempt was made to get them to
embark at once. But the regiment refused to proceed to Sukkur,
unless they were allowed extra batta and rations, the men
declaring that these were essential to their maintenance in 
1
Sind.
Every effort was made by the commanding officer of the 
regiment to bring the men back to order but they positively 
refused to proceed. Next day Lieutenant-Colonel Norton told 
Dick that the 3rd and the 4th companies of the 69th had loaded 
their hackeries and marched towards the boats, and he expressed 
the hope, that the want of combination amongst the disaffected 
might bring a favourable result. Accordingly, the whole regi­
ment was pardoned on the morning of 25 February and the men 
”who were willing to march trusting to the liberal considera­
tion of Government,” were ordered to fall out. On this occasion
1. Norton to Asst. Adj. Genl. Ferojepore 24 February 1844. 
No,36. Bengal Mily. Cons., 8 March 1844. No.109.
467 men declared their readiness to march.
Having achieved so much Norton appealed to Major- 
General Dick for further instructions.
His hesitation, when reported to the Governor-General, 
drew down an angry reproof , He should have embarked with the 
regimental colours and the 467 men, ”that measure would in all 
probability have induced the remainder of the regiment to 
follow” and could have led to the future union of the whole 
regiment. Ellenborough was in fact so irritated by the mis­
handling of matters at Ferozepore that he ordered the transfer 
of the divisional commander to the Presidency Division, declar­
ing that ”it would not be expedient to continue Major-General 
Dick in the command of Meerut Division,” since he had ”shown 
himself to be unequal to the difficulties in which [he had]
lately been placed.” Major-General Grey was appointed to the
3
Meerut Division in his place.
Before this letter could reach Meerut Dick had com­
mitted a further blunder. He had paraded the 69th on 19 March 
1844 and had read out to the men, through the regimental inter­
preter, a promise that if the men proceeded to Sukkur he would 
solicit the Commander-in-Chief to recommend to the Government 
that increased pay should be granted to them as well as
1. Subadars - 52, Naiks - 51> Drummers - l6and Sepoys - 348*
2. Norton to Asst, Adj. Genl., Ferojepore 25 February 1844. 
No.37. Bengal Mily. Cons. 8 March 1844 No.109.
3. Mily. Secy, to Adj. Genl, Fort William 8 March 1844.
No, 175 Bengal Mily. Cons., 8 March 1844 No.108.
pensions to the families of any -who might die in Sind. He
added the threat that if they refused they would ”inevitably
experience the punishment which awaited all ranks of the
2
34th regiment.” When Dick had left the parade, Norton had 
formed the regiment into squares, and after explaining to the 
men the seriousness of any refusal to march to Sukkur, had 
told them that he would advocate their cause with Government 
and ”use every influence” to gain for the men all for which
??3they had asked.
That night a few more sepoys came to Norton and ex­
pressed their willingness to march to Sukkur. Though next morn­
ing these sepoys were abused and beaten by those who were still 
turbulent, and the disturbance was with difficulty quelled by
4
the officers, the mutinous spirit was obviously declining.
By the morning of 21 March Norton could report that complete 
peace and order prevailed among the regiment. Some 167 men
M 4,
1. Dick by the order of 6 March 1644 had already been ordered 
to be removed from the Meerut Division. Hence, no step was 
taken for the unauthorised promise. But the Governor-Gener­
al in a secret and confidential letter dated 1 April 1644, 
to the Commander-in-Chief pointed out the inexpediencies
at all times of holding out the expectation of extraordin­
ary rewards for the execution of ordinary duty. It was also 
mentioned that Dick by his promise of recommendation of 
increased allowance to the troops had placed both the Gov­
ernment and the Commander-in-Chief in a false position. He 
should have remembered that the Government would act on its 
own deliberate judgment of right or expediency and cannot 
place itself implicitly in the hands of the Commander-in- 
Chief.
2. Dick to Adj. Genl. Ferojepore, 19 March 1644. No.45.
Bengal Mily.Cons. 4 April 1644. No.41.
3. Bengal Mily Cons., 4 April 1644, No.45.
4. Norton to Asst,Adj.Genl. Ferojepore 20 March 1644 No.46. 
Bengal Mily.Cons., 4 April 1644 No.41.
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were now willing to march to Sind.
Meanwhile a general order had been issued. After dec­
laring that the 34th had been ordered to be disbanded the Com­
mander- in- Chief told the refractory troops at Ferozepore that
if they did not T7forthwith submit themselves to authority and
2
proceed to Sukkur/* they too would be disbanded. The order
was read to the troops on 23 March 1844 and except for 179
sepoys the whole regiment expressed their readiness to proceed
3
to Sukkur unconditionally. Next morning the regiment was 
paraded again and this time, but for 90 sepoys, the whole 
69th expressed its willingness to proceed. Norton hoping that 
the Commander-in-Chief would support his action immediately 
paid up and discharged the 90 men. The 69th regiment then 
embarked for Sukkur.
Meanwhile, the 4th regiment had reached Ferozepore on 
1 March 1844. Dick, realising the state of general discontent 
among the troops stationed at Ferozepore, asked Major Caley 
not to ^compromise the men of his regiment by sounding the
5
state of their feelings on the subject of progress to Scinde,!f 
But Caley, convinced of his influence and personal hold over 
the men, ordered the officers immediately to unload and
1. Norton to Asst. Adj. Genl, Ferojepore 21 March 1844 No. 47. 
Bengal Mily. Cons., 4 April 1844, No.41.
2. G.O.C.C, 20 March 1844 No. 638 Bengal Mily. Cons. 12 April 
1844, No,90.
3. Norton to Fast Ferojepore 23 March 1844 No.49. Bengal Mily,
Cons., 12 April 1844. No, 93.
4. Norton to Fast. Ferojepore 24 March 1844 No.51. Bengal Mily.
- Cons,, 12 April 1844 No.93.
5. Dick to Caley Ferojepore 29 February 1844. Bengal Mily.Gons. 
22 March 1844 No,280.
discharge the hackeries and to make arrangements for proceed- 
1
ing to Sind. Lieutenant Young, on his inspection round on
the night of 1 March found that the hackeries were still to be
unloaded. He asked the pay havildar for an explanation and was
told that TTthe hackeries were unloaded but as it threatened to
2
rain they were loaded again.u Young, ordering them to be
unloaded again, retired to bed. But little later, being
informed that his company refused to unload the hackeries,
Young returned to the lines and ordered his men to turn out.
The men did not stir from their tents. Young then lost his
temper and, taking a bayonet, drove the men out of the tents
and drew them up in lines. Then he ordered four files from the
left to unload the nearest hackery. Davedeen Singh one of the
sepoys, thereupon asked ?*How could four files unload a hackery
when it took 120 men to do it?,T At this Young struck him in the
face with the bayonet. Trouble immediately started and the men
came towards Young Ttall at once in a threatening manner.?¥
Young kept them off with the bayonet until the Sergeant-major
had placed four sentries over the bell of arms. Then Young
went to report to Caley. On coming back the Lieutenant found
that the whole regiment was in arms and in a state of open 
3mutiny. By this time Caley had appeared in the lines with 
Captain Goldney, Commander of the 9th company, Goldney asked 
one man to give him his musket and took it, but tTthe man
1. Dick to Adj. Genl.Ferojepore 4 March 1844. Bengal Mily. 
Cons., 22 March 1844 Bo,280
2. Young before the court of enquiry Ferojepore 2 March 1844 
No.2. Bengal Mily. Cons. 22 March 1844 No.280,
3. Young before court of enquiry Ferojepore 2 March 1844, No.2 
Bengal Mily. Cons. 22 March 1844. No.280.
wrested it back,™ Goldney drew his sword. Galey realised the
mistake he had committed in issuing the order to unload and
promptly cancelled it. The regiment then returned to its
1
former state of tranquility.
Next day Caley ordered a court of enquiry to be con­
ducted by Captain-major Milton. Evidence from both the native 
soldiers and the European officers was reconwwwided. The sepoys 
Davedeen Singh and Ram Singh accused Young of striking them 
with his bayonet. Goldney also was charged with striking one
sepoy and Captain Bechar was accused of having fired a pistol
2
towards the sepoys. Young admitted having struck Davedeen
Singh and Ram Singh and medical certificates were produced
before the court, testifying that both Davedeen Singh and Ram
3
Singh t?had a slight puncture of the skin on right cheek,YT 
Goldney denied that he had used his sword, saying he had heard 
^Captain Oldfield to say Y?no?? and Major Caley calling ?Tthat*s 
not the way, no violenceT”, In the event the court held only 
Young guilty and he was placed under arrest.
The Commander-in-Chief being informed of the whole inci­
dent , found that non-compliance with the Major-GeneralTs
4
orders had been the primary cause of this disturbance. But 
as Caley had been led away by his firm belief in his regiment
1. Davedeen Singh and Ram Singh before court of enquiry Feroze- 
pore 2 March 1844* Bengal Mily. Cons., 22 March 1844 No,280
2. Davedeen Singh and Ram Singh before court of enquiry Feroje­
pore 2 March 1844. Bengal Mily.Cons, 22 March 1844. No,280.
3. Asst. Surgeon before court of enquiry Ferojepore 2 March 1844. 
Bengal Mily,Cons. 22 March 1844 No.280,
4. Adj, Genl, to Dick, Saharanpore, 9 March 1844 No.556.
and as he had already expressed regret, the Commander-in- 
Chief did not censure him. Nor were Goldney and Bechar found 
blameworthy. Young, however, was severely censured and was 
ordered to be released with an admonition to have greater res­
traint on his temper in future. Further he was removed from the 
command of the company until the commanding officer would be
2
satisfied that he could fTsafely be entrusted with the command.?t
Although the 4th regiment returned to order it still
persisted in refusing to march to Sukkur. On 20 March, 1844,
Caley at a regimental parade asked the men who were willing to
march to Sukkur to step forward. Only a few men stepped out of
the ranks and the parade was dismissed. That same night a few
other sepoys came to Caley and expressed their readiness to
obey the order to march. Caley realised that there were other
sepoys too who were willing to proceed but were being held
back by fear of their comrades. The Major therefore requested
the Commander-in-Chief to follow a policy of rigorous 
3coercion.
Accordingly the Commander-in-Chief sent stringent 
orders^ which were read on 23 March 1844. Perhaps the 4th reg­
iment realised that with the submission of the 69th it was 
fighting a losing battle, for on 24 March3 with the exception 
of one naik and 190 sepoys the regiment ^expressed contrition
1, Caley to Asst. Genl. Ferojepore 4 March 1844. Bengal Mily. 
Cons., 22 March 1844. No.280.
2, Adj. Genl. to Dick Saharanpore 9 March 1844 No.533. Bengal 
Mily, Cons., 22 March 1844 No.2810
3, Caley to AsstQ Adj. Genl. Ferojepore 20 March 1844 No,79. 
Bengal Mily.Cons,, 4 April 1844. No.41,
4, See p. 4 0 5 *
for their past misconduct and their readiness to march to 
1
Sukkur* n As those who had refused were generally men of
turbulent character, Caley in his desire to get rid of them
2
?7told them that they would be discharged. 77
The Commander-in-Chief however, ordered the despatch of 
the Judge-Advocate General to Ferozepore to {lold a court-mart­
ial on both the 4th and 69th sepoy regiments. But before this 
officer could reach Ferozepore, the 69th regiment had already 
marched for Sukkur, the 4th had received orders to move on 
26 March, while the discharged sepoys of both the 4th and the 
69th were ready to start for their homes. The actions and prom­
ises of the commanding officers, Norton and Caley, as the 
Judge-Advocate claimed, had precluded any trial of these men, 
f7The act of Lieutenant-Colonel Norton [had] completely tied our
hands and the act of Major Caley [had] left us no discretion
3
and no choice of measures,n
The Commander-in-Chief on receipt of these censorious 
comments issued a general order on 3 March 1344* This drew the 
attention of all officers to the rules governing discharge, 
which laid down that only in time of peace and when the defic­
iency in a corps did not exceed ten men per company, was a 
soldier, with three years7 service entitled to his discharge. 
The order then pointed out that the officers of both the 4th
1. Caley to Adj, Genl, Ferojepore 24 March 1344* No,34* Bengal
Mily.Cons,, 4 April 1344. N0.5O.
2. Caley to Adj.Genl., Ferojepore 24 March 1344* No.34* Bengal
Mily.Cons., 4 April 1344. No,$0.
3. Judge-Advocate General to Fast. Ferojepore 23 March 1344. 
Bengal Mily,Cons., 12 April 1344. No.93*
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and 69th regiments ”in contravention of these rules and of the 
well known practice of the service” had assumed to themselves 
a power which properly could only be exercised by the Govern­
ment, Vincent, the commanding officer at Ferozepore, was also
1
censured for having approved these actions of Caley and Norton. 
The Home authorities had throughout been kept informed
by the Indian Government of the mutinous behaviour of the
2
native soldiers. In one of their letters the Calcutta Govern­
ment explained in detail the reason for granting and withdraw­
ing the Sind allowance over which the mutinous regiments had 
raised such a clamour, ”Money rations, that is, rations” or 
an equivalent amount of money "given to the troops in addition 
to pay and full batta” had first been granted in Sind in 163^ 
and in 1839^ they had been withdraw^, Then from 1 June 1842 
when the insurrection at Kabul had rendered the state of Sind 
"similar to that in which these allowances had been first 
granted”, the money rations were regranted to the troops serv­
ing in Sind. The troops which served in Sind under Napier also
5
enjoyed these allowances. But in May 1843 it appeared to the 
Governor-General that all military operations at Sind would be
1. G.O.C.C. 30 March 1844. Bengal Mily.Cons, 12 April 1844.
No.94.
2. In addition to the 4th, 34th, 64th and 69th sepoy regiments, 
6th regiment Bengal native cavalry, (where the majority of 
the recruits were Muslims) 7th regiment Madras native caval­
ry and 47th Madras sepoy regiment mutinied in 1844.
3. G.O.G.G. 18 December 1838. Bengal Milyc Cons. 18 December 
1838. Np.lli,
4* G, 0. G. G. * 31 December 1839} Bengal Mily., Cons* 31 December 
- 1839. Nq 0143.
5. G.O.G,G. 30 May 1843. Bengal Mily, Cons, 30 May 1843. No.168,
concluded before 1 July 1843 and consequently he had ordered 
the cessation of these allowances from that date. The reduct­
ion had taken place in the allowances while the Bombay army 
still had its detachment in Sind, That detachment, informed of 
the retrenchment, had submitted to it. But by some oversight 
or accident the order had not been communicated to the Bengal 
troops till 14 October by which date some of the Bengal 
sepoy regiments had already been ordered to march to Sukkur, 
These regiments had not understood that while they lost the
boon of money rations, they continued to receive field allow-
1
ance, that is, full batta in all the cantonments in Sind*
The Directors reply to this letter throws further light 
on the origin of the money allowance and the causes for its 
long retention. They pointed out that the habit of granting 
money rations derived from practice prevailing in Madras. In 
1824, during the Burmese War, a body of Madras sepoys had been 
sent to Ghittagong and had been paid at the rates prevailing 
for foreign service. The Bengal Government, on 27 September 
1824 had therefore laid down that the foreign service which 
entitled sepoys to free rations, should be defined as service 
outside their Presidency. A general order of 25 November 1824 
had accordingly been issued granting "in consequence of the 
dearness of provisions and the nature of the operations about 
to be undertaken along the eastern frontier, money rations to 
the native troops actually serving beyond the Brahmaputra and
1, For, Sec, despatch to Secy, of State from Bengal Fort 
William 14 March 1844 No.5.
in Assam,” At the close of the war, the Bengal Government had 
resolved that the regular native regiments retained for service 
in Arakan should continue in receipt of money rations. Since 
then the troops had always enjoyed this allowance in Arakan,
The Madras sepoys employed in the Tenasserim province, after 
its annexation to the British territories and those who were 
employed at Penang, Singapore and Malacca, also enjoyed this 
advantage.
The native troops employed in the Afghan war, on the 
ground that they were employed beyond the natural boundaries of 
Hindustan, also had enjoyed this privilege. It was also argued 
that the nature of the service, and the distance of the field 
compelled the sepoys to leave their families behind and to pro­
vide for their maintenance by leaving large portions of their 
pay to be issued on family certificates. On these various 
grounds the measure adopted by the Bengal Government had been 
approved by the Home Government,
After the conclusion of the Afghan War Sind had been 
garrisoned by Bombay troops and at that point the Supreme Gov­
ernment had decided to withdraw money rations. But no report of 
the change had been made to the Home Government, In June 1842 
at the time of the outbreak at Kabul the money rations had 
been regranted to the native troops serving in Sind, again 
without notice to London.
After this recital of the history of money rations the 
Home authorities went on to ask the Indian Government to 
"advert to the precedents established in Arakan and at the
stations on the East coast of the Bay of Bengal," and declared 
they should "be prepared to sanction such a regulation for the 
future grant of money rations to the troops serving beyond the 
boundaries of Hindustan," as might be consistent with the pec­
uliar nature of the service. So it would be for the Governor- 
General in Council said the Home Government "to consider 
whether it be not advisable to revise the order ... and to 
grant money rations in Sind under all circumstances," After 
thus throwing the onus of deciding the matter upon the author­
ities in India, the Directors concluded by demanding that all 
changes whatever, affecting the accustomed privileges and
allowances of the native troops should be reported to the Home
1authorities before their publication.
There was a similar exchange of letters between the 
Indian and Home authorities about where responsibility for out­
breaks over the Sind allowances should lie. The Government of 
IndiaTs view was that these deplorable occurrences had mainly 
arisen "either from a want on the part of the officers of that 
influence over the sepoy" which was found to be "the constant 
result of a temper of kindness and of judgment, or from the
failure on the part of the officers to exert the influence
2
they possessed,"
The Home authoritiesT reply showed no disposition to 
accept this analysis of mutinies so foreign, as they put it,
1, Court to Bengal‘31 May 1844. Board Collection 94,623. 
pp.499-507.
2. For, SecuDespatch to Secy, of State from Bengal, Fort 
William 22 April 1844. No.27.
"to that zealous devotion to the duties of the profession and 
to the exigencies of the public service" which characterised 
the conduct of the native troops. They drew attention to the 
promise made by the Commander-in-Chief to the 64th that he 
would recommend to Government that higher pay and allowances 
should be granted to them. No one could reasonably have 
doubted, they declared, "but that the troops would consider 
such a promise by the Commander-in-Chief as tantamount to a 
grant by the Government, Even the Lieutenant-Colonel (Moseley) 
stated almost in set terms *that he considered the communica­
tion as an announcement of a grant not only promised but actu­
ally realised,"
They expressed a dou-t whether the Commander-in-ChiefTs 
request for extra allowances should not have been heeded: 
"Considering the great powers confided to the Gommander-in- 
Chief *.. and the critical position in which he was placed at 
a distance of 1000 miles from the seat of Government, with a 
large body of mutinous troops to be brought into subjection," 
the Home authorities "should have been disposed to have 
acquiesced if the Supreme Government had thought it consistent 
with its duty to comply with his request." They argued that, 
in any case, once his plea had been disallowed "it was of 
first rate importance that measures should have been taken to 
correct this erroneous impression under which the 64th regi­
ment had embarked and under which their commanding officer 
appeared to have acted." They commented upon the unusual 
feature in the mutiny of the 64th that there had been violence
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towards European officers. Those officers should certainly 
have exerted their influence - had they had any. But the 
officers were not altogether to blame, "partly from imperfect 
information as to the allowances to be received in Scinde, 
partly from a belief that there had been some mistake which 
rested with Government to correct," The Commander-in-Chief 
had not been fully aware of all the circumstances - witness 
his letter of 13 March 1844 - small wonder then that "the 
officers in command of the troops in Scinde were like himself 
unaware of the advantages the troops would gain by serving in 
that province." The Home Government would not blame them "if 
they should have failed to explain them to their men. It was 
most regrettable that in so important a matter as the pecuni­
ary claims of native troops serving in a province which they 
had been accustomed to consider as a foreign country there 
should have been an entire absence of that publicity of 
announcement ... necessary for the satisfaction of the troops 
and the information of their officers," The Home authorities 
further censured the Supreme Government for not informing them 
of the different arrangements made in the allowances of the 
troops throughout the operations in Afghanistan and Sind, 
Approving the decision of the Indian Government to remove 
Major General Dick to the Presidency Division the London 
authorities concluded the despatch by expressing their satis­
faction that "disloyalty to the Government or a desire to 
avoid an obnoxious duty" had not been the occasion of the
1 418mutinous conduct of the tioops at Ferozepore*
While the Indian Government was busy with the mutinies 
among its native soldiers and with throwing the blame on its 
army officers the Press in India was freely expressing its 
opinion on these incidents, A few quotations will show that 
the view1 taken of this question by the Press was uniform as to 
the justice of the sepoys! claim, and the folly of the Indian 
Government.
The Delhi Gazette, condemning the conduct of the Govern­
ment, remarked that the men had throughout declared their 
willingness to follow their officers anywhere, claiming only 
that without extra money they would not be able to maintain 
themselves in Sind. The sepoys were not blind to the fact that 
the nominal annexation of a foreign country did not at once 
remove the inconveniences and evils for which the extra money 
had been granted. The editor concluded however with the com­
ment that ?fthe chances of discomfort, sickness and even death 
would not have weighed for a moment against this going forward,
wrote that though no excuse could be offered for mutiny much 
could be said in defence of men who were ordered to perform a 
service which had never entered into their calculation when 
they were enlisted. When they were told Sind belonged to the 
British and they could not therefore be considered on foreign
2
had good faith been kept with the army.TT The Bengal Hurkaru
1. For. Sec. Despatch to Bengal. London 19 February 1845 
For, Sec.Cons, 18 April 1845# No.109.
2. The Delhi Gazette 12 March 1844.
service when there they replied that Bokhara might belong
to us in a few years and then they should have to go there
1
without batta? The Athenaeum quoted the Agra Ukhbar which 
said that the Government must remember that this was not a 
mutiny in spirit but a mere matter of striking a proper bar­
gain, The extra allowance for a foreign service was 77 a thing 
which the sepoys on leaving the provinces [had] always been 
accustomed to look forward to77 - and rightly so. The paper 
cautioned the Government that if they disregarded this warn­
ing and tampered with the pay of the soldiers they should send
for more European regiments in time and disband the native 
2
army,
A week later the Friend of India wrote in similar vein 
it was impossible 7tto deny that the men had reason and equity 
on their side however objectionable might be the mode in which
they had forced their claims on the notice of GovernmentJ?^ The
Bombay Times pointed out that during the Afghan wars the 
patience of the sepoys had been pushed to the very limits of 
endurance but yet had not failed them* Now a system seemed 
77to have been devised for the very purpose of destroying the 
character of an army.77 If the Company was not in a position to 
pay their troops77 on such a scale as to secure their service 
let them contract the boundaries of their empire and limit the
4strength of their army,77 Several letters were also published
1. The Bengal Hurkam 12 1Viarch 1844.
2. Athenaeum 16 March 1844.
3. Friend of India 24 March 1844.
Bombay Times 26 March 1844,
in the Athenaeum, One of the writers observed 77if the necess­
ities of the state77 x^ iere so urgent 77 as to render it expedient 
to reduce the field batta of the Sipahis, it would be no un-
1
seemly parsimony to extend the reduction on to the officers,77 
Another letter argued that the Government should have remem­
bered that the sepoys, being mainly Hindus from Oudh, would 
naturally consider Sind, a Mahomedan country, a foreign 
country. Sepoys coming to Sind would seldom or never hear of 
or from their families - because none of their friends would 
ever come to such a dread climate in the way they came to all 
other countries. Moreover Sind was a great distance from Oudh 
and though if furlough were granted they would certainly avail 
themselves of it, yet by doing so they would suffer great pri­
vation and fatigue. Even worse was the effect of the climate 
upon the sepoys. One who had not seen them with Sind boils 
could scarcely form a conception what they had suffered from 
them, from the fever which followed and the prostration of 
strength unknown in Hindustan. Equally in one who had been 
there, never would 77the sufferings the troops underwent last
year from want of common attention on the part of their own
%
Government be obliterated from their minds.77 The Naval and 
Military Gazette wrote 77when a mutiny77 occurred in the Bengal 
troops there had 77been some mismanagement in those who77 gov­
erned the Indian army - 77whether in the officers77 who were in 
command 77or in the Government who issued orders.77*^
Athenaeum 20 February 1844.
2, Athenaeum 30 March 1844.
3. Quoted in Bengal Hftrkaru 8 January 1845.
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By the middle of 1844 peace and order had returned to 
the lines of the Bengal sepoy army and soon after the sepoys 
received another opportunity to engage themselves in active 
warfare, and so to forget their grievances. Since the death of 
Ranjit Singh in June 1839 the state of the Panjab had been one 
of chronic revolution, till in 1845 Dhulip Singh a young son 
of Ranjit Singh became the ruler. From those revolutions and 
accompanying assasinations the constant gainer had been the 
Khalsa army, for from every claimant to the throne the Sikh 
troops had extracted additions to their numbers and to their 
rewards. The army, by 1845 had become a state within the state, 
with its own organisation and its own arms. Under such circum­
stances the regent and council of the boy Maharaja were not 
disinclined, as Roberts has made clear, to divert the attention 
of the over-powerful army from internal affairs and iTto allow 
the Khalsa to test its strength against the Company!? Either 
the Khalsa t?would spend its superabundant energies in a career
of conquest and the sovereignty of Hindustan would pass to the
1
Sikh§., or it would be shattered in the conflict.VT On 3 Dec­
ember 1845 hhe Sikhs began to cross the Sutlej.
The British forces were quickly put in motion to resist 
the Sikh invasion. Under the designation of the ’Army of the 
SutlejT, the troops were grouped under the command of Sir Hugh
Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied in the field by the
2Governor-General Sir Henry Hardinge. This TArmy of the
1. Roberts - op.cit., p.334.
2. Cardew - op.eft. , p.306,
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Sutlej1, consisting of 18 sepoy regiments with certain other 
European and native troops, assembled at Ambala, where some of 
the sepoy regiments were already stationed. Others came in from 
stations scattered far and wide, from Ferozepore, Ludhiana, 
Benares, Delhi, Mynpuri, Etawah, Agra and Moradabad.^
The first battle was fought at Mudki on 18 December. 
There followed Ferozeshah, on 22 December, Aliwal on 28 January 
1846 and the final victory at Sobraon on 10 February, The war 
had lasted only 54 days and during that time there had been 
four pitched battles - nthe fiercest and most desperately con­
tested that British troops in India had ever been called upon 
2
to fight,” The losses on the British side had been very 
severe. The British troops were exhausted by fatigue, want of
food and water. Besides, nearly 700 native soldiers had been
3
killed, 1697 wounded and there were 379 sepoys missing.
The conduct of the sepoy regiments in these heavy 
battles was being criticised by John Jacob. nThe wretched 
state of discipline in the army of Bengal very nearly caused 
the loss of the first and second battles, in fact the Euro­
peans had to do everything and suffered heavily.Ti^  But on both 
occasions they had been exhausted by fatigue, by long fasting 
and want of water. Sir Henry Hardinge in a letter to Ripon
1. Bengal Military statements 1845.
2. Roberts - op.cit., p.338.
3. Cardew - op.cit., p,l89,
4. Lambrick - John --- . p.123.
5. fTThe sepoys had been exhausted by the long march, and they 
had not the powers of endurance of the British soldier, 
they suffered especially from lack of food and from the 
difficulty of cookinglt.R.S.Rait - The Life and Campaigns 
of Hugh Viscount Gough Field-Marshal, vol.II, p.19.
wrote there could "be no doubt that the following reason 
[might] have operated prejudicially upon the native corps. The 
troops having been collected from various points, and constant­
ly engaged in marching, had only been brigaded on paper....
The troops therefore were not in the state of organisation and 
formation so essential to discipline and field movements, The 
brigadiers and their staff were unknown to the men, and the 
men to the brigadiers, while at Mudki the confusion of the
attack, combined with the facts above noticed, had created a
1
feeling that the army was not well in hand. Sir Hugh said 
the services "of the native troops engaged" could not be "dis­
regarded or unrecognised,,, neither at Moodkee nor at Feroze- 
shah were they equal to the occasion, but this was undoubtedly 
owing to the frightful exhaustion of the sepoys who had not 4
the same stamina and physical endurance as the British 
2soldier," In any case, the sepoys fully retrieved their
reputation when fighting under more favourable conditions at 
3
Sobraon, Lord Hardinge, Sir Hugh and Major-General Littler, 
who were with the TArmy of the SutlejT praised the native 
soldiers for their loyalty, patience and perseverance. In a 
despatch of 2 December 1SL5 Governor-General wrote from 
Ambala to the Secret committee of the East India Company that 
he had "no cause to doubt the loyalty of our admirable native 
army", though he had every reason to believe that endeavours
1. Ibid. , p. 7,
2. Gough and Innes - The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars, p.130,
3. Ibid.. p.130.
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had been ”systematically made, on a very extensive scale, to
tamper with them; that promises of promotion and reward [had
been] lavishly made and that their religious prejudices” had
1
been forcibly appealed to, Littler, commander of the Infantry 
division, pointed out that despite such temptation not a single 
desertion took place. He also explained that though the sepoys 
”patience and perseverance in marching through the day, ex­
posed to the sun and want of water” had no doubt weakened 
their energies, it had not damped their order, for they had 
”evinced great and firmness and resolution in advancing to the
attack, until borne down by the most furious and irresistible
2
fire from all arms that man could be exposed to,” Again on 
30 December 1345 Hardinge wrote from Ferozepore ”the troops 
were engaged in cooking their meals, when Major Broadfoot re­
ceived information that the whole Sikh army was in full march,
with the intention to surprise the camp. The troops immediate-
3
ly stood to their arms and advanced,” In the House of Commons 
Sir Robert Peel spoke about the native army ”constant efforts 
were made by the Government and Panjaub to corrupt our native 
troops.,,,,The pay of an infantry soldier of the Panjaub 
[was] about twenty-five shillings a month; while the pay of a 
sepoy in Her MajestyTs service [was] only about fourteen or 
fifteen shillings a month. Constant exertions were made, by 
direct and indirect means, aided by community of language and 
of religion, to shake the fidelity of the native troops; but
1, The War in India, p,5.
2- Ibid., p.53.
3, Ibid., p.20.
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.,. they were made without success. The loyalty of the sepoys
1
with scarcity a single exception” had been untainted.
In appreciation of their service the Governor-General
granted to every soldier engaged in the campaign a medal Ttto
be worn with their uniforms, on which the word TFerozeshahrT
would be inscribed as denoting that they had served in this
// 2important campaign.
The news of the termination of the war was received 
with the greatest enthusiasm in England. Hardinge, Gough and 
the TArmy of the Sutlej1 were thanked by both Houses of Parl­
iament, Both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Ghief 
were raised to the Peerage. The troops which had taken part in 
the battles, were allowed to inscribe the words fMoodkeeT 
fFerozeshahrT TAliwal* and TSobraon* on their colours. Medals 
were granted for personal bravery. Further, the corps engaged 
in those four battles were given a gratuity of six monthsT 
batta ”as a testimony of the gratitude of the Government and
of the admiration with which” it had regarded their conduct in 
3
the field. In addition to this gratuity, soldiers ,Tencount-
ing readily and enduring with fortitude peculiar hardships
arising from climate, from privation or from disease...” were
4
entitled another six monthsT batta. Thus the troops received 
altogether a gratuity of 12 months? batta.
The War in India p0125.
2. G.0;G.G. 30 December 1845? Bengal Mily, Cons. 30 December 
1845, No.69.
3. G.O.G.G. 12 December 1846. Bengal Mily. Cons. 12 December
1846 No*78.
4. G.O.G.G. 22 February 1847. Bengal Mily. Cons, 22 February
1847 No* 35.
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At an early stage of the War it had become apparent to 
the authorities that the maintenances of a large force on the 
Sutlej and the provision of the necessary garrisons in the 
different parts of the Bengal Presidency must produce a great 
strain upon the existing strength of the sepoy army establish­
ment. Hence in January 1846, several new corps had been raised. 
Ten levies, of a thousand men each, were ordered to be raised 
and trained as a reserve and to act as feeders to the regiments 
in the field. Besides this, in order to provide for garrison 
duties and for the preservation of order while so large a 
portion of the army was in the field, 18 battalions of 475 
men each, were ordered to be formed, drafts of 165 native
officers and men taken from each of the existing native regi-
1
ments not in the field. But before all these troops had 
actually been raised or formed the war was concluded. Conse­
quently, the new levies and battalions referred to above, were 
ordered to be disbanded and the strength of each infantry was 
limited to 800 privates.
Even after the establishment of peace, the political 
condition of the Panjab remained critical. Early in 1848 Lord 
Dalhousie succeeded Lord ^ardinge as Governor-General. Scarce­
ly had he taken up the reins of government when another clash 
with the Sikh troops occurred. In April 1848 Dewan Mulraj 
x'esigned from the post of Governor of Multan. Two British
officers who had been sent to instal his Sikh successor, were
1, G.O.G.G. 22 January 1846, Bengal Mily. Cons, 22 January 
1846 No. 46,
2. G.O.G.G, 22 March 1846. Bengal Mily. Cons,, 22 March 
1846 No, >4
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murdered. Though a young Lieutenant Herbert Edwarcjjis attacked
Mulraj -with all the available local levies, he could not
take the fortress or prevent the spread of the revolt.^ In
October 1848 the Sikh garrison at Peshawar mutinied and soon
the whole of the northern Panjab was in the hands of the 
2
rebel Sikhs,
In consequence of all these outbreaks a British force
was assembled at Ferozepore. This TArmy of the Panjab! with
other troops included 18 sepoy regiments which were placed
3under Major-Generals Whish, Gilbert and Campbell. Some of 
the native regiments were at Ferozepore, others were required 
to march from places like Lahore, Ambala, Hoshiarpu-r, the 
Jullundar Doab, Kangra, Meerut, Delhi, Mo.radabad, Cawnpore and
4
even from Barrackpore.
The campaign was opened on 22 November by an attack on 
Sher Singh at Ramnagar and on 13 January 1849 the battle of 
Chilianwala was fought. With the battle of Gujarat on 22 Feb­
ruary, the campaign ended.
Thus ended the second Sikh War. The TArmy of the Panjab* 
was soon dispersed. The regiments were sent back to their can­
tonments while some others were kept in the Panjab. A medal 
was issued to commemmorate the battles of TMultanT, TChilia>\^ 
walaT and *Gujrat* and the same names were authorised to be
Oxford - p.618.
2. Roberts - op.cit., p.340.
3. G.O.G.G. 12 June 1848. Bengal Mily. Cons. 12 June 1848.
No.64.
4. Bengal Mily.Statement. 1817.
1
borne on the colours of corps engaged in those campaigns.
Batta for six months was also granted to the troops employed
2in this campaign though it was twelve months before it was 
paid,^
After its annexation, the Panjab, like Sind, was consid­
ered a regular British province and the sepoys stationed there 
were deprived of the extra allowances they had received during 
the Panjab campaigns. Once again the native soldiers rose in 
mutiny against the change in the financial position.
On 9 June 1849 the military Auditor-General at Calcutta 
passed an order withdrawing the extra allowances paid to the
sepoys in all the cantonments in the Panjab. The order said
4
that this new rule was to be enforced from 1 April 1849. The
instruction reached Wazirabad in July 1849 and it met with
immediate opposition from the sepoy regiments stationed at
Rawalpindi. Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, was informed on the
5 624th that the 13th and 22nd regiments at Rawalpindi had 
refused to accept their pay at the revised rate.
On enquiry it was proved that while three companies 
(the 2nd, 3rd and 6th) of the 22nd regiment had been allowed
1. G.O.G.G. 14 July 1849. Bengal Mily. Cons. 14 July 1849.
. No. 78.
2. G.O.G.G. 14 July 1849 Bengal Mily,. Cons. 14 July 1849.
No. 78.
3. G.O.G.G, 20 March I85O Bengal Mily. Cons. 20 March 1850.
No. 67
4. Mily, Aud.Genl. to Field Paymaster in Panjab. Calcutta 9 
June 1949 No,2. ^engal Mily Cons. 20 October 1849 No.29.
5. Mitchell to Campbell Rawalpindi 24 July 1849. Bengal Mily. 
Cons. 20 October 1849 No,29.
6. Nesbitt to Campbell Rawalpindi 24 July 1849. Bengal Mily. 
Cons., 1849 No.29.
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Sind field allowance, the remaining seven had not received it. 
Consequently, these seven companies of the 22nd regiment and 
the whole 13th regiment refused to receive their pay. It was 
also found that the pay abstraction (for June 1649) for all 
the companies of the 22nd had been despatched to the Paymaster 
at Wazirabad on 2 July, The order of the military auditor- 
general about the withdrawal of extra allowance had reached 
the Paymaster on 5 July, On 9 July, while informing the 
company officers of all the regiments stationed in Panjab can­
tonments of the new situation the Paymaster of the army at 
Wazirabad pointed out that the 22nd was granted "the Sind 
field batta for May only;"
But the officers of three companies (the 2nd, 3rd and 
6th) of the 22nd "had committed the error of drawing the 
Scinde field batta for June." When they saw the letter of 
the Paymaster^ they prepared and sent fresh abstracts (for 
June) on 16 July in lieu of those containing the erroneous 
drawing, but took advantage of the circumstances to include 
the batta for May, ., * The remaining seven companies not 
having committed the mistake of drawing Scinde Field batta for 
June 1849, did not find it necessary to send in fresh abstracts 
for that month but in accordance with the letter drew the
1
batta for May in the abstract for July, on 1 August 1849.”
Accordingly, three companies received the allowances for May 
whi^k the remaining seven companies of the same regiment and
1. Nesbitt to Campbell - Rawalpindi 5 September 1849. Bengal. 
Mily. Cons. 20 October 1849. No.29.
all those of the 13th had as yet received only the basic pay 
of eight rupees and eight annas0
On receipt of this account the Adjutant-General ob­
served that it was "the duty cf the Adjutant of a regiment to 
examine the pay abstracts of companies before submitting them 
for the Commanding Officer’s counter signature, previous to 
their transmission to the pay office, and if the circumstances 
of the 2nd, 3rd and 6th companies having drawn in their 
amended abstracts field Scinde allowance for May while the 
remaining companies of the regiment had not drawn that allow­
ance, was not brought to the Commanding Officer’s notice or if 
brought to notice and still permitted, the proceeding --  was
very injudicious on the part of the Adjutant and Commanding 
1
Officer.,,"
The Governor-General and Sir Charles Napier, the Com-
mander-in-Chief after consulting with each other blamed the
pay master and the officers at Rawalpindi and observed, rightly
enough that confusion pervaded the whole of it. The Government
finally decided that however unsatisfactory and objectionable
it might be "to allow the mutinous men to escape punishment it
would be better rather to pay that allowance to the remainder
of the two regiments than to retrench the payment "which had
2been made to three companies of one of them.
But before this letter reached Rawalpindi, Campbell had
1. Adj. Genl. to Campbell. Lahore 11 September 1849, Bengal 
Mily, Cons. 20 October 1849. No*29.
2. Mily.Secy, to Adj. Genl. Simla 19 September 1849 No„234 
Bengal Mily. Cons, 20 October 1849. No.29.
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tided over the difficulty. On 26 September he wrote to Napier 
that on ”the day before your prescription for bringing them to 
their senses was despatched from Simla,” both the 13th and the 
seven companies of the 22nd had agreed to take their pay at
1
the reduced rate and it had been ”given to them accordingly,” 
The extra money which had already been granted to the three 
companies of the 22nd were however, allowed to the 13th and 
the remaining seven companies of the 22nd with their pay for 
September.
As the editorial of the Mofussilite shows the sympathy
of the Press in India was with the sepoys. The paper remarked
that it was ”not at all surprised at the conduct of the sepoys
*.,Had notice been given to the sepoys that Tsince the Panjaub
had been annexed, all extra allowances would be stopped,* the
sepoys would have been prepared for the measure . #. The folly
of the Government in a little matter [had] led to the dis-
2
affection of probably good men and excellent soldiers...”
2
The Home Authorities were informed of the circumstances
and the Government of India perhaps was relieved to think that
the danger was over. But before long the dissatisfaction among 
the native soldiers manifested itself again at Wazirabad. On 
4 December 1&49? Lieutenant-Colonel Moody, the Commanding 
officer of the 32nd regiment informed Major-General Hearsay
1. Campbell to Napier Rawalpindi 26 September 1849 Bengal Mily. 
.Cons. 20 October 1849* No.29*
2. The Mofussilite 2 August 1849.
3* L. from Bengal 14 October 1849* M*L. received from. Bengal
Vol. S £>
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the Brigadier at Wazirabad that his men were grumbling and
murmuring in the lines. The men were saying that the pay and
allowances now ordered for troops serving in the Panjab would
1”not fill their bellies,” Though Moody was of the opinion
that until the men actually refused their pay no overt measure
was necessary, Hearsey ordered him to parade the regiment, to
read the Articles of War and to explain to them those Articles
2
^bearing upon refusal to receive pay.” Hearsey himself recog­
nised that the situation was an unhappy one , sealing -from
for there were with the 32nd at Wazirabad two other 
regiments which still were receiving the additional Sind batta.” 
This anomalous and invidious position had arisen as the result 
of an order issued by the Military Auditor-General, granting 
Sind batta to such regiments as might choose ”to keep up their 
own courage in constant readiness for service”. Since the 53^d 
and 60th had chosen to adopt that cause they were still receiv­
ing the Sind batta, and were to receive it until January I85O,
As Hearsey said, whatever the reasons for the situation, it 
must ”appear hard to the sepoys of the 32nd regiment that as
3
serving at the same station they should get inferior allowance,” 
The Commander-in-Chief knowing about the incident de­
cided to take stern measures. Approving what Hearsey had done, 
Sir Charles informed the Brigadier that ”if any open and
1. Hearsey to Burroughs. Wuzeerabad, 5 December 1849. No.676, 
Bengal Mily.Cons. 28 December 1849* No,50,
2. Hearsey to Burroughs. Wuzeerabad 5 December 1849. No.676.
Bengal Mily, Cons. 28 December 1849. No.50.
3. Hearsay to Burroughs. Wuzeerabad; 5 December 1849. No.676.
Bengal Mily. Cons. 28 December 1&49. No.50.
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decided display of ill feeling” was exhibited it should be put 
down at once, The troops should be reminded that if the price 
of Abtah (flour) or rice should exceed 15 seers per rupee and 
the prices of other articles of food should also rise corres­
pondingly they would get compensation money* So the troops had 
no just grounds for complaint, Hearsey was therefore ordered 
to issue the pay to the regiment at the usual time and in the 
prescribed manner. If any man of any grade refused to receive 
his pay he should ”be immediately tried by a District court- 
martial on a charge of mutiny,” The Court, in turn should be 
made aware that mutiny was punishable with imprisonment with 
hard labour,^
Accordingly on 14 December 1849, the pay of the 32nd 
was ordered to be disbursed at the revised rate and in the
2
usual way. Four men including a havildar named Ranjeet Singh 
refused .to receive their pay. They were immediately put -under 
arrest and Hearsey addressed the sepoys in their own language, 
mentioning their fidelity and bravery and his warm feelings 
towards them, It had good effect. The men took their pay and 
went to their lines. The foui' convicted soldiers were tried by 
court-martial and as Sir Charles wished, were sentenced to 14 
years imprisonment with hard labour. They were ordered to be 
handed over to the civil authorities of the station, and the 
court, following the order of Napier, requested them that the
punishment might be carried out within the cantonment of
1, Adj.Genl.to Gilbert. Lahore 8 December 1849. No,114.Bengal 
Mily, Cons, 28 December 1849. No,50*
2. He was in Company?s service from 1809. India Gazette
4 February 1850,
Ultx^WabonJL where the culprits could be seen **in irons and at
1work by their former comrades.** This sentence, however, did
not satisfy Napier, who ordered a revision of the sentence.
The mutineers were then sentenced to death - a sentence which
Sir Charles commuted to transportation of life. In his general
order Napier described how **in eternal exile** they would
**expiate their crimes. For ever separated from their country
and their relations, in a strange land beyond the seas/* they
2
would **linger out their miserable lives.**
Although no other mutinous incident was staged in 1849 > 
the flame of discontent remained hidden in the hearts of the 
sepoys only to flare out again in February I85O. In October 
1849 the 66th regiment was ordered to march from Lucknow to 
Govindgarh, for garrison duties. The regiment reached Govind- 
garh by the end of January 1850,
In the evening of 31 January I85O Major Troup the com­
manding officer of the 66th regiment learnt from Lieutenant 
Ross that his company were murmuring in their lines about 
the reduced rate of pay and allowance in the Panjab. Troup
immediately paraded the regiment. On parade, as Troup reported,
3
the men were ”remarkably steady/* At 10 o Tclock that night 
four men from each company of the 66th were brought by their 
European officers to see the Major. When they were asked to 
state their grievances through one of their representatives,
Troup was told that they had **come far away from home** and
1. Adj.Genl.to Gibbert. Lahore 8 December 1849. No.114.Bengal 
Mily. Cons. 28 -December 1849. No, 50.
2. G. O.C.C. 25 January I85O. Bengal Mily.Cons, 25 January 18§0. 
No.34.
3. Troup to Burroughs. Govindgarh. 1 February I85O. 5i P.M. 
Bengal Mily. Cons. 22 March I85O, No.55.
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were doing as much duty as the corps who were garrisoned there
before them and yet they were receiving less pay. If they were
not allowed enough pay to maintain themselves, how could they
1perform the duties. The men were all very respectful, but 
seemed determined. Troup tried to make them realise that they 
were enrolled 77on seven rupees a month and for this pay they 
took an oath to serve the Government wherever they might be 
ordered, whether within or without the Company’s territories. ’7 
He further explained that the Government under peculiar cir­
cumstances and for a particular period had granted extra 
money to certain regiments. But during a time of peace to 
claim such privileges was ridiculous. The men were further 
told that the Major had no power either to allow or disallow 
any money to the regiment. On these arguments the men remarked 
that the Major was everybody to them. They also pointed out 
that all the enemies of the Gompany had not been conquered yet. 
If the Company should want to employ the native soldiers 
against its enemies like Golab Singh, then it would be better 
to hold out some hopes before the sepoys.
The Major, expressing his hope that they would win 
medals, if any war with Golab Singh took place dismissed them.
Next morning the regiment was paraded and the order of 
the Commander-in-Chief that the 66th would not be allowed Sind 
field batta at Govindgarh was read to them. Then the men were 
dismissed. But one hour later, Lieutenant Carter of the 7th
1. Troup before Court of Enquiry Govindghur 3 February IS50,
Bengal Mily. Cons,, 22 March I65O, No.56.
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company reported to Troup that his men had refused to take 
their accoutrements off and had told Carter that they would 
like to be discharged* After asking them to send four men in 
the morning to place their request before the Major, Carter 
succeeded in making them take off their accoutrements and go 
back to their lines.
Troup immediately sent an express letter to Major- 
General Gilbert, Commander of the Panjab Division* Next morn­
ing he sent an order to the European officers of the 66th that 
they were no longer required to bring their men to the Major 
if the men ?Thad nothing to state - but their grievances about 
the pay*?T In the meantime, the 1st regiment of native cavalry 
had reached Govindgarh and Troup informed its commanding offi­
cer, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford about the state of the garri­
son. Carter came to see the Major in the morning and reported 
that his company T?had changed their minds and no longer wished 
to cut their names at the present time; but they would wait to 
see if their bellies could be filled" A few moments later Ross 
reported to Troup that the Grenadier company without permission 
had taken their arms and had refused to surrender them without 
seeing the Major. Troup requesting Bradford to keep a squadron 
of his cavalry (with loaded carbines) ready to act if required 
decided to remove the 66th from duties inside the fort. He 
went to meet his regiment, paraded it, and then addressed them 
in such language as he thought ?T suitable to the occasion.Then 
he asked the sentry over the arms rack to point out the man 
who had first come to take his arms. After some hesitation the
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sentry pointed out sepoy Mirza Khyroola Beg of the grenadier 
company, This sepoy was immediately arrested. On further in­
sistence the Jamadar Ganga Singh also was pointed out as one 
who had known what was happening but had not informed the 
European officers about it. The Major placed the Jamadar too 
under arrest. While this arrest of the Jamadar and the sepoy 
was being made three companies (the 7th, 8th and 9th) of the 
regiment tried to release the prisoners. Meanwhile the cavalry 
squadron had reached the fort. But Lieutenant Barker, in charge 
of the gate guard duty, not having any orders, refused to allow 
the squadron to enter the fort. The men of the 66th who were 
on gate guard duty took the opportunity to close the main gate 
shouting that they would not admit the cavalry. Captain Mac­
donald of the 66th now went near the main gate and after 
striking two or three soldiers with his sword forced them to 
give way. The gate was opened and the squadron trotted into 
the fort, Troup now ordered the regiment to pile arms, an order 
which was obeyed after a little hesitation. The 66th was
marched unarmed out of the fort and the command of the fort
1
was made over to Bradford,
General Gilbert reached Govidgarh, on 3 February and a 
court of enquiry was held next day. The European officers and 
the native soldiers were examined. It was found that the 
general order of the Commander-in-Chief had reached Lucknow on
7 November and that the 66th had commenced its march on 12
1. Bradford to Deputy Asst, Adj. Genl, Amritsar 3 February 
1850, No.26.Bengal.Mily, Cons, 22 March I85O. No*55
November 1849. Before it left Lucknow, a printed copy of the 
general order had been sent to ‘che regiment to be written into 
the order book. That part of the order rescinding the Sind 
batta had also been explained by the Regimental Sergeant - 
major to the orderly havildars of companies for the information 
of their men, Troup added that he had not himself explained the 
matter at a regimental parade because the general order had 
not directed commanding officers to take such action, ftIn the 
Lucknow brigade™ he said ™it was customary when it was con­
sidered necessary to explain any General Order to the troops 
on parade for that purpose,0 On this occasion no such order 
was issued.™ Troup further defended himself by saying wif I 
had felt the necessity of further explanation or had not been 
strongly impressed that the subject of this order was well 
known to the regiment I would not have been guided by the 
custom,
Another point brought out at the enquiry was the 66th
on its way from Lucknow to Govindgarh had often met ™the
native officers and men goingon furlough from almost every reg­
iment then serving in the Panjab. These men were questioned by 
the 66th about the price of provision in the Panjab and the 
answer almost invariably after detailing their price was ™and
2
the extra pay to the troops serving there™ had been withdrawn.
The opinion of the Court of enquiry was that Major
1, Troup before Court of enquiry Govindghur 4 February I85O 
Bengal Mily.Cons. 22 March 1850. No,56,
2, Troup to Burroughs Amritsar 3 March 1850, Bengal Mily Cons.
3 April 1850. No.71.
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Troup, before marching from Govindgarh, should have read the 
general order to the regiment himself, Troup, for his part 
blamed the native officers of the 66th - attributing ™the 
whole of this disgraceful affair to the gross neglect of duty
and utter faithlessness of native commissioned and non-commis-
1 1 sioned officers.™ The Court sent 95 soldiers for trial.
Gilbert meanwhile had ordered an immediate general
court-martial. He had explained his action to the Commander-in-
Chief as follows: ™prompt punishment, in such cases, being most
conducive to the upholding of discipline induced me to follow
this course instead of first submitting the proceedings of the
2
Enquiry for His ExcellencyTs consideration.
The 95 men were tried in two batches at Govindgarh and
sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour. Three sepoys and
jne Jamadar were sentenced to 14 years, 28 sepoys to 10 years
and 8 sepoys to 7 years. Six others were acquitted and 47 were
immediately dismissed. Two Subadars also were tried and dis-
3
missed from the service.
The men who were sentenced to imprisonment, were
ordered ™to be immediately ironed and then to be marched past
the front of their own regiment, the 66th on parade, on their
4way to the Amritsar jail.™ Further, Gilbert ordered the 
court to forward copies to the civil authorities so that the
1. Troup to Burroughs Amritsar 3 March I85O. Bengal Mily.Cons.
3 April I85O. No.69.
2. Gilbert to Adj.Genl,Govindghur 9 February I85O, No,270. 
Bengal Mily.Cons. 22 March I85O. No.55.
3. Gilbert to Adj. Genl, Govindghur 15 February I85O. No,294. 
Bengal Mily Cons, 22 March I85O. No.55
4. Gilbert to Adj. Genl.•Govindghur 15 February I85O. No,294. 
Bengal Mily,Cons, No.55.
misconduct and punishment of the offenders might be made gen­
erally known in the districts to which they belonged because
such a measure would have the best effect in checking the dis-
1
graceful conduct of which they had been guilty. The 66th was
ordered to be marched to Ambala, to be paid there at the usual
cantonment rates (seven rupees) and then to be disbanded* The
47 sepoys who were sentenced to be dismissed from the service
by the court martial were granted two annas per day each as
their subsistence money and were ordered to be taken to Lud-
2
hiana for their dismissal.
The 66th marched from Govindgarh to Ambala, and on 21 
March 1850 was there paraded. The order of disbandment was read 
to them. Major General Hill, Commander of the Sirhind Division, 
enquired of the men whether they were fully paid and ”the 
reply from the whole body in the most respectful manner was 
that they were.” Immediately after Hill marched them through 
the cantonment ”in presence of the troops paraded on this
3
occasion” and left them on the Saharanpur road.
On 27 February 1^50, a general order to the European 
officers of native regiments was issued. Pointing out that an 
interpreter had been appointed to every regiment for the pur­
pose of translating orders to the native corps Napier censured 
Troup for not himself explaining to the sepoys through his
1. Gilbert to Adj, Genl. Govindghur 15 February I85O* No,294.
Bengal Mily,Cons. 22 March 1850. No.35
2. Bengal Mily.Cons, 15 March I85O. No.129.
3. Hill to the Adj. Genl, Amballa- 22 March I85O. No,309.
Bengal Mily. Cons. 10 April I85O. No,72.
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regimental interpreter ,?one of the most important and critical
orders that ever was issued by a Governor-General and which the
Commander-in-Chief had especially directed to be carefully
1
explained by commanding officers to their regiments.” Such 
laxity of discipline, Napier added was enough to destroy the 
best army in the world.
The order expressed the hope that the young officers of 
the native regiments would realise ?Tthe necessity of endeav­
ouring to associate as much as possible with the native 
officers” and would ”make them their comrades in every sense 
of the word” The European officers could then only expect to 
acquire a thorough knowledge of the feelings of their men. It 
was not through sergeant-majors or orderly havildars that a 
sepoy was ”to learn the justice, the generosity and the care 
for his welfare which was exercised by his Government 
directly from the European officers,”
In conclusion the order reminded the European officers 
of the native army that ”in future every order issued by the 
Commander-in-Chief was to be read by the Commanding officers 
personally or through their interpreters to their regiments 
under their respective command and again read and explained by
every European officer on his private parade to the company
3uunder his command.”
The Home Authorities approved the decision of the
1. G, O.G.&. 2? February I85O, Bengal Mily. Cons, 22 March
I850, No.45.
2. G,0,G. 27 February I85O. Bengal Mily.Cons, 22 March I85O.
No.45.
Governor-General and remarked that Troup1 s explanation could
not ”exonerate him from the blame which was attached to his
1
direct disobedience of the instruction,”
Troup and Barker both were tried by court-martial as 
Napier wished. They were severely censured but at the same 
time were reappointed to a new regiment.
Recruits for this new regiment, the Nusseri battalion, 
were drawn from Nepal, and Napier hoped that the use of a 
new type of recruits would prevent any further spread of mut­
inous feelings in the Bengal army, since, as he said, it 
would show the sepoys that the Government was not dependent on
the native troops of the line alone or on the classes from
2
which they were now exclusively recruited for its power.
The Press in India, hitherto ready to point out the 
genuine grievances of the sepoys who mutinied, on this 
occasion had censured the 66th and the whole native army, most 
severely. The Mofussilite wrote the sepoy had been ”so
petted, belauded and indulged” that he was ”quite spoilt --
he should be kept well under and taught to think less of him-
3
self than he does at present.” The Bengal Hurkaru observed 
that though the mutineers of the 66th had ”exceeded anything 
within our own experience in India”, they had only been 
T?sentenced to 14 years1 imprisonment or even less severe
1. D. to Bengal -Bengal 27 November 1850. No. 129. M,D. 
sent^to Bengal Vol. 36.
2. Adj.Genl. to Mily.Secy.Lahore-27 February I85O. No,295. 
Bengal Mily.Gons. 22 March I85O. No.5$.
3. The Mofussilite 8 February I85O,
443
punishment.” ”This extraordinary mildness” the editor was at 
a loss to account for.” Some summary scene should have been 
enacted as speedily as possible - a scene which would have 
made a lasting example impression or whatever of a mind the 
Bengal sepoy® might have”'*’ While expressing these opinions 
the Press also pointed out to the Indian Government that the 
native soldiers served only for their pay and unless the 
monthly pay which they received enabled them, under any cir­
cumstances, to keep up the family remittances they would
speedily become discontented and eventually would be sullen,
2
sulky, insolent and mutinous. When that was the case, the
Government should have considered that the price of grain in
the. Panjab in I85O was almost as high as when they first
crossed the Sutlej. The operations of the Sikh war had put a
stop to all agricultural labours and had ruined the standing
crops of a great part of the country.and accordingly ”the
bazaars of grain throughout the Panjab [were] mainly supplied
from our provinces - even from Rohilcund and equally
3
distant parts,”
The Delhi Gazette asked how often did ”the Government 
of this country want the same lesson to be read to it?” 
Experience did ”not appear to guide its counsels in the least 
. * * . The foolish alterations continually made in their pay 
whenever this river or that had to be crossed,” had been 
enough to turn ”the heads of any soldier in the world -
1. The Bengal Hurkaru 28 February I85O.
2. the Mof ussilibe"8"February I85O.
3* Ibid., 15 February I85O.
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soldiers even whose patriotism could be appealed to,” The 
remedy of all these evils regarding pay was, as a correspon­
dent wrote in the Mofussilite T to lay down a clear account of 
what pay would be drawn under all circumstances, an account
which ought to be explained to each recruit on being sworn in,
2
and from which no deviation should ever be allowed. The 
Government was also urged not to recruit its native infantry 
soldiers almost entirely from one district but to find sub­
stitute for the Oudh men from the Gurkhas, the Muslims to the
3 4
North and west of Peshawar, the Sikhs and the Eurasians, It
was also pointed out that it had been more good fortune that
the 66th had not been able to-seize the fort of Govindgarh
5
with its treasures and stores. ”Had it once closed the gates
on its officers the mere circumstances would have rendered
them desperate and the first flag of revolt in the Panjaub * * *
would in that case have been hoisted by our own troops. They
would then have been joined by the discontented spirits of 
6
the Panjaub.”
1. Delhi Gazette 28 February I85O,
2. The Mofussilite 26 February 1850.
3. ”There is no employment for the half-caste children of 
European soldiers except becoming drummers in the native 
regiments.” P.P. 1831-32, XIII, (735~v),H. C. pp.24, 11, 17,
4. The Mofussilite 26 February I85O.
5. ”Besides the political importance of the fort, the fort 
contained ten lakhs of treasure, innumerable quantities of 
arms and ammunitions of war which had lately been taken, 
from the enemy and also a monthsf supply for 1800 men.” - 
Troup before court of enquiry.-Govindghur, 4 February I85O. 
Bengal Mily.Cons,, 22'March I85O, No.56.
6. Athenaeum 9 March I85O.
445
With the disbandment of the 66th order was restored.
The sepoys submitted to the service conditions imposed by the 
Government and the mutinous disposition was not shown for some 
time to come. The tranquility that now settled upon the sepoy 
lines was reflected in the period itself for, apart from 
certain skirmishes with Afghan marauders on the north-western 
frontier, there was no other warfare in the plains of India.
But India was not destined yet to enjoy tranquility for 
more than a year. Trouble again broke out in Burma where the 
local Governors had been harassing the English traders. In 
1&51 these traders asked for help from the Indian Government, 
and in 1&$2 the Governor-General ordered the despatch of an 
expeditionary force to Burma.
The 36th sepoy regiment was one of the corps chosen for
this service. Lieutenant-Colonel Burney, the commanding
officer, was asked on 12 February to ascertain whether his men
1
were willing to volunteer for Rangoon. At this time three 
companies of the 3£th were at Midnapore on detached duty, a 
majority of the others (6$0) were on guard duty at Fort Will­
iam, and the rest were at Barrackpore. On receiving the letter 
Burney ordered the pay havildars of the companies who were at 
Barrackpore to proceed to Fort William to ascertain the feel­
ings of the men on duty there. These pay havildars went to 
Fort William and on returning they reported ??that if the
1. Banks to Burney Fort William 12 February 1&52. Bengal Mily. 
Cons. 13 August 1&52. No.59.
Colonel and the officers went they were not unwilling to 
go1*,^  Two days later, on 14 February Burney was removed from 
the command of the regiment, having been posted to another 
corps.
Major Knyvett who succeeded to the command of the regi­
ment, assembled the whole of the native officers on duty in 
the Fort and explained the wishes of Government and the advan­
tages to be derived from volunteering. The native officers
expressed their willingness to go but declined to answer for 
o
their men.
On 27 February Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, Commander
of the Presidency division was informed that the Governor-
General was desirous of sending the 3$th by sea to Rangoon.
But in the event of its not volunteering to go by sea, it
would be ordered to march to Arakan to relieve the 67th which
3
would then be sent to Burma.
The publication of this letter was delayed till the 
whole regiment had returned from the Fort and detached duty.
On 6 March Burney resumed to command of the regiment. 
He at once issued a regimental order for the companies to 
attend at his quarters on 8 March ?fwith side arms, in order 
for each individual to affix his signature in presence of the 
officer of his companyTT to a role of those willing to go to
1. Burney before Ct. of Enq, Barrackpure 18 March 1852,
Bengal Mily.Cons, 13 August 1852. Noo60,
2C Knyvett before the court of enquiry 18 March 1852, Bengal 
Mily.Cons, 13 August 1852. No.60,
3. Banks to'Hamilton 27 February I852. No.511. Bengal Mily, 
Cons. I852. No.60.
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Rangoon and ^Dissentients” would have their names placed in
1
another column and would be required to give their reasons.
On 8 March when the order was to be carried out Captain
Nepean found that his company had not fallen in on parade and
that the men evinced a ”great disinclination” to do so. With
much difficulty and after half an hour of persuasion the
company fell in and marched off. Nepean then left his company
under the Subadar and went to see whether another company under
his command was ready. On returning to the parade ground
Nepean found the men of the first company still near the
quarter guard. The Subadar reported that they had acted in
2
this way at the instigation of four sepoys. Even after
NepeanTs arrival the sepoys still refused to go to the Major Ts
quarters to sign the roll. Finding that the men would not obey
3
his orders Nepean went to Burney.
The misconduct of NepeanTs company was reported to 
Brigadier Warren, Commanding at Barrackpore. Next morning the 
regiment was paraded by Warren and the letter from Government 
was read and explained to the men. The regiment when asked 
about their volunteering for Rangoon, expressed their unwilling­
ness to proceed by sea and stated nthey were ready to move in
4any direction by land.”
1. Bengal Mily Cons, 13 August lSjJ?.. No.60. Ap.M,
2. Kalka Singh, Gurdial Singh, Peerkhan and Ramsuran Pathak,
3. Nepean before Court of enquiry Barrackpore 16 March 1652 
Bengal Mily,Cons. 13 August 1852. No.60.
4„ Warren to Ross Barrackpore 9 March 1652. No.87. Bengal 
Mily.Cons. 27 March I852. No.329*
With this expression of unwillingness on the part of
the 38th all attempts to induce the regiment to volunteer
should have ceased. But some of the native officers continued
to try to induce the men to go on board ship. These attempts
were so frequently repeated that the men became both annoyed
and afraid. They thought that they would by force be put on
board because, as the current rumour had it, ”the Lieutenant-
Colonel had ”promised to the Government the service of the
regiment” and he thought ”that the regiment was under his 
1
thumb.” The men were so worried that on 17 March, after
parade had been dismissed all the companies fell in again and
set off to see their company commanders to complain of the
annoyance to which they were subjected. When they were marching
to the officers* Quarters, Lieutenant Castle, the Adjutant of
the regiment saw them and ordered them to go back to their
lines. The order appeared to have been obeyed unhesitatingly.
But the men when near the bells of arms, called for the
Adjutant, who went to them. After a short explanation from
him that the whole business was about to be investigated ”the
2
men went quietly to their lines,”
On 18 March 1852 a court of enquiry was held at Barrack­
pore. It was proved that Burney had first elicited the opinion 
of a few sepoys on his own initiative. As no opposition was 
expressed he had assumed that the whole corps would consent to
1. Deputy Judge Adv.Genl. to Asst.Adj,Genl* Hoshyarpore 
3 April 1852. No.22
2. Castle before court of enquiry Barrackpore 18 March 1852, 
Bengal Mily,Cons, 13 August I852. No.60.
proceed to Rangoon, It was also established that the sepoys
had been threatened by Burney that if they did not volunteer
they would be sent to Arakan as a mark of his displeasure. He
1
said to the 38th that he was the same man who had put 26 men 
in irons and that he would serve all ”the rascals in the same 
way.” This angered the men, particularly as there was some 
accompanying threat to deprive them of their invalid pensions. 
This threat to the sepoys on parade on 12 March, observed the 
court of enquiry, was very objectionable. Equally injudicious 
was the regimental order of Burney. The signing of the rolls 
one by one seemed ”to have raised fears in the minds of the 
men and to have been the chief cause of the discontent in the 
regiment,” Burney in his deposition before the court explained 
the reasons for his conduct. ”With apprehension of disappoint­
ment” he had considered himself in a false position and in 
order that no blame might be imputed [ to him] for want of 
caution in ascertaining the correct state of feeling among the
men of the regiment” he had deemed it wise to issue the Regi- 
2
mental order. The court did not agree.
The conduct of Knyvett also was censured by the court, 
Burney and Knyvett did not get along well together. For that 
reason Knyvett passing over Burney, his Commanding officer, 
had reported the conduct of his company direct to Warren,
1. ”In 1840 the 38th had manifested an insubordinate spirit to 
avoid going to Candahar but prompt and decisive measure 
adopted by me in bringing to trial 26 men saved the regiment, 
Bengal Mily.Cons. 13 August l8$2e Noc60, Ap.H •
2, Bengal Mily Cons. 13 August 1852, No.60, Ap.M,
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Knyvett was also censured for having replaced the havildar- 
major (drill havildar) who was a Brahmin by a Rajput - a move 
which had excited further discontent.
1
Burney requested the Court to discharge 400 men from 
the 38th, these being the men who were most disaffected and 
who had influenced the other men of the regiment in its recent 
insubordinate conduct. But the names of only eight of these 
men appeared in the report of the Court, which did not see any 
reason why the summary removal from the service of all these
400 men recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Burney should take 
2
place.
Hamilton, when forwarding the proceedings of the court
to the Adjutant-General added his opinion that ”the whole
business was injudicious and ended as it ought to have been
anticipated it would by placing the Government in a false
position. As a regiment it was not expected that they would
volunteer for ship board.” 'Such mass voluntary had never yet
taken place, but the Government had always succeeded in obtaining
individual volunteers, when called for and would continue to 
3do so.
The Commander-in-Chief for his part expressed his 
regret that everything should have been so strangely misman­
aged in the 38th by its superior officers, and ordered the
1. They were all Hindus of inferior caste as mentioned by 
Burney in his statement before this court.
2. Bengal Mily.Cons. 13 August 1852. No,60.
3. Hamilton to Adj.Genl. Barrackpore 24 March 1852, No.48.
Bengal Mily.Cons. 13 August 1852. No.60.
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dismissal of the eight sepoys.
Meanwhile, the Governor-General in a minute of 20 March,
had declared that although the Government might feel dissap-
2
pointed that the 3$th had not volunteered as on a former 
occasion, still the Government had no right to complain. The 
men were not enlisted for service by sea and they had been 
”guilty of no insubordination in declining to embark.H As for 
the rumour that the regiment would refuse even to march to 
Arakan, that appeared to have been exaggerated, *TIn order to 
avoid all possible risk of a manifestation of mistaken dis­
content in the corps,the Governor-General thereupon ordered
the 3^th to march for Dacca to relieve the sickly 74th regiment
3
stationed there.
The Home Authorities, on learning about the unhappy in­
cident of 1852, censured Burney and approved the measures taken 
by the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, They did 
not leave the matter there, however, for they suggested that
4
such a change in the terms of future enlistments might be made
5
as might ^eventually relieve you from similar embarassments.
As usual this Barrackpore incident of 1BJ2 drew the 
attention of the Press in India. Several letters and articles
1. Memorandum of the C.in C. Kangra 3 April 1852. Bengal 
Mily.Cons. 13 August 1852, No.60.
2. nIn 1S29 nearly half of the regiment volunteered to- accom­
pany Burney to Ava? Bengal Mily. Cons. 13 August 1$52.Ap.M.
3. Bengal Mily. Cons. 27 March 1852. No,330.
4. Soon after Lord Dalhousie issued an order that all sepoy 
recruits should be enlisted for general service.
5. D, to Bengal 20 October lSd?* No.12$. M, D, sent to Bengal. 
Vol.40.
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were published. A few censured the 3$th and abused them as
1
77 contemptible and litigous scoundrels, and wondering why the 
whole corps was not disbanded, blamed the military authorities 
- the Commander-in-Chief who was at Kangra, the Adjutant-Gener­
al, who was at Simla and the Judge-Advocate General who was in 
Sind for their want of firmness and decision. The writer of a 
letter published in the Delhi Gazette under the name *centur- 
ionT objected to the practice of asking sepoys if they would 
do this or that. The British were the lords of the country and 
it was their duty to show these so-called soldiers that mere 
wearing of a red coat and cross belts would not make them 
soldiers.2
But except for these few adverse opinions the Press in
India in general censured the Government for its bad policy
and management* The Telegraph and Courier wrote that the 3$th
3
could not be blamed for any breach of military discipline.
The Athenaeum observed that the affair had been mismanaged
and pointed out to the Government that the Bengal sepoys were
knot enrolled for service beyond the sea. One correspondent of 
the Delhi Gazette was of the opinion that in almost every 
instance of mutiny of the native regiments the Government was 
to be blamed and that it would T7most assuredly turn itself out 
of the country at no very distant period by its own repeated
acts of gross mismanagement and of bad faith to its native
1. Morning Chronicle quoted by the Englishman and Military 
Chronicle 11 March 1^52.
2. The Delhi Gazette 12 May 1^52,
3. The Telegraph and Courier 23 March 1&52,
Athenaeum 23 March IS52*.
,fl
troops.
Summarising the history of the Bengal native infantry 
regiments from 1796 onwards it can be pointed out that with 
the gradual growth of the Company!s empire the size and impor­
tance of the sepoy army had also increased. After 1S24, how­
ever, the number of the regiments remained fixed (74 regiments) 
and though the strength of individual regiments often increased 
or decreased to suit the circumstances the increases did not 
keep pace with the growth in territory. While the sepoys became 
more self-consciously aware of their importance they thus 
found themselves employed for long periods on boring or even 
unmilitary duties, and that at ever increasing distances from 
their home. A gradual deterioration of discipline followed. If 
the sepoy regiments continued to distinguish themselves in 
action against the CompanyTs enemies, they also increasingly 
made themselves notorious for mutinous conduct.
All these mutinous outbreaks in the Bengal army from 
1824 to 1852 showed the sepoys were gradually growing discont­
ented with their service conditions. Besides this, these in­
cidents further pointed out that mismanagement prevailed in the
1, The Delhi Gazette 27 March 1&52.
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military department and with Henry Lawrence it can rightly
be said ”after a hundred years * experience of Indian warfare
the East India Company was still nearer the A B C  than the Z
1
of a sound, practical military administration.” If peace 
and order did reign in the lines from 1852 to 1857 the quiet 
was deceptive. It was but a lull preceding the storm which 
rolled down the plains of India in all its fury in 1857.
1. Lawrence - op. cit. , p. 157
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CHAPTER Y
CONCLUSION
In 1849 the editor of the Mofussilite, in a review 
of the state of the Bengal native infantry, wrote "they 
undoubtedly possess many of the best qualities of soldiers, 
they are for the most part fond of and devoted to the 
services; they are patient, cheerful and obedient. And on 
glorious campaigns in Sind, on the Sutledge and most recently 
in the Panjab have shown that they are disposed to perform 
readily all military duties." Such praise might have led the 
reader to believe that all was well with the sepoy army, had 
not the editor gone on to admit that "of late years, our 
sepoys have, however, deteriorated," and concluded that though 
"the fault lies in part with the Government, the chief cause 
is m  the present system."
What that system was, and how it had developed, has 
already been stated, and the evidence of that deterioration, 
revealed in sepoy outbreaks, has already been given in earlier 
chapters. It remains to analyse the effect of the administra­
tive policies of the Company upon the Bengal army, and to 
estimate the importance of the various causes of the disturb­
ances which have been recorded.
1. The Mofussilite, 26 June” 1849. "
In the earliest years, until 1796, the conditions of 
the Company's service were so novel, and so constantly 
changing, the loose, free-lance traditions of the Mughal and 
Maratha military systems so strong, the example set by the 
officers and men of the Company's European forces so dubious, 
that the occurrence of unrest in the sepoy forces might seem 
to require little explanation. In those years the transition 
from hired Indian levy into disciplined army was still pro­
ceeding, for that reason our discussion will relate only to 
the period which began in 1796, to the years that is when 
the army had received its regular regimented organisation, 
had come under a series of elaborate codes and regulations, 
and had been placed completely in European hands.
The first question which requires an answer is why 
the sepoys ever chose to mutiny : why, if they had serious 
grievances, they chose to air them in that drastic way? It 
has been seen that the ordinary crime rate of the sepoy 
battalions was very low, in marked contrast to that of the 
Europeans in the Company:s service, whose drunken disorders 
began to attract many earnest reforms in this period. Doubt­
less the tedium of years of sepoy life, the irritations of 
the hot weather, or the discomforts of the monsoon in un­
drained cantonment lines, the worries of long separation from 
family and village, and a multiplicity of other petty causes 
at times built up such a pitch of exasperation that the sepoys
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only needed one more grievance to explode. But the penalties 
for mutiny were known, the flow of Persian!sed Hindustani at 
the monthly reading of the Articles of War did not pass over 
every head and some old sepoy or native commissioned officer 
was probably to be found in almost any regiment who could 
recall Munro^1 s or Paget's drastic treatment of mutineers.
Had there been some less drastic means of making known and 
securing redress of grievances it would surely have been 
taken. That suggests that there was a serious breakdown of 
communications between the sepoy and higher authority.
The proper channel through which to make grievances 
known ought to have been the non-commissioned and commissioned 
native officers. But the jamadars and subadars of the native 
infantry were in a very curious position. It was only with 
difficulty that they could make their status as officers felt 
among the sepoys or with the European officers of their regi­
ments, They had emerged, by long service, from the sepoy's 
ranks, but yet had to share their lives and manner of life, 
and like the sepoy obey the orders of the youngest subaltern. 
They were surrounded by men recruited from their own or 
neighbouring villages, with whom there were thus strong ties 
of caste, village, perhaps even kinship. They were elderly men, 
with years of hard service behind them, and no prospects of 
early promotion, or of titles and rewards to spur them on, 
men therefore inclined to swim with rather than against the
tide,1 Occasionally, as in the 1824 mutiny of the 47th, they 
were themselves implicated in mutinys (on that occasion they 
and the native Kcommis si one d officers of the regiment shared 
the grievance of the sepoys, having been told that they must 
make their own arrangements for transport. The court of 
enquiry denounced them for having indirectly encouraged that
p
mutiny, and they were discharged "as a salutary example to
m ove ttv^y m eteJy  sfcooJi ,
the Native officers of the army in general. " ^  Hence the 
punitive orders issued to the 64th in 1844, designed to make 
the native officers realise that they would be "held respon­
sible for the maintenance of discipline and good order among 
the men in their lines,1 and Hunter's later threats that 
unless they produced the ringleaders in the mutiny, they
Awould "by force be deprived of their arms," Again,in 1850, 
when the 66th refused to march to the Panjab, the native 
officers failed to exert their authority to prevent the dis­
turbance, and failed equally to keep their European officers 
informed of what was happening. Eventually Jamadar G-anga Singh 
was arrested for passive complicity in the mutiny. Two 
subadars, one jamadar of the regiment were punished for what 
Colonel Troup denounced as "the gross neglect of duty and 
utter faithlessness of native commissioned and non-commissioned
1. Malcolm commented that the native officers acted "like men 
who, while desirous of not forfeiting what they possessed, 
were without adequate motives to make them perform with 
spirit a difficult and dangerous duty. The political 
history of India Vol.2. p.234.
2. TJenl.observation of the court of enquiry, para."S3C 
Barrackpore 2 January 1825. Bengal Mily.Cons. 6 January 1825
3. See Chapter IV. p.ss4 s'0'*
4. See Chapter IV. p#3 $0 '
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officers,1’ Communications thus sometimes broke down because 
the native officers identified themselves with their men, 
actively or passively, and hushed up grievances so as to 
avoid trouble *
They also broke down for the very opposite reason, 
that the native officers had come to be seen by the men as 
part of the officers group, indifferent or hostile to their 
interests. For many years, as was seen in Chapter II, the 
European officer's had added largely to their pay by a series 
of irregular expedients - bazaar allowances, off-reckoning 
funds, if not such frauds as underpayments to the sepoys, or 
false muster-rolls. In all such operations the aid, or at 
least the silence of the native officers, pay havildars etc,, 
had been an essential part, to be rewarded by improper pro­
motion, or undue authority, Something of that tradition 
seems to have lingered on, The enquiry into the mutiny of 
the 47th revealed that the Subadar-Major by his -undue 
influence with successive colonels had secured the improper 
promotion of two of his relatives, - and that the sepoys had 
attempted to burn down his hut, and had demanded that he be 
put to death. The 64th likewise complained of the undue 
influence of Subadar Durga Prasad with the Colonel, and of 
the improper promotion of Havildar Seetaram, and also stated 
that they had not had one month's pay complete. When the 
sepoys had so little trust in their native officers, it might 
well have seemed that only a demonstration would make their
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grievances known.
Had the European officers of the Bengal native infan­
try themselves heen in closer touch with their men the weak­
ness of the native officer link would not have been so much 
a stumbling stone. But it is clear that direct contact between 
officers and sepoys was not present very often. Enquiry com­
mittee after enquiry committee pointed to the need for a 
closer and friendlier relationship between European officers 
and the men. Lt. Col. Cartwright was censured for his short- 
tempered manner and '’lack in the art of gaining esteem;” 
Captain Horsborough in 1825 should have been censured for his 
complete ignorance of the sickness among his men. In 184-4, 
Colonel Moseley was found to have taunted and ridiculed his 
men, and Lt. Young was removed for the violence of his temper. 
We have seen how inadequate cadet training was and how in­
creasingly young officers came out from England with a fixed 
idea of the inferiority of Indians. Such harsh treatment as 
listed above followed from such attitudes.
Discontent among officers with their service condi­
tions, the flight of the better men to lucrative posts out­
side their regiments; the interposing of a mass of regulations 
between the authority of the officer and the sepoy, also led 
to slackness in duties. Very often those who remained with the 
regiments had suffered as much from the slowness of promotion 
and the absence of any spur to ambition as had their native
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officers. Lt. Col. Moseley had entered the Company’s service 
in 1805, had waited twenty years for his captaincy, and had 
only hecome a Lt. Col. in 1836 - and if his experience was 
shared hy many others who had to put in fifteen or twenty 
years before reaching the rank of captain, so probably others 
lost their temper while waiting for promotion, and certainly 
lost their zeal. Captain Burt, it was noted, seldom appeared 
on parade, and was ignorant of the fact that his new recruits 
were all old sepoys on the run. The medical officer of the 
46th at Hangpur had submitted no report on the health of the 
regiment, until required to do so by the court-martial,
Colonel Troupe in 1849 left it to his sergeant-major to in­
form the 66th of the most important fact that the Panjab batta 
had been withdrawn. No wonder that General Hunter thought it 
necessary in 1844 to remind the officers that "the mere 
getting over a duty," was inadequate and that in 1850 the
Mofussilite should have thought it necessary to stress "how
1
imperatively requisite it is for the European to mingle with
2
and know the men."
But it was impossible so to mingle with the men if 
officers had not learnt their language - and the evidence
1. Napier's General Order of 27 February 1850 particularly 
stressed the need for young officers to associate with 
the native officers and make them their comrades and to 
keep in direct contact with the men of their regiment.
2* The Moffussilite 15 October 1850.
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suggests that very often they had not done so. It was still 
in 1852 the general practice to attach an interpreter to 
every native regiment, and the reports of the courts of 
enquiry suggest that many officers still relied upon the 
interpreter, or upon the native officers to make good their 
own linguistic deficiencies, (Those officers who passed their 
language examinations only too often were lost to the regi­
ments by appointment to the political or civil service).
In some cases a very high proportion of the officers
with the regiments were comparative new comers, who had had
no opportunity to learn to know their men. Captain Mcnaughton,
a member of the Barrackpur general court martial noted that
at the time of when the 47th mutinied there was but one of its
2
old officers present. Similarly when unrest developed in 
the 4th, 34th, 64th and 69th in 1844, it was found that the 
great majority of the officers attached to those regiments 
had been posted to them since 1840, In an army, where
1. M,C. 8 August 1796. Grace Bengal regulations 1799* p.320, 
Carroll's Bengal Code 1817. Sec.XLI.
•  8. S „ J . ig3s- t (a. s
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1personal influences counted for a great deal, the lack of 
a well-established relationship between officers and men was 
a great drawback.
Another common feature of the regiments in which 
mutinies occurred was the absence of a considerable propor­
tion of such officers as had been posted to them. One partic­
ularly striking coincidence, if it was coincidence, was that 
the colonel commanding was in no case present with his 
regiment when it mutinied. In 1825, Colonel Shuldham of the 
46th was holding a staff appointment 5 in 1844 Colonel Cunliffe 
of the 4th was on furlough, Colonel Cooper of the 34th was 
commandant at Barrackpore, Colonel Tapp of the 64th seems to 
have been on sick leave and Colonel Durant of the 69th on 
leave. In 1849-50 Colonel Latter of the 66th was absent on 
furlough, while in 1852 Colonel Wymer, A.B.C. to the Queen, 
was on staff duty. Three of the seven regiments mentioned 
above had fewer than the sanctioned number of officers on 
their strength - the 46th had only nineteen of the authorised
1. Such personal influence has always been important in the 
Indian army. Sir Claude Auchinleck observed "Those who 
have served for many years with Indian troops, as I have 
done, have always recognised that the loyalty of our men 
was really to the officers of the regiment or unit... the 
men’s allegiance for all practical purposes was focused 
on the regiment, and particularly on the regimental 
officers, on whom they depended for their welfare, advance­
ment and their future prospects. In these officers their 
faith and trust were almost childlike, as events have 
proved time and time again. It is true to say that in 
almost every case of serious discontent or indiscipline, 
and there have been remarkably few of them which has 
occurred in the past fifty years, the cause could be traced 
to indifferent officers and bad man-management♦”
John Corij&ll - Auchinlech pp. 947-948.
twenty-three, and all of them had a high proportion of such 
officers as had been posted to them absent from the regiment. 
When the mutinies occurred - the 66th, indeed had nearly one-
1
third of its officers away, including the commanding officer. 
As a result such officers as Captain Burt or Captain Nepean 
had to try and cope with two companies, with one of which 
they must obviously have had little acquaintance. No wonder 
then that the sepoys, with strange company commanders or none 
at all, with the commanding officer, the father of the regi­
ment, in every instance absent, and with native officers who 
either would not or could not speak for them, rose in mutiny 
to express their grievances.
Mutiny, it has been argued, was resorted to because 
no other way seemed open of securing the attention of author­
ity - authority which had become steadily less personal and 
more remote. Not all of the grievances were in themselves of 
such great importance as to seem to require drastic action, 
mutiny was a sign of maladministration, of bad man-management. 
There were, however, a number of issues round which discontent 
frequently focussed, and which were likely to lead to 
violence.
1, In 1625, 6 of the 19 officers of the 46th were absent.
In 1844, 8 of the 22 officers of the 4th were absent.
In 1844, 9 of the 23 officers of the 34th were absent.
In 1844, 8 of the 22 officers of the 64th were absent.
In 1844, 6 of the 23 officers of the 69th were absent.
In 1850, 8 of the 23 officers of the 66th were absent.
In 1852,11 of the 22 officers of the 38th were absent.
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As might have been expected with a mercenary army, 
questions of pay and allowances were often at the back of 
outbursts - and the sepoys on such matters were constantly 
given the worst sort of lead by their officers. The sepoy 
outbreak at Buxar followed directly upon the successful 
mutiny of the European troops there, and at a later date the 
series of memorials, and the formation of committees of 
protest by the officers of the Bengal native infantry, culmin­
ating in the attempted boycott of Bentinck when the officers1 
batta was cut, were a constant incitement to the sepoys to 
seek a remedy by similar methods. Unfortunately for the 
sepoys the active protest which secured partial remedies for 
the officers more often ended in punishment for them, even 
when the press showed itself sympathetic to their case.
Many observers pointed out that the sepoy served 
only for his pay - Badenach's comment that patriotism was 
entirely unknown and that its place was occupied for the 
sepoy by love of money was typical of many. It is striking 
then to note that the basic pay of the Bengal sepoy, which 
had been seven rupees a month in 1796 remained seven rupees 
until the end of our period. The question at once poses itself, 
was thxs reward, 84 rupees a year, still as great in compar­
ative terms at the end of the period as it obviously had 
been at the beginning, or was the increase in the number of 
mutinous outbreaks in the 40 *s and 50* s a sign that the sepoy 
was finding his pay less and less adequate?
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An analysis of the price of rice over the sixty years 
from 1796 onward would indicate that the cost of living did 
register an upward trend. The price of rice per maund had 
been twelve annas in 1790, it rose to one rupee four annas 
in 1804-05, and though it fell again to fifteen annas in 1813 
and even to eight annas in 1815 it rose steadily thereafter 
to one rupee two annas in 1828-29, one rupee seven annas in 
1832 and one rupee six annas in 1852. The average wage rates 
of a labourer or ploughman, in so far as they can be ascer­
tained, kept pace with the rise in the cost of the basic food 
stuffss a ploughman who had earned twenty two rupees a year 
in 1790-1800, received twenty-nine rupees in 1813 and thirty 
three rupees in 1830-31. It is true that in time of war the
Government did adopt measures to stabilise the price of food
1grains for the sepoy. But they were exceptional measures 
- and in any case took no account of the rising expenses of 
the sepoy's family. (To some degree the families in the 
villages, where they were engaged in agriculture, may have 
benefited from rising prices, of course). This gradual rise 
in the cost of living must have affected the sepoys in many 
ways, for not only were they nominally expected to feed them­
selves, but they had also to provide their own clothes, hire 
their own transport, build their own huts, and the rising
1. In 1847, when Hardinge reported that the sepoys were
suffering from the high price of grain, the Court allowed 
compensation to be paid whenever grain rose to more than 
three rupees eight annas a maund - that is to nearly five 
times the cost of rice in 1796, when the pay scales had 
been fixed.
G.O.G. G. 17 December 1847.
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grain prices were an element in the cost of all these.
One other point needs to he considered - the prices 
that have been quoted above were those prevailing in the 
settled provinces of Lower India. But more and more troops 
of the Bengal native infantry found themselves posted to up 
country stations, where peace was of recent introduction, and 
agriculture was less prosperous. The 34th spent three years 
in Bundelkhand and another in the Jungle Mahals, the 64th 
was at Ludhiana in 1843 and thereafter was ordered to Sind - 
these were peace time postings, but to areas where war and 
disturbance, and the natural poverty of semi-desert, still 
unirrigated areas with poor communications made rations 
expensive. When the 47th was ordered to Burma, the troops 
already in action were suffering heavily, not from enemy 
action, but from "the want of the simplest articles of diet." 
During the Afghan campaign, in 1839, atta was sold in the 
camp bazars at more than two rupees a maund. In 1845, at the 
time of the Sind mutinies the Delhi Gazette'1’ made it clear 
that it thought the sepoys claim for extra pay to cover the 
dearness of provisions in Sind was reasonable, and in 1850 
the Mofussilite condemned the army authorities for not
1. The Delhi Gazette pointed out that the sepoys being far 
from their Home s and paying at a high rate for all the 
necessaries of life "as Attah was 17"ir seers a rupee, fuel 
four maunds dal 13 seers, ghee 2 seers etc.", rightly 
felt that they would not be able to send as much as usual 
to their families.
Delhi Gazette 13 February 1850. quoted by Athenaeum 
~28IFe bruary 1850. 
x 40 seers = a maund, 1 seer = about 2 pounds.
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recognising that the high cost of grain in the Pan jab had 
made the sepoys' pay inadequate, if they were both to feed 
themselves and maintain their family remittances. The price 
of grain in the Panja-jtb was "almost as high as when they 
first crossed the Sutlej". The operations of the Sikh war 
had put a stop to all agricultural labourers and had ruined 
the standing crops of a great part of the country and 
accordingly "the bazaars of grain throughout the Panjab [were] 
mainly supplied from Rohilakhand and other equally distant 
parts." If seven rupees was no longer by 1852, very 
handsome pay in the old provinces of the Company, it was 
certainly too low in the vast new conquests made since the 
1830*s.
The extension of the Company's territory also imposed 
upon the sepoys ever larger marches at each new posting. These 
were not merely tedious, indeed worse than tedious in absurd 
uniforms and weighted down with clumsy equipment, but very 
expensive. The cost of carriage, as has been seen, fell upon 
the sepoy, not upon the army authorities. The 47th between 
1807 and 1811 had four changes of station. In 1814 it was 
called upon to march 500 miles from Barrackpore to Benares, 
in 1816 to march 300 miles to Binapore and again in 1818 to 
march a further 500 miles to Agra. The 66th in the seven years 
before it mutinied had moved 650 miles from Cawnpore to 
Barrackpore, another 350 miles into Arakan, a year later
The Mofussilite 8 February 1850.
over 700 miles back to Binap ore, and thereafter 400 miles to 
Lucknow and 500 miles to Govindgarh, The hard marching, with 
great expense for carriage cattle, with which the regiments 
were faced as the Belhi territories, the Panjab and Sind 
were added to the Company's possessions became a very potent 
source of distress and irritation, even when wretched com­
missariat arrangements had not broken down under the stress 
of war, as they had in 1824. When it is remembered that each 
change of cantonment also involved the sepoy in some expense 
for new hutting it seems remarkable that there were not more 
mutinies on the lines of that staged by the 47th.^
The extension of the Compaq's territories had 
other consequences also. One was that it became more difficult 
for the sepoys to secure or take leave, and that casual 
meeting with men from the village which had helped to main­
tain contact with families at home became less and less 
likely. The revival of opposition to sea voyages in the 
1820* s may have been caused in part by the experience of those 
troops sent to Java who had been promised an early return to 
India when the fighting was over, but found themselves in a 
prolonged and unwilling exile. Certainly one reason for the 
dislike of Sind service was that it cut men off from their 
homes, twelve hundred miles or more away in Oudh. That point
1. The petition which began the disturbances in the 64th had 
made much of the fact that the regiment had only been 
seven months in Ludhiana, after serving in Afghanistan, 
and yet was being* asked to move to Sind.
n
was clearly made in 1844 "by a writer to the Athenaeum.
The others more important, point was that every new 
conquest while it added to the expense of the sepoy curtailed 
his opportunity of earning extra allowances. No question so 
roused the feelings of the European officers of the Company 
as the reduction in their batta, and no question provoked 
so many mutinies among the sepoys. It is true that after 1837 
the marching batta of the Bengal native infantry was some­
what increased to bring it into line with the allowances 
granted to sepoys of the Madras and Bombay armies, but the 
loss of the allowance for service beyond the boimdaries of 
the Bengal Presidency which followed from the incorporation
of Sind and the Panjab as regular parts of that Presidency
2
far outweighed any benefits conferred. It was, indeed, 
difficult to dispute the logic of the sepoys of the 34th,
4th and 69th that if extra allowances had been needed by the 
troops serving before them in Sind, they, too, had themselves 
and their families to support. No condition had been altered 
- except the legal one of Sind's incorporation in the Bengal 
Presidency - why then should they be deprived by a stroke of 
the pen of benefits previously held to be necessary? To dis­
allow batta was a breach of faith. Indeed, so strong was
1. Chapter IV. p.
2. By a curious anomaly the allowance for service in Arakan 
and Bower Burma was continued after the conclusion of 
the first Burmese war.
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their argument that even the army administrators supported
them in their demand for the re intro duct ion of the withdrawn
facilities. The Commander-in-Chief with evident sympathy,
1
wrote to the Governor-General that Sind was "considered a
foreign country by the native troops and increased advantages
[were] given as an inducement to serve in that quarter; the
men [were] impressed with the conviction that they [were]
entitled to such and however erroneously they [looked] upon
the attempt, to withhold them [was] almost a breal^of faith
towards them on the part of the Government which they [had]
2
a right to resist."'
However, the very same issue, the withdrawal of 
allowances, was permitted to precipitate yet another crisis 
less than six years later. As if experience gained both by 
the Government and native regiments during the outbursts of 
1844- was of no avail and yet another explosive situation was 
created in 1849 by the adoption of almost parallel measures. 
After the successful conclusion of the Sikh wars, the Govern­
ment declared the newly annexed Panjab to be a province of 
the Bengal Presidency and promptly withdrew the foreign ser­
vice allowances enjoyed by the troops serving in that area*
1. Though the mutinous regiments did not raise the issue, 
Ellenborough believed that "fear of the Scinde fever" was 
responsible for much of the unrest, and the Commander-in- 
Chief obviously shared his view - witness his plea that 
the scheme of family pensions payable to the heirs of those 
dying of disease contracted in Sind should be continued, 
even though Sind was no longer on a war footing.
2. Adj.Genl. to Mily. Secy. Shahdera 26 February 1844*
Bengal Mily. Cons, a H<w<dv vaM .
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The sepoys, who argued that posted as they were far from home 
in a very costly country, it would he difficult for them to
subsist on their reduced pay, at once protested. They ex-
1claimed "etna tallab se pait naheen burraga" and asked
2if the soldiers were not fed, "how could they hear arms?"
Once again the injustice as well as the unwisdom of such 
curtailment of allowances was recognised hy the Commander-in- 
Ohief, hy the Home Authorities and hy many sections of the 
press. Once again, however the remedy adopted was force and 
punishment,
The remedy was inappropriate, the more so as it was 
very clear that the authorities hy their clumsy handling of 
the Sind and Pan j ah disturbances had much aggravated a 
difficult situation, A measure of economy of doubtful exped­
iency having been decided upon there had followed an extra­
ordinary series of blunders at every level. Orders had been 
inadequately explained, promises had been loosely made, or 
made without due authority, displays of conciliatoryness had 
alternated with ill-judged attempts at firmness. Even the
C o m  rr>t3 e . Y  C fo
highest authorities, the ^ -in- the Indian Government and 
the Home Government had been uncertain about how the pay 
scales had been arrived at, and were at odds with one another. 
The other permanent cause of disturbance was the 
caste feeling of the sepoys, and in particular the sepoys'
1, "This amount of pay will not fill our bellies."
2. Adj.Genl. to Maj . Genl. -St ihbe-rt. Lahore 8 December 1849«
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dislike of serving outside India and of sea voyages* After 
some initial success in securing volunteers, achieved "by 
taking great care over detail and exercising a patient con­
ciliatoryness, the fear of loss of caste re-emerged in 1824.
The court of enquiry upon the mutiny of the 47th made it clear
Lt ■
that one reason why the efforts of^Col* Cartwright failed was 
that the sepoys suspected that when the miserable bullocks 
he provided failed they would be compelled to continue by 
sea - a suspicion only strengthened by the threats of their 
Muslim Subadar-Major about the sea-voyage, In 1842 Pollock 
had much difficulty in inducing his sepoys to advance upon 
Kabul, the men of the 60th and 53rd saying that they would 
"not go to Cabul to be made Mussalmans of.1 In 1844 a 
writer to the Athenaeum pointed out that service in Sind 
a HtoMsstiflmm. was necessarily objectionable to Hindu sepoys.
The outburst in 1852, when the attempt was made to ship an 
entire regiment by sea to Rangoon, ought then to have been 
foreseen. The 38th had done "much good service in the Mysore 
and Candahar campaigns", yet still the men refused to pro­
ceed by sea, despite the very great persuasions and pressure 
of their officers. As Subadar-Major Meer Munsoor Ally told 
the Barrackpore court of enquiry, "the men positively set 
their faces against volunteering in spite of being offered 
the chance of enlisting as a marine battalion and thereby 
earning more money."'** The weight and reality of the menfs
1. Bengal Mily. Cons. 13 August 1852. No.60.
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religious scruples were made very obvious - and in 1852 the 
authorities showed that they recognised this hy the mildness 
of their punishment of the 38th. Yet in 1857? when those same 
scruples were again offended, there was, initially at least, 
a great readiness either to pooh-pooh or dismiss them, or to 
attempt to overcome them hy force.
A most striking feature of the sixty years that have 
heen reviewed is the absence of serious unrest in the Bengal 
native infantry before 1824, and the increasingly serious 
and frequent outbreaks after that year. By 1824 many of the 
grievances of the European officers had been redressed. After 
1824 the grievances of the sepoys, non-commissioned and 
commissioned native officers became more serious and received 
but scant attention.
The most important sources of discontent were 
financial. While the cost of living was rising, basic pay 
scales remained virtually unaltered, and the small additions 
for long service secured with such difficulty by Bentinck 
were swallowed up by the loss of batta. Before 1824 the army 
had been expanding rapidly, had .constantly been in action, 
and had spent much of its time on foreign service. Prospects 
of promotion were therefore good, there was official priae 
money to be hoped for and much opportunity for unofficial 
looting. The Mughal and Maratha tradition of the army living 
off the countryside as it advanced was not forgotten, and
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sepoys could hope to secure their food and firewood from the 
villages and so live more or less free of expense. But in the 
later years when the stability of the civil administration 
and the extent of the Company's territorial possessions had 
increased, the sepoys were deprived of these advantages. At 
the same time the opportunities for promotion were diminish­
ing - whence the large number of fit younger men who chose 
to leave after they had served out their fifteen years. Bor 
the European officer there were opportunities outside the 
regiment, in the political or civil lines, or in service with 
irregular corps. Bor the sepoy there were no such spur for 
ambition, though Malcolm in 1826 had urged that the sepoy 
"should be taught to look to meritorious services in the army 
as the road to employment under the civil administration of 
his native province * Even such honours as Bentinck did 
secure as outlets for ambition and zeal too often went to 
those whose main vent was found in the number of years they 
had quietly served.
If the financial advantages of military service under 
the Company were diminishing, so were the imponderable advan­
tages of prestige and social consideration. The hardening of 
the attitude of European officers towards their men has been 
sufficiently stressed already. But there was a similar change 
of attitude in officials outside the ranks of the army. The 
administration of the Company was steadily losing its military
1. Malcolm, op.cit., Vol.2, p.243*
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flavour - the revenue official, judge or civil engineere were 
coming into their own# These men were unwilling to accord to 
the sepoy the special privileges which he had once enjoyed;
the refusal "by magistrates automatically to give priority to 
the suit of a sepoy was a symptom of a wider change, visible 
also in the impatience expressed in the press at the religious 
scruples or even the pride of the native infantry.
In his own community, too, the sepoy or subadar was 
no Donger so important a figure. New classes in Indian society 
were achieving importance, western educated men for whom the 
government was finding increasing scope in its administration. 
As has been seen the comparisons did not fall to be drawn 
between the pay and prospects of a subadar and those of a 
tahsildar or munsif. Moreover the army as a whole had lost 
some of the glamour born of almost unbroken success. The 
campaigns in Burma in 1 8 2 in Afghanistan in l83^y&nd iu the 
Panjab wa< against the Sikhs had been very hard fought, the 
outcome often uncertain, and occasionally disastrous. The 
institution of subadar majorships, the meagre awards of the 
Order of Merit or Order of British India did not adequately 
compensate for lost glory. Service in the Bengal native 
infantry was neither as financially rewarding, nor as satisfy­
ing socially in the thirties, forties and fifties as it had 
been in the first half c-f our period.
The Indian Government refused, however, to admit the 
deterioration - or if mutiny and constant press discussion
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of what was wrong made thorn admit that something was amiss, 
refused to take any effective steps to redress grievances and 
restore hope. Schemes for training cadets were dropped, though 
admonitions ahout considerate treatment of the sepoy went out 
in plenty. The number of officers with their regiments was 
allowed steadily to decline. The effective pay of the sepoy 
was not even made to match the general rise in prices, 
honorary awards were granted with a grudging hand. The lesson 
of mutiny after mutiny went unlearnt, the information from
i
courts of enquiry went unutilised until in 1857 the whole 
rigid, clumsy out-dated machine of the Bengal native army, 
after nearly destroying those who directed it, destroyed 
itself.
APPENDIX A
Review Roll of recruits entertained for the 1st "battalion 
1st regiment native infantry, by - - in the district of 
Buxar, in the months of April and May, 1800.
Barrackpore, 31st May 1800
No. Names Remarks
Heera Loll 
G-onga Sing 
Sheik Ramjhan - 
Eyzoolah Khan - 
Munsa Ram
Beny Sing 
Heera Sing 
Rundeer Sing -
entertained 15th April 
" 20th "
" 25 th 51
» 30th "
" 1st May
M 29th April
" 29th "
" 1st May
Approved by 
me -
this 31st May 
1800.
A.B. Lt.-Col, 
Commanding 
1st regiment.
Rejected as 
unfit for the 
service.
' A.B.Lt. 
Colonel Com­
manding 1st 
regiment.
Doondee Khan
Saidut Ally
Burjoo Sing
" 16 th April
deserted 8th May
- entertained 20th April 
died 25th May
C.D.
Recruiting
Officer.
The above table is taken from 8 August 1796. Carroll's
Bengal Code 1817. Sec. XVII.
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Declaration on oath by recruits at their enrolment*
"I, A. B* inhabitant of  village, ---
Pergunnah,  Subah, son of ---, do swear that
I will never forsake or abandon my colours; that 
I will march wherever I am directed, whether within 
or beyond the Company's territory, that I will 
implicitly obey all the orders of my Commanders, and 
in everything behave myself as becomes a good 
soldier and a faithful servant of the Company; and 
failing in any part of my duty, as such I will 
submit to the penalties described in the Articles 
of War which have been read to me*5'
1. C. 8 August 1796, G-race Bengal Regulation 1799, p. 10, 
Carroll's Bengal Code 1817, Sec,XLI, Standing Orders in 
Bengal regiment 1852, p. 104.-
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APPENDIX D.
Statistical returns of -prices and wage rates in 
Bengal Presidency, (1790-1852)#
In converting English into Indian prices, the follow­
ing established rules have been followed:
Previous to 1828-29 the sicca rupee was converted to 
the current rupee by the addition of 1 6 ^  batta and the 
current was reckoned at two shillings. Hence, one sicca rupee 
was equivalent to 2 shillings^ pence. Prom 1836-37, when 
the Companyjwas ordered to be taken as current, it was laid 
down that 16 Company rupees were equal to 15 sicca rupees, 
the sicca rupee being valued at two shillings. The Indian
i
maund was to the Cwt. as 36 to 49 , i.e. 82 lbs.
A. Price Schedule.
1, Rice (Coarse)  ^
Year. Price per cwt. Remarks .
Conversion. 
Price in Sicca
rupee per maund
s o d. ix 4 m- A. - P*
1792. - 0 - 5 - 0 - Pamine year i - 10 - 0
1813 - 3 - £ average price 15 - 0
1832 -Prom
to
3 “11 
3 - 9* - average price i - 7 - 0
1852 -Prom
to
3 " 9 
3 - 8-1- average price 1 1 6 - 0
1, P.P. 1852-53? (362), XXI, H.L.p.l. 
2c P.P. 1852-53, (362), XXI, H.L. p.l.
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2. Rice (Medium).
Year Price in sicca per maund
R A P
1790-1800 — 0 12
0 )
1804- 05 — 1 4 0 ( ■ 1
1815-16 - 0 8 0 1
1828-29 Prom 1 0
^ \ % Z.
to 1 4 0 )
To summarise the combined price variation tables for coarse
and medium quality rice per maund in sicca rupees s
1790 - 1800 1804-05 1813 1815-16
R. A. P. R. A. P. R. A. P. R. A. P.
0-12 -0 1- 4- 0 0-15- 0 0 - 8 - 0
1828-29 1832 1852
R. A. P. R. A. P. - R. A. P.
1- 2- 0 1- 7- 0 1 - 6 - 0
B« Wage rates;
Before 1852, as was reported in the House of Lords 
there were "no periodical reports of the wages of rural labour 
or of the wages of day labourers, but the subjoined particu­
lars1 were "furnished as a partial return to the present 
r e q u i s i t i o n . T h e  following figures had been collected from
1* W. Hamilton - A geographical, statistical and historical 
description of Hindustan and the adjoinih^^^iintries. 
Vol.II, pp.35? 39 and 40.
2, Bengal Commercial report 1828-29. p.14.
3. P.P. 1852-53? (362), XXI, H.L. p.2.
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W.J.Bayley, Judge-Magistrate of Burdwar and from the Pro­
ceedings of the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium at Calcutta. 
1. Ploughman.
Region Wages per annum in Sicca rupee.
Dinaj^pur 4-
Backer - 
gunje
24 Par- 
ganas
Murshi-
dahad.
1790-91 1813 1830 - 31
With food 
and 
raiment
Without 
food and 
raiment
Without 
food and 
raiment
With food 
and 
raiment
Without 
food and 
raiment
R. A. P. R * A • P • R. A. P R. A. P R. A .
0101 12-0- 0 24- 0-
0101CTi 18- 0- 0 18-0- 0 36- 0-
12- 0- 0 25-12- 0 29- 0- 0 35- 8-
to 
41- 8
12- 0- 0
•
|
12- 0- 0 
to
24- 0- 0
The above figures averaged yield the following wage rates, 
Year
(With food and raiment)
(Without food and raiment).
( n (f it it  ^^
(With food and raiment)
(Without food and raiment).
1790-91
1813
1830-31
Rs. 9 - 4 - 0  
Rs.21 -ljk - 0
Rsv29 - 0 - 0 
Rs.16 - 0 - 0 
Rs.32 -14 - 0
1. P.P. 1852-53, XXI, (362), H.I. p.3-
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20 Coolie (Labourer)*
Region Wages, per anuum in Sicca rupee*
1790- 91
With food 
and 
raiment
R. A. P.
Lina;) pur
Backer-
gunje
24 Par- 
ganas
Murshi-
dabad
9 - 0 - 0
Without 
food and 
raiment
R. A, P
2 2 - 8 - 0
1 8 - 0 - 0
2 4 - 0 - 0
14 —0 —  0
1803-04
Without 
food and 
raiment
R. A. P
1830 - 31
With food 
and 
raiment
R. A* P.
45 -
L8 - 0 - 0 36 -
Without 
food and 
raiment
R. A. P
3 0 - 0 - 0
!2 -0 -  0
45 -
45 -
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
■0
The average wage for a coolie per annum was 
Year
1790-91
1803-04 - 
1830-31 |
J
Rs. 11 
Es, 2% 
Rs. 30 
Rs. 20 
Rs. 42
-  8
- v
- o
- o
0
0
0
0
0
With food and raiment. 
Without food and raiment.
t it
With food and raiment. 
Without food and raiment.
1, P.P. 1852-53, XXI, (362), H.L. p.3.
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prices, the basic pay of the sepoy remained at Rs. 7 through­
out the period.
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